Norton v Herald

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17 CLR 76

Practice (High Courl)-Costs-Taxation-Action - - instituted in one Registry-Costa

of attendance of solicitor on proceedings in another Registry. SYDNEY,

An action was brought in the New South Wales Registry of the High Court by a Melbourne solicitor, who had acted for a client in a libel action in Dec. 10, 11.

the Supreme Court of Victoria, to recover from the client, who was a resident of Sydney, the amount of his bill of costs in respect of that action, and an order was made for the taxation of those costs. The bill of costs was taxed in Melbourne, and such an amount was taxed off it that the client became entitled to the costs of taxation. On the taxation of the last mentioned costs a certain sum was claimed as being the travelling expenses of the client's

17 CLR 77

Sydney solicitor to Melbourne to attend the taxation of the original bill of costs and his expenses of residence while there. This sum the Deputy Registrar disallowed, and allowed in lieu thereof a sum which he thought sufficient to cover the cost of employing a Melbourne solicitor as agent on the taxation, being of opinion that the attendance of the Sydney solicitor in Mel- bourne was not reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

Held, affirming the decision of Barton A.C.J., that the Deputy Registrar had acted on the right principle, and that there was nothing to show that the amount allowed by him was insufficient.

APPEAL from Barton A.C.J.

An action was brought in the Sydney Registry of the High Court by David Houston Herald, a solicitor practising in Mel- bourne, against John Norton, a resident of Sydney, to recover the amount of a bill of costs for professional services rendered by Herald to Norton in a libel action which had been brought in the Supreme Court of Victoria against Norton. In the costs action, on the application of the plaintiff, an order was made directing taxation of Herald's bill of costs, and referring the taxation to the proper officer of the High Court at Melbourne, On taxation more than one-sixth was taxed off the bill, and the defendant thereupon became entitled to the costs of the taxation. On 9th May 1913, on the application of the plaintiff, an order was made by Barton A.C.J., that the plaintiff should have liberty to sign final judgment for £455 9s. 11d., less such sum as the Deputy Registrar at Melbourne might assess as the defendant's costs of taxation of the bill of costs. On the assessment the defendant claimed £547 6s. 4d., and the Deputy Registrar allowed £18 7s., and on objections to such assessment being brought in by the defendant, the Deputy Registrar adhered to the amount allowed by him and stated his reasons as follows :-

In the amount SO allowed by me is an item of £5 5s. for attendances of defendant's solicitor on defendant taking instruc- tions for taxation. This is altogether distinct and apart from…

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Details
Case
[1913] HCA 63
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

An action was commenced in the Sydney Registry of the High Court by David Houston Herald, a Melbourne solicitor, against John Norton, a Sydney resident, to recover the amount of a bill of costs for professional services rendered in a libel action in the Supreme Court of Victoria. An order was made for the taxation of Herald's bill, which was referred to the High Court at Melbourne. Following taxation, more than one-sixth of the bill was taxed off, entitling Norton to the costs of taxation. Norton claimed substantial travelling and accommodation expenses for his Sydney solicitor to attend the taxation in Melbourne. The Deputy Registrar disallowed these expenses, allowing a lesser sum for the engagement of a Melbourne agent solicitor, deeming the personal attendance of the Sydney solicitor unnecessary. Barton A.C.J. dismissed Norton's summons to review this decision, and Norton appealed to the Full Court.

The central legal issue before the Full Court was whether the Deputy Registrar had erred in principle or exercised his discretion unreasonably in disallowing the travelling and accommodation expenses of the defendant's Sydney solicitor to attend the taxation of the plaintiff's bill of costs in Melbourne. The court was required to determine whether, in the circumstances, the attendance of the Sydney solicitor was reasonably necessary, or if the allowance for a local agent was sufficient and appropriate.

The Full Court, in dismissing the appeal, affirmed the decision of Barton A.C.J. and the Deputy Registrar. The Court reasoned that the Deputy Registrar had applied the correct principle by considering the reasonableness of the expense in the particular circumstances, rather than simply treating it as a matter of right to have one's own solicitor attend in another state. The Court found no evidence to establish the reasonable necessity for the Sydney solicitor's presence in Melbourne, nor that it was a prudent step. Given that the Sydney solicitor had no prior knowledge of the matter, the Court concluded that any competent Melbourne solicitor could have adequately handled the taxation. The Court emphasised that it would not interfere with the taxing officer's discretion on quantum unless the decision was demonstrably wrong in principle or manifestly unjust, which was not established by the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

David Houston Herald, a Melbourne solicitor, initiated an action against John Norton, a resident of Sydney, to recover costs incurred in a libel action against Norton in the Supreme Court of Victoria. Herald's bill of costs was subsequently taxed in Melbourne, and an order was made for Norton to pay the taxed amount. Norton, however, became entitled to the costs of the taxation as more than one-sixth of the original bill of costs was taxed off. On the taxation of these costs, Norton claimed his Sydney solicitor's travelling expenses to Melbourne for the taxation proceedings, along with his residential expenses while there. The Deputy Registrar disallowed this claim, ruling that the personal attendance of the Sydney solicitor in Melbourne was unnecessary and that the costs of employing a Melbourne solicitor as an agent for taxation would be sufficient. Norton appealed this decision.

The appeal was brought before the Full Court of the High Court, with Blacket K.C. arguing on Norton's behalf that the attendance of Norton's Sydney solicitor in Melbourne was reasonable and should be reimbursed. Bavin, representing Herald, countered that the Deputy Registrar had applied the correct principle in disallowing the costs and that the appeal should be dismissed. The Court, ultimately, dismissed Norton's appeal, affirming that the Deputy Registrar had acted on the right principle and that the amount allowed was sufficient. The Court emphasised that the appeal was to be dismissed unless it could be shown that the Deputy Registrar's decision was incorrect in principle or manifestly unjust, which Norton had failed to demonstrate.

The case of Norton v Herald originated in the Sydney Registry of the High Court, where David Houston Herald, a Melbourne solicitor, filed an action against John Norton, a Sydney resident, to recover his bill of costs from a previous libel action in the Supreme Court of Victoria. An order for the taxation of the costs was made, and the taxation was referred to the appropriate officer in Melbourne. Following the taxation, Norton claimed his costs of taxation, including travel expenses of his Sydney solicitor, H.A. Moss, to attend the taxation in Melbourne. The Deputy Registrar disallowed these expenses, substituting a sum deemed sufficient to cover the cost of employing a Melbourne solicitor as an agent for the taxation. Norton appealed this decision, arguing that his solicitor's attendance in Melbourne was necessary. The Full Court of the High Court, hearing the appeal, upheld the Deputy Registrar's decision, finding no error in principle or manifest injustice in the disallowance of the travel expenses, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the Deputy Registrar was correct to disallow the costs claimed for the attendance of the Sydney solicitor in Melbourne for the taxation of the bill of costs?
2. Whether the Deputy Registrar's decision was unreasonable or manifestly unjust in not allowing the costs claimed by the Sydney solicitor for attending the taxation of the bill of costs in Melbourne?
3. What is the appropriate principle to be applied when determining whether the costs of a solicitor's attendance at a taxation proceeding in another registry should be allowed?
4. Whether the Deputy Registrar erred in treating the matter as if it were a case of town and country instead of independent registries?
5. Whether the costs claimed by the Sydney solicitor for attending the taxation of the bill of costs in Melbourne were reasonably necessary in the circumstances?

Held
1. The Deputy Registrar was correct to disallow the costs claimed for the attendance of the Sydney solicitor in Melbourne for the taxation of the bill of costs. Appeal dismissed with costs.
2. The Deputy Registrar's decision was not unreasonable or manifestly unjust in not allowing the costs claimed by the Sydney solicitor for attending the taxation of the bill of costs in Melbourne. Appeal dismissed with costs.
3. The appropriate principle to be applied when determining whether the costs of a solicitor's attendance at a taxation proceeding in another registry should be allowed is whether a reasonably prudent man would have taken that step in the particular circumstances.
4. The Deputy Registrar did not err in treating the matter as if it were a case of town and country instead of independent registries, as the Deputy Registrar considered what was reasonable in the circumstances of this particular case.
5. The costs claimed by the Sydney solicitor for attending the taxation of the bill of costs in Melbourne were not reasonably necessary in the circumstances. Appeal dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The central issue before the court was whether the Deputy Registrar was correct in disallowing the costs claimed by the Sydney solicitor for attending the taxation of the bill of costs in Melbourne. The Deputy Registrar had disallowed these costs, substituting instead allowances for a special letter of instructions and remuneration for a Melbourne solicitor to peruse the bill of costs. The court found that the Deputy Registrar's decision was grounded on the correct principle, namely, what a reasonably prudent person would deem necessary in the circumstances.

The Deputy Registrar had considered the reasonableness of the Sydney solicitor's attendance at the taxation proceeding and concluded that it was not reasonably necessary. The court held that the Deputy Registrar had exercised his discretion correctly and that there was no evidence to suggest that the amount allowed by the Deputy Registrar was insufficient. The court applied the principle that where a matter is within the discretion of the Registrar, it is not the role of the court to determine whether the discretion was exercised correctly or incorrectly. This principle was drawn from the case of McIver & Co. Ltd. v. Tate Steamers Ltd.

The court further held that the Deputy Registrar had not erred in treating the matter as if it were a case of town and country instead of independent registries. The Deputy Registrar had clearly stated that he considered the reasonableness of the solicitor's attendance in the particular circumstances of the case, rather than applying a blanket rule. The court rejected the argument that the costs should be allowed simply because the action was instituted in the Sydney Registry, emphasizing that the reasonableness of the attendance was the key consideration.

In determining the appropriate principle for allowing costs of a solicitor's attendance at a taxation proceeding in another registry, the court relied on the guiding principle of what a reasonably prudent person would do. The court noted that it was not for the Registrar to consider how the matter could have been most cheaply done but rather to determine whether the attendance was reasonably necessary. This principle was applied to conclude that there was no reasonable necessity for the Sydney solicitor's attendance at the taxation in Melbourne.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this case is that where a matter is within the discretion of the Registrar, it is not the role of the court to determine whether the discretion was exercised correctly or incorrectly. The court should only intervene if the decision was manifestly unjust or based on an incorrect principle. The Deputy Registrar had applied the correct principle in this case and exercised his discretion correctly, resulting in the disallowance of the costs claimed by the Sydney solicitor for attending the taxation in Melbourne.