NSX Limited and Australian Securities and Investments Commission

[2023] AATA 3544

NSX Limited and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2023] AATA 3544 (27 July 2023)

Division:TAXATION AND COMMERCIAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2021/5082

Re:NSX Limited

APPLICANT

AndAustralian Securities and Investments Commission

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Deputy President Bernard J McCabe

Date:27 July 2023

Place:Sydney

1. The Tribunal is satisfied there is a specific and substantial conflict, or potential conflict, between one or more of the commercial interests of ASXL and NSX, and ASXL's obligation under
   section 792A(1)(a) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), which obliges ASIC to consider an application NSX makes under regulation 7.2.16(2) of the Corporations Regulations 2001 (Cth).

2. The parties have seven days from the date of these reasons to confer on appropriate orders under ss 42D or 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) that give effect to these reasons. If the parties cannot agree on a form of orders within that time, each party shall, within three clear business days thereafter, exchange with each other and submit to the Tribunal proposed orders with submissions in support.

3. These reasons shall not be published otherwise than to the parties for 14 days from the date of the reasons to allow time for each party to make any submissions about the desirability of making orders under s 35 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 to redact or suppress any text.

   .................................SGD....................................

   Bernard J McCabe, Deputy President

   Catchwords

   ASX LISTING RULES – REGULATION OF MARKET LICENSEES – Fair, orderly and transparent market – Potential conflict situations – Commercial interests – Specific and significant conflicts – Enforcement powers – Commercially sensitive information – Conflict of interest

   Legislation

   Administrative Appeals Act 1975 (Cth)
   Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)

   Corporations Regulation 2001 (Cth)

   Cases

   Rural Press Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2003] HCA 75

   REASONS FOR DECISION

   Deputy President Bernard J McCabe

   27 July 2023

4. The Australian Stock Exchange Limited (ASXL) is licensed to operate a financial markets business under Part 7.2 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – specifically, Australia’s largest stock exchange, the ASX. ASXL attracts issuers of securities who wish to list on the stock exchange, and traders who deal in the securities that are issued. As part of its offerings to listed entities and traders, ASXL provides a clearing facility known as ASX Clear and a securities settlement facility through the Clearing House Electronic Sub-register System, or CHESS.

5. ASXL has general obligations as a licensee set out in s 792A(1) of the Corporations Act. These include an obligation to take steps to ensure “the market is a fair, orderly and transparent market”. Consistent with that obligation, ASXL administers a framework of rules which govern the operation of the market. The ‘ASX listing rules’ include the power to require an entity listed on the market to disclose confidential information about its business to ASXL in some circumstances. An entity that fails to disclose information as required may be subject to sanctions.

6. NSX Limited is listed on the ASX. NSX is therefore subject to ASXL’s listing rules. NSX operates a financial markets business of its own, the National Stock Exchange. (The National Stock Exchange is technically operated through a wholly owned subsidiary of NSX called National Stock Exchange of Australia Ltd, or NXSA. In these reasons, I will refer to the applicant as NSX and will not otherwise mentions NXSA unless it is relevant to do so.) NSX traces its roots back to the former Newcastle Stock Exchange that was established in 1937. That exchange was one of a number of regional securities exchanges that existed to service local businesses. NSX’s exchange now operates with a small cohort of listed entities and a modest number of traders. It is a minnow compared to the whale operated by ASXL. NSX does not so far have the economies of scale required to offer meaningful competition to ASXL. Part of NSX’s competitive challenge may lie in the fact it has not yet developed clearance and settlement infrastructure of its own: NSX’s clients are required to use the clearance and settlement services provided by ASXL. NSX say the ASXL’s clearance and settlement infrastructure gives ASXL market power in the financial markets business and allows ASXL to derive healthy profits.

7. NSX has a plan to take on ASXL in the financial markets business in which they compete, albeit that competition is currently lop-sided in ASXL’s favour. NSX says it is making headway in its attempts to attract new listings that will help it become more profitable. It has also made significant progress towards developing Clearpay, a clearance and settlement system that can be used instead of ASX Clear and CHESS. The Clearpay system is being developed using blockchain technology. If the system lives up to its promise, Clearpay may confer a significant competitive advantage on NSX and any other market operator to whom the technology is licensed. NSX says that prospect must be worrisome to ASXL. NSX is worried in turn that ASXL might somehow misuse opportunities afforded to it under the listing rules to spy on or perhaps stymy NSX in its initiatives.

8. The Corporations Act recognises the possibility that a market licensee might face a conflict between its role as market operator and its own commercial interests. Section 798DA requires that the listing rules permit the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to step into the shoes of the market operator and make decisions on its behalf in certain conflict situations. Section 798E provides for regulations to be established that deal with ASIC’s role when responding to a conflict.

9. Regulation 7.2.16 of the Corporations Regulations 2001 deals with potential conflict situations as anticipated in s 798E. Regulation 7.2.16(2) permits an entity in competition with ASXL to request that ASIC replace ASXL as the decision-maker in relation to questions arising under the ASX listing rules. ASIC does not have to agree to a valid request to step in, but it must at least consider doing so – which presumably requires it to consider assurances from ASXL and perhaps some special arrangements that would address the challenge as an alternative to ASIC taking over the decision-making function itself. But an entity will only be entitled to make the request if it satisfies the criteria in Reg 7.2.16(1).

10. This case focuses on whether NSX can satisfy the criteria in Reg 7.2.16(1) so ASIC would be required to at least consider taking action under Reg 7.2.16(2). The parties agreed it would be sufficient if the Tribunal addressed that issue. If the Tribunal decides ASIC must engage, the question should be remitted to ASIC so that it may do so.

11. For reasons I explain below, I am satisfied NSX satisfies the relevant criteria in

    
    

    Reg 7.2.16(1). ASIC is therefore obliged to consider an application from NSX under

    
    

    Reg 7.2.16(2). It will be necessary for the parties to confer over whether it would be appropriate for me to make an order under s 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (the AAT Act) which would conclude the proceedings or whether it would be preferable to make an order under s 42D which would allow the matter to be returned to the Tribunal should the applicant be dissatisfied with the outcome of the reconsideration process.

    The issues before the Tribunal

12. I have already referred to the general obligations imposed on a licensee pursuant to s 792A of the Corporations Act. One of those obligations is the requirement to have adequate arrangements for handling conflicts between the commercial interests of the licensee and for the licensee to ensure the market is fair, orderly and transparent: s 792A(1)(c). I have also mentioned the power in s 798E to make regulations for ASIC to step in and deal with conflict situations.

13. ASIC is not obliged to step in and replace ASXL just because somebody alleges a conflict. That would almost certainly be inefficient. Regulation 7.2.16(1) creates a threshold which must be crossed before ASIC is required to entertain a request for intervention. The subsection provides:

    1For subsection 798E(1) of the Act, this regulation applies in relation to specific and significant conflicts, or potential conflicts that would be specific and significant, between:

    (a)the commercial interests of Australian Stock Exchange Limited (ASX) in dealing with a body (the competitor) that operates a business with which:

    (i)     ASX is in competition; or

    (ii)    a subsidiary of ASX is in competition; or

    (iii)   a joint venture (however described) to which ASX is a party is in competition; or

    (iv)   a joint venture (however described) to which a subsidiary of ASX is a party is in competition; and

    (b)the need for ASX to ensure that the market operated by it operates in the way mentioned in paragraph 792A(1)(a) of the Act.

14. The dispute in this case resolves around the import of this sub-section. NSX says ASIC is refusing to even consider what should be done to manage the conflict which NSX alleges because ASIC says the criteria in sub-section (1) have not been satisfied.

15. To expedite the review, it was agreed the hearing would focus on two questions. Those questions were:

    Question one: Does the applicant operate a business with which [ASXL] is in competition?

    Question two: If the answer to Q1 is “yes”, are there any specific and significant conflicts, or potential conflicts that would be specific and significant, between (a) the commercial interests of ASXL in dealing with the applicant; and (b) the need for ASXL to ensure that the market operated by it operates in the way mentioned in paragraph 792A(1)(a) of the Corporations Act…; and (c) if “yes” what are these conflicts or potential conflicts?

16. ASIC conceded at the hearing that NSX and ASXL are technically in competition for the purposes of the regulation (transcript at p 28) in at least two and arguably three areas of endeavour. That means Question One is answered in the affirmative. The real debate between the parties was over whether there were specific and significant conflicts arising out of ASXL’s commercial interests and its obligations to operate the market in a way that is fair, orderly and transparent.

    The ASX listing rules and the powers of ASXL as market operator

17. Section 761A defines ‘listing rules of a financial market’ as:

    …any rules (however described) that are made by the operator of the market, or contained in the operator's constitution, and that deal with:

    admitting entities to, or removing entities from, the market's official list, whether for the purpose of enabling financial products of those entities to be traded on the market or for other purposes; or

    the activities or conduct of entities that are included on that list.

18. The ASX listing rules feature provisions requiring a listed entity to disclose information to ASXL, including:

    3.1: once an entity is or becomes aware of any information concerning it that a reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on the price or value of the entity’s securities, the entity must immediately tell ASX that information. [The notes to Rule 3.1 make clear the requirement to disclose extends to information that may be confidential or which is not ripe for public disclosure to the market.]

    11.1: If an entity proposes to make a significant change, either directly or indirectly, to the nature or scale of its activities, it must provide full details to ASX as soon as practicable. It must do so in any event before making the change. … [The Rule goes on to specify (relevantly): “The entity must give ASX information regarding the change and its effect on future potential earnings, and any information that ASX asks for.” (Emphasis added)]

19. ASXL has broad enforcement powers under the listing rules. Rule 17.3 permits ASXL to suspend quotation of a listed entity’s securities if the entity is unwilling to comply with or breaks a listing rule. ASXL also enjoys wide latitude in its administration of the listing rules such as Rule 17.3. Rule 18.5A provides:

    ASX may exercise, or decide not to exercise, any power or discretion conferred under the listing rules in relation to an entity in its absolute discretion. It may do so on any conditions and, if it does so, the entity must comply with the conditions.

20. The power to demand information is reinforced in Rule 18.7 which provides:

    An entity must give ASX any information, document or explanation that ASX:

    asks for to enable ASX to be satisfied that the entity is, and has been, complying with, or will comply with, the listing rules of any conditions or requirements imposed under the listing rules; or

    reasonably requires to perform its obligations as a licensed market operator. …

21. ASXL’s power to enforce the listing rules is further reinforced by Rule 18.8 which permits ASXL to require an entity “to do or refrain from doing any act or thing that, in ASX’s position, is necessary to ensure or facilitate compliance with the listing rules…”. ASXL may also publicly censure an entity under Rule 18.8A if ASXL considers the entity has breached the listing rules or any condition or a requirement imposed under the listing rules.

    
    
    

22. It follows ASXL:

    (a)is in a position where it can expect to be informed of matters that may be sensitive or confidential; and

    (b)has a broad discretion to require disclosure and to impose sanctions in connection with its administration of the rules (which include the requirement that an entity make disclosures to ASXL).

23. If the information held by a particular entity also happens to be of interest to ASXL because – for example – the entity is a commercial rival of ASXL and the information might impact on ASXL’s competitive position, there is obviously potential for conflict between those commercial interests and ASXL’s obligations under s 792A of the Corporations Act.

24. ASXL itself has recognised the possibility of such a conflict in its Conflict Management Policy, a copy of which is reproduced in the documents provided pursuant to s 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) at pp 509ff. Under the heading ‘Review parties’, the document states:

    As part of ASX’s assurance program, ASX has identified certain parties (referred to as “Review Parties”) who could pose a possible conflict situation for ASX. These are parties who have a material connection with, or are in competition to, ASX and in relation to whom ASX might be seen to have a commercial interest in showing them favour or disfavour when making decisions such as under its Listing Rules or Operating Rules, as a holder of AFSLs, as an operator of a clearing and settlement facility, in its role as a benchmark administrator or other capacities.

    A listed entity or participant, or an entity applying for admission as a listed entity or participant, or an entity offering a competing market service that seeks the services of ASX’s clearing and settlement facility is regarded as a Review Party for these purposes if:

    ·it has a licence to operate a market or CS facility in Australia in competition with the ASX Group or is in the process of obtaining such a licence from ASIC;

    ·it holds a substantial shareholding in ASX or ASX holds a substantial shareholding in it

    ·it is a related body corporate of another party described in the preceding bullet points or

    ·ASX classifies it as a Review Party due to the potential for a conflict between ASX’s commercial interests and its FOT or FE obligations.

    ASX may also determine an entity to be a review party in any other circumstance where it considers they may be a possible conflict.

    [Footnotes omitted]

25. The document expressly names NSX as a current ‘Review Party’ to whom the Conflict Management Policy applies.

26. ASIC points out ASIC would only have a role under Regulation 7.2.16 if the conflict is or would be “specific and significant”. It is therefore necessary to review and characterise the commercial interests that might lead to the conflict(s) but it would be helpful to clarify what is meant by “specific and significant conflicts, or potential conflicts”.

27. The requirement that the decision-maker identify a ‘specific conflict’ must be understood in its context. The rule contained in the regulation assumes ASXL and the entity in question are competitors in some respect, but a more precise identification of the risk is required before ASIC can be involved. (If it were enough to allege the entities were in competition, the words “specific and significant” would have no work to do.) It will generally be necessary to identify how a particular commercial interest of ASXL might be engaged over and above the mere fact of competition. As we shall see below, it is possible to identify three different and sufficiently precise ways in which commercial interests of ASXL might lead to conflict that can be defined and assessed to determine whether it is, of itself, sufficiently significant to bring it within the intended operation of the Regulation.

28. The word ‘significant’ is an imprecise word that is capable of taking on different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. The very imprecision of words like ‘significant’ (or ‘reasonable,’ or ‘substantial’) may be an asset when dealing with factual situations that are difficult to anticipate. One should hesitate before trying to define a plain-English word like ‘significant’ by reference to other words – particularly words of limitation – that are not used in the legislative scheme. It does not seem appropriate to incorporate some sort of quantitative or weighted analysis (e.g., a ‘dominant or relatively important concern’) into the definition or to define the words with reference to what they are not (e.g., to say ‘significant’ means ‘not insignificant’).

29. One must instead look to the language of the provision in the context of the statutory scheme and the purpose disclosed therein – most obviously, the requirement in s 792A of the Corporations Act that the market operator attempt to ensure the market is ‘fair, orderly and transparent’. Reference to that purpose suggests the rule is intended to address situations in which the market operator’s commercial interests might impact or be assumed to impact on its objectivity in administering the rules and the exercise of the powers and discretions. When considering application of the rule, one must do so from the point of view of the ordinary, fair-minded but commercially sophisticated observer rather than from the perspective of, for example, NSX. (That is appropriate since the obligation referred to in

    
    

    s 792A(1)(a) is plainly to be evaluated objectively.)

30. The next step is to ask whether that observer would assume the specifically identified commercial interest of the market operator was significant. It will be significant in the relevant sense if the identified interest would be expected to become a factor affecting the objective judgment of the market operator when undertaking decision-making processes under the particular listing rule in question. No doubt the fair-minded observer’s assessment of ASXL and the risk would be tempered by the knowledge ASXL would be acting in breach of its obligations and the terms of its licence – and damage its commercial reputation – if it were found to have acted in its own interests. One could assume ASXL would be circumspect given those consequences, particularly where the commercial interests at stake are not especially great. An existential threat, on the other hand, would obviously pose a significant conflict between interest and obligation precisely because it would be difficult for an objective decision-maker to put a threat on that scale out of its mind. 

    The commercial interests that potentially give rise to conflicts between ASXL and NSX

1. NSX says there are at least three areas in which it competes with ASXL where a specific and significant conflict may arise.

2. The first of these is in the market for issuers. The ASX attracts the vast majority of Australian companies seeking to list and issue securities through a stock exchange. NSX is very small in comparison. It is nonetheless seeking to attract companies that would otherwise list on the ASX, or which are already listed there. NSX’s principal witness in relation to this competition was Mr Tim Hart, the company’s chairman. I do not need to recount all the detail of Mr Hart’s evidence here; some of it was the subject of confidentiality orders because he was talking about the company’s strategies for competing with ASXL. In summary, he said NSX was working to attract additional listings to its exchange, and it was focusing on listings in one or more sectors of the market to that end. He said NSX was competing on the quality of service provided and the amount of fees that it charged. He said there was wide-spread dissatisfaction about service and cost issues amongst companies listed (or which may list) on the ASX. That created an opening for NSX. He said NSX was close to a point where it would attract sufficient listings for it to develop scale, at least in some areas. I was referred to examples of entities that had been lured from the ASX, and I was told ASX tended to respond when it became aware an entity might consider de-listing from the ASX with a view to joining NSX. Mr Hart also mentioned that he expected listings on the NSX would receive a welcome fillip when it was able to introduce more flexible and cost-effective clearing and settlement processes in place of the existing, unduly expensive services provided by ASXL through CHESS.

3. During cross-examination, Mr Hart was asked questions about some of the companies that had listed or sought to list on NSX. ASIC also provided me with statements and oral evidence from Mr James Andronis, Senior Manager in the Market Supervision group at ASIC. Mr Andronis pointed out an entity which wanted to list on a market needed to identify whether it would be able to meet the listing rules applicable to that market; only an entity that met the listing rules for more than one market would be able to choose. He said (at [9] of his statement: ex. 5) an entity with a choice would presumably focus on:

   ·The ability to successfully list and raise the funds sought.

   ·The liquidity of the Available Markets.

   ·The number of companies listed on the Available Markets.

   ·Existence of peers in the relevant sector listed on an Available Market

   ·Reliability and integrity of Available Markets

   ·The initial listing and ongoing listing fees charged by Available Markets

   ·The perceived viability of the Available Markets.

4. Mr Andronis was asked questions during cross-examination about the significance that an entity might attach to the quantum of fees charged by the exchange when the entity was deciding whether to list. Mr Andronis insisted that, to his knowledge, it was not an important consideration. He also did not attach much weight in his statement to the availability of clearing and settlement facilities. He said all markets were assumed to have those so they would not factor in an issuer’s choice of market.

5. Mr Andronis clearly believed NSX was not an effective or especially threatening rival to ASXL. Without hearing from ASXL or having access to the sort of evidence one would expect in a competition law case where the state of competition in a market (or the market power of a participant) was being discussed, it is difficult to reach a firm view about the extent of any conflict that might arise. I acknowledge there was evidence suggesting ASXL had occasionally reacted to threatened departures from the ASX by offering inducements to stay. But that does not of itself suggest ASXL regarded the threat to its commercial interests was such as to give rise to a significant conflict in the sense I have already described when it came to exercising its powers and functions under the listing rules. Having said that, I accept there was a specific conflict that might have arisen out of NSX’s attempts to target companies in a particular area of the market. Cases like Rural Press Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2003] HCA 75 at [46] per Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ illustrate how the emergence of a small competitor can motivate a corporation with market power to use its position to ‘nip in the bud’ any prospect of a challenge to its competitive position over the medium term. Although NSX did not offer the sort of economic analysis that might be expected in a competition law case, it was effectively making the argument that ASXL had market power and might have anti-competitive ends in mind were it to ask for information about NSX’s progress in attracting more listings. I accept there would be significant and specific conflict if the fair-minded observer might assume ASXL’s concern over its competitive position could impact on its judgment when it exercised its regulatory function.

6. There is some doubt about whether the evidence is sufficient to permit that inference to be drawn. I have no such concerns in relation to the second commercial interest where conflict might arise. I refer to NSX’s development of the Clearpay system. I have already pointed out ASXL has its own long-established clearance and settlement systems, most obviously CHESS. NSX argues CHESS is an important source of revenue for ASXL. Control over that infrastructure may constitute a barrier to entering the market for rival market operators: a rival would have to bear the cost of setting up their own arrangements or strike a deal with ASXL, as NSX has done. In any event, NSX is developing Clearpay. NSX says Clearpay may provide a superior alternative to the CHESS system. If it lives up to its promise, it could confer a competitive advantage on NSX but also on any other market operator that might take up that technology and seek to compete with ASXL.

7. NSX led evidence – mostly in the form of media reports and statements from ASXL – pointing to the difficulties ASXL is experiencing in developing a suitable replacement for the ageing CHESS system. CHESS is apparently based on old technology.

8. I was provided with a good deal of evidence about the development of Clearpay and its promise. Mr Hart provided some of the detail but I also heard from NSX’s chief operating officer, Mr Chan Arambewela. Mr Arambewela had previously worked on the

   
   

   CHESS-replacement project for ASXL. As I understand it, the Clearpay system is based on distributed ledger technology (DLT). If it can be successfully launched, NSX is confident that it might prove to be a ‘game changer’. It is difficult to make a judgment in relation to that claim, not least because NSX is understandably concerned to protect the intellectual property it is developing. And therein lies the problem. It wants to protect that intellectual property from ASXL in particular, precisely because ASXL may have most to gain from learning that information given the challenges it is experiencing with its

   
   

   CHESS-replacement project.

9. The corporate world is littered with the wreckage of enterprises that failed to anticipate the implications of new technology for their existing business models. Any competently managed enterprise would be alive to such a risk. Our fair-minded observer would assume managers of an established enterprise would make it a priority to find out whatever they can about new technologies being developed by competitors. Managers defending the status quo would surely want to assess the threat (and the promise) of new technology for their own business. Moreover, the potential significance of the technology is such that NSX would have to disclose it to ASXL in accordance with the rules. At that point, if not before, a specific conflict will become manifest. Given the existential threat that such a technology might pose and the likelihood ASXL will be confronted with the need to deal with the disclosure, our fair-minded observer would have no trouble concluding ASXL would face a significant conflict.

10. That brings me to the last of the three commercial interests which might lead to conflict. I do not need to rehearse the detail in these reasons given the sensitivity of what was described. Suffice to say NSX was able to strike a deal with a foreign entity to operate another market. Mr Hart gave evidence to the effect that he understood ASXL may have been involved in negotiations with the same counterparty, but they were unsuccessful. Having successfully beaten off that competition, he argued, NSX will need to disclose information about the deal in due course to ASXL in accordance with the listing rules. At [55] of his statement (ex. 1), Mr Hart explained:

    The disclosure of commercially-sensitive information to ASXL would have the effect of:

    (a)permitting ASXL to make use of, or have regard to, NSXL's commercially-sensitive information in its own business;

    (b)limiting the ability of NSXL to fairly compete with ASXL; and

    (c)hindering NSXL's business expansion plans.

11. Without evidence from ASXL, it is difficult to be sure whether ASXL was in fact a rival of NSX in relation to the deal in question. In saying that, I do not mean to suggest I doubted Mr Hart, who I am satisfied did his best to assist the Tribunal. Mr Hart made clear he inferred ASXL was a rival because of comments made by the counterparty at one of the meetings as the deal was being closed, but he accepted that was not necessarily definitive.

12. NSX says ASXL has an interest in besting NSX in any contest over the opportunity to operate alternative markets and exchanges. That is arguably a specific commercial interest which might be of sufficient magnitude – especially if NSX proposed deploying its new settlement technology – to persuade the fair-minded observer that there is potentially a significant risk of conflict between those interests and ASXL’s obligations as it made decisions required of it under the listing rules.  I accept ASIC might reach a different view – or be satisfied there is no further action required – after obtaining further information from ASXL once ASIC took up NSX’s application under Regulation 7.2.16, but that is a question for another day.

    Conclusion

13. I am satisfied there is a specific and significant conflict, or potential conflict, between:

    ·one or more commercial interests of ASXL and those of its competitor, NSX, and

    ·ASXL’s obligation under s 792A(1)(a) of the Corporations Act.

14. The parties have seven days from the date of these reasons to confer on orders under

    
    

    ss 42D or 43 of the AAT Act that give effect to these reasons. If the parties cannot agree on a form of orders within that time, each party shall, within three clear business days thereafter, submit proposed orders with submissions in support.

15. These reasons shall not be published otherwise than to the parties for 14 days from the date of the reasons to allow time for each party to make any submissions about the desirability of making orders under s 35 of the AAT Act to redact or suppress any text.

I certify that the preceding 42 (forty-two) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Deputy President Bernard J McCabe

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Associate

Dated: 27 July 2023

Date(s) of hearing:	16-17 May 2023, 7 June 2023
Counsel for the Applicant:	Mr Nicholas Wood SC
Solicitors for the Applicant:	Hunt & Hunt
Counsel for the Respondent:	Ms Zoe Maud SC
Solicitors for the Respondent:	Mr Robert Chiarella