O’Cleary & Vukasin (No 4)
[2024] FedCFamC1F 872
•18 December 2024
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
O’Cleary & Vukasin (No 4) [2024] FedCFamC1F 872
File number: SYC 4005 of 2020 Judgment of: CAMPTON J Date of judgment: 18 December 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – COSTS – Where the husband seeks costs payable by the wife pursuant to s 117 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) of substantive s 79 proceedings – Where consideration is given to the conduct of the wife in the proceedings, including opposing a determination as to a portion of the husband’s interests in a corporation being held on trust for a third party to the marriage, the wife prosecuting relief outside the reasonable ambit of the s 79 discretion, the wife’s offer of settlement being unreasonable, proposing a compromise well outside the reasonable ambit of discretion – Where the husband made a competitive offer of settlement that had some deficiency in the interpretation of its terms – Where both parties, but the wife to a greater extent, failed in compliance with their obligations pursuant to the legislation and the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) – Costs ordered for both the substantive proceedings and the costs application in a fixed sum. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 75, 79, 95, 117
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) s 67
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) Sch 3, r 1.04 and r 12.07
Cases cited: Browne v Green (2002) FLC 93-115; [2002] FamCA 791
D & D (Costs) (No 2) (2010) FLC 93-435; [2010] FamCAFC 64
Graham & Squibb (2019) FLC 93-892; [2019] FamCAFC 33
Idoport Pty Ltd v the National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] NSWSC 23
Kohan & Kohan (1993) FLC 92-340; [1992] FamCA 116
Limousin v Limousin (Costs) (2007) 38 Fam LR 478; [2007] FamCA 1178
O’Cleary & Vukasin (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 660
O’Cleary & Vukasin (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC1F 814
Sfakianakis& Sfakianakis (2019) 59 Fam LR 419; [2019] FamCAFC 54
Warbrick and Warbrick (No. 2) (2021) FLC 94-030; [2021] FamCAFC 101
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 50 Date of hearing: 6 December 2024 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Puckey KC Solicitor for the Applicant: Jeffrey Choy Legal Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Smith Solicitor for the Respondent: JC Legal Practice ORDERS
SYC 4005 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR VUKASIN
Applicant
AND: MS O’CLEARY
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
CAMPTON J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 DECEMBER 2024
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.On or before 31 March 2025, or within such further time as agreed in writing between the husband and the wife, the wife pay the husband’s costs fixed in the sum of $177,500.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym O’Cleary & Vukasin has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
CAMPTON J:
Mr Vukasin (“the husband”) and Ms O’Cleary (“the wife”) were engaged in proceedings commenced on 22 June 2020 in which they each sought orders adjusting their property pursuant to s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”). Mr Passerini intervened and was joined to the proceeding on 13 December 2023. Reasons for judgment were published and orders were made on 30 September 2024. These reasons assume familiarity with the primary judgment (see O’Cleary & Vukasin (No 2) [2024] FedCFamC1F 660).
These reasons determine an application for costs filed by the husband on 9 October 2024. The application for costs of the intervenor, heard at the same time as the husband’s application, was compromised after judgment was reserved by way of consent orders made on 9 December 2024. The wife is to pay Mr Passerini’s costs fixed in the sum of $110,000 within 65 days. For the reasons that follow, the wife is ordered to pay the husband’s costs of the substantive proceedings fixed in the sum of $165,000, and the costs of the costs application in the sum of $12,500, being a total of $177,500 on or before 31 March 2025.
BACKGROUND
The husband and the wife were married in 2013, separated on 26 January 2019 (at [92]), and were divorced in 2021. There are no children of the relationship.
The central issues in the primary determination were as to whether the husband held 30 per cent of his interests in Vukasin Pty Ltd for the benefit of the intervenor, whether the husband or the wife was to retain a property at G Street, Suburb H (“the G Street property”) in specie, and as to the value of a cash adjustive sum payable by the husband to the wife.
The husband and the wife engaged in mediations on 2 December 2020, 31 July 2023 or 3 August 2023, and 13 August 2024. They could not achieve a compromise.
The husband conceded the claim of the intervenor. The wife opposed it. A declaration was made as to the husband holding 30 per cent of the share capital and any dividends and/or distributions associated or connected with those shares in Vukasin Pty Ltd on trust for the intervenor, and orders were made facilitating the transfer of the shares to him or his nominee as agreed in writing no later than 31 December 2026.
The value of the property of the husband and wife was found to be $45,264,891 (at [187]). The s 79 orders provide for the wife to receive 16.5 per cent of the value of that property, being $7,402,545, and for the husband to receive 83.5 per cent, being $37,461,366. Orders were made providing for the husband to discharge a NAB mortgage secured on the G Street property. The husband complied with that order on 5 November 2024. The orders then provided for the wife to have the first option to retain the G Street property by paying the husband $3,679,350 on or before 25 November 2024. The wife exercised that option and paid the husband those monies on 25 November 2024.
THE COMPETING RELIEF AS TO COSTS
Pursuant to Order 16 as made on 30 September 2024, the husband filed an Application in a Proceeding on 9 October 2024 seeking:
1. That in accordance with s117(2), s117(AB) and 117(C) of the Family Law Act 1975 that the [wife] be ordered to pay the costs of and incidental to the proceedings of the [husband] as follows:
a.
i.from the date of the mediation convened on 2 December 2020; or
ii. in the alternative, from the date of the directions made on 13 December 2023 setting the matter down for trial; or
iii. in the alternative from the date of filing of my trial affidavit on 18 April 2024; or
iv. in the alternative from the date of the service of my offer of settlement on 31 July 2024.
b. on an indemnity basis, or in the alternative on a party-party basis
By way of her Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed on 25 November 2024 the wife seeks:
1. That the husband’s costs application filed on 9 October 2024 be dismissed, or in alternate, the cost application be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal hearing.
2. That the husband pays for the wife’s costs in this proceeding.
The wife’s application for a “stay” or an adjournment of the hearing of the husband’s costs application pending the outcome of her appeal from the s 79 orders was determined and dismissed on 22 November 2024 (O’Cleary & Vukasin (No 3) [2024] FedCFamC1F 814). Seeking the same relief three days later absent any change of circumstance or further evidence is an abuse of process. This part of the relief sought by the wife in her Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed on 25 November 2024 was not prosecuted at the costs hearing. It was implicitly abandoned and will be refused.
THE LAW
The relevant principles as to costs are well settled. While the starting position established by s 117(1) of the Act is that each party pays their own costs, s 117(2) allows the Court to make such orders as to costs as it considers just if there are circumstances which justify it doing so. In considering what order for costs, if any, should be made, the Court is required to have regard to the matters set out in s 117(2A) of the Act and give weight as it considers appropriate to any relevant factor. It is well settled that no single factor in s 117(2A) has priority, nor must more than one factor be satisfied. Rather, any one factor may be sufficient.
The husband bears the onus to establish circumstances which justify departing from the position that each party pay their own costs, for the making of a costs order in his favour. If the husband establishes there are circumstances justifying a costs order, the next consideration is on what basis costs should be paid.
The Full Court has made clear that it is unnecessary to spell out detailed reasons for decisions in costs matters. I shall refer to such s 117(2A) matters as are relevant and engaged here.
CONSIDERATION
After the s 79 determination, each party has the benefit of significant property as identified earlier. The wife’s income and income earning capacity is less than that of the husband but is nevertheless not insubstantial (at [241]). To raise funds to retain the G Street property the wife entered a loan agreement to borrow $3.11 million, attracting interest of one per cent each month. The parties’ financial circumstances are a consideration that weighs in favour of the wife.
The husband submitted the wife’s conduct in the proceeding was the primary factor grounding his application for costs, including consideration of:
(a)The wife’s opposition to the determination of Mr Passerini’s entitlements in Vukasin Pty Ltd. He said this “struck at the core” of the s 79 process in the identification of the existing legal and equitable interests of the husband, and that the dispute as to Mr Passerini’s entitlements, being an issue in the s 79 proceeding since it was initiated, “should never have existed”.
(b)The wife’s adducing of inaccurate and at times deliberately false evidence designed to secure a greater division of property in her favour.
The husband submitted, and I accept, that the wife was absolute in her position on the first subject matter throughout the litigation, alleging fraud on the part of both he and Mr Passerini as to entering documents in 2006 and 2013 recording the terms of their agreement as to the husband holding 30 percent of his interest in Vukasin Pty Ltd for Mr Passerini. The wife “at the eleventh hour” (on the eve of the trial) conceded that she had been made aware of Mr Passerini’s entitlements by the husband at the time of the commencement of her relationship with him in early 2013. She nevertheless maintained in cross-examination that the written agreement between the husband and Mr Passerini was fabricated, although she could not point to any fact of circumstance or evidence to support that assertion (Exhibit 1, Transcript 10 September 2024, p.157 lines 14–45). The submission of the husband then flowed to the position taken by the wife being an “unmeritorious claim pursued from start to finish”, and that the husband was “dragged to judgment” before a settlement as to the issue of Mr Passerini’s interest was achieved. The wife had little to say in response to this submission. The submission attracts significant weight.
The husband’s criticisms as to the evidence adduced by the wife at trial echo the findings made in the primary reasons, especially as identified in bold:
36I accept the submission of the husband that an underlying theme constructing the presentation of the wife’s case was to adduce evidence in which she had been either reckless as to its content, or which she knew was inaccurate, with the objective of achieving a perceived advantage in securing findings to generate a greater value of the adjustment of property in her favour.
…
136At no time during the four years of the proceeding did the wife identify or disclose her knowledge of an agreement or understanding between the husband and [Mr Passerini] for [Mr Passerini] to be “entitled” to 30 per cent of the proceeds of any sale of [Vukasin Pty Ltd]. She did not adduce evidence to explain her secretion of her knowledge of that information or why she provided evidence of her knowledge of this understanding on the business day prior to the trial. She had steadfastly put directly into issue the contention that [Mr Passerini] has any interest arising from any agreement or understanding at any time in [Vukasin Pty Ltd].
137It is a reasonable indicator that the wife implicitly knew this information was relevant and material, else it would not have been included in her late affidavit. Her evidence as to her knowledge of an understanding or agreement between the husband and [Mr Passerini] does not stand on all fours with the case that she had pleaded. The circumstances and content of this evidence adversely impacts on her reliability and credibility on the subject matter of [Vukasin Pty Ltd] and the husband’s interests therein. I treat her evidence on this subject matter with caution.
138In cross-examination the wife said she did not know whether the 2006 and 2013 agreements were fabricated. She said she could not point to any fact grounding the assertion that the documents had been fabricated. She nevertheless maintained her contention that the 2006 agreement and the 2013 agreement were not authentic.
(Emphasis added)
The wife submitted that “[t]he highwater mark of the complaint was the income and financial resources available to the wife for which “broad” and “robust” findings have already been made against the wife in the proceedings”, and that there is no evidence that the wife’s failure to make disclosure caused unnecessary or additional costs to the husband. Those submissions are accurate. In her affidavit filed on 25 November 2024 the wife attempted to shift the blame for her deficiencies in the conduct of her case to her prior solicitors. I give this evidence little weight where it is adduced absent particularity or context.
The husband submitted that the wife was “wholly unsuccessful” because she sought a cash payment from him to achieve 40 per cent of a pool of property that she sought to be valued at approximately $60 million, while he proposed a division of 15 per cent in favour of the wife of a pool of property that he sought to be valued at approximately $45 million. The s 79 determination was that the wife to be entitled to 16.5 per cent of a pool of $45 million. He submitted that the integers in which the wife was unsuccessful included her contentions as to:
(a)An additional $15 million in divisible property of the parties;
(b)A 30 per cent assessment in respect of her contribution-based entitlement; and
(c)A 10 per cent adjustment in her favour pursuant to s 75(2) factors.
The husband appropriately conceded that this does not mean that he was wholly successful in obtaining every order for which he pressed. The husband’s submissions illustrate the unreasonableness of the ambit of the wife’s claim at trial. That said, the husband’s approach to the s 79 dispute between he and the wife over the past four years has been blinkered, and to a degree intransigent, until shortly before the trial. Until identified for the purposes of trial, the relief he sought in his Responses to the wife’s Initiating Application over the course of the litigation were on the margins of being outside the generous ambit of the s 79 discretion, albeit not in the same outer realm as that of the wife. He adopted a more realistic approach to the litigation in the shadow of the trial. The wife was not wholly unsuccessful in the s 79 proceeding, in that she achieved orders adjusting the property of the husband in her favour.
A consideration of these factors as relevant to s 117(2A) weigh significantly in favour of the husband.
As is made clear by s 117(2A)(f), offers of settlement carry significant weight (Browne v Green (2002) FLC 93-115). On 23 February 2024 directions were made for the parties are to exchange offers of settlement with each of the other parties on or before 26 July 2024.
The husband made an offer of settlement on 31 July 2024 in the following terms:
1.The [wife] repay the loans (“the [Vukasin Pty Ltd] loans”) made by [Vukasin Pty Ltd] to [F Pty Ltd] between 10/05/2013 to 07/08/13, which totals the amount of $253,980.54.
2.The [wife] to pay to the [husband] the sum of $3,000,000.00;
3.That the [wife] to retain all assets and superannuation in her name.
4.That the [husband] to retain all assets and superannuation in his name.
5.Each party to pay their own costs of the proceedings.
The husband conceded that none of the offers of settlement that he made prior to 31 July 2024 assisted him in this costs application. Implicitly, at no time from June 2020 to 31 July 2024, did he make any reasonable offer to compromise the proceeding, failing in his obligations pursuant to what was previously s 67 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth), and what is now s 95 of the Act, and r 1.04 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) (“the Rules”).
I do not accept the submission of the husband that he was unable to make a well cast offer of settlement of the s 79 proceeding until the issue of Mr Passerini’s interest in Vukasin Pty Ltd was determined. It is not unusual for parties to disagree as to the inclusion of items in the balance sheet identifying their property or as to the value of those items. This does not preclude parties from adopting a commercial and reasonable approach to offers of settlement.
The husband had every opportunity to construct an offer of settlement pursuant to the Rules and directed to the wife based upon his contention as to the property of the parties that he has the benefit of 70 per cent of Vukasin Pty Ltd in order to compromise the litigation over the four years prior to July 2024, just as he did by way of his offer on 31 July 2024.
The construction of the husband’s offer made on 31 July 2024 permits the wife to retain the G Street property. Uncertainty exists from the terms of the offer as to which of the husband or the wife is to pay the loan secured by way of mortgage on the G Street property in the sum of approximately $910,000. The husband is the borrower of the loan. The wife has provided the security by way of the property of which she is the sole legal owner. This uncertainty distorts the impact of the husband’s offer. At the costs hearing the husband said that he has at all times been making the repayments of that loan, and that it was intended by the offer that he would be liable for it, and that there was “never suggestion” that the wife would be responsible for it. He said that whilst paragraphs 3 and 4 of his offer refers to assets, it was “understood or intended” that there would be no other adjustment of property whether that be of “debt or assets”. The wife did not concede this to be the case at the costs hearing. A lacuna exists in the evidence on this topic.
There is no evidence that the wife sought to enquire from the husband as to who between them would be liable to pay the mortgage pursuant to the terms of his offer.
The wife did not adduce any evidence in her affidavit for the costs hearing that she had made an offer of settlement at any time during the litigation.
In his affidavit the husband said “[a]t no time did the Wife make an offer of settlement”. The evidence was incorrect. Almost nonsensically, it emerged during the costs hearing that the wife had made an offer of settlement on 26 July 2024 (Exhibit 3). The terms of the wife’s offer were:
1.The [husband] pay the [wife] the sum of thirteen million dollars ($13,000,000) within fourteen (14) days of this offer.
2. The [wife] shall retain all assets and superannuation in her name.
3.That the [husband] pay the [wife’s] costs of and incidental to the application.
The wife’s offer also suffers the same deficiency as the husband’s offer as to certainty regarding which party would be responsible for the mortgage secured on the G Street property.
The wife’s offer was unreasonable and well outside the generous ambit of the s 79 discretion. The wife’s motives for not making a reasonable offer to the husband have not been made plain. Rhetorically, the wife’s unreasonable position made it all but impossible for the husband, irrespective of the deficiency in the construction of his offer, to achieve a reasonable conclusion of the proceedings and litigation in a timely manner or in cost effective circumstances.
The husband submitted that his construction of his offer resulted in the wife achieving approximately $400,000 more at trial than she would have by way of his offer. He said that there was a de minimis margin between his offer of settlement and the outcome of the trial, and that after a consideration of costs incurred by the parties, the wife would have been significantly better off if she had accepted his offer of 31 July 2024. The wife submitted that she achieved a significantly better outcome at trial than by way of an objective construction and implementation of the husband’s offer. The impact of the responsibility to pay the loan secured by way of mortgage secured on the G Street property generates significant shifts in the effect of the husbands offer made 31 July 2024, highlighting the uncertainty pivoting that deficiency.
The husband conceded that “the whole of the proceeding was inextricably linked to the determination of the wife’s claim against [Mr Passerini], such that it is not possible to separate the husband’s costs associated with that claim from his costs associated with the property division claim”.
The Rules of Court require parties to focus on the benefits of being reasonable in the course of litigation and on a bona fide basis to compromise the litigation. The husband failed in that obligation in not making a reasonable offer to compromise prior to 31 July 2024, he otherwise conducting the litigation on the margins as to compliance with that obligation by way of his final relief sought until its amendment in the shadow of the trial. The wife has failed in complying with those obligations on multiple levels throughout the litigation. I do not accept the wife’s arguments that her financial position neutralises justifying circumstances as to costs. A consideration of all the above factors justifies a departure from the usual position that each of the husband and the wife pay their own costs from the time of the husband’s offer made on 31 July 2024. The wife did not in her evidence, or in submissions, provide a sound reason for why a costs order should not be made from that date.
THE BASIS OF COSTS TO BE PAID – FIXED?
The husband pressed two alternatives, either indemnity costs, or costs in a sum quantified by the Court on a party and party basis. He did not seek costs as assessed or agreed. The wife opposed indemnity costs and the fixing of costs.
The husband incurred costs of $743,000 in the substantive proceedings. The evidence identifies he incurred costs of around $324,000 after he served his 31 July 2024 offer of settlement. He did not adduce evidence as to the value of his costs incurred on a party and party basis from that time. The wife’s costs notice filed on 9 September 2024 identified that she incurred costs of $581,596. She did not adduce evidence as to the value of her costs incurred for the proceedings or since the husband’s offer made on 31 July 2024, either on an indemnity basis or on a party and party basis. She adduced no evidence as to her failure to comply with r 12.06 as to filing a notice of these costs, or as to why she neglected to engage with the evidence adduced by the husband on these topics.
Indemnity costs are only justified in exceptional cases (Kohan & Kohan (1993) FLC 92-340 at 79,614; D & D (Costs) (No 2) (2010) FLC 93-435; Limousin v Limousin (Costs) (2007) 38 Fam LR 478). While not endorsing the conduct of the wife in the litigation by way of her opposition of Mr Passerini’s claim absent merit, including the maintained contention of fabrication of the agreement, her unreasonable position as to the s 79 orders sought being outside the reasonable ambit of discretion, and the terms of her overtly optimistic and unreasonable offer made on 26 July 2024, the husband has not established on the particular facts of this case the exceptional circumstances necessary to achieve indemnity costs when consideration is given to his own conduct in the four years of the proceedings as identified earlier in these reasons. That said, as recorded in Sfakianakis& Sfakianakis (2019) 59 Fam LR 419:
10It is, however, a mistake to think that if a costs order is made, that order can only be on a party and party basis or on an indemnity basis. The words “such order as to costs ... as the court considers just” permit the Court to fashion an order that is apt to the circumstances. One such well-known example is assessment on a trustee basis, which is more generous than party and party costs, but falls short of an indemnity. Orders for a partial indemnity or for a particular period are obvious possibilities. The Court may also fix costs in a particular sum, taking account of all relevant circumstances; that type of order too is neither one for party and party costs nor an indemnity costs order.
On balance, weighing all the above considerations, it is just if costs are paid by the wife on a solicitor and client basis from 31 July 2024.
As to the fixing of costs, r 12.17(a) permits the Court to adopt a course to fix costs without formal assessment or taxation, although it is accepted that it is entirely a matter of discretion. The fixing of a sum must occur judicially but is not required to be conducted in any “scientific or formulaic manner” (Idoport Pty Ltd v the National Australia Bank Ltd [2007] NSWSC 23 at [10]).
The husband and wife have been in intensive hard-fought litigation since June 2020. I am mindful of the requirement of r 1.04 of the Rules, being to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively, and efficiently as possible. I propose to adopt the approach taken by the Full Court in Warbrick and Warbrick (No. 2) (2021) FLC 94-030 (“Warbrick”) where the Full Court dealt with a similar situation where costs other than indemnity costs were not properly quantified. The Full Court observed:
13.…We do not intend to permit the costs question to become, in effect, satellite litigation. It is appropriate that the wife’s costs are fixed and this issue is brought to a close.
I am satisfied that the observations of the Full Court in Warbrick are apposite here. These parties have already been engaged in more than four years of litigation. In this case, which has been complex and protracted, and where the costs incurred to date are significant for both parties, to order costs in a specified amount avoids the expense, delay, and aggravation arising out of an assessment of costs (Graham & Squibb (2019) FLC 93-892 at [92]).
Both the husband and the wife engaged senior and junior counsel for the trial. It was appropriate having regard to the issues in the proceeding for each of the husband and the wife to engage senior counsel and in so far is necessary, each is certified for the purposes of costs.
The husband adduced into evidence the fee agreements entered with his solicitors, junior counsel, and senior counsel, together with a summary of the different integers of costs incurred after 31 July 2024, including the costs of each senior and junior counsel, single expert valuation costs, and solicitor costs, totalling $324,381. Senior counsel costs were $110,000, junior counsel costs were $74,236, his solicitors’ costs were $80,313, and disbursements, including single expert and mediation costs, falling into a different category of costs, were $59,832. These materials enable broad comparisons to be made between costs of the categories of items incurred with those specified in Schedule 3 of the Rules having regard to the complexities of issues at trial, the volume of trial material, and the length of the trial.
The touchstone as to the fixing of costs is to ensure that process is logical, fair, and reasonable. The wife had an opportunity to make submissions as to the quantum of costs if fixed but did not do so. In the circumstances it would not occasion injustice to the wife by applying a broad-brush approach to fix costs on the material available. The costs payable by the wife to the husband of the substantive proceedings on a solicitor and client basis from the date of the offer, being 31 July 2024, to conclusion of the trial, is fixed in the sum of $165,000.
THE COSTS OF THE COSTS APPLICATION
The husband incurred costs of the costs application of $16,092 and the wife costs of $10,563.
The wife was unsuccessful in resisting the making of a costs order. She knew, or ought to have known, that the husband enjoyed a reasonable prospect of achieving a costs order as to the substantive proceedings in his favour. There was no evidence of the wife making an offer to compromise the costs dispute with the husband by paying any costs to him. The circumstances justify the wife paying the husband’s costs of the costs application.
It is just to fix the costs of the husband in the costs application payable by the wife in the sum of $12,500.
TIME TO PAY THE COSTS ORDERED
Both parties agreed that the time for the wife to pay any costs, if ordered, would be after the wife’s appeal from the primary judgment was determined, anticipated to be during March 2025. The time for the wife to pay the husband’s costs will be 31 March 2025, unless otherwise agreed in writing by them.
For all of the above reasons, I make the orders as set out herein.
I certify that the preceding fifty (50) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Campton. Associate:
Dated: 18 December 2024
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