FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
O’Halloran v Wood [2003] FCA 854
JUSTIN JAMES O’HALLORAN v PETER WOOD, who is sued in his capacity as the delegate of DAVID KNOTT in his capacity as Chairman of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission -and- AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENT COMMISSION
S 481 of 2003
SELWAY J
15 AUGUST 2003
ADELAIDE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
S 481 OF 2003
BETWEEN:
JUSTIN JAMES O’HALLORAN
APPLICANTAND:
PETER WOOD, who is sued in his capacity as the delegate of DAVID KNOTT in his capacity as Chairman of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission
FIRST RESPONDENTAUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENT COMMISSION
SECOND RESPONDENTJUDGE:
SELWAY
DATE OF ORDER:
15 AUGUST 2003
WHERE MADE:
ADELAIDE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Court has no jurisdiction to review the decision of the first respondent referred to in par 1 of the Application for an Order of Review filed herein.
2.The application by the applicant for an interlocutory injunction contained in par 4 of the Notice of Motion herein dated 30 June 2003 be dismissed.
3.The applicant shall pay the respondent’s costs of the Notice of Objection to Competency herein dated 11 June 2003 and of the Notice of Motion herein dated 30 June 2003, such costs to be taxed in the absence of agreement.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
S 481 OF 2003
BETWEEN:
JUSTIN JAMES O’HALLORAN
APPLICANTAND:
PETER WOOD, who is sued in his capacity as the delegate of DAVID KNOTT in his capacity as Chairman of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission
FIRST RESPONDENTAUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENT COMMISSION
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
SELWAY J
DATE:
15 AUGUST 2003
PLACE:
ADELAIDE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
There are two issues dealt with in these reasons. The first is whether this Court has jurisdiction under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (‘the Act’) to review a decision made under a certified agreement. For the reasons given below that question is answered no. The second is whether an interlocutory injunction should be made restraining the respondents from filling the vacancy caused by the dismissal of the applicant from his employment with the Commonwealth under the Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) (‘PS Act’). For the reasons given below the answer to that question is also no.
On 4 October 2002, the first respondent determined that the applicant was declared ‘excess’ (‘the first decision’). The parties are agreed that the power exercised by the first respondent in declaring the applicant to be excess was cl 46.5 of the Australian Securities & Investments Commission Certified Agreement 2001-2003 (‘the Certified Agreement’).
On 4 April 2003, the second respondent terminated the employment of the applicant (‘the second decision’). The parties are not in agreement as to the source of the relevant power. The applicant says that the relevant power was contained in the Certified Agreement. The respondents say…
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- Case
- [2003] FCA 854
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In considering the jurisdiction to review the first respondent's decision, the court examined the nature of the decision and the relevant statutory provisions. The court concluded that the decision was not justiciable, and therefore, it lacked the jurisdiction to review it. Regarding the application for an interlocutory injunction, the court found that the applicant had not demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits or that irreparable harm would result if the injunction were not granted. Consequently, the court dismissed the application for an interlocutory injunction.
The court also addressed the matter of costs, determining that the applicant should bear the costs of the respondents' objections and motions. The court ordered that these costs be taxed in the absence of an agreement between the parties. The final orders included a declaration that the court had no jurisdiction to review the decision, the dismissal of the interlocutory injunction application, and the imposition of costs on the applicant.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The Court has no jurisdiction to review the decision of the first respondent referred to in par 1 of the Application for an Order of Review filed herein.
2. The application by the applicant for an interlocutory injunction contained in par 4 of the Notice of Motion herein dated 30 June 2003 be dismissed.
3. The applicant shall pay the respondent’s costs of the Notice of Objection to Competency herein dated 11 June 2003 and of the Notice of Motion herein dated 30 June 2003, such costs to be taxed in the absence of agreement.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: SELWAY J
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