NSW Trustee and Guardian v Togias
[2022] NSWCA 225
•9 November 2022
|
New South Wales |
Case Name: | NSW Trustee and Guardian v Togias |
Medium Neutral Citation: | [2022] NSWCA 225 |
Hearing Date(s): | 23 May 2022 |
Date of Orders: | 9 November 2022 |
Decision Date: | 9 November 2022 |
Before: | Mitchelmore JA at [1]; |
Decision: | (1) Appeal allowed in part. |
Catchwords: | EQUITY – trusts and trustees – constructive trusts – where respondent’s former de facto partner convicted of drug-related charge – Forfeiture Order made in respect of de facto partner’s assets pursuant to Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW) – where respondent performed domestic duties, raised children, and worked in business founded by de facto partner – whether “joint relationship and endeavour” formed pursuant to which respondent made contributions to acquisition of two properties the subject of the Forfeiture Order – application of principles in Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137; [1987] HCA 59 – challenges to findings as to how respondent’s contributions to properties were said to be established – application of maxim “equity is equality” |
Legislation Cited: | Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW), ss 10A, 22, 24-27 |
Cases Cited: | Austin v Hornby (2011) 16 BPR 30,623; [2011] NSWSC 1059 |
Texts Cited: | A Black, “Baumgartner v Baumgartner, the Constructive Trust and the Expanding Scope of Unconscionability” (1988) 11 UNSW LJ 117 |
Category: | Principal judgment |
Parties: | NSW Trustee and Guardian (Appellant) |
Representation: | Counsel: |
File Number(s): | 2022/4794 |
Publication Restriction: | Nil |
Decision under appeal: | |
Court or Tribunal: | Supreme Court of NSW |
Jurisdiction: | Equity – Expedition List |
Citation: | [2021] NSWSC 1588 |
Date of Decision: | 10 December 2021 |
Before: | Sackar J |
File Number(s): | 2020/189689 |
[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]
HEADNOTE
[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]
This appeal concerned two properties respectively located in Glenwood (the “Glenwood Property”) and Seven Hills (the “Seven Hills Property”), in New South Wales. The properties were registered in the name of Mr Wayan Arya Subakti, the former de facto partner of the respondent, Ms Nicolitsa Togias.
The respondent and Mr Subakti commenced a romantic relationship in 1998. In 2000, Mr Subakti purchased a residential property in Wentworthville and, also that year, started a business as a sole trader called “Bio-Form”. The respondent’s evidence was that she was responsible for “the housework, the grocery shopping, and sometimes the cooking”. She also worked in the Bio-Form business.
In 2003, the Glenwood Property was purchased for $690,000 in Mr Subakti’s name. The respondent was told that the loan should be in Mr Subakti’s name because of her lack of credit history. In 2008, the Seven Hills Property was purchased for $342,000 in Mr Subakti’s name as a place to store products for Bio-Form.
On 29 January 2010, the respondent ended her relationship with Mr Subakti when she was notified of his arrest on a drug-related charge. Mr Subakti was subsequently convicted and sentenced to a period of imprisonment. On 5 May 2014, on the application of the NSW Crime Commission, the Supreme Court made a Forfeiture Order, pursuant to the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW), in relation to Mr Subakti’s interests in property, including the Glenwood Property and the Seven Hills Property.
In 2020, the respondent brought proceedings in the Equity Division against the State of NSW and the NSW Trustee and Guardian (the latter being “the appellant” on the appeal). In asserting a beneficial interest in the Glenwood Property and Seven Hills Property, the respondent’s primary case rested on the existence of a common intention as between her and Mr Subakti that he would hold the legal interest for the benefit of their joint relationship, for the purpose of enhancing their joint wealth and welfare. In the alternative, she relied upon a joint endeavour in which she and Mr Subakti pooled their resources. The appellant’s primary contention was that there was no common intention or joint endeavour warranting the imposition of a constructive trust.
The primary judge held that the respondent had not established the existence of a common intention with respect to the two properties. However, his Honour found that the respondent “made significant contributions, financial and otherwise, to the maintenance of the properties, the business and has brought up the children of her and Mr Subakti’s former relationship”. His Honour held that, by virtue of those contributions, a remedial constructive trust arose over the Glenwood Property and Seven Hills Property. His Honour declared that the appellant held 50 per cent of both properties on trust for the benefit of the respondent.
The appellant appealed on five grounds, primarily that his Honour erred in holding that the respondent had established that she and Mr Subakti formed a “joint relationship and endeavour” pursuant to which she made contributions to the acquisition of the properties (Ground 1). Grounds 2 to 4 posited various errors that his Honour made as to how that contribution was said to be established, including by the respondent foregoing a wage for her work in the Bio-Form business (Ground 2); being a homemaker and mother to Mr Subakti’s children (Ground 3); and incurring borrowings and expenses after their relationship ended (Ground 4). By Ground 5, the appellant contended that if his Honour was correct in his conclusion as to the existence of a constructive trust, his Honour erred in applying the maxim “equity is equality” and holding that the respondent should hold half of the beneficial interest in the two properties.
The Court (Mitchelmore JA, Basten and Griffiths AJJA agreeing), allowing the appeal in respect of the Seven Hills Property, and in respect of the Glenwood Property insofar as it imposed a constructive trust in the order of 50% of the beneficial interests in the Property, held:
As to the respondent’s financial contributions generally:
(1) Although previous cases recognise that contributions to a joint endeavour may be other than financial, there have been few cases in which such contributions have fallen to be considered, and still fewer where such contributions were predominant: [69]-[87], [103].
Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; [1985] HCA 78; Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137; [1987] HCA 59; Green v Green (1989) 17 NSWLR 343; Stowe v Stowe (1995) 15 WAR 363; Dunne v Turner (unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, 20 August 1996); Parij v Parij (1997) 72 SASR 153; Engwirda v Engwirda [2000] QCA 61; Lloyd v Tedesco (2002) 25 WAR 360; [2002] WASCA 63; West v Mead (2003) 13 BPR 24,431; [2003] NSWSC 161; Read v Nicholls [2004] VSC 66; Cressy v Johnson [2009] VSC 52 discussed.
(2) The primary judge’s reference to the respondent having made significant contributions, “financial and otherwise” (emphasis added), could only relate to the period after the respondent’s relationship with Mr Subakti ended. Before that time, she made no direct financial contribution to the purchase of the properties. To the extent that his Honour relied on the post-January 2010 financial contributions as supporting the existence of a joint endeavour, the primary judge erred: at [90]-[91], [107], [118], [154].
As to the Glenwood Property:
(3) The respondent’s labours at home and in the Bio-Form business, over some 11 years, supported the existence of a joint endeavour with Mr Subakti, the purpose of which was to enhance their material wellbeing. The primary judge did not err in concluding that the Glenwood Property was purchased in the course of, and for the purpose of, the joint endeavour pursuant to which the respondent made those contributions. Nor did his Honour err in concluding that it would be unconscionable for Mr Subakti (or the appellant) to assert a legal interest over the whole of the Glenwood Property as against the respondent without making any allowance for her contributions: [93]-[96], [118], [151], [154].
Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; [1985] HCA 78; Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137; [1987] HCA 59 followed.
(4) The purpose of making adjustments as identified in Baumgartner and cases which have followed it is to avoid injustice to the party whose legal interest will be subject to the constructive trust. Although the contributions that the respondent made operated to free Mr Subakti up to earn an income to put towards the purchase of the Glenwood Property and the mortgage, the fact that he was responsible for making all financial contributions (from the Bio-Form business and other sources) overcame the presumption that equity is equality. The respondent’s beneficial interest was properly assessed at a quarter share, rather than a half-share: [108]-[110], [118], [153], [154].
Parij v Parij (1997) 72 SASR 153; West v Mead (2003) 13 BPR 24,431; [2003] NSWSC 161 considered.
As to the Seven Hills Property:
(5) A distinction of substance between the Glenwood Property and Seven Hills property, which the primary judge did not separately consider, was that the latter was financed and purchased for a solely commercial purpose. Although the respondent sought to characterise that business as a partnership, such a characterisation was inconsistent with her role as found by the primary judge, which was, in effect, that of a clerical assistant. Having regard to the respondent’s contributions, the acquisition of the Seven Hills Property did not form part of the joint endeavour: [94], [99]-[100], [118]-[119], [133], [154].
Parij v Parij (1997) 72 SASR 153; Read v Nicholls [2004] VSC 66 considered.
Judgment
MITCHELMORE JA: This is an appeal from a decision of Sackar J, who declared that the appellant, the New South Wales Trustee and Guardian, holds 50 per cent of two properties for the benefit of the respondent, Ms Nicolitsa Togias, pursuant to a remedial constructive trust: Togias v State of New South Wales & Anor [2021] NSWSC 1588. The two properties are respectively located in Glenwood (“the Glenwood Property”) and Seven Hills (“the Seven Hills Property”), in New South Wales.
The Glenwood Property and the Seven Hills Property were registered in the name of the respondent’s former de facto partner, Mr Wayan Arya Subakti. The respondent and Mr Subakti were in a relationship between 1998 and January 2010. On 29 January 2010, the respondent ended the relationship when she was notified of Mr Subakti’s arrest on a drug-related charge. Mr Subakti was subsequently convicted of the charge and sentenced to a period of imprisonment.
On 5 May 2014, on the application of the NSW Crime Commission, the Supreme Court made a Forfeiture Order, pursuant to the Criminal Assets Recovery Act 1990 (NSW) (“CAR Act”), in relation to Mr Subakti’s interest in property, including the Glenwood Property and the Seven Hills Property. In the proceedings before the primary judge, the respondent contended that the Forfeiture Order did not cover her beneficial interest in the two properties.
The primary judge concluded that a remedial constructive trust arose by reason of the indirect contributions that the respondent had made, through homemaking and domestic duties as well as work that she undertook in Mr Subakti’s business. By its Notice of Appeal, the appellant contends that the conclusion of the primary judge was the product of a number of errors. Its primary contention is that his Honour erred in finding that the respondent had established a joint relationship and endeavour to which she had contributed, so as to give rise to a remedial constructive trust of the type described by the High Court in Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137; [1987] HCA 59 (“Baumgartner”).
For the reasons I set out below, I consider that his Honour did not err in concluding that there was a joint endeavour between the respondent and Mr Subakti of a nature that was capable of giving rise to a remedial constructive trust with respect to the Glenwood Property. However, his Honour erred in concluding that the maxim “equity is equality” applied so as to confer on the respondent a beneficial interest in that property as to 50 per cent. I also consider that his Honour erred in concluding that the Seven Hills Property was acquired as part of and for the purpose of a joint endeavour as between the respondent and Mr Subakti, so as to give rise to a constructive trust with respect to that property.
Background to the proceedings
There was no dispute as to the background to the proceedings before the primary judge, although the parties emphasised different aspects of the evidence for the purposes of their respective arguments. In what follows, I have relied primarily on the summary and findings of the primary judge.
The relationship between the respondent and Mr Subakti
The respondent met Mr Subakti in mid to late 1997, when she was working in a café. In late 1998, when the respondent was 20 years old, she and Mr Subakti commenced a romantic relationship: [6], [105]. The respondent’s first child with Mr Subakti was born on 7 January 2001; the second was born on 25 May 2005: [9], [11], [111].
In or around December 2000, Mr Subakti purchased a property in Fullagar Road, Wentworthville (“the Wentworthville Property”) for $235,000. The respondent had accompanied Mr Subakti on property inspections and he consulted with her on which property was best for them: [105]. The primary judge observed that it was unclear precisely how the purchase price for this property was funded, although it was common ground that Mr Subakti had received an award of compensation of $200,000 in relation to an industrial accident, which was reduced by legal fees and expenses to $180,000: [5], [125].
Also in late 2000, Mr Subakti started a business as a sole trader, called “Bio-Form” (“the Bio-Form business”): [8]. It appears to have been a local distribution operation for a parent company in the USA. Following their move to the Wentworthville Property, the respondent and Mr Subakti began to concentrate more on the business, selling products to retail outlets and operating as a wholesaler.
The respondent’s evidence was that she was responsible for “the housework, the grocery shopping, and sometimes the cooking”: [105]. She also worked in the Bio-Form business. According to the respondent, she promoted the products at shopping centres, placed advertisements and organised mail-outs. As English was not Mr Subakti’s first language, the respondent also communicated with the director of the Bio-Form company in the United States, organised import permits and deliveries, and issued tax invoices to customers: [106]. In late 2002 or early 2003, at the respondent’s suggestion, the couple leased a retail store in the Liverpool shopping area, which they opened in about July 2003: [108]. The respondent’s evidence was that in these early days, she worked in the store seven days a week: [109]. She also continued to market the Bio-Form products to wholesale customers.
On 1 May 2003, the Glenwood Property was purchased for $690,000 in Mr Subakti’s name; settlement occurred on 24 July 2003. The respondent accompanied Mr Subakti to arrange finance for the property, and was told that the loan should be in Mr Subakti’s name “because of her lack of credit history”: [109]. The evidence was unclear as to precisely how the purchase price was funded. Perpetual Trustees Victoria Ltd provided a loan of $552,000: [126]. There was a particular dispute about the provenance of $37,000, which his Honour considered was not sufficiently explained in the absence of evidence from Mr Subakti: [127]. The Bio-Form business did not make a profit in any relevant year.
In about July 2004, the respondent and Mr Subakti moved the business to different retail premises, still in Liverpool: [110]. In the first half of 2005, they attended a meeting with their accountant and were advised to operate their business through a company: [112]. On 1 August 2005, Bio-Form Nutrition Australia Pty Ltd was incorporated, with Mr Subakti the sole director and shareholder: [12], [112]. In about September 2006, the couple moved the Bio-Form business into premises at Liverpool Westfield: [112].
All of the income from the business was paid into Mr Subakti’s personal bank accounts or into the company’s bank account after its incorporation. The loan repayments for the Glenwood Property and household expenses were drawn from Mr Subakti’s account: [113]. The respondent continued to work in the Bio-Form business but she did not receive a wage (until around November 2014).
On 11 July 2006, Mr Subakti was charged with possession of a prescribed restricted substance, namely, 180 x 20mg tablets of Tamoxifen contrary to s 16 of the Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act 1966 (Cth): [13]. On 21 February 2007, he was convicted in the Local Court at Liverpool.
In mid-2007, Mr Subakti was admitted to hospital with acute renal failure, following which he received lengthy dialysis treatment every second day until undergoing a kidney transplant: [14]. The respondent looked after Mr Subakti between mid-2007 and 2009, including following his kidney transplant: [114].
In early 2008, the respondent and Mr Subakti began looking for a warehouse to store the Bio-Form products. In May 2008, the Seven Hills Property was purchased for $342,000, in Mr Subakti’s name: [15]. The respondent said that the purchase was partly financed using a re-draw facility secured on the Glenwood Property, together with a business loan from Westpac which was secured by a first mortgage over the Seven Hills property: [115]. The primary judge found that the purchase was funded in part by a loan from Delta Home Loans of $106,000 and an amount from Westpac of $239,400: [128]. As to the Delta Home Loans loan, his Honour found that there were two deposits into that loan account; one in May 2008 from an account in Indonesia, and one in August 2008: [129]. His Honour found that the deposits from Indonesia were not credibly capable of explanation, and none was forthcoming from Mr Subakti: [141].
Between May 2008 and May 2010, the respondent and Mr Subakti used the Seven Hills Property as an office, warehouse, and storage facility for the Bio-Form business: [16], [115]. According to the respondent, they made loan repayments on the Seven Hills Property using income from the Bio-Form business: [115]. Ultimately, the primary judge did not make a finding specifically in relation to this evidence, although as will be seen below his Honour considered the financial position of the Bio-Form business in some detail.
Cessation of the relationship
On 29 January 2010, Mr Subakti was charged with supplying 279 grams of cocaine: [18]. It is common ground that the respondent ended her relationship with Mr Subakti that day: [18]. On 2 December 2011, he was convicted in the District Court at Parramatta of supply prohibited drug in a commercial quantity and was sentenced to a period of imprisonment.
The respondent’s evidence was that she continued to operate the Bio-Form business after Mr Subakti was arrested and their relationship ceased. However, she found it difficult to obtain loans or funds for the cashflow of the business and her personal expenses, as she did not have a credit history: [117]. The respondent used Centrelink payments that she received for business and living expenses and received loans from family members.
On 1 April 2010, the respondent was appointed director and secretary of Bio-Form Nutrition Australia Pty Ltd, and Mr Subakti ceased to hold those positions: [20]. She continued to operate the business through that company until 2015: [118]. In that year, the company went into liquidation and was deregistered: [29], [32]. From 2015 onwards the respondent continued to operate the business through another company that the accountant had arranged to be incorporated, Bio-Form Sports Nutrition Pty Ltd. Without making a positive finding, the primary judge observed that this appeared to be a “phoenix operation”: [155].
In around May 2010, the respondent arranged to lease the Seven Hills Property to a third party: [21], [119]. The amount of the rental payments exceeded the amount of the mortgage and outgoings: [165].
Upon his release on parole on 29 January 2014, Mr Subakti returned to live at the Glenwood Property with the respondent and their two daughters. Although they were living together, the respondent said that she and Mr Subakti remained separated. Nevertheless, the judge accepted he was available to give evidence to support her assertions and was not called: [161].
NSW Crime Commission proceedings against Mr Subakti
On 15 February 2010, the NSW Crime Commission filed a summons in the Supreme Court seeking a restraining order in respect of Mr Subakti’s property under s 10A of the CAR Act (“the 2010 proceedings”): [19]. On 18 February 2010 and 8 March 2012, caveats were respectively placed on the Glenwood Property and Seven Hills Property.
On 5 May 2014, the Supreme Court made orders by consent in the 2010 proceedings, pursuant to s 22 of the CAR Act, forfeiting Mr Subakti’s interests in property to the Crown. The six-month period precluding the appellant from taking possession of the Properties ended on 5 November 2014: [27]. It was around this time that the respondent started paying herself a wage: [28], [113].
On 1 August 2014, Mr Subakti applied by way of a notice of motion for exclusion orders under s 25 of the CAR Act in respect of the Glenwood Property and the Seven Hills Property. In early 2016, Hall J heard Mr Subakti’s application along with an application by the NSW Crime Commission for a proceeds assessment order under s 27 of the CAR Act. On 6 October 2016, his Honour entered judgment for the NSW Crime Commission; and on 24 October 2016, his Honour made proceeds assessment orders in the amount of $899,739: New South Wales Crime Commission v Subakti [2016] NSWSC 1421: [321].
In 2016, the respondent also filed a summons in the Supreme Court, seeking exclusion orders under ss 25 and 26 the CAR Act in respect of the Glenwood Property and the Seven Hills Property. In 2017, while these proceedings were on foot, Mr Subakti was charged with further drug supply and possession offences and reincarcerated until March 2020: [33]-[34]. On 22 October 2019, RA Hulme J dismissed the respondent’s application on the basis that she was not the de facto partner of Mr Subakti when the assets forfeiture order was sought (in April 2014) and made (on 5 May 2014): Togias v New South Wales Crime Commission [2019] NSWSC 1556. On 7 November 2019, his Honour also dismissed the respondent’s application for payment of an amount of the proceeds of the sale of forfeited property on the basis of hardship pursuant to s 24 of the CAR Act.
Although his Honour dismissed the proceedings, RA Hulme J was satisfied that the respondent had no prior knowledge of any serious crime-related activities or illegal activities of Mr Subakti before his arrest in 2010. The appellant did not challenge that finding in these proceedings: [147].
The decision of the primary judge
By her further amended statement of claim in the Equity Division, the respondent sought a series of declarations in the alternative, the primary one being:
“A declaration that the plaintiff and the defendants held their respective legal and beneficial interests in the properties located at [Glenwood and Seven Hills] upon trust to repay to each of them their respective contributions, and as to the residue, for the plaintiff and the defendants in equal shares; or alternatively, for the plaintiff and the defendants, having regard to their respective contributions and capital appreciation.”
The case for the respondent relied primarily on her evidence, in an affidavit sworn on 2 October 2020. She was cross-examined about her knowledge of the Bio-Form business, but not about the non-financial contributions that she said she had made during the course of her relationship with Mr Subakti, including her work in the Bio-Form business. The primary judge summarised the respondent’s claim of beneficial interest as resting on “the matter being a contributions case in the sense of Muschinski and Baumgartner”, referring there respectively to Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; [1985] HCA 78 (“Muschinski”) and Baumgartner: [64]. The respondent submitted that:
(1)the Bio-Form business in its various iterations was established “with the common intention of the [respondent] and Mr Subakti that his interest in the business and the income earned in the course of operating the business, was held for the benefit of the joint relationship between him and the plaintiff and for the purpose of enhancing their joint wealth and welfare”: [67];
(2)the relationship had broken down without attributable blame: [68]; and
(3)it would be unconscionable for the defendants to deny her beneficial interest in the two properties: [72], having regard to:
(a)her contributions before 29 January 2010 largely as a homemaker in a domestic setting; and
(b)after that date, her contributions in terms of causing and ensuring that all principal and interest repayments had been made in respect of the Glenwood Property, along with payments of outgoings, which had staved off a mortgagee sale and caused capital appreciation: [78].
The evidence for the appellant, which his Honour accepted, was directed towards “[identifying] the source of funds used to purchase the properties or to leave unanswered the origins of some amounts to suggest they were derived from illicit activities”: [121]. The appellant contended that any common intention or joint endeavour which may have existed by which the respondent would acquire a beneficial interest in the Glenwood Property and Seven Hills Property ended on the day that she ended the relationship with Mr Subakti: [79]. Before that time, she had not contributed money or other property to the acquisition of either property: [81].
In so far as the respondent had worked in the Bio-Form business without pay, the appellant submitted that she did so only to develop the business: [82]. Further, in circumstances where the business expenses were approximately equal to income, the appellant submitted that the funds which financed the loan repayments and other expenses of the joint relationship were “entirely, or primarily, from unidentified sources”: [82]. The appellant submitted that the evidence did not support the respondent’s contentions in the further amended statement of claim, in particular that the Glenwood and Seven Hills Properties were acquired using funds from the Bio-Form business and that income from the business was applied to loan repayments and other expenses: [93].
As to the respondent’s reliance on Muschinski and Baumgartner, the appellant contended that she had not contributed any money or property to the relationship and there was no pooling of earnings: [96]. Her unpaid work for the Bio-Form business was insufficient to establish an interest in the two properties, having regard to the income and expenses of the business and the likelihood that it was not the source of contributions to the acquisition or retention of those properties: [97]. Further, the respondent failed, in its submission, to discharge her onus of proving a “joint relationship or endeavour” and that the parties had made contributions on that basis: [98].
In his Honour’s judgment of 10 December 2021, the primary judge set out the above background before turning to a consideration of the applicable principles. His Honour set out a comprehensive summary of the position regarding the development of the principles concerning constructive trusts following Baumgartner: [40]-[48]. His Honour also considered at some length the maxim that equity is equality, describing it as reflecting “the flexibility with which Baumgartner constructive trust cases can be applied”: [49]-[62].
The primary judge commenced his consideration of the competing submissions by describing the matter as “an unusual case”: [122]. His Honour was satisfied that the respondent “never made and indeed was simply incapable of making any direct contribution to the purchase of any assets, property or chattels”: [122].
In relation to the Bio-Form business, it became clear to his Honour in the course of the respondent’s evidence that she “did not have a detailed appreciation of the financial situation of Mr Subakti nor for that matter the Bio-Form business”, describing her knowledge as being “of a most vague and general nature”: [123]. He later referred to her lack of qualifications, and lack of experience in the products the subject of the Bio-Form business: [158]. Ultimately, his Honour characterised the respondent’s contribution to the business as that of “a clerical assistant attending to simple record keeping tasks”: [158]. His Honour then stated at [159]:
“The [respondent] does assert that she was party to discussions with Mr Subakti from time to time when he acquired the properties at Wentworthville (December 1999), Glenwood (2003) and Seven Hills (2008). She also asserts that she kept house, cooked and cleaned from time to time but was never in a position to make any direct financial contribution to the acquisition of any assets. I am satisfied the substance of that evidence is accurate and truthful. Indeed it is unchallenged.”
Although the respondent made no direct financial contribution to the acquisition of the two properties, or the Bio-Form business, his Honour stated that, “like so many women she did substantially contribute in an indirect way”: [143]. His Honour continued, at [144]:
“She supported Mr Subakti when he was deciding to purchase assets, was a homemaker, the mother of his two children and more to the point, worked in or in connection with his business.”
His Honour considered that the respondent had “exaggerated some of her evidence”, without identifying in what respects. Having regard to questions that his Honour asked of the respondent during her cross-examination, this observation may have related to her claim to have worked in the retail premises of the Bio-Form business at all times. (It was apparent from her evidence that at some point Mr Subakti had instructed the respondent not to attend the shop, instead inviting the woman with whom he was having an affair to work there: [157].) His Honour’s observation may also have related to her evidence in response to questions about the business, which she was either unable to answer or able to answer only in vague and general terms.
What was significant to his Honour was the motivation for her exaggerations, being “an understandable desire to salvage something out of what in many respects has been a disastrous relationship”: [145]. His Honour described the relationship as “marred … by Mr Subakti’s controlling, disrespectful and violent aggressive behaviour”: [156]. On “numerous occasions” Mr Subakti lied to the respondent, including about his age, his previous relationship and the children thereof, and criminal activity in which he engaged during the time of that relationship: [156]. He was also unfaithful: [157]. His Honour was satisfied that the respondent’s efforts “were frequently underestimated and hence underappreciated”, with much of what she did being “behind the scenes”: [148]. His Honour continued:
“The mere fact that Mr Subakti had everything in his name and never it seems, on the evidence, gave much thought to the financial wellbeing of his partner and it seems his two daughters does not mean the [respondent] is not in equity entitled to have her not inconsiderable efforts recognised.”
In relation to the Bio-Form business, his Honour referred to the evidence of Ms Holz, who had analysed its financial position (using records from the Australian Taxation Office) and the home loan payments for the Glenwood Property between 2004 and 2010. According to Ms Holz, the income and expenditure for those financial years, on average, disclosed losses (with the exception of a small profit in two financial years): [131]. On the basis of Mr Subakti’s tax returns from 2005 to 2010, the salary he received from Bio-Form Nutrition Australia Pty Ltd varied from $35,665 at its highest, to $6,150 at its lowest: [132]. Having regard to other bank records, Mr Subakti’s ownership of luxury vehicles and share purchases, and the amount of cash found in his possession, at the Bio-Form shop and at the Glenwood Property at the time of his arrest, his Honour found that Mr Subakti had access to alternative sources of funding, the provenance of which was unknown: [134]-[138]. His Honour stated in this regard at [140]:
“Mr Subakti had been incarcerated on two occasions relating to drug offences and so therefore trying to make entire sense of the financial situation is a somewhat futile and idle endeavour. It is clear that on Ms Holz’s analysis the net income from Bio-Form would likely have been insufficient to make the loan repayments to Perpetual on the Glenwood property. The annual periodical payments on Glenwood for the period 2004 to 2010 were approximately $40,000. In the same period the expenditure approximated [or] slightly exceeded its [the business’] income.”
Although it was undeniable that some of the sales of Bio-Form were for legitimate goods, his Honour described it as “impossible” to say how much: [142]. At the same time, it was “inescapable”, in his Honour’s view, that “money was coming from another source other than sales through the Bio-Form business for Mr Subakti to maintain his and the [respondent’s] lifestyle, with property purchases, stock, cars and shares”: [142].
On the issue of the existence or otherwise of a common intention, the respondent gave no evidence of having any conversation with Mr Subakti in which he acknowledged that she had an interest of any kind in the Glenwood Property or the Seven Hills Property: [152]. The properties were in his name, and all relevant bank accounts were in his name or the company’s name: [152]. The respondent was also unable to provide anything except high level explanations when asked about the business and various discrepancies between income and expenditure: [153]. His Honour contrasted this with her “plight” following Mr Subakti’s arrest in 2010, when she had to source funds from her sister and even from her daughter, which was “suggestive of the fact that Mr Subakti made monies available from his criminal activities for the business and maintenance of the couple’s lifestyle”: [153]. His Honour stated at [154]:
“The [respondent] clearly assisted Mr Subakti in the running of what was obviously ‘his’ business both when he was and when he was not incarcerated although under a different name. She ‘paid’ expenses from time to time from the business when Mr Subakti was in gaol. I am satisfied she managed the business and organised the payment of expenses. However apart from foregoing a wage there is no evidence before the court which would permit an accurate calculation to be done on the basis for example of how much she would have been paid if employed at arm’s length. She does say at one point she started paying herself a wage, there is no evidence about what that was.”
Ultimately, his Honour concluded that the contributions the respondent had made were not the result of a common intention, stating at [161]:
“There is really no dispute on the evidence that as Mr Subakti’s partner she did over the years leading to their relationship ending make substantial indirect contributions. The question though is whether that was as a result of a common intention as understood in the authorities. I think not. I am unable to find in the evidence as a matter of fact the requisite intention. I am fortified in that finding by reason of a failure on the [respondent’s] part to call Mr Subakti.”
The primary judge next turned to examine “whether in the absence of such a common intention [the respondent] is entitled to a finding of a remedial constructive trust”: [162]. His Honour set out his reasons for affirmatively answering that question at [162]-[163]:
“In that situation the inquiry the Court must undertake is not as to the actual presumed intentions of the parties, but rather whether it would be a fraud on the party in question to deny the trust. Despite this, intention is not entirely irrelevant as it must be shown that the benefit or money contributed to the acquisition of the property was on the basis and for the purposes of the joint relationship. Further, it is plain from the authorities that a finding of a Baumgartner constructive trust cannot be based on general notions of fairness. To some extent the question is addressed by an analysis of the financial circumstances of the parties.
The mere fact that the [respondent] cannot show the exact money she contributed is not fatal. I am satisfied that she did borrow funds and deferred wages to contribute to the properties. Furthermore, as I have already said, she has made significant contributions, financial and otherwise, to the maintenance of the properties, the business and has brought up the children of her and Mr Subakti’s former relationship. I am therefore satisfied that a remedial constructive trust should be imposed.”
In terms of quantifying the respondent’s beneficial interest, his Honour had earlier stated that “[t]his is not a case where a simple mathematical calculation is possible”: [146]. At [164]-[165], his Honour considered the maxim “equity is equality”, stating:
“While recognising that the maxim should not be applied in lieu of difficult calculations, this is a case, in line with authorities, where resort to its guidance is in my view more than appropriate. Here, it would be almost impossible to precisely calculate the total sum of the plaintiff’s contributions financial and otherwise. Therefore, in applying the maxim I would find that the beneficial interest ought to be shared equally. The [respondent] was not challenged on her evidence as to the significant non-financial efforts she has undertaken and I am not satisfied that the [appellant] has established that the position should be otherwise.
Although the relationship between the [respondent] and Mr Subakti ended in 2010, her efforts in the Bio-Form business and in borrowing funds where needed have managed in practical reality to maintain both properties concerned. The rent exceeds the outgoings of the Seven Hills Property. The [respondent] facilitated the payment of expenses relating to the Glenwood Property excluding the rates. As a result of my judgment there will need to be further debate about precisely the form of relief that I will grant …”
The appeal to this Court
The notice of appeal contains five grounds of appeal. The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in holding that the respondent had established that she and Mr Subakti formed a “joint relationship and endeavour” pursuant to which she made contributions to the acquisition of the Glenwood Property and the Seven Hills Property (Ground 1). Grounds 2 to 4 posit various errors that his Honour made as to how that contribution was said to be established, including by the respondent:
(1)forgoing a wage for her work in the Bio-Form business (Ground 2);
(2)being a homemaker and mother to Mr Subakti’s children (Ground 3); and
(3)incurring borrowings and expenses after their relationship ended (Ground 4).
As part of Ground 2, the appellant also contends that his Honour erred in relying on the respondent having contributed to the Bio-Form business in circumstances where she had not established that any legitimate funds from that business had been put towards the two properties.
If the appellant does not succeed on the other grounds, Ground 5 alleges that his Honour erred in applying the maxim “equity is equality” and holding that the beneficial interest in the Glenwood Property and Seven Hills Property should be shared equally.
The submissions of the appellant
In oral submissions, Senior Counsel for the appellant described the central issue in the appeal as the proper application of the principles in Baumgartner. He submitted that the primary judge had impermissibly expanded the operation of the principles that were applied in that case, beyond the manner in which they had been applied in intermediate courts of appeal.
In relation to the facts, the appellant acknowledged that the respondent had worked without pay in the Bio-Form business and was a homemaker. Before the end of the relationship, she had made no direct financial contribution to the acquisition of the Glenwood Property or the Seven Hills Property. In so far as the primary judge relied, at [163], on the respondent having made significant contributions of a financial kind, she had done so only in the period after the relationship ended. This was specifically the subject of Ground 4, with the appellant submitting that whatever might have been the position before 29 January 2010, after that time the respondent’s contribution could not come within the Baumgartner principles. That said, the appellant accepted that adjustments would need to be made to reflect the payments the respondent had made with respect to the Glenwood Property after the relationship ended.
As to the period before the relationship ended, the appellant submitted that the respondent had not established a joint endeavour as between her and Mr Subakti for the purpose of which the Glenwood Property and the Seven Hills Property were acquired. The appellant submitted that Baumgartner entailed a pooling of resources with the intention to enhance the material wellbeing of both parties to the de facto relationship. Senior counsel relied in this respect on the reasons of Murray J in Lloyd v Tedesco (2002) 25 WAR 360; [2002] WASCA 63 at [16].
The appellant submitted that there was no evidence before the primary judge of a joint endeavour in support of which the respondent contributed to the Bio-Form business, including by forgoing a wage, for the purpose of adding to the wealth of the family in a manner which was referable to the two properties. Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that such evidence could have been given by the respondent, for example as to conversations she had with Mr Subakti or as to the purpose for which she made the contributions. The respondent could also have called Mr Subakti to give such evidence.
Instead, as his Honour found, the respondent had no involvement in the financing of the Bio-Form business, nor did she have any understanding of the business. The appellant submitted that having regard to the evidence, his Honour should have found that the respondent worked in the Bio-Form business as an incident of the domestic relations between her and Mr Subakti. As she had little in the way of experience and had never worked, the respondent was not giving away income that she might otherwise have earned, let alone for the purposes of a joint endeavour.
In relation to Ground 3, the appellant emphasised the need for the joint endeavour to be referable to the two properties in question. By reference to the evidence of Ms Holz, Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that the money for the Glenwood Property did not come from the Bio-Form business, but from Mr Subakti individually. The appellant submitted that the respondent could not establish that her work in the business was such that she made a contribution to the Glenwood Property. The situation was even less favourable for her in relation to the Seven Hills Property. In the appellant’s submission, there was no basis for concluding that the source of the funds for payments on that property was legitimate.
Finally, in relation to Ground 5, the appellant submitted that the respondent had not established what any of her contributions were. In the absence of such evidence, the appellant submitted that the Court should not be persuaded that the principle “equity is equality” should be applied. The appellant contended that the primary judge had impermissibly extended Baumgartner in his application of the “equity is equality” maxim.
The submissions of the respondent
The respondent contended that the primary judge correctly concluded that she substantially contributed to acquiring and maintaining the Bio-Form business and the two properties, in addition to bringing up the couple’s children. In oral submissions, Senior Counsel for the respondent emphasised that there was no challenge to her evidence about the nature of the relationship, and the domestic and work duties she performed. That evidence supported that she and Mr Subakti essentially worked in a partnership in which she looked after the home and children and assisted with the business for their mutual benefit. Working together, they had built up shared equity in both a residential property and a business property.
As a matter of principle, nothing turned on whether the asset constituted accommodation or a business, or whether the respondent’s contributions were financial or non-financial, courts having recognised the validity of the latter. The respondent contended in this respect that the appellant’s reliance on remunerated work was misplaced: what mattered was the pooling of labour towards a common end. It was clear from her evidence that she and Mr Subakti had worked in the home (largely her doing) and in the business, combining their assets and their labour. It was impossible to reach the conclusion that someone in her position would have performed all of the work that she did without any expectation of receiving something in return in terms of an equity in the event that the relationship came to an end.
The respondent submitted that the appellant sought to identify error by reference to a false premise, namely, that she and Mr Subakti intended to pool their resources. She contended that nothing in Baumgartner required any such intention. Rather, a trust may be presumed in the absence of express intention, from the contribution of a party to the means of acquisition. Senior Counsel for the respondent observed in this respect that “[e]quity acts negatively to prevent one party to the relationship from obtaining an advantage”. It followed that the absence of evidence from Mr Subakti was of no practical significance. Further, and in any event, she submitted that Mr Subakti was not naturally “in her camp”, relying in this respect on evidence she gave in re-examination about the difficulties of their relationship.
As to Ground 3, the respondent submitted that it was not relevant to focus on how Mr Subakti funded the acquisitions of property. If this Court accepted, as had the primary judge, that the respondent made substantial contributions, equity’s conscience was enlivened once it became clear that someone, being the appellant (standing in Mr Subakti’s shoes), chose to assert full legal ownership. What was important, Senior Counsel contended, was vindication of the respondent’s rights in the face of unconscionable conduct by the legal owner. The respondent relied in this respect on the decision of the Court of Appeal in Green v Green (1989) 17 NSWLR 343 and the decision of Campbell J in West v Mead (2003) 13 BPR 24,431; [2003] NSWSC 161.
In relation to Ground 4, the respondent observed that after January 2010, she had continued to pay the mortgage in relation to the Glenwood Property, thereby preserving the trust property. Senior Counsel submitted that the respondent’s evidence in answer to questions on this topic eloquently summed up why a court of equity would intervene, with the respondent stating that she was unaware of the finality of the situation and believed that she had an equitable interest, being the mother of his children and living in the home. In relation to the Seven Hills Property, the respondent accepted that the lease of that property from May 2010 meant that the rent exceeded the mortgage repayment and outgoings. However, she relied on the fact that from the earliest stage of the business Mr Subakti and the respondent were working together, and that same business was the reason the Seven Hills Property was purchased.
Finally, in relation to Ground 5, the respondent submitted that the “equity is equality” maxim had the practical advantage of sparing the Court from complex factual enquiries as to the parties’ respective beneficial interests. In her submission, once the claimant’s contributions were shown to be substantial, the principle applied and the onus shifted to the party insisting that title should be held unequally. In the present case, the starting point was the respondent’s substantial contributions, on a domestic level and to the business. In so far as the appellant sought to rely on Mr Subakti’s illegal activities, the respondent submitted that involved an inversion of the principle of clean hands.
Consideration
Applicable principles
The simplicity with which the elements that must be satisfied to establish a joint endeavour constructive trust may be expressed belies the difficulty that can attend the application of those elements, and, if satisfied, determining the terms of the trust. The authors of Jacobs’ Law of Trusts in Australia (8th ed, 2016, LexisNexis Butterworths) expressed the view that what remains unclear is “when and why the interposition of equity to prevent unconscientious reliance on legal rights in the Australian cases will give rise in equity to a proprietary rather than a personal right, and a proprietary right which is a constructive trust ‘fashioned’ by the court”: at [13-53]. The absence of clarity is more acute where, as here, the contributions relied on for the existence of a constructive trust are indirect and primarily of a non-financial character.
In Woods v McKinlay (No 2) [2021] NSWSC 1510 at [231], Parker J distilled the principles in Baumgartner regarding a joint endeavour constructive trust as requiring satisfaction of the following elements:
“(1) the formation of a joint endeavour between the parties;
(2) the acquisition of property pursuant to that joint endeavour; and
(3) the premature termination of the joint endeavour, leaving one part [sic] with a legal interest which that party was not intended to enjoy beneficially in those circumstances.”
See also, for example, West v Mead (2003) 13 BPR 24,431; [2003] NSWSC 161 at [58]-[62]; Australian Building & Technical Solutions Pty Ltd v Boumelhem [2009] NSWSC 460 at [51]-[53]; Austin v Hornby (2011) 16 BPR 30,623; [2011] NSWSC 1059 at [158]; Craig v Silverbrook [2013] NSWSC 1687 at [104]; Zhang v Metcalf [2020] NSWCA 228 at [57].
In Muschinski, the elements that Parker J subsequently summarised in Woods were readily ascertainable. Mrs Muschinski and Mr Dodds both held a legal interest in the property in issue, as tenants in common. Despite their shared legal interest, Mrs Muschinski had paid the whole of the purchase price. She had done so in circumstances where she and Mr Dodds had agreed to develop and use the land together, and Mr Dodds’ contribution was to put in the time, effort and funds to develop the property: at 610. As matters transpired, and without any suggestion of blame, “the substratum … of that arrangement … was largely removed and their joint project was abandoned”: at 610. Thus it transpired that Mr Dodds held a legal interest as to half of the property, as a tenant in common, in circumstances to which the parties did not advert and in which it was not specifically intended or specially provided that he should enjoy such a benefit.
Deane J described the constructive trust as developing, as had the other types of trust, “as a remedial relationship superimposed upon common law rights by order of the Chancery Court”. Unlike express and implied trusts, however, the constructive trust “arises regardless of intention”, such that its rationale “must still be found essentially in its remedial function which it has predominantly retained”: at 613. The remedy was not available merely because it would be unjust or unfair in a situation of discord for the owner of a legal estate to assert ownership against another. Rather, it would “properly be available if applicable principles of the law of equity require that the person in whom the ownership of property is vested should hold it to the use or for the benefit of another”. Notions of fairness and justice remained relevant “to the traditional equitable notion of unconscionable conduct which persists as an operative component of some fundamental rules or principles of modern equity”: at 616.
Deane J observed that both common law and equity recognised that “where money or other property is paid or applied on the basis of some consensual joint relationship or endeavour which fails without attributable blame, it will often be inappropriate simply to draw a line leaving assets and liabilities to be owned and borne according to where they may prima facie lie, as a matter of law, at the time of the failure”: at 618. His Honour referred in this context to the circumstances in which equity comes to the aid of a fixed term partner who has paid a premium, on premature dissolution of the partnership; and to the aid of a joint venturer in the event of premature collapse of the joint venture, precluding the attainment of the commercial advantage. Observing that the prima facie rules were properly to be seen as “instances of a more general principle of equity” (at 618-619), his Honour described that more general principle at 619-620 (citations omitted; see also at 599 per Mason J):
“Like most of the traditional doctrines of equity, it operates upon legal entitlement to prevent a person from asserting or exercising a legal right in circumstances where the particular assertion or exercise of it would constitute unconscionable conduct. The circumstances giving rise to the operation of the principle were broadly identified by Lord Cairns LC, speaking for the Court of Appeal in Chancery, in Atwood v Maude: where ‘the case is one in which, using the words of Lord Cottenham in Hirst v Tolson, a payment has been made by anticipation of something afterwards to be enjoyed [and] where … circumstances arise so that future enjoyment is denied’. Those circumstances can be more precisely defined by saying that the principle operates in a case where the substratum of a joint relationship or endeavour is removed without attributable blame and where the benefit of money or other property contributed by one party on the basis and for the purposes of the relationship or endeavour would otherwise be enjoyed by the other party in circumstances in which it was not specifically intended or specially provided that that other party should so enjoy it. The content of the principle is that, in such a case, equity will not permit that other party to assert or retain the benefit of the relevant property to the extent that it would be unconscionable for him to do so.”
The latter part of this passage was picked up by the majority in Baumgartner, to which I will return. Staying with Muschinski, Deane J observed that the operation of the principle precluded Mr Dodds from asserting or retaining, against Mrs Muschinski, his one-half legal ownership of the property to the extent that it would be unconscionable for him to do so. In this context, notions of what was fair and just were relevant “only in the confined context of determining whether conduct should, by reference to legitimate processes of legal reasoning, be characterized as unconscionable for the purposes of a specific principle of equity whose rationale and operation is to prevent wrongful and undue advantage being taken by one party of a benefit derived at the expense of the other party in the special circumstances of the unforeseen and premature collapse of a joint relationship or endeavour”: at 621.
If no more than a commercial relationship had been involved, Deane J considered that Mr Dodds’ conduct in seeking to retain the unfair advantage of unforeseen circumstances by asserting his legal entitlement to a one-half interest in the property without any adjustment to compensate Mrs Muschinski would “plainly be unconscionable”: at 621. As his Honour recognised, the relationship between the parties was “a mixture of the commercial and the personal”, with the personal relationship providing the context and explaining the content of the planned commercial venture: at 621. Relevantly for present purposes, his Honour stated in this context at 621-622:
“If the personal relationship had survived for years after the collapse of the commercial venture and the property had been unmistakenly devoted to serve solely as a mutual home, any assessment of what would and would not constitute unconscionable conduct would obviously be greatly influenced by the special considerations applicable to a case where a husband and wife or persons living in a ‘de facto’ situation contribute, financially and in a variety of other ways, over a lengthy period to the establishment of a joint home. In the forefront of those special considerations there commonly lies a need to take account of a practical equation between direct contributions in money or labour and indirect contributions in other forms such as support, home-making and family care. In fact, of course, the personal relationship also failed in the present case. The Picton property was not devoted to serve as a mutual home for a lengthy period after the collapse of the planned commercial venture. There is no consideration or combination of considerations arising from the personal relationship between the parties which could properly be seen as negating or overriding the unconscionable character of Mr Dodds’ conduct in seeking, in the circumstances, to assert and retain the benefit of a full one-half interest in the property without making any allowance for the fact that Mrs Muschinski has contributed approximately ten-elevenths of the cost of its purchase and actual improvement.”
In Baumgartner, the parties’ respective legal interests regarding the property in issue were as they are in the present case: the respondent held no legal interest, while the appellant held the entirety of that interest. Mason CJ, Wilson and Deane JJ referred with approval to the extract from Deane J’s reasons in Muschinski at 620 which I have set out at [65] above. In applying those reasons to the circumstances in issue, their Honours stated at 148-149:
“In the present case the parties pooled their earnings with a view to meeting all the expenses and outgoings arising from their living together as a family. The individual contributions of each party were not allocated to a particular category or particular categories of expenses and outgoings. The pool of earnings was used to pay outgoings associated with accommodation … as well as other living expenses. There was no suggestion that the respondent’s contributions were paid and received by way of rent or a charge for use and occupation and for living expenses. Such a suggestion would be inconsistent with the relationship that came into existence between the appellant and the respondent, a family relationship which was for the most part until 1982 a long-term stable relationship in which marriage was under continuous contemplation. …
In this situation it is proper to regard the arrangement for the pooling of earnings as one which was designed to ensure that their earnings would be expended for the purposes of their joint relationship and for their mutual security and benefit. To the extent which the pooled funds were the source of payment of mortgage instalments by the appellant, the pooled funds contributed not only to present accommodation expenses but also to the security of the parties’ accommodation in the future. In this context it would be unreal and artificial to say that the respondent intended to make a gift to the appellant of so much of her earnings as were applied in payment or mortgage instalments. There is no evidence which would sustain a finding that the respondent intended to make a gift to the appellant in this way.”
It was in this context that their Honours made the statement that is often cited in subsequent cases, at 149:
“The case is accordingly one in which the parties have pooled their earnings for the purposes of their joint relationship, one of the purposes of that relationship being to secure accommodation for themselves and their child. Their contributions, financial and otherwise, to the acquisition of the land, the building of the house, the purchase of furniture and the making of their home, were on the basis of, and for the purposes of, that joint relationship. In this situation the appellant’s assertion, after the relationship had failed, that the Leumeah property, which was financed in part through the pooled funds, is his sole property, is his property beneficially to the exclusion of any interest at all on the part of the respondent, amounts to unconscionable conduct which attracts the intervention of equity and the imposition of a constructive trust at the suit of the respondent.”
It was unnecessary in either Muschinski or Baumgartner to consider the role of non-financial contributions. In Muschinski, Deane J contemplated that such contributions may have played a role if the personal relationship had survived the commercial, and the parties had continued to live in the property in question. Such contributions (had they been made) may have operated to negate the unconscionability of Mr Dodds retaining a half share in the property without making any allowance for the extent of Ms Muschinski’s contribution. In Baumgartner, Mason CJ, Wilson and Deane JJ contemplated that non-financial contributions may have a role, both as to the nature of the joint endeavour and the question of unconscionability, observing at 149-150:
“Equity favours equality and, in circumstances where the parties have lived together for years and have pooled their resources and their efforts to create a joint home, there is much to be said for the view that they should share the beneficial ownership equally as tenants in common, subject to adjustment to avoid any injustice which would result if account were not taken of the disparity between the worth of their individual contributions either financially or in kind.” (Emphasis added.)
In Baumgartner it was appropriate to make an adjustment by reference to the respective financial contributions of the parties, albeit making an allowance for the respondent’s period of parental leave. In so doing, however, their Honours noted that it had not been suggested “that the difference in the amount of the financial contributions was offset by the greater worth of the respondent’s contribution in other areas”: at 150. Gaudron J, in agreeing, observed that in the context of domestic relationships it would be “relevant to inquire whether the asset was acquired for the purposes of the relationship, and whether non-financial contributions should be taken into account”: at 156.
In Dunne v Turner (unreported, Queensland Court of Appeal, 20 August 1996), Pincus JA, with whom McPherson JA agreed, recognised that there was no binding authority on the question of whether contributions other than financial contributions should be taken into account when considering whether a constructive trust should be imputed. However, his Honour considered that both Muschinski and Baumgartner answered that question affirmatively; see also Miller v Sutherland (1990) 14 Fam LR 416 at 424 per Cohen J; Parijv Parij (1997) 72 SASR 153 at 163 per Debelle J. In Engwirda v Engwirda [2000] QCA 61, the Queensland Court of Appeal (Pincus and Davies JJA, Helman J) referred at [25] to Dunne v Turner in support of the proposition that the contributions made by parties to a relationship need not be of a financial kind.
Accepting that to be so, as Nettle J observed in Read v Nicholls [2004] VSC 66 at [60], neither Muschinski nor Baumgartner explained “how one is to go about placing a value upon contributions of that kind”. In Parij v Parij, the appellant had contended that assets of her husband apart from the family home (in which she was declared to have an interest) were subject to a constructive trust. The appellant made no financial contribution to those specific assets and could point only to her performance of the roles of primary homemaker and caregiver with respect to them. In concluding that the primary judge erred in rejecting the appellant’s contention for a constructive trust in respect of those assets, Debelle J stated at 165-166:
“The parties lived together for almost 17 years in a de facto relationship. The trial judge found that they were generally a loving and devoted couple until the relationship began to deteriorate about a year before the separation. The plaintiff made a financial contribution to family expenditure, although that financial contribution was not as great as that of the defendant. In addition, the plaintiff has performed the roles of homemaker and caregiver for the defendant and the children throughout the period of the relationship. For these reasons, I think that it would be unconscionable for the defendant to retain all of the other assets.”
As to the terms of the constructive trust, Debelle J considered at 166 that the guidelines relating to an assessment of the contributions of the parties to a dissolved marriage were relatively well-established and were relevant. His Honour made particular reference at 167 to the need to examine the facts and circumstances of each case which “may lead to a determination that there should be equality, but equality is not the starting point”. His Honour also observed that substantial, not token, regard should be had to the contribution of the partner who is the homemaker and caregiver; and that, as a general rule, the domestic activities of one partner may properly be regarded as contributing towards the acquisition of property by the other partner through his or her business activities.
Ultimately, Debelle J concluded at 168 that the appellant was entitled to a one-third share in the respondent’s accountancy business and two additional houses. Cox J considered that the appellant was entitled to a 20 per cent share, stating, at 155:
“… it [is] important that when the parties started living together in 1978 they owned practically nothing, that they lived together for 17 years, that there was no general pooling of income, and that while they were at Alice Springs the plaintiff was earning an appreciable income in part-time employment and that for most of their time together in Adelaide she was working full-time.”
In Cressy v Johnson [2009] VSC 52 at [192], Kaye J described the decision in Parij as “the high-water mark” in terms of the favourable application of the principles in Muschinski and Baumgartner to a person claiming a constructive trust over property.
The Court of Appeal in Queensland reached a different result in Engwirda, albeit apparently without being referred to Parij. The appellant in Engwirda submitted that a constructive trust arose as to one half of all of the property owned by her de facto partner (who was a property developer) and companies that he controlled. She submitted that although her partner had no intention of holding any part of his property for her, she had made a contribution to the gaining, improvement or retention of that property, or of property from which that property was derived, on the basis of and for the purposes of their joint relationship. It was therefore unconscionable for the respondent to retain the property entirely upon the failure of the relationship: at [23].
The Court recognised at [25] that contentions of the kind that the appellant was advancing were made and sometimes succeeded “in a context in which both parties to a relationship such as this have provided their resources, in money and labour, for the purpose of acquiring and improving assets to be used by the parties in their joint relationship; usually a residence but sometimes a business in which they were or expected to become involved together”. However, the contentions could not succeed in that case for two reasons, the first of which was outlined at [26]:
“In the first place, the assets acquired were of a purely commercial kind and there was no question of an expectation that both parties would be involved in their use. Where assets acquired in the name of one of the parties are of a domestic kind or comprise a small business in which the parties contemplate working together, domestic work done or domestic payments made by one of the parties can readily be seen as contributing to the acquisition of those assets even where there has been no pooling of funds. But it is much more difficult to see any such nexus between domestic expenditure or work and the acquisition of assets the acquisition of which requires the successful management of a large business enterprise of the kind and size which the first respondent conducted with his brother.”
The second, and related, reason was the nature of the pooling of resources which had occurred in that case, which the Court described as being “of a limited kind and for a limited purpose”: at [27]. The appellant and the first respondent had both contributed financially to the general running of the household, but this did not show “a pooling of resources or any expectation of it except for the limited purpose of running their household and then only in the sense that each contributed labour and money to that purpose, the source of the appellant’s money being, in substantial effect, a gift from the first respondent”: at [27]. The Court did not intend “to denigrate, in any way, the quality or value of the domestic contribution of the appellant to the welfare of the parties and their children”: at [28]. However, it did not follow that such a contribution “had any significant effect on the gaining, improvement or maintenance of the assets from which each derived their separate capital assets and income”: at [29].
The Western Australian Court of Appeal had earlier reached a similar conclusion in Stowe v Stowe (1995) 15 WAR 363. As in Engwirda, the appellant sought a constructive trust with respect to all of the property of her former de facto partner. She relied in this respect on her former partner’s promise that he would marry her and that she would not need to work or make any contribution to acquire and maintain a home for herself and the child of a former relationship. She also relied on promises that particular homes would be the family home. The Court accepted that contributions by a de facto spouse to family welfare had been used to support claims for constructive trusts over family homes, in cases of a common intention: at 373. The Court also accepted that contributions to the family welfare or the parties’ general business activities could support claims for constructive trusts based on unconscionable conduct over other types of properties, where such properties have been improved by the contributions of a spouse: at 374. However, the Court considered that “on existing equitable principles, where there is no common intention to share all the property of one of the spouses, and there is no pooling involving all such property, and where only particular properties (but not all) owned by one spouse have been improved by contributions of the other spouse, contributions by the latter to the general welfare of the parties (whether to the general benefit of the family or to business activities carried on by them) cannot give rise to a constructive trust over all such property”: at 374.
Stowe was decided before Parij but was apparently not drawn to the attention of the South Australian Full Court. Referring to Stowe in Lloyd v Tedesco, Murray J stated at [15]-[16]:
“The important consideration where a claim for equitable relief is based upon unconscionability said to arise in the context of non-material contributions by one de facto spouse is that such contributions be related, where a declaration of trust is sought, to the particular items of property over which it is said the trust should be declared. It may be that one party to a relationship makes an important contribution to the relationship by performing a role of support, a role as caregiver, homemaker and the like. No doubt contributions of that kind will be referable to the mutual affection and concern for each other which the parties have.
But unless the purposes of the provision of a contribution of that kind go further and the court concludes that it is intended to enhance the material wellbeing of both parties, or to provide the contributing party with an interest in specific property, or that it is made upon the basis that that party would have an interest in such property, then it seems to me that equity will not hold to be unconscionable the retention of property in the beneficial ownership of the other party who has directly contributed to the acquisition, maintenance and enhancement of that material wealth or property.” (Emphasis added.)
In addition to Stowe, Murray J relied on the reasons of Gleeson CJ in Green v Green (1989) 17 NSWLR 343 at 353, where his Honour stated that the mere existence of a matrimonial or de facto relationship “combined with express or implied undertakings to provide support and accommodation” would not form a sufficient basis for concluding that there is a constructive trust by virtue of which a proprietary interest in the home occupied by the parties is created. Murray J stated, at [30]-[31]:
“The guiding principle is unconscionability. In this, as in every such case of a failed de facto relationship, there must be more than simply the performance by the plaintiff of the valuable role of the provision of love, care and support. The provision of such a contribution will be sufficient only if it is related in some factual way to the generation of wealth as part of a joint effort or endeavour to provide for the parties’ mutual material welfare and security. That need not, of course, be the only purpose of the provision of such assistance to the defendant, but it must be one of the material purposes because it is that which marks out the character of the joint endeavour as being one which will generate a claim, upon the failure of the relationship, without the fault of the plaintiff, to a share in the property created, acquired, maintained and improved during the course of the relationship, where the endeavour can be seen to be related to particular items of property, or will generate a claim for compensation representing the value of the contribution made by the claimant to the increase in the material wealth which was intended to be enjoyed by the parties jointly.
A joint endeavour of this character is one which has the aim of adding to the parties’ material wealth for their mutual benefit rather than being one where the plaintiff simply provides loving care and support to the defendant as a normal incident of a de facto relationship. In that sense it is right to say that the joint endeavour must be one intentionally or deliberately entered into for the purpose of advancing the parties’ mutual material wealth. Only if it bears that character will it be unconscionable to allow the defendant to retain the entirety of the beneficial interest in that wealth. To hold otherwise, and in particular to hold that it would be sufficient if in fact the efforts of the plaintiff advanced the defendant’s capacity to acquire wealth, would, in my opinion, be to commit the error to which Deane J adverted in Muschinski of giving undue rein to the court’s idiosyncratic notions of fairness and justice.” (Emphasis added.)
Also in Lloyd v Tedesco, Pullin J referred to Parij and agreed with Debelle J that unconscionable conduct had to be shown before relief could be granted. However, his Honour considered that “the factual finding which must be made before coming to consider the issue of unconscionability is that there was a joint enterprise of a commercial nature”: at [83]. In this context, his Honour considered at [87] that the facts in Parij suggested that the South Australian Court had sufficient material before it to infer that there was an intention to be involved in a joint enterprise of that nature:
“Such an inference could be drawn from the fact that, in that case, the parties purchased three houses and put them in joint names; that the plaintiff borrowed money for the purpose of making improvements to a house and repaid the loans; and that sometimes the plaintiff borrowed moneys and the defendant repaid the loans.
Once such an inference was drawn, then it would have been quite correct for the Court to reach the conclusion that it was unconscionable for Mr Parij to seek to deny that Mrs Parij had some interest in the ‘other assets’.”
In Pullin J’s opinion, it was the financial aspects that led to the conclusion in Parij that there was a joint endeavour, with the references to homemaker contributions being “additional matters to note”: at [89]. However, if his Honour was wrong, and Parij should be read as concluding that the mere existence of the de facto relationship and the provision of homemaker duties was enough to ground a claim for a constructive trust over property, his Honour respectfully disagreed with that conclusion: at [90]. Accordingly, his Honour did not accept that even if there were no intention to participate in a joint enterprise in the nature of a commercial venture, the appellant should nevertheless succeed in her claim because of her contributions as a homemaker: at [90].
In referring to the need for a joint enterprise “of a commercial nature”, it may be that his Honour meant no more than what Murray J described as an enterprise “which has the aim of adding to the parties’ material wealth for their mutual benefit rather than being one where the plaintiff simply provides loving care”. So to construe his Honour’s requirement would be consistent with the nature of the assets which were in issue in Parij, being two houses (apart from the family home), one of which was used as a holiday home and the second of which was purchased shortly before the couple separated and into which the respondent moved upon separation. It would also be consistent with the conclusion that Pullin J reached regarding the circumstances in Lloyd: the parties did not own property jointly or live in property jointly owned; the appellant did not share an inheritance that she received with the respondent and instead loaned funds to him (which she later sued to recover); the respondent incorporated companies of which the appellant was not a director or shareholder; and the appellant performed very little work in the respondent’s business: at [91]-[93]. His Honour described these circumstances as “quite different from the circumstances in Parij, and quite different from the circumstances in Baumgartner and Muschinski v Dodds”: at [93].
The point may be illustrated by reference to three cases. In the first, Green v Green,[14] the plaintiff had been brought by Robert Green (deceased at the time of the proceedings) from Thailand as a prepubescent girl. He asked her to come to Australia with him (through an interpreter) promising to look after her, pay for her expenses and arrange for her education.[15] He accommodated her first in a property in Kirrawee and then at Blakehurst. In relation to the acquisition of the property at Kirrawee, Gleeson CJ noted what occurred:[16]
“In 1969 the deceased and the respondent began looking for a house and they found the Kirrawee property. The deceased asked the respondent whether she liked it, to which the respondent replied that she did. Then, according to the respondent, the deceased said: ‘This is your house. I bought this for you’. The house was renovated and the deceased bought furniture for it.
…
In about 1975 there occurred what has been referred [to] as ‘the swap agreement’. Prior to that time the Blakehurst property had been occupied by [the eldest son of the deceased] but in early 1975 his marriage broke down. The deceased informed the respondent that he intended to give the Kirrawee property to [his son] and that she could move into the Blakehurst house. … The deceased said he would ‘fix it up’ and that ‘it would be (her) house’. Work was done on the Blakehurst house over the following couple of months, and the respondent and her children have lived in that house from that time until the present. In about 1976 the deceased instructed his solicitor … to transfer title of the Blakehurst property to the respondent. … For reasons that are not clear, no such transfer occurred.”
[14] (1989) 17 NSWLR 343 (Gleeson CJ, Priestley JA agreeing, Mahoney JA dissenting).
[15] Green at 345-346.
[16] Green at 348B-G.
Referring to the reasons of the trial judge, Gleeson CJ continued:[17]
“… Hodgson J based his conclusion that the respondent had a proprietary interest in the Blakehurst property upon the existence of a constructive trust. It is clear that the mere existence of a matrimonial or de facto relationship, combined with express or implied undertakings to provide support and accommodation, will not form a sufficient basis for concluding that there is a constructive trust by virtue of which a proprietary interest in the home occupied by the parties is created …. In a legal system which does not include concepts of family or community property, and where an obligation on the part of a husband to house and provide for his wife is commonly regarded as an incident of the matrimonial relationship, an undertaking of the kind referred to cannot of itself confer upon a wife a legal or equitable interest in the matrimonial home. … Nevertheless, it is now well-settled that there are circumstances in which a court of equity will intervene to declare the existence of a proprietary interest in a family home on the part of spouse or de facto partner, and the unifying principle under the cases where such intervention is regarded as appropriate is that in the circumstances of the case, and in accordance with equitable doctrines, it would be unconscionable on the part of the person against whom the claim is set up to refuse to recognise the existence of the equitable interest: Baumgartner [at 147.]
The most common case of intervention of that kind to be found in the law reports is the case where the person in whose favour a constructive trust is found has, directly or indirectly, made a financial contribution towards the cost of acquiring, improving or maintaining the property in question.”
[17] Green at 353C-D.
In applying the relevant principles, Gleeson CJ reasoned:[18]
“… [T]he evidence establishes that the deceased, over the entire period of his relationship with the respondent, represented to her that it was his intention that she should have some form of proprietary interest in the homes he provided for her and that, by the time they moved into the Blakehurst property, and at all times thereafter up until the death of the deceased, it was their common intention that the respondent should have a proprietary interest in the Blakehurst property…. Like [Hodgson J], I would be unwilling to accept that it was the representation of the deceased, or the common intention of the parties, that the respondent should simply have the absolute beneficial ownership of either the Kirrawee property or the Blakehurst property. My reason for this relates to the position in which that would have left the deceased. I cannot accept that he would have intended that he himself should have no interest in the properties or that he could be excluded from them by the respondent during his lifetime. I agree with his Honour that the evidence establishes an acting by the respondent to her detriment on the faith of the relevant promises or representations.”
[18] Green at 356F-357B.
Gleeson CJ concluded:[19]
“In my view the conclusion which best gives effect to the intentions of the parties, in all the circumstances, is that at the time of the death of the deceased he and the respondent were beneficially entitled to the Blakehurst property as joint tenants. That produced the consequence that following the death of the deceased the respondent became entitled to absolute beneficial ownership of that property by right of survivorship.”
[19] Green at 358D-E.
The rarity of such cases may be explained in part by a matter of chronology noted by the Chief Justice in his opening observations, namely that the need to invoke equitable principles giving the respondent a proprietary interest in land arose from the fact that the deceased had died about a year before the enactment of the Family Provision Act 1982 (NSW) which, he noted, “would have given the Court discretionary power to make provision for the surviving party out of assets owned or controlled by the deceased.”[20]
[20] Green at 345C.
The second case was a decision of the Western Australian Full Court, Lloyd v Tedesco.[21] The appellant failed at trial because she had failed to prove a case, as explained by the trial judge, Miller J, in the following terms:[22]
“It is clearly accepted by the plaintiff that the mere existence of a de facto relationship cannot of itself establish a joint endeavour of the type contended for by the plaintiff in this case. Upon the cessation of such a relationship the mere fact that a woman has performed household chores and acted as caregiver will not entitle her to seek relief by way of compensation. What is essential is that the plaintiff prove an actual intention to pool the resources of herself and the defendant for the purposes of the alleged joint endeavour. If she is able to do this she will recoup by way of compensation such contributions as she made to that joint endeavour.”
[21] (2002) 25 WAR 360; [2002] WASCA 63 (Murray J, Hasluck J agreeing and Pullin J).
[22] Ibid at [27].
Without endorsing the need for an actual intention to pool resources, Murray J accepted the thrust of this reasoning, expressed as follows:
“30 The guiding principle is unconscionability. In this, as in every such case of a failed de facto relationship, there must be more than simply the performance by the plaintiff of the valuable role of the provision of love, care and support. The provision of such a contribution will be sufficient only if it is related in some factual way to the generation of wealth as part of a joint effort or endeavour to provide for the parties' mutual material welfare and security. …
31 A joint endeavour of this character is one which has the aim of adding to the parties' material wealth for their mutual benefit rather than being one where the plaintiff simply provides loving care and support to the defendant as a normal incident of a de facto relationship. In that sense it is right to say that the joint endeavour must be one intentionally or deliberately entered into for the purpose of advancing the parties' mutual material wealth. Only if it bears that character will it be unconscionable to allow the defendant to retain the entirety of the beneficial interest in that wealth. To hold otherwise, and in particular to hold that it would be sufficient if in fact the efforts of the plaintiff advanced the defendant's capacity to acquire wealth, would, in my opinion, be to commit the error to which Deane J adverted in Muschinski of giving undue rein to the court's idiosyncratic notions of fairness and justice.”
A third case concerning a domestic relationship was West v Mead.[23] Although the facts of that case arose some years after the commencement of the Property (Relationships) Act, the domestic relationship involved two women and the Act was not amended until 1999 to cover domestic relationships between persons of the same sex.
[23] See fn 11 above.
West v Mead involved a changing relationship at a point in which the parties began to pool their earnings. After referring to the principles stated in Muschinski and Baumgartner, Campbell J made the following observations as to the relevant principles:
“57 Extending the notion of contributions to include not only monetary contributions (which are readily measurable), but also non-financial contributions (not so readily measurable in monetary terms) raises the prospect of difficulty of application of this principle. In practice, that difficulty often does not become acute because of the way that presumptions, and the onus of proof, work in this area.
58 Before any particular asset can become subject to a constructive trust in accordance with the Baumgartner principle, one needs to have a joint relationship or endeavour, and an asset acquired in the course of, and for the purposes of, that joint relationship or endeavour. …
59 In accordance with this approach, a plaintiff needs to establish that there is indeed a joint endeavour between the parties, in which expenditure is shared for the common benefit. It is also necessary to identify what the scope of that joint endeavour is. It is a question of fact, for any couple, what the scope of the joint endeavour they are engaging in is. Further, for any couple, the scope of the joint endeavour they are engaged in might change from time to time. If, within the scope of a joint endeavour which lasts for years, an asset is acquired, as a result of contributions both parties have made, and for a purpose of the ongoing joint endeavour of the parties, this gives rise to the presumption that the beneficial interest ought be shared equally. That presumption can be displaced if one party is able to show that the contributions, both financial and non-financial, to that asset should be regarded as unequal. In practical terms, this way of proceeding will place the onus of attributing a value to non-financial contributions on the person who asserts that the title should be held unequally.
60 A second way in which the principle that beneficial ownership should be proportionate to contributions, which underlies the law of resulting trusts, is transmuted in the Baumgartner type of constructive trust, is in another aspect (besides counting non-monetary contributions) of what counts as a contribution to the purchase price. The payment of mortgage instalments, after a property has been acquired using money borrowed and secured by mortgage, has been accepted as a ‘contribution’, in this context – Baumgartner at 148. This is unlike the resulting trust principle, in accordance with which it is only in unusual situations that a payment of such mortgage instalments is regarded as a contribution. …
61 Even if one bears in mind that mortgage instalments usually include a component of each of principal and interest, it is still possible for the mortgage instalment to be taken into account in deciding the terms of a constructive trust. Continual payment of the interest on the loan which finances the family home is every bit as much a part of the joint endeavour of maintaining the family unit and providing for its future as is meeting other recurrent but necessary expenses like buying the groceries. But the fact that part of the instalment is a payment of interest means that the beneficial interest in property acquired as a result of paying an instalment is not likely to be equal in value to the amount of the instalment paid. It is the proportions in which contributions to the purchase price are made which matter in determining beneficial ownership, not the absolute amount of such contributions.
62 Another aspect of difference between the Baumgartner basis for a constructive trust, and a resulting trust, concerns the role which the intention of the parties plays. The Baumgartner type of constructive trust is imposed to prevent an unconscionable assertion of legal title, in circumstances where the parties had no explicit intention about how the legal title would be held in the circumstances which have arisen. By contrast, the presumption of a resulting trust is one which seeks to give effect to the intention of the parties, by making a presumption about what that intention was …. Even so, that is not to say that the intention of the parties has no role to play in whether a Baumgartner constructive trust should be held to exist. Part of the justification for imposing the Baumgartner constructive trust is that the parties have jointly been building up assets, on the basis that those assets will be available for the joint endeavour in future. Part of the reason why it can be unconscionable to let the legal title lie where it falls, if the relationship fails, is that each knew that the other was contributing to a common pool on the basis that the pool, and assets acquired from it, would be used for their ongoing common benefit. It is unconscionable for the party who ends up, at the end of the relationship, with a disproportionate share of the assets which were built up during the relationship, to keep those assets when he or she knew that that was the basis on which the assets were being built up.
63 Another way in which the intention of the parties would be relevant would be if they had formed an express intention about what was to happen in the circumstance which has in fact arisen. If the parties have expressly contemplated the very situation which has arisen, and have, in advance, agreed how the assets built up as a result of their joint efforts should be divided in that situation, it would often be the case that there is nothing unconscionable in holding the parties to their agreement.”
Application of principles
It may readily be accepted that Mr Subakti and Ms Togias were involved in a relevant “joint endeavour”, namely a domestic relationship which involved them living together and bringing up children. Although it might be said that the ending of the relationship was not without “attributable blame”, the attribution of blame is only relevant in circumstances where the blame is attributable to the party seeking to invoke equity.[24] In this case the blame lay with Mr Subakti and his involvement in criminal activities. It was accepted that the relationship terminated unexpectedly (at least from the point of view of Ms Togias) with the arrest and incarceration of Mr Subakti.
[24] Ashley Black, “Baumgartner v Baumgartner, the Constructive Trust and the Expanding Scope of Unconscionability” (1988) 11 UNSW LJ 117 at 127.
Because the equitable principles developed as legislatures were conferring on courts powers of redistribution of property on the termination of domestic relationships,[25] either by reference to principles of fairness or what is just and equitable (“the family law principles”), the more limited equitable principles (which expressly eschewed those grounds) have not been fully developed. Thus, the cases suggest that while non-financial contributions are not sufficient to create an interest in property owned by the other partner to the relationship, they may affect the quantum of the interest in circumstances where it otherwise arises because of a representation or a pooling of financial resources.
[25] Domestic Relationships Act 1994 (ACT), s 15; Property Law Act 1974 (Qld), s 286; Domestic Partners Property Act 1996 (SA), s 10; Relationships Act 2003 (Tas), s 40; Relationships Act 2008 (Vic), s 45; Family Law Act 1997 (WA), s 205ZG.
On one view, to allow the partner who raised the children and looked after the home to obtain an interest in the property owned by the other partner is to allow seepage of the family law principles into the equitable jurisdiction of the court, an approach expressly denied in Muschinski and Baumgartner and by this Court in Bryson v Bryant.[26] In the last case the majority accepted that the earlier decision in Hibberson v George[27] adopted similar reasoning, imposing a constructive trust based upon the financial contributions of the parties to the relationship. Perhaps the only modification of established principle in that case was the recognition that pooling of resources was not required in every case. McHugh JA observed:[28]
“Indeed it is not necessary that there should be physical pooling. It is probably enough that by mutual arrangement the parties have each spent moneys for the purpose of their joint relationship knowing that part of it was to be spent in financing the purchase of the home.”
Expenditure, not merely on the purchase of the home, but on the purchase of furniture and furnishings and on the repair and renovations of the house were treated as part of the basis of apportioning the beneficial interests.
[26] (1992) 29 NSWLR 188 at 222 (Sheller JA), 231 (Samuels AJA), Kirby P at 203-204 dissenting.
[27] (1989) 12 Fam LR 725 (McHugh JA, Hope JA agreeing; Mahoney JA dissenting).
[28] Hibberson at 742.
On the other hand, the broader approach may now be legitimate on the basis that there has been a change in the scope of the concept of unconscionable conduct in relation to domestic relationships over the last 40 years. It may be that the widespread legislative adoption of the family law principles is partly responsible for that change.
Although the appellant contended that any entitlement of Ms Togias would involve an unwarranted expansion of the equitable jurisdiction of the court, a position which is readily supportable on the basis of statements of principle discussed above, in my view a different approach is available and is to be preferred. That approach would accept that it may be unconscionable for a partner holding the legal title to property of the joint endeavour to deny any beneficial interest in the partner who contributed non-financial benefits alone. The basic rationale for the preferred approach is that there is nothing new in the willingness of equity to have regard to indirect and non-financial contributions to a joint endeavour involving a domestic relationship and home ownership. If it be unconscionable for the working partner to deny a proprietary interest in property devoted to the domestic relationship in circumstances where there has been a pooling of resources, and, in that circumstance, to take account of non-financial contributions, it is difficult to justify denying to the non-working partner, who brings no financial resources to the relationship, a proprietary interest based on non-financial benefits alone.
In one sense, the partner with the least by way of financial resources has a stronger claim to equitable protection than the partner who has some financial resources, but is not the primary income-earner. While there were statements in the reasoning of the Chief Justice in Green v Green which might be seen as inconsistent with this approach, the success of the mother and homemaker in that case appears to have turned on expressions of intention by the deceased purchaser of the property: indeed, it has been treated as a case of proprietary estoppel.[29] Although not necessarily irrelevant, the role of intention in such a case is limited, as explained in Muschinski, Baumgartner and West v Mead. While the deceased’s intentions and representations may well have justified the extent of the interest conferred in Green v Green, their absence does not support the conclusion that without them Ms Green would have got nothing.
[29] The Public Trustee v Kukula (1990) 14 Fam LR 97 at 99-100 (Handley JA, Samuels and Clarke JJA agreeing); Bennett v Tairua (1992) 15 Fam LR 317 at 323 (Rowland J).
Where a claim is based entirely upon non-financial contributions, the party asserting the equitable interest must establish the extent and value of the contributions in the context of the joint endeavour. I accept that Ms Togias was entitled to an equitable interest in the Glenwood property on the basis that it was the family home, that she contributed (i) to its maintenance, (ii) to the ability of the registered owner, Mr Subakti, to engage in whatever activities provided the finance for the family, and (iii) by way of raising the children, thereby relieving Mr Subakti of a potential financial burden. On Ms Togias’ evidence, which was neither challenged nor supported by Mr Subakti, she also contributed to his legitimate business relationships by assisting in dealing with third parties, because her English was better than his. (On the other hand, the absence of any established profitability of the business rendered that assistance of no proven financial value.) However, I do not accept that in such circumstances, there is scope for a presumption of equal interests. Further, as Sifris J held in Hill v Love,[30] the value of contributions to family welfare by way of domestic assistance should not be assessed by reference to the commercial value of those services.
[30] (2018) 53 VR 459; [2018] VSC 29 at [126].
In what is an entirely impressionistic exercise of valuing her entitlement, it is appropriate to take into account the period of the relevant contributions.[31] Although the relationship predated the purchase of the Glenwood property, her contributions must relate to the interest in the Glenwood property and thus cover a period when she was responsible for maintaining the home and was the mother with responsibility for one, and then two, children. However, the total relevant period was 6.5 years, which is a moderate time, well short of a lifetime contribution or even a contribution extending throughout the primary school years of the children.
[31] Miller v Sutherland (1990) 14 Fam LR 416 at 425 (Cohen J).
Taking these factors into account, but accepting that the exercise of valuation is impressionistic, and having regard to the exercise undertaken by Cohen J in Miller v Sutherland,[32] a case where there was no pooling of funds, I would conclude that Ms Togias was entitled to a 25% interest in the Glenwood property. As noted above, I agree that she had no interest in the Seven Hills property.
[32] Ibid.
GRIFFITHS AJA: I have had the benefit of reading the draft reasons of Mitchelmore JA and Basten AJA. I agree with the orders proposed by Mitchelmore JA for the reasons given both by her Honour and the additional reasons of Basten AJA which helpfully elaborate on some important considerations but not in a way which is inconsistent with Mitchelmore JA’s reasons.
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Amendments
16 December 2022 - Formatting of footnotes corrected.
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