IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
Brisbane No. 576 of 1995
Before the Hon. Mr Justice Shepherdson
[O'Grady & O'Grady v. State of Qld]
BETWEEN
GERALD MICHAEL O'GRADY
First Plaintiff
AND
COLLEEN JOAN O'GRADY
Second Plaintiff
AND
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
DefendantJUDGMENT - SHEPHERDSON J.
Judgment delivered 15/08/1995
CATCHWORDS: NEGLIGENCE - application by first plaintiff s.31(2) Limitation of Actions Act - 59 year old man spent working life exposed to sun's rays - In 1994 developed squamous cell carcinoma - surgery - first learned then of potential for that type of cancer to metastasise - material fact of a decisive nature - had known for some 10 years that he suffered skin cancers.
Counsel:Land for applicant first plaintiff
Flanagan for defendant
Solicitors:Kevin Bradley of Booval for applicant
K.M. O'Shea Crown Solicitor for respondent
Hearing date: 1 August 1995
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF QUEENSLAND
Brisbane No. 576 of 1995
Before the Hon. Mr Justice Shepherdson
[O'Grady & O'Grady v. State of Qld]
BETWEEN
GERALD MICHAEL O'GRADY
First Plaintiff
AND
COLLEEN JOAN O'GRADY
Second Plaintiff
AND
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
DefendantJUDGMENT - SHEPHERDSON J.
Judgment Delivered 15 August 1995
The abovenamed first plaintiff has applied for an order pursuant to s.31(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 that the period of limitation for the above action be extended so that it expires on 6 April 1995.
The summons before me was filed on 15 May 1995.
The writ of summons was issued on 6 April 1995 and in it the first plaintiff claims damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence and/or breach of statutory duty of the defendant its servants or agents.
I mention in passing that I was informed from the bar table that the second plaintiff does not intend to press her claim as endorsed on the writ.
It is not in dispute that on this application the applicant is required to establish the following three factors:-
That a material fact of a decisive character relating to the applicant's right of action was not within the applicant's means of knowledge until a date after the commencement of one year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation (s.31(2)(a));
That there is evidence to establish the right of action (s.31(2)(b));
That the application is brought within 12 months of the applicant ascertaining the material fact of a decisive character relating to his right of action (s.31(2)).
Factor One
The affidavit evidence before me shows:-
That the applicant was born on 28 December 1935;
That in early May 1994, the applicant discovered a sun spot on the top of his left ear, that he went to see his general practitioner Dr Ratnam about it and was referred to Dr Brumm who diagnosed it as a squamous cell carcinoma;
That Dr Brumm removed this carcinoma in his surgery; the applicant did not go to hospital and did not lose any time off work as a result of this minor surgery;
That a few weeks after this carcinoma was removed…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read O'Grady & O'Grady v State of Qld and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [1995] QSC 183
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that O'Grady had established the material fact of decisive character, which was that squamous cell carcinomas had the potential to metastasise. O'Grady first learned of this potential after surgery in July 1994, which was after the limitation period had begun. The court also found that there was sufficient evidence to establish O'Grady's right of action against the defendant. The defendant had a duty to protect O'Grady from exposure to the sun while he worked outdoors, and had failed to do so. The application was brought within 12 months of O'Grady ascertaining the material fact, as the application was filed on 15 May 1995, and the period of twelve months expired on 11 July 1995. Therefore, the court granted the application and extended the limitation period.
The court orders that the period of limitation for this action be extended so that it expires on 6 April 1995. The parties shall hear from the court on the question of costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Queensland. The first plaintiff applied for an extension of the limitation period under section 31(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 to ensure the action would not be statute-barred. The writ of summons was issued on 6 April 1995, and the application for the extension of time was filed on 15 May 1995. The second plaintiff indicated she does not intend to pursue her claim. The court considered the application and delivered its judgment on 15 August 1995.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Was a material fact of a decisive nature relating to the applicant's right of action not within the applicant's means of knowledge until a date after the commencement of one year before the expiration of the period of limitation?
2. Is there evidence to establish the right of action?
3. Was the application brought within 12 months of the applicant ascertaining the material fact of a decisive nature relating to his right of action?
Held
1. The court concluded that the material fact of a decisive nature relating to the applicant's right of action was not within the applicant's means of knowledge until a date after the commencement of one year before the expiration of the period of limitation. The application for an extension of the limitation period was successful.
2. The court found there was evidence to establish the right of action against the defendant.
3. The court determined that the application was brought within 12 months of the applicant ascertaining the material fact of a decisive nature relating to his right of action.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court considered the three factors required by s.31(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 to grant an extension of the limitation period. Firstly, the court assessed whether a material fact of decisive nature relating to the applicant's right of action was not within the applicant's means of knowledge until a date after the commencement of one year last preceding the expiration of the period of limitation. The court found that the applicant first learned of the metastatic nature of the squamous cell carcinoma in July 1994, which was after the one-year period before the limitation period expired. The court accepted that the applicant was not aware of this fact prior to this time and that he was not the type of person who should have been expected to seek advice on the metastatic potential of squamous cell carcinomas.
Secondly, the court considered whether there was evidence to establish the right of action. The applicant needed to show that it appeared he would be able to adduce evidence at trial that would allow the court to form an opinion that he had a right of action. The court noted the relationship between exposure to the sun and the subsequent development of skin cancer, and the employer's obligation to establish, maintain and enforce a safe system of work. The court was satisfied that the applicant had led sufficient evidence from which it formed the opinion that the applicant had a right of action against the defendant.
Thirdly, the court examined whether the application was brought within 12 months of the applicant ascertaining the material fact of a decisive nature relating to his right of action. The court determined that the application was indeed brought within this time frame. Therefore, the court granted the applicant's application to extend the limitation period.