NRMA Insurance for the Nominal Defendant v Al-Bayati (No 2)

Case [2019] NSWCA 14


Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: NRMA Insurance for the Nominal Defendant v Al-Bayati (No 2) [2019] NSWCA 14
Hearing dates: On the papers
Decision date: 15 February 2019
Before: Macfarlan JA;
Barrett AJA
Decision:

Notice of motion filed on 28 November 2018 dismissed with costs.

Catchwords: COSTS – application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs – offer of compromise and Calderbank letter – indemnity costs – discretion to “otherwise order” – element of compromise – all or nothing case – where offer is invitation to surrender – COSTS – exercise of general discretion – offer of compromise and Calderbank letter – indemnity costs – appeal proceedings – reliance on offer made in first instance proceedings.
Legislation Cited: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW)
Cases Cited: Commonwealth of Australia v Gretton [2008] NSWCA 117
County Securities Pty Limited v Challenger Group Holdings Pty Limited (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 273
Evans Shire Council v Richardson (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 61
Regency Media Pty Ltd v AAV Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 368
Robb Evans of Robb Evans & Associates v European Bank Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 170
Category:Costs
Parties: Shahed Al-Bayati (Applicant on the motion)
NRMA Insurance for the Nominal Defendant (Respondent on the motion)
Representation:

Counsel:
Mr N Husani, Solicitor (Applicant on the motion)
Mr J Mancuso, Solicitor (Respondent on the motion)

  Solicitors:
Solicitors:
Thomas Booler Lawyers (Applicant on the motion)
Hall & Wilcox (Respondent on the motion)
File Number(s): CA 2018/222259
 Decision under appeal 
Court or tribunal:
District Court
Jurisdiction:
Civil
Date of Decision:
21 June 2018
Before:
Strathdee DCJ
File Number(s):
DC 2017/116637

Judgment

  1. THE COURT: On 7 November 2018, the Court dismissed with costs the Nominal Defendant's application for leave to appeal against a judgment of $60,898.56 ordered on 21 June 2018 in favour of Ms Al-Bayati. By notice of motion filed on 29 November 2018, Ms Al-Bayati seeks an order that the costs awarded to her and against the Nominal Defendant be assessed on an indemnity basis.

  2. In support of that application, Ms Al-Bayeti relies on both an offer of compromise made under rule 20.26 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) on 10 August 2018 and a Calderbank letter of the same date.  Each conveyed an offer of settlement of the proceeding in this Court on the basis that the summons seeking leave to appeal be dismissed and that each party bear its own costs.

  3. The Nominal Defendant accepts that a prima facie entitlement to assessment on an indemnity basis arises where a settlement offer is made but not accepted and the party to whom the offer was made achieves an outcome no more favourable to it than the offer. It refers, in relation to the formal offer under the rules, to rule 42.15A of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. The principle is the same in the Calderbank context.

  4. However, the Nominal Defendant resists that outcome in the present case on the footing that neither document of 10 August 2018 conveyed an offer of real and genuine compromise.  In each case, it is said, a document despatched some five hours after service of the summons seeking leave to appeal did no more than invite surrender or capitulation - albeit with each party left to bear its own costs.

  5. While an offer that is in substance an invitation to surrender usually lacks the elements of “give and take” that characterise compromise, it can in certain circumstances result in the successful triggering of the indemnity costs mechanism under the rules: Regency Media Pty Ltd v AAV Australia Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 368 at [31]. But for that to happen, the claim or defence must be something approaching the character of frivolous or vexatious: ibid quoting Robb Evans of Robb Evans & Associates v European Bank Ltd (No 2) [2009] NSWCA 170 at [20]. The overriding question goes to the reasonableness of the conduct of the recipient in not accepting the offer. Rejection or non-acceptance of an offer to capitulate cannot, in general, be unreasonable if the case sought to be advanced by the rejecting (or non-accepting) party has some colour of substance to it.

  6. In this case, the Court found that the Nominal Defendant’s proposed grounds of appeal raised arguments that "cannot be dismissed out of hand" and were "reasonably arguable".  Leave to appeal was refused because the Nominal Defendant did not establish that it had "plainly suffered an injustice".  The application for leave to appeal was therefore not devoid of prospects of success and the Nominal Defendant did not engage in relevant delinquency by persisting with the application for leave.

  7. Ms Al-Bayati seeks to call in aid an offer of compromise and a Calderbank offer made by her in the court below.  Because of those offers, the primary judge ordered that the costs of Ms Al-Bayati, as the successful plaintiff at trial, be assessed on an indemnity basis for a period after the offers had been made.

  8. It is true that rule 51.49 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules permits this Court to have regard to any offer of compromise made in the court below. But, as was emphasised in Regency Media at [39], the appeal is a separate proceeding. The discretion as to costs must be exercised in relation to that separate proceeding. By the time that the the proceeding commences, there is a new landscape in which, to quote again from Regency Media (at [40]) “facts have been found, credibility issues resolved and the weight of evidence determined”; and (also at [40]):

“Although there may be a challenge to such findings, the parties are nonetheless in a different position from that prior to trial and should assess their cases accordingly, if they intend to seek indemnity costs based upon an offer of compromise.”

  1. The primary judge was called upon to decide difficult factual issues.  Accounts of witnesses about the motor accident differed in material ways.  Once the findings of fact had been made, the factors that were at work in the assessment of settlement offers made in advance of trial no longer operated.  In the circumstances of this case, what was reasonable or unreasonable in response to a settlement offer made before trial throws no light on the reasonableness or otherwise of offers in advance of the hearing of the summons seeking leave to appeal.

  2. The party making an offer of compromise or Calderbank offer bears the onus of satisfying the court that it should exercise the costs discretion in its favour: Evans Shire Council v Richardson (No 2) [2006] NSWCA 61; Commonwealth of Australia v Gretton [2008] NSWCA 117 at [46]; County Securities Pty Limited v Challenger Group Holdings Pty Limited (No 2) [2008] NSWCA 273 at [31]. Ms Al-Bayati has not discharged that onus.

  3. The notice of motion filed on 28 November 2018 is dismissed with costs.

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Details
AGLC
NRMA Insurance for the Nominal Defendant v Al-Bayati (No 2) [2019] NSWCA 14
Case
[2019] NSWCA 14
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The New South Wales Court of Appeal considered an application for leave to appeal in *NRMA Insurance for the Nominal Defendant v Al-Bayati (No 2)*. The dispute concerned an application for leave to appeal a decision, with the primary issue revolving around the costs of the proceedings, specifically whether indemnity costs should be awarded.

The court was required to determine whether to grant leave to appeal and, in relation to costs, whether to depart from the usual order that costs follow the event. This involved considering the effect of an offer of compromise and a Calderbank letter made by the applicant, and whether these offers warranted an award of indemnity costs. The court also had to assess whether reliance could be placed on an offer made in earlier, first instance proceedings when considering costs for appeal proceedings.

The court dismissed the notice of motion for leave to appeal. In doing so, it exercised its discretion regarding costs. The court found that the offer of compromise and the Calderbank letter, when viewed in the context of the appeal proceedings, did not justify an order for indemnity costs. The court's reasoning implicitly involved an assessment of the nature of the offer and the overall circumstances of the case, leading to the conclusion that the general discretion to order costs should apply.

The notice of motion filed on 28 November 2018 was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Notice of motion filed on 28 November 2018 dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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