Northern Territory v Public Trustee of NT

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Northern Territory v Public Trustee of NT [2001] NTSC 110

PARTIES:THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA  

and

PUBLIC TRUSTEE OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA on behalf of the estate of MICHAEL JAMBAJIMBA MARSHALL

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY EXERCISING TERRITORY APPELLATE JURISDICTION

FILE NO:No 2 of 2001 (9710750)

DELIVERED:  7 December 2001

HEARING DATES:  24 October 2001

JUDGMENT OF:  MILDREN J

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Appellant:J Stirk           

Respondent:  J B Waters QC

Solicitors:

Appellant:Povey Stirk

Respondent:  Collier & Deane

Judgment category classification:    A

Judgment ID Number:

Number of pages:  19

IN SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT ALICE SPRINGS
(9710750)

Northern Territory v Public Trustee of NT [2001] NTSC 110

BETWEEN:

THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA

Appellant

AND:

PUBLIC TRUSTEE OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA on behalf of the estate of MICHAEL JAMBAJIMBA MARSHALL

Respondent

CORAM:    MILDREN J

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered 7 December 2001)

  1. This appeal raises the question of whether an application for assistance under the Crimes (Victims Assistance) Act (the CVA Act) survives the death of the victim, in circumstances where the death of the victim was not the result of the injuries the victim sustained as a result of the offence committed by the offender upon the victim and where the victim had brought an application for a certificate which was still pending at the date of his death.

  2. The learned Magistrate held that the application was a cause of action vested in the victim within the meaning of s 5(1) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act (the LRMP Act) and therefore survived for the benefit of his estate and granted a certificate for the maximum claimable, namely $25,000.

  3. The appellant has appealed that decision to this Court.  Counsel for the appellant, Mr Stirk, submits:

    1. the principle that a personal action dies with the claimant has no application to a statutory claim for compensation under the CVA Act;

    2. the provisions of s 5 of the LRMP Act do not apply to statutory claims;

    3. the question of whether or not the claim survives the death of the complainant depends upon the intention of the legislature to be ascertained by reference to the terms of the CVA Act only.

    4. on the true construction of the CVA Act, the claim did not survive for the benefit of the victim's estate.

  4. Counsel for the respondent, Mr Waters QC, submitted:

    1. the action fell within the description of a cause of action vested in the victim as at the date of his death, and therefore survived because of s 5 of the LRMP Act;

    2. there is a presumption that statutory rights survive unless there is a clear indication to the contrary in the Act and there is no such indication in the CVA Act;

    3. in any event, on the true construction of the CVA Act, the claim did survive for the benefit of the victim’s estate.

  5. The submissions thus raised, and…

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Details
Case
[2001] NTSC 110
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Northern Territory v Public Trustee of NT involved a dispute over the interpretation of the Compensation to Relatives Act 1963 (NT), specifically whether a victim's right to claim compensation survives their death and can be pursued by their personal representative. The dispute was heard and determined in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory. The appellant, the Public Trustee of the Northern Territory, argued that the victim's right to compensation under the Act did not survive his death and, therefore, could not be pursued by the personal representative. The respondent contended that the right to compensation did survive the victim's death and could be pursued by the personal representative.

The court was required to decide the scope of the right to claim compensation under the Act and whether that right survives the death of the victim. The court considered the purpose of the Act, which is to provide compensation to victims of crime, and the potential beneficiaries of such compensation. The court also considered the arguments regarding double-dipping and subrogation rights under the Act.

The court found that the purpose of the Act was to provide compensation to victims of crime and their dependants, and that the right to claim compensation under the Act does survive the victim's death. The court rejected the argument that the right to compensation should not survive the victim's death because it could lead to an offender benefiting from the compensation. The court held that if an offender is the next of kin or the person most likely to benefit from an award to the victim's estate, the amount paid would be recoverable via the processes envisaged by the Act. The court also rejected the argument that the right to compensation should not survive the victim's death because it could lead to double-dipping. The court held that the Territory's rights of subrogation under the Act would prevent double-dipping. The court concluded that the learned Magistrate was correct in finding that the victim's right to claim compensation under the Act survived his death and may be pursued by his personal representative.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Further, there is nothing in s 5(1) of the CVA Act which confers the right, which unequivocally shows that the intention was that the right would not survive the victim's death. As this is beneficial legislation, s 5(1) must be construed to give the most complete remedy which is consistent with the actual language employed and to which its words are fairly open: see Woodruffe v The Northern Territory of Australia, supra, at [28]. The purpose of the Act is to provide compensation to victims of crime. Victims of crime are likely as not to have dependants who could well be expected to benefit from an award of compensation for pecuniary loss suffered by the victim, or who may have indirectly suffered from the victim having incurred expenses as a result of the injury. It was submitted that in some cases, the ultimate beneficiary might in fact be the offender, a result which might well be described as absurd if it were true. I accept that it is not uncommon for offenders to be the victim's next of kin or the person most likely to benefit from an award to his estate. To the extent that that is so, the amount paid would be recoverable via the processes envisaged by s 21 and s 22 of the Act; and it may also be that the offender would be prohibited from recovering on the basis that it is contrary to public policy, but it is not necessary to decide that question. It is true that in some circumstances persons who would not otherwise have any moral claim to the money might gain a windfall, but that line of reasoning, which Winfield accepted was a valid policy reason for keeping that aspect of the rule which provided that actions in tort should die with the victim (supra, at 249-50), has been discarded by the legislature (and not only in this jurisdiction) by enactments such as the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, s 5(1) and I see no reason why the legislature would wish now to resurrect it from the dead. Mr Stirk suggested another reason, namely that because of s 23(1), such claims were open to double-dipping, but this submission overlooks the Territory's rights of subrogation under s 22 of the Act.Conclusion In my opinion, the learned Magistrate was right for the reasons which I have endeavoured to express, in concluding that the victim's right to claim compensation under the Act survived his death and may be pursued by his personal representative. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with costs.----------------------------------------

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established