O'Sullivan v Department of Natural Resources and Mines - [2002] QLC 70

LAND COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION: O'Sullivan v Department of Natural Resources and Mines [2002] QLC 0070

PARTIES: Robin A O'Sullivan
(applicant)
v
Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines

(respondent)

FILE NO: AV2000/0318

DIVISION: Land Court of Queensland

PROCEEDING: Appeal against an Annual Valuation

DELIVERED ON: 5 September 2002

DELIVERED AT: Brisbane

HEARD AT: Brisbane

MEMBER: Mr RP Scott

ORDER: The appeal is allowed, the valuation of the respondent is set aside and the unimproved value of Lot 2 on Registered Plan 11158 is determined at Two Hundred and Forty-one Thousand Six Hundred Dollars ($241,600).

CATCHWORDS: Statutory Valuation – heritage listing (Local Government) – use not diminished – restriction on development.

[33] [37]

Statutory Valuation – use of sale price not unimproved value.

[22] [23] [24]

Valuation – after date sales – acceptable.

[16]

APPEARANCES: Mr DF O'Sullivan for the applicant
Mr K Fisher, Crown Law, for the respondent

The applicant owns a property described as Lot 2 on Registered Plan 11158, Parish of South Brisbane, County of Stanley, which was valued by the respondent Chief Executive at $247,500 pursuant to the provisions of the Valuation of Land Act 1944 as at a relevant date of 1 October 1999. The applicant lodged an objection with the respondent concerning that valuation and, being dissatisfied with the outcome of that objection, has appealed to this Court.
The applicant was represented by Dermott Francis O'Sullivan, her husband, who gave evidence in support of the appeal. Valuation evidence for the Chief Executive was given by Arend Boudewyn Van Hees, a registered valuer.
The subject property is located at 199 Boundary Street in the suburb of West End and is situated approximately 3 km south-west of the Brisbane Central Business District. West End is an inner suburb of Brisbane being one of the earliest developed on the southern side of the Brisbane River. Boundary Street is a significant commercial street in the West End business area.
The subject property has an area of 233 metres and consequently has a narrow frontage to Boundary Street from which vehicular access may not readily be obtained. Boundary Street is bitumen sealed with concrete kerbing and channeling and there are bitumen sealed footpaths provided. The subject property enjoys the usual services. The land is rectangular in shape, excepting for the addition of a small triangular piece to the rear of the land designed to accommodate an access easement which services the subject property and other properties nearby. The land is zoned "Business" under the Town Plan for the City of Brisbane gazetted in 1987 and effective at the date of valuation. There is on the land a two-storey commercial building with a shop at street level, which has been used as a newsagency for many years. The building was constructed in 1891, according to Mr O'Sullivan. It has an awning over the footpath at its front and is adorned with wrought-iron lacework along the façade of the upper level verandah. It has a timber floor over timber stumps. These features give the property an historical attraction which was recognised by the Brisbane City Council and which I discuss further below.
Mr Van Hees valued the subject property by reference to property sales in the vicinity and struck a figure of $310,000 ($1,330 per m²). He discounted that "start point" figure by 20%, according to him, to arrive at $247,500 ($1,062 per m²) having regard to the restrictions that are imposed on the property owing to its listing, he said, under the Heritage Register Planning Scheme Policy of the City Council. I calculate the discount to be slightly greater than 20% but nothing turns on that difference.
The appeal by the property owner may be reduced to two central points:
1.The figure of $1,330 per m² is too high as a "start point".
2.The 20% discount does not sufficiently reflect the restrictions of the heritage listing.

I will consider these points in this order and in so doing will first deal with some features of the subject property raised before me in debate.
In his valuation report Mr Van Hees said, "The land is slightly above street level, well drained and level." Mr O'Sullivan took issue with that description saying that the land was not above street level, but was slightly below street level at its frontage, then slopes away by nearly 2 metres into a depression towards the back of the block. He said that the back of the land was once a gully or natural watercourse and is now filled. The property is, he said, located on the course of natural drainage from the northern slopes of the Hill End area, then down Boundary Street, Melbourne Street and onto the river. Mr Van Hees conceded that as an appropriate description of the land.
More to the point, however, is the evidence from Mr O'Sullivan as to the subject land being inundated in April 1989, such that trading stock was damaged. Whilst Mr O'Sullivan was of the view that the flooding did not result from a blocked drain, there was evidence from Mr Van Hees that a subsequent flood event in March 2000 which was of a higher level than the 1989 event, did not inundate the subject property, therefore suggesting that the 1989 inundation resulted at least in part from a blocked or impeded drain. Whilst that may well be the case, it seems to me that the presence of a natural watercourse/gully, if the land is viewed as it ought to be in an unimproved state, indicates that the subject property places great reliance on the adequacy and efficient operation of the drainage system. That compared with an otherwise well drained property is in itself a negative feature of the land.
Vehicular access to the subject property is gained via an easement which services the land at its rear and provides access to and egress from Thomas Street. Mr O'Sullivan referred to various disagreements between parties who use that easement and to the practical difficulties in utilizing the easement for access to the subject property. No mention is made in Mr Van Hees' valuation report of the easement access, nor was Mr O'Sullivan's evidence with respect to the easement challenged.
In his valuation Mr Van Hees relied on three sales. Sale 1 is located at 81 Boundary Street, South Brisbane, has an area of 556 m² and sold on 5 September 1997 for $660,000 ($1,187 per m²). The land was redeveloped following sale by the construction of a bank building, which in due course was occupied by the bank that had previously been located in the building on the land which is the subject of Sale 3 in Mr Van Hees' valuation. The sale was applied by the Chief Executive at $1,061 per m². I note that the sale land is well drained and level and has good street exposure, being located at the intersection of Mollison, Boundary, Browning and Melbourne Streets, near what was at the time of sale a roundabout. The sale property is of a regular shape with a frontage of 38 metres and an average depth of 15 metres, has access from Mollison Street and is surrounded by a mix of business and multi-unit development. Much of that development was being carried out by the purchaser who gained the advantage of being able to demolish the old service station that had been located on the sale land and to carry out a development on the sale property in concert with its nearby development. As such, there is an adjacency factor in the sale that needs to be taken into account, though it would probably not comprise a substantial amount as the property was sold at public auction. Whilst the adjacency factor did not receive mention in Mr Van Hees' valuation report he said that the applied value of $1,061 per m² reflected some allowance for this factor.
Mr Van Hees expressed the view that the Sale 1 property and the subject were comparable with the sale property having superior street exposure, though inferior pedestrian access and inferior location and a larger size than the subject land. In so far as size is concerned, he expressed a view commonly heard in this Court that the per m² value of commercial properties is generally higher the smaller the size. A comparison of the three sales points quite clearly to the fact that there is an inverse relationship between size and price per unit area.
Mr O'Sullivan said that the Sale 1 property is in an area of West End that may have historically been less attractive than the area of the subject property for eatery/retail development, but that in recent years there has been an increase in activity in the area of Sale 1. I should mention that Sale 2 should be regarded as being in the same area as Sale 1. There are presently three banks in this area and there are substantial developments for multi-unit residential purposes. My appreciation of the evidence is that whilst Mr O'Sullivan's thesis is more readily demonstrated today, it seems to be the case that at the relevant valuation date a high level of commercial interest was evident in the area of the subject property, though the revitalisation of the area of Sales 1 and 2 was apparent. Mr O'Sullivan referred to a number of vacancies in the vicinity of the subject land which are evident at the present time. There may be any number of explanations for such vacancies, however this evidence and the evidence generally does not lead me to conclude that as at 1 October 1999 the prospect of an emergence of commercial activity in the area of Sales 1 and 2 was such that it heralded a palpable decline in the attraction of the area of the subject property. The area of the subject land at the relevant date was one which still attracted people to its small businesses.
Sale 2 in Mr Van Hees' valuation is at 53 Mollison Street, South Brisbane. The sale property has an area of 304 m², was sold on 20 April 2000 for a price of $480,000 which included, in Mr Van Hees' opinion, improvements valued at $60,000. Mr Van Hees said that the Chief Executive's statutory valuation of the sale property was $380,000 ($1,250 per m²), a figure which includes a 5% discount attributed to the listing of the sale land as a Commercial Character Building by the Brisbane City Council in accordance with its Heritage Register Planning Scheme Policy. Mr Van Hees described the sale land as being well drained and level and having access to Mollison Street. He said that the sale land comprises a larger block with a wider frontage than the subject but is in an inferior location, having regard to his opinion that at the relevant valuation date properties at the Vulture Street end of Boundary Street were more attractive than those at the Mollison Street end and to the fact that the subject enjoys more prominent exposure than this sale. There had been an old gun shop located on the sale land and this was converted into a coffee shop business though, given its Commercial Character listing, the developer was required to preserve the street frontage features of the building.
The third sale property in Mr Van Hees' valuation is located at 132 Boundary Street, West End, has an area of 405 m² and sold on 3 March 2000 for $960,000. The sale property was at the time of sale improved with a building that had been used as a bank. Mr Van Hees estimated a value of $440,000 for the improvements, yielding an analysed price of $520,000, whilst the unimproved value applied to the land was $465,000 or $1,148 per m². The sale property is in a slightly inferior location to the subject, according to Mr Van Hees, in that coffee shops and fashion outlets show a preference for the western side of the street, which is shielded from the afternoon sun. Mr O'Sullivan referred to a coffee shop/café developed on the eastern side of the street as indicating that such businesses were not exclusively located on the western side, though the weight of evidence appears to me to support the view put by Mr Van Hees, particularly as I note that he refers to the difference as being slight only.
Mr O'Sullivan was critical of the sales relied upon by the Chief Executive in that he observed that Sales 2 and 3 in Mr Van Hees' valuation took place after the relevant date for valuation purposes. Now whilst it is preferable to have sales which take place on or just prior to the date for valuation, sales which take place after that date are admissible as long as the evidence does not reveal some event which would render the post-date sales inappropriate for comparison purposes (McCathie v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1944) 69 CLR 1 relying on Daandine Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Land Tax, unreported). I have no evidence to show that during the short period between the relevant valuation date and the dates of sales numbered 2 and 3 an event or events took place which would lead to my rejection of those sales. I acknowledge that there has been a move in focus towards the northern end of Boundary Street in the vicinity of Sale 2, however that change does not appear to have taken place other than in a gradual way over time. It is not an event attributable to the period between the date for valuation and the date of the respective sales.
The precise manner in which Mr Van Hees has utilised his sales evidence is somewhat masked by the fact that he has presented his comparisons on an overall basis, that is both taking into account the relevant features of the comparisons and on the basis that the subject property is listed as a heritage property. Where he concludes, for example, that Sale 1 (at $1,061 per m²) is "comparable" to the subject property and he places a value of $1,062 per m² net on the subject property, he is saying, as I understand him, that his value takes into account all relevant aspects including the heritage listing. Indeed, he points out in his comparisons between Sales 1 and 3 and the subject property on pages 3 and 4 of his valuation report that the factor of the listing is taken into account in the overall comparison. I will come to Sale 2 shortly.
If I continue with my Sale 1 example, it seems to me that his comparison with Sale 1, absent the heritage listing, leads to a conclusion that the "start point" value of the subject land is $1,330 per m². That is, the sale in his comparison has superior exposure, but has an inferior location and a larger size, the last two points depressing the price per m² compared with the subject property, with the first point concerning exposure enlarging the price.
A similar approach to the above paragraph reveals that the subject property (absent the heritage listing) would in comparison with the Sale 3 property have a value of $1,435 per m², if the sale is applied directly; that is, before adjustments are made. The sale land is larger in size and, according to Mr Van Hees, has a "slightly inferior location". It seems that these factors led to a conclusion that the subject property has a value of $1,330 per m², that is this value is after adjustment most influenced by the relative size differential. Other factors which need to be taken into account in the comparison are the superior access on the sale property and that it is well drained and level. If I accept Mr Van Hees' initial comparison, it seems to me that some further downward adjustment of his "start point" value, based on this sale considered alone, is warranted. Otherwise his comparison appears valid.
Mr Van Hees said that in the applied value of $1,250 per m² for his Sale 2 he allowed 5% for the fact that this property is listed as a Commercial Character Building. I understand this to mean that the applied value of $1,250 per m² is a figure which is 95% of what the figure would have been (that is $1,315 per m²) had it not been so listed. It is that higher figure, therefore, that should be taken into consideration in placing the "start point" value on the subject property. Without adjustments the "start point" value of the subject property would be $1,643 per m²; that is $1,315 ÷ 80%. Mr Van Hees' "start point" value of $1,330 per m² for the subject, based on that figure of $1,643 per m², seems low given that he said that Sale 2 is less well located than the subject and larger in size, though it is not greatly larger compared with the difference between the subject property and Sale 3. I have no evidence concerning the access available to the Sale 2 land, though note that it has a larger frontage than the subject property and that it is "well drained and level", according to Mr Van Hees. A comparison between this sale and the subject land employing the figure of $1,643 per m² would appear to more than support Mr Van Hees' conclusion of $1,330 per m² based on his points of comparison. I note, however, that Sale 2 took place at a time well after the date of Sale 1 and after the evidence of a revitalisation of the area of these sales became apparent. I also note that Sale 2 took place after Sale 3 and that whilst the purchases were by different companies the same principal was involved. It would not be beyond reason to infer that the purchaser of Sale 2 was aware that the bank would be moving in across the road onto the Sale 1 land – supplying a source of customers for the coffee shop, which was developed on the Sale 2 land in due course. In short, the sale price of Sale 2 might well have included a specific locational factor. It is wise, therefore, to place a lessened reliance on that sale.
In applying Mr Van Hees' Sales 1 and 3 I need to take into account the disabilities of the subject property not referred to in Mr Van Hees' valuation namely the easement access and the topography/drainage. When I draw these two features into the comparison, it is clear that there needs to be some reduction of his "start point" value of $1,330 per m². Whilst the disabilities are real, they are not of a nature that requires a substantial reduction in value. I settle on an overall figure of $302,000 as adequately catering for all of the advantages and disabilities of the subject land referred to in evidence, apart from the heritage aspect. I now turn to Mr O'Sullivan's valuation evidence to see whether it challenges this conclusion.
Mr O'Sullivan included two sales in his evidence. The first was a sale at 179 Boundary Street of a property comprising two lots totalling 946 m² which sold, as I understand it, a short period prior to 1 October 1999, however no actual sale date was provided. Mr O'Sullivan did not provide details of the sale price of this property, but referred to its "unimproved value" which was $845.66 per m² according to him at the time of the sale. I can only conclude that this "unimproved value" was the statutory value applied to the property by the Chief Executive on a date prior to 1 October 1999.
Reference to this transaction is of no assistance to me. The process of valuation in a case such as this is one of first taking the sale price, then comparing the sale property with the property being valued in such a way that material factors are taken into account. Those material factors such as location, size, zoning and so on will often lead the valuer to make adjustments of the sale price in arriving at a value for the property being valued. A range of comparable sales gives greater certainty to the level of adjustments. Utilising the unimproved value instead of the sale price does not provide any validity to the sales transaction as a basis for valuation. Apart from that I could not extract from the evidence a suitable comparison between this "sale" and the subject property.
The second sale referred to by Mr O'Sullivan was of a property at 164 Boundary Street having an area of 1,619 m² which sold for $1,350,000. This sale took place on 1 February 1999 to an adjoining owner who apparently intended to develop the property in concert with his adjoining business. An approval for the development of a commercial building was obtained following sale. The Kurilpa Child Care Centre was located on the sale land at the time of sale, however the improvements associated with that were demolished following sale. I have no evidence as to whether the demolition costs exceeded any scrap value in the materials generated, however it is clearly the case that the structures on the land at the time of sale added little or no value to the land value. Mr O'Sullivan placed no reliance on an analysed sale price, but referred to the unimproved value of $679 per m². This transaction therefore attracts the same criticisms that attach to his first sale.

Mr O'Sullivan did not provide a comparison between his second sale and the subject property, however there are two significant features of that property which invite mention. First, the property, whilst in reasonable proximity to the subject, is located on the fringe of the commercial activity of Boundary Street, as I understand the evidence. In short, its location is inferior to the subject, even though it is located opposite a well-patronised restaurant, the "Coffee Club". Second, it is a substantially larger property to the extent that it is in a different class from the subject in my view. Indeed its price confirms that it does not constitute a good basis for valuing the subject property in that it is well removed from the value of the subject property suggested by either party. To the extent that a comparison can be made between this sale and the subject property, the sale would indicate a value well below the value that ought to be placed on the subject as a "start point" value.
Mr O'Sullivan's suggested value of the subject property as a "start point" value was based on the proposition that the value lay between $845.66 per m² and $679 per m², that is between the unimproved values of his two "sales". It is clear from what I have said in para [23] about the appropriate valuation process that the method presented by Mr O'Sullivan cannot be accepted.
In the notice of appeal the applicant provided an estimate of value of $98,034. That figure was calculated by employing the unimproved value of the land at March 1992, then increasing that by the factor of the Consumer Price All Groups Index up to the relevant valuation date. That is not an acceptable method of valuation (Tow v The Valuer-General (1978) 5 QLCR 378, 381).
In his valuation report Mr Van Hees said that the subject property is listed on the Brisbane City Council Heritage Register Planning Scheme Policy as a Commercial Character Building. It was the restrictions which such a listing imposed on the subject property that led Mr Van Hees to apply a discount of 20% to the "start point" value that he had found. He did not supply evidence in the form of any statutory or town planning requirements that would apply to a property listed as a Commercial Character Building, but appears to have adopted a 20% discount based on his appreciation of the type of restrictions that he understood would apply.
Notwithstanding his assertion that the subject property is listed as a Commercial Character Building, Mr Van Hees provided a copy of Appendix 2, page 93 of the Brisbane City Plan 2000, Volume 2, headed "Heritage Register Planning Scheme Policy" and which says in part "contains a register of Heritage Places" to which the Heritage Place Code applies. He further supplied page 111C of Appendix 2 of Brisbane City Plan 2000, Volume 2, which listed the subject property, along with a number of other properties, as a Heritage Place. I note that this page includes the words "amended 1 July 2000" (almost three years after the valuation date), but have no evidence as to what amendments were made to the list after 1 October 1999, assuming that such a list did exist at that date.
I was provided with no evidence to indicate that a Commercial Character Building would be treated for town planning purposes in a similar manner to a Heritage Place. Nevertheless, Mr Van Hees gave evidence that a discount of 20% would apply to the subject property whether the listing was as a Heritage Place or as a Commercial Character Building.
Mr O'Sullivan said that the subject property was registered as a Heritage Place No. 43 in 1992, but did not produce a copy of the relevant part or parts of the Register revealing that information. Nevertheless, I accept that evidence.
It will be useful to refer to the approach that should be adopted in cases such as this. Assistance is provided by Shara Pty Ltd v Chief Executive, Department of Lands (1996-97) 16 QLCR 340, a case involving a property listed pursuant to the Queensland Heritage Act 1992. At pp.343-344 of the reported decision the Court said:
" The key question then that one must ask in approaching a valuation of this type is whether the listing has had some limiting effect on what I will call the 'unaffected highest and best use', that is the use that would have been possible but for the listing. It seems to me that the impact of the statutory limitations could occur in one of two ways. The first would be, as was the case in the Ballow Chambers matter, that the unaffected highest and best use is unable to be achieved by virtue of the limitations of the listing, and that some lesser use would constitute the highest and best use for valuation purposes (the 'affected highest and best use'). The second possibility is that the unaffected highest and best use may be achievable, but the convenience or security of continued operations may be affected or perceived to be affected by the statutory constraints. Let me call this the 'inconvenience factor'. It may, of course, be possible for the inconvenience factor to have an impact on the affected highest and best use. It is by no means the case, however, that the listing of a property would always bring with it a reduction in its value. Indeed, there may be cases where heritage listing could be capitalised on in the marketplace.
Given what I have said here, it would not be appropriate to value land on the basis of a use that would be unavailable, having regard to the effect of the statutory constraints, and then to discount that valuation in some way. Such an approach would be akin, for example, to valuing land as a multi-storey office building site then discounting the value so deduced because the local authority zoning was in fact residential. The correct approach is to value the land based on a highest and best use which is consistent with the constraints imposed by the listing and to then consider whether the use so ascertained might be affected by any, if any, inconvenience factor."
Mr O'Sullivan was critical of Mr Van Hees' valuation where he said, "As vacant land the appeal property is subject to the same development requirements as apply to the sale properties". Mr Van Hees has not, however, valued the subject property on the basis that it could in fact be developed for commercial purposes in a similar manner to his Sales 1 and 3, but has properly been guided by the requirement to take into account the heritage restrictions (see Ballow Chambers Ltd v. Valuer-General (1992-93) 14 QLCR 422.
In his valuation Mr Van Hees said, "The heritage restrictions imposed on the subject land by the Brisbane City Council Heritage Register do not prevent the land being used for commercial purposes." No complaint was raised by the appellant with respect to this proposition which, placed in context, is consistent with the approach endorsed in Shara. The complaint is with respect to the 20% allowance for the "inconvenience factor", Mr O'Sullivan suggesting that an allowance of 30% would be more appropriate.
In support of this suggestion Mr O'Sullivan referred to three matters. First, he said that any building alterations or refurbishment would be expensive because of the need to utilise selected materials and to employ appropriate artisans. He gave evidence of an adjoining owner, a pharmacist, who had spent, according to Mr O'Sullivan, about $1,000,000 in carrying out renovations, the suggestion being that for an unlisted property equally effective renovations could have been carried out less expensively. Whilst no conclusion of a proportionate nature may be drawn, I can easily accept Mr O'Sullivan's broad proposition. Equally, I can accept the proposition of the respondent that expenditure of the order undertaken may be assumed to have constituted an acceptable investment.
Second, he provided evidence that Brisbane City Council had required the removal of signage at the front of the newsagency on the subject property on the basis that it did not "fit into the visual and historical context of the building". Notwithstanding the fact that the Council had not yet moved to enforce this requirement, it is clearly the case that the mere existence of the requirement comprises an inconvenience or a matter of concern to the tenant and, therefore, to the owner. Third, Mr O'Sullivan provided a copy of pages 89 to 93 of Brisbane City Plan 2000 Volume 1 entitled "Heritage Place Code" which said in part, "This Code will apply in assessing building work (including demolition) subdivision or operational work on a premises that includes a Heritage Place or on a premises adjoining a Heritage Place". The Code provides for "Code Assessment" for what I will call minor works and "Impact Assessment" for more significant works. The purpose of the Code is to "ensure that development does not detract from the cultural heritage significance of the heritage place".
I understand from Mr O'Sullivan's evidence that the cultural heritage significance of the subject property particularly lies in the front part of the building structure, that is the awning and the iron lacework. He also mentioned the timber floor and Mr Van Hees made particular mention of the verandah. Clearly, preservation of these features would involve greater expense during any development or refurbishment than would be the case if the owner had open slather.
Notwithstanding what I have said to this point on this issue, it seems to me that the issue of the restrictions that might be imposed on a Heritage Place for any particular development, minor or major, is best characterised as comprising a risk factor or a burden that runs with the land. The precise impact of that risk factor or burden turns on the nature of any development or refurbishment that might be proposed. The specific impact of the heritage restriction would turn very much on the nature of any proposed development and the role that the need to preserve the heritage features of the property plays in such a development. It follows that some broad allowance should be made when considering the question of unimproved value, but bearing in mind that notwithstanding the heritage restrictions the property can still be used for commercial purposes.
I have concluded on the evidence that I heard that an allowance of 20% is not inappropriate. Whilst Mr Van Hees' opinion that such an allowance should apply appears to have originally been based on a confused understanding of the heritage status of the property, this does not mean that it is a wrong allowance. It is one that he adhered to after a consideration of Mr O'Sullivan's evidence. On the other hand, Mr O'Sullivan did not convince me that an allowance approaching 30% ought to apply. I acknowledge that in the final analysis the allowance to be made is one that must be based on judgment and not one that can be justified by reference to some form of mathematical analysis. However the appellant has not adduced evidence which convinces me that any allowance greater than 20% ought to be allowed.
I was referred by the respondent to the decision of my brother Member, Dr Divett, in Uniacke Pty Ltd v. Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources and Mines [2002] QLC, 6 August 2002, in support of the 20% allowance that I have settled on. I should record that I place no reliance on that case in drawing my conclusion. There are two reasons for this. First, Dr Divett said at para [38], "In the absence of any other estimate by the appellant of the impact of heritage restrictions on the value of the land, I will accept Mr Van Hees' estimate of 20% reduction for that purpose". That does not comprise a clear endorsement of the adoption of a 20% rate. Second, a conclusion as to the level of discount for any "inconvenience factor" is a question of fact that needs to be decided, having regard to the evidence of each individual case. I should also mention that I have placed some reliance on the evidence from Mr Van Hees that he had allowed a 5% allowance only with respect to the heritage listing of his Sale 2 property. Only limited comparison was made between the heritage features of this property and the subject, but such comparison as there was suggests to me that a greater discount than 5% should be made to the subject property's "start point" value.

In summary, I conclude that the subject property ought to be valued on the basis that it has a "start point" value of $302,000 discounted by 20% to reflect the heritage listing of the property. Accordingly, I will allow the appeal and determine the value of the subject property at $241,600.

RP SCOTT
MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT