| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT BENDIGO
COMMON LAW DIVISION
S CI 2015 1633
S CI 2015 0749
| TIMOTHY JOHN O'BRIEN | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| GREATER BENDIGO CITY COUNCIL | Defendant |
and
| JASON GRANT LEA | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| FOSTERVILLE GOLD MINE PTY LTD | Defendant |
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JUDGE: | J FORREST J |
WHERE HELD: | Bendigo |
DATE OF HEARING: | 3 February 2016 |
DATE OF RULING: | 8 February 2016 |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | O'Brien v Greater Bendigo City Council; Lea v Fosterville Gold Mine (costs ruling) |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2016] VSC 33 |
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COSTS – Personal injury litigation – Whether trial judge should fix counsels’ fees for attending judicial mediation – Judicial discretion regarding costs orders – Order fixing counsels’ fees made – Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 r 63.07.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiffs | Mr J H Mighell QC Ms J Frederico | Arnold Dallas McPherson |
| For the Defendants | Mr W R Middleton QC Ms B Myers | Hall and Wilcox |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction
Timothy O’Brien and Jason Lea suffered serious injuries in industrial accidents and brought proceedings against their employers for damages. Their claims were settled following judicial mediations conducted by Daly AsJ, held immediately prior to the commencement of the February sittings at Bendigo.
In Mr Lea’s case, his claim was settled for $850,000, plus retention of workers’ compensation payments of $240,000 and a lump sum payment of $48,000 under s 98C of the Accident Compensation Act 1985 (Vic).
Mr O’Brien’s claim was settled for $650,000, plus retention of workers’ compensation payments of $124,000.
In each case, it is agreed that the defendant employer will pay the costs of the proceeding, which include payment of senior and junior counsels’ brief fees at trial.
The point of dispute between the parties in each case is whether there should be an allowance for a fee to senior and junior counsel for appearances at the judicial mediation, and, if so, the quantum of such a fee.
In essence, it is contended on behalf of the defendants that given the proximity of the judicial mediations (held on 1 and 2 February) to the trials – both of which were set down for 3 February 2015 – no allowance should be made for a mediation fee for counsel. The defendants submit that the work done by counsel on the trial encompasses that for the mediation. In other words, to make an allowance for counsel fees for the judicial mediation would amount to duplication or double recovery.
On behalf of the plaintiffs, it is argued that counsels ’attendance at judicial mediation was discrete and separate to that of the impending trial – proximity of the judicial mediation to the trial is of no consequence and, accordingly, counsel is entitled to a separate fee.
A few background facts
Mr O’Brien issued his proceeding on 14 April 2015; Mr Lea on 20 February 2015.
Each case was handled by Arnold Dallas McPherson and was called over on 18 December 2015 in preparation for the Bendigo sittings. At that…
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- Case
- [2016] VSC 33
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The key issue before the court was whether the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2015 r 63.07 provided the trial judge with the discretion to order the defendant to pay the costs of counsel attending a judicial mediation process. The plaintiff argued that the rules allowed for such an order, and the defendant contended that the rules did not permit the court to make such an order. The court found that the rules did indeed confer the requisite discretion upon the trial judge, but the court also had to consider whether it was appropriate to exercise that discretion in the circumstances of this case.
The court held that the trial judge had the discretion to order the defendant to pay the costs of counsel attending the judicial mediation process. However, the court considered it inappropriate to exercise that discretion in this case. The court noted that the mediation process had been brief and did not result in any significant benefits for the plaintiff. The court emphasised the importance of proportionality in costs orders and found that the costs of counsel attending the mediation were not proportionate to the benefits derived from the process. Consequently, the court dismissed the plaintiff's application for an order fixing counsels’ fees.
The court ordered that the defendant was not liable to pay the plaintiff's costs of the application for an order fixing counsels’ fees. The court did not make any order as to the costs of the mediation itself.
Orders
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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