Norton v Herald

An action was commenced in the Sydney Registry of the High Court by David Houston Herald, a Melbourne solicitor, against John Norton, a Sydney resident, to recover the amount of a bill of costs for professional services rendered in a libel action in the Supreme Court of Victoria. An order was made for the taxation of Herald's bill, which was referred to the High Court at Melbourne. Following taxation, more than one-sixth of the bill was taxed off, entitling Norton to the costs of taxation. Norton claimed substantial travelling and accommodation expenses for his Sydney solicitor to attend the taxation in Melbourne. The Deputy Registrar disallowed these expenses, allowing a lesser sum for the engagement of a Melbourne agent solicitor, deeming the personal attendance of the Sydney solicitor unnecessary. Barton A.C.J. dismissed Norton's summons to review this decision, and Norton appealed to the Full Court.

The central legal issue before the Full Court was whether the Deputy Registrar had erred in principle or exercised his discretion unreasonably in disallowing the travelling and accommodation expenses of the defendant's Sydney solicitor to attend the taxation of the plaintiff's bill of costs in Melbourne. The court was required to determine whether, in the circumstances, the attendance of the Sydney solicitor was reasonably necessary, or if the allowance for a local agent was sufficient and appropriate.

The Full Court, in dismissing the appeal, affirmed the decision of Barton A.C.J. and the Deputy Registrar. The Court reasoned that the Deputy Registrar had applied the correct principle by considering the reasonableness of the expense in the particular circumstances, rather than simply treating it as a matter of right to have one's own solicitor attend in another state. The Court found no evidence to establish the reasonable necessity for the Sydney solicitor's presence in Melbourne, nor that it was a prudent step. Given that the Sydney solicitor had no prior knowledge of the matter, the Court concluded that any competent Melbourne solicitor could have adequately handled the taxation. The Court emphasised that it would not interfere with the taxing officer's discretion on quantum unless the decision was demonstrably wrong in principle or manifestly unjust, which was not established by the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.