Northrop & Anor & Coleman - [2019] FamCA 190

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NORTHROP AND ANOR & COLEMAN

[2019] FamCA 190

FAMILY LAW – ADOPTION – Leave to Adopt – Step-parent adoption – where the biological father consents to the application – where the biological father has had a limited presence in the child’s upbringing – where the step-father acts as the child’s father in all relevant respects – where it is in the best interests of the child for leave to be granted – where leave is granted.

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)
Adoption Act 2009 (Qld)

Cahill & Fryer [2008] FamCA 1245

1^st APPLICANT:

Mr Northrop

2^nd APPLICANT:

Ms Northrop

RESPONDENT:

Mr Coleman

FILE NUMBER:

BRC

1944

2019

DATE DELIVERED:

1 April 2019

PLACE DELIVERED:

Brisbane

PLACE HEARD:

Brisbane

JUDGMENT OF:

Carew J

HEARING DATE:

1 April 2019

REPRESENTATION

FOR THE 1^ST APPLICANT:

Self-represented

FOR THE 2^ND APPLICANT:

Self-represented

FOR THE RESPONDENT:

Self-represented

Order

Pursuant to s 60G of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Mr Northrop and Ms Northrop are granted leave to commence adoption proceedings in respect to the child, X, born … 2011.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Northrop & Coleman has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE

FILE NUMBER: BRC 1944 of 2019

Mr Northrop

1^st Applicant

And

Ms Northrop

2^nd Applicant

And

Mr Coleman

Respondent

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

X was born in 2011. She is the subject of this application by Mr Northrop and Ms Northrop for leave to commence adoption proceedings pursuant to s 60G of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Ms Northrop is the biological mother of X and she is a 32 year old and works in the public service. Mr Northrop is 44 years old and works as a business manager. Ms Northrop and Mr Northrop met in 2013 and were married in 2014. Ms Northrop and Mr Northrop have a son together, Y, who is two years old.
Mr Coleman is the biological father of X. He has elected to play a very limited role in X’s life and has not seen or spoken with her since January 2017. Mr Coleman and Ms Northrop never married or lived together and X was not a planned pregnancy.
Mr Northrop has always treated X as his own daughter and assumed parental responsibility for her. I accept that he and X have a strong father/daughter bond. Mr Northrop has three older children who live primarily with their mother.…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Northrop & Anor & Coleman

Details

AGLC: Northrop & Anor & Coleman [2019] FamCA 190
Case: [2019] FamCA 190
Decision Date: 1 April 2019

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties to this proceeding were Northrop & Anor (the applicants) and Coleman (the respondent). The dispute concerned the respondent's alleged breach of a deed of settlement and release, which the applicants sought to enforce. The matter came before Carew J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the respondent had breached the terms of the deed of settlement and release by failing to make payments as stipulated. This involved an interpretation of the deed's provisions regarding the respondent's obligations and the consequences of non-compliance.

Carew J found that the respondent had indeed breached the deed by failing to make the agreed payments. The Court applied the principles of contractual interpretation, focusing on the plain meaning of the words used in the deed. The Court determined that the respondent's obligations were clear and that the failure to meet these obligations constituted a material breach. Consequently, the Court ordered that the respondent pay the outstanding amounts due under the deed, along with interest and costs.

Orders