IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S650 of 2007
B e t w e e n -
IRENE NOTARAS
Applicant
and
WAVERLEY MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
First Respondent
ERROL WILFRED LEVITT
Second Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
HEYDON J
KIEFEL J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 13 JUNE 2008, AT 2.21 PM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR B.W. WALKER, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR P. KING for the applicant. (instructed by NSW Legal Exchange)
MR M.G. CRAIG, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friends, MR G.B. NEWPORT and MR M.A. STAUNTON, for the first respondent. (instructed by Wilshire Webb Staunton Beattie)
MR N.A. HEMMINGS, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR D.T. MILLER for the second respondent. (instructed by Allens Arthur Robinson)
HEYDON J: Mr Walker, I have a lot of sympathy for your client but what is wrong with the reasoning of the Court of Appeal?
MR WALKER: If there is error, it relates to the matter where I have a further burden, namely, was it properly before the Court of Appeal? I will call it the clause 1.6 matter and this is my answer to Justice Heydon’s question. Your Honours will have seen at page 28 of the application book quoted in Justice Tobias’ paragraph 36 that the clause 1.6 which, in our submission, was wrongly approached by the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, an essential footing, correctly noted by our opponents in the written submissions, is that so‑called development control plans are statutory creatures promulgated by the consent authority, the Council. They are there to make more detailed provision for matters within a relevant environmental planning instrument, namely, a local environmental plan. They may not be inconsistent with such a plan and they are ineffective to the extent that they are merely the same.
Our friends are correct in pointing out that there is a difference between a development control plan and a local environmental plan. On the other hand, the statute, section 79C, as your Honours have seen, requires in the list of matters that must be taken into account in considering an application for development consent that consideration be taken of a DCP. That is the route by which we submit error is shown in the following stages of reasoning, if I may call them that, to be found on the following three pages of the application book.
The first is page 70, where the argument in relation to the factual record – that is going to be important for the Suttor v Gundowda burden placed on us – is noted in paragraph 133 which, as your Honours will recall, clause 1.6 said of cases of so‑called exceedence of controls that in a particular case a particular control if able to be clearly demonstrated to be “unreasonable or unnecessary in…
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- Case
- [2008] HCATrans 232
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Council had erred in law by failing to give adequate consideration to the provisions of the WLEP 1996 and the WDCP 1996 when determining the development application. Specifically, the applicants argued that the Council had misinterpreted or misapplied clauses relating to building height, site coverage, and the provision of open space, thereby rendering its decision unlawful. The Court was required to determine if the Council's assessment of the development against these planning instruments was so flawed as to constitute a reviewable error.
In their joint judgment, Heydon and Kiefel JJ found that the Council had indeed failed to properly consider the relevant planning controls. Their Honours observed that the Council's assessment of the proposed development against the WLEP 1996 and WDCP 1996 was superficial and did not engage with the specific requirements of those instruments. The Court emphasised that a decision-making authority must demonstrate a genuine and thorough consideration of all relevant planning controls and policies. The failure to do so, as occurred in this instance, amounted to an error of law. The Court concluded that the Council's decision was invalid.
Background
Background to the litigation
This matter came before the High Court as an application for special leave to appeal a decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal. The applicant, Irene Notaras, sought to challenge the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in dismissing her appeal against a decision of the Waverley Municipal Council to grant development consent for residential development in contravention of the relevant development control plan. The key issue before the High Court was whether special leave should be granted to appeal on the basis that the Court of Appeal had erred in law in failing to properly consider whether the Council had complied with clause 1.6 of the development control plan when granting consent. The High Court ultimately refused special leave on the basis that the point raised was not properly before the Court of Appeal and could not be agitated on appeal in accordance with the principle in Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd. The Court also dismissed an application for costs made by the respondents.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the Court of Appeal err in its reasoning by not properly considering the statutory requirement of clause 1.6 of the development control plan?
2. Was the issue of clause 1.6 properly raised before the Court of Appeal, and if not, can it still be considered under the principle of Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd?
3. Did the Court of Appeal properly consider the impact of the alleged failure to follow clause 1.6 on the manifest unreasonableness of the Council's decision?
4. Was there a sufficient factual record to infer that the Council considered and applied clause 1.6 in making its decision?
Held
1. Did the Court of Appeal err in its reasoning by not properly considering the statutory requirement of clause 1.6 of the development control plan? The Court concluded that the Court of Appeal did not err in its reasoning regarding the consideration of clause 1.6. The Court held that the development control plan was not mandatory and that the councillors were familiar with the discretion available to them. The appeal was dismissed.
2. Was the issue of clause 1.6 properly raised before the Court of Appeal, and if not, can it still be considered under the principle of Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd? The Court concluded that the issue of clause 1.6 was not properly raised before the Court of Appeal. The Court held that it could not be considered under the principle of Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd as it would have been open to the respondents to have met by calling further evidence. The appeal was dismissed.
3. Did the Court of Appeal properly consider the impact of the alleged failure to follow clause 1.6 on the manifest unreasonableness of the Council's decision? The Court concluded that the Court of Appeal properly considered the impact of the alleged failure to follow clause 1.6 on the manifest unreasonableness of the Council's decision. The Court held that the extent of non-compliance was very small and that the councillors were familiar with the discretion available to them. The appeal was dismissed.
4. Was there a sufficient factual record to infer that the Council considered and applied clause 1.6 in making its decision? The Court concluded that there was a sufficient factual record to infer that the Council considered and applied clause 1.6 in making its decision. The Court held that the development control plan was not mandatory and that the councillors were familiar with the discretion available to them. The appeal was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Notaras v Waverley Municipal Council & Anor, the court addressed several pivotal issues concerning the statutory requirement of clause 1.6 of the development control plan (DCP) and the applicability of this requirement in the context of manifest unreasonableness. The applicant argued that the Court of Appeal erred by not properly considering the statutory requirement of clause 1.6, which provides a process for addressing exceedances of controls in the DCP. The applicant contended that the Council failed to follow the stringent process outlined in clause 1.6, which required clear demonstration of unreasonableness or lack of necessity of the controls that had been exceeded, a failure that rendered the Council's decision manifestly unreasonable.
The court began by examining whether the issue of clause 1.6 was properly raised before the Court of Appeal. The applicant argued that although clause 1.6 was not explicitly mentioned in the points of claim at trial, the essence of the argument was implicitly present in the allegations that the DCP had been ignored. The court considered the principle from Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd, which generally precludes the raising of new arguments on appeal that were not presented at the trial level unless there are exceptional circumstances. However, the court noted that the applicant's argument centered on the Council's failure to adhere to its own procedural requirements, which were set out in the DCP. The court acknowledged that the Council's officers had described the exceedances as "acceptable," which, according to the applicant, did not satisfy the rigorous process outlined in clause 1.6.
The court then turned to whether the Court of Appeal properly considered the impact of the alleged failure to follow clause 1.6 on the manifest unreasonableness of the Council's decision. The applicant argued that the Court of Appeal did not adequately address the manifest unreasonableness argument, which included the failure to properly consider clause 1.6. The court recognized that the Council's decision-making process involved extensive deliberation over several months, during which various officers and councillors considered the provisions of the DCP. The court emphasized that the DCP, while providing detailed provisions, did not mandate a specific outcome and that the Council was not required to state detailed reasons for its decision.
Finally, the court assessed whether there was a sufficient factual record to infer that the Council considered and applied clause 1.6 in making its decision. The respondent argued that the extensive documentary record and the familiarity of the councillors with the DCP provided sufficient grounds to infer compliance with clause 1.6. The court noted that the extent of non-compliance was minimal and that the Council's decision, in light of the detailed consideration given to the DCP, was not manifestly unreasonable.
In conclusion, the court determined that the issue of clause 1.6, while important, was not properly raised at the trial level and could not be agitated on appeal according to the principles established in Suttor v Gundowda Pty Ltd. The court also found that the Court of Appeal had sufficiently considered the impact of the alleged failure to follow clause 1.6 and that there was a factual basis to infer that the Council had considered the clause in making its decision. Therefore, special leave to appeal was refused. The ratio decidendi of this case is that arguments concerning the procedural requirements of a statutory instrument, such as a DCP, must be properly raised at the trial level to be considered on appeal, and that substantial compliance with such procedural requirements can be inferred from the extensive documentation and familiarity with the statutory instrument.