NRND and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Migration) [2018] AATA 3601 (21 September 2018)
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No: 2017/7742
GENERAL DIVISION )Re: NRND
Applicant
And: Minister for Immigration and Border Protection
RespondentDIRECTION
TRIBUNAL: Deputy President J W Constance
DATE OF CORRIGENDUM: 26 September 2018
PLACE: Sydney
IT IS DIRECTED that, in accordance with subsection 43AA(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), the text of the decision in this application is to be altered such that:
- the wording of the decision is changed to:
The decision under review, being the decision made 25 October 2017
to exercise the discretion to refuse the visa applicant’s application for a Partner visa, is set aside;
The matter is remitted to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection for reconsideration with a direction that the visa applicant should not be refused a Partner (Provisional)(Class UF) visa under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
- the wording in paragraph [5] of the reasons for the decision is changed to:
For the reasons which follow, the matter will be remitted to the
Minister for reconsideration with a direction that Mr G should not be refused a Partner (Provisional)(Class UF) visa under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
- the wording in paragraph [103] of the reasons for the decision is changed to:
It will be decided that the matter will be remitted to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection for reconsideration with a direction that Mr G should not be refused a Partner (Provisional)(Class UF) visa under s 501(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
...................[sgd]................................................
J W Constance
Deputy PresidentDivision:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2017/7742
Re:NRND
APPLICANT
AndMinister for Immigration and Border Protection
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Deputy President J W Constance
Date:21 September 2018
Place:Sydney
The decision under review, being the decision made 25 October 2017 to exercise the discretion to refuse the visa applicant’s application for a Partner visa, is set aside.
In substitution, it is decided that the matter will be remitted to the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection for reconsideration with a direction that the visa applicant be granted a Partner (Provisional)(Class UF) visa.
..................[sgd]......................................................
J W Constance
Deputy PresidentCATCHWORDS
MIGRATION - discretion to refuse the application for a visa - Partner visa - whether the visa applicant is of good character - substantial criminal record - people smuggling - transportation of refugees - humanitarian crisis - Ministerial Direction No. 65 - protection of the Australian community - seriousness and nature of conduct - expectations of the Australian community - risk to community should conduct be repeated - decision set aside and remitted to the Minister
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth)
CASES
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Daniele [1981] FCA 212
SECONDARY MATERIALS
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Cth), Direction [No 65] – Visa refusal and cancellation under s501 and revocation of a mandatory…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read NRND and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (Mig... and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2018] AATA 3601
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the Minister had properly exercised the discretion to refuse the visa application, having regard to Ministerial Direction No. 65, which outlines considerations for assessing the character of visa applicants. Specifically, the Court had to determine if Mr G’s past conduct, namely the people smuggling offence, posed a risk to the Australian community, and whether the seriousness and nature of his conduct, along with community expectations, warranted the refusal of the visa.
Deputy J W Constance P reasoned that while people smuggling is a serious offence, Mr G’s conduct was at the lower end of the scale. This conclusion was based on the circumstances of the offence, including that Mr G did not attempt to evade authorities and that the refugees crossed the border on foot before re-entering his vehicle. Furthermore, the Hungarian court imposed a suspended sentence, indicating that the period of pre-trial detention was considered sufficient punishment, provided no further offences were committed. The Court found that the Minister had not given sufficient weight to these mitigating factors and the fact that Mr G had not re-offended since the incident.
Consequently, the Court set aside the decision to refuse Mr G’s Partner visa application. The matter was remitted to the Minister for reconsideration with a direction that Mr G be granted a Partner (Provisional)(Class UF) visa.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Primary considerations are set out in Paragraph 11 of Part B. They are:(a)protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct;(b)the best interests of minor children in Australia;(c)expectations of the Australian Community.5.1.1 Primary consideration (a): Protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct. Paragraph 11.1 of the Direction provides that “decision-makers should have regard to the principle that the Government is committed to protecting the Australian community from harm as a result of criminal activity or other serious conduct by non-citizens.” Consideration is also to be given to the nature and seriousness of the visa applicant’s conduct to date and the risk to the community should the visa applicant commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct.5.1.1.1 The nature and seriousness of Mr G’s conduct to date Subparagraph 11.1.1 sets out further principles to which regard is to be had in considering the nature and seriousness of the non-citizen’s criminal offending. These are set out in full in the schedule (Schedule 1) to these reasons. The crime committed by Mr G was neither violent nor sexual in nature. It was not committed against the refugees. Rather, it was a crime against the State of Hungary in the exercise of its rights as a sovereign State. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the offence of people smuggling is a serious offence with serious consequences for Australia if this country is the subject of the illegal activity. In this regard, I have taken into account material provided on behalf of the Minister.[9] [9] Exhibit R2: Khalid Koser and Marie McAuliffe, “Establishing an Evidence-Base for Future Policy Development on Irregular Migration to Australia”, Irregular Migration Research Program Occasional Paper Series, June 2013.Exhibit R3 Australian Federal Police web page 31/08/2018, Why People Smuggling threatens all Australians. Several matters cause me to conclude that Mr G’s offence was to the lower end of the scale of similar offences. First, the circumstances of his offending. He did not attempt to evade the law enforcement authorities in either country by concealing the refugees or attempting to convey them across the border. On the contrary, he caused them to approach the crossing point on foot to ascertain what, if any, action would be taken against them. They were permitted to enter Hungary under circumstances unknown. They were then required to proceed on foot about one kilometre past the check point before again entering the vehicle being driven by Mr G. Secondly, Mr G was not imprisoned after he was convicted. On the limited evidence available as to the Court proceedings in Hungary, I am satisfied that the Court considered that the 30 days during which Mr G was held in custody prior to his court appearance was an appropriate period of detention provided he did not commit any further offences. This was significantly less than the term of actual imprisonment which could have been imposed.