Northbuild Construction Pty Ltd v Discovery Beach Project Pty Ltd (No 1)

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Northbuild Construction P/L v Discovery Beach Project P/L  [2005] QSC 045

PARTIES:

NORTHBUILD CONSTRUCTION PTY LTD
ACN 011 063 764
(applicant)
v
DISCOVERY BEACH PROJECT PTY LTD
ACN 100500 981
(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BS 1437 of 2005

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

3 March 2005

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

1 March 2005

JUDGE:

Muir J

CATCHWORDS:

ARBITRATION – THE AWARD – FORM AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE AWARD – where arbitrator’s intention unclear – where further application to court or arbitrator required to correct award

Commercial Arbitration Act 1990, s 31, s 32
Cockatoo Dockyard Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (No 3) [1994] 35 NSWLR 688
JugoslavenskaOceanska Plovidba v Castle Investment Co Inc [1974] 1 QB 292 (CA).
Margulies Brothers Ltd v Dafnis Thomaides & Co (UK ) Ltd (1958) Ll Rep 20250
McDonald v Dennys Lascelles Ltd (1933) 48 CLR 457
Selby Whitbread & Co [1917] 1 KB 736

COUNSEL:

P J  Dunning for the applicant
P A Hastie for the respondent 

SOLICITORS:

Ebsworth & Ebsworth Lawyers for the applicant
Minter Ellison for the respondent

  1. The applicant is a builder under a building contract entered into with the respondent proprietor for the construction of a building or group of buildings at Marcoola described as the “Surf Air Redevelopment”. A dispute over progress claims and variation orders was submitted to arbitration by the parties and on 18 February 2005, the arbitrator, after receiving submissions from the parties, handed down an interim award. The purpose of this application is to obtain leave pursuant to s 33 of the Commercial Arbitration Act 1990 (“the Act”) to enforce the interim award and to obtain judgment for the applicant against the respondent in the sum of $1,234,488, being the total value of the variation orders referred to in the award.

  1. The application is resisted on grounds that:

(a) The interim award merely makes a number of rulings and is not an award for the payment of money capable of enforcement under s 33 of the Act.

(b)        If contrary to the respondent’s principal submission, there is an enforceable award, the most recent progress certificate issued shows that more moneys are owing to the respondent under the building contract than to the applicant. It would thus be unjust to make the order;

(c)        The respondent terminated the building contract. There is thus no utility in attempting to construe the arbitrator’s “ruling” as declarations. The agreement has no role to play with respect to recommendations for progress payments made after termination.

  1. I now turn to a consideration of each of the above contentions.

Is the award capable of enforcement?

  1. The award commences by the arbitrator stating that for the reasons set out in “this Interim Award” rulings are made. There are then five paragraphs. The last three paragraphs deal with questions of interest and costs which are stated to be reserved.

  1. Paragraphs a) and b) provide:

“a)on the proper interpretation of…

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Details
Case
[2005] QSC 45
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Northbuild Construction Pty Ltd v Discovery Beach Project Pty Ltd (No 1), the Federal Court of Australia considered issues related to the form and construction of an arbitral award. The dispute arose from a construction project where Northbuild, the applicant, sought payment for work completed under a series of variation orders. Discovery Beach, the respondent, had deducted moneys from payments due to Northbuild, claiming they were justified under the terms of the contract. The matter was referred to arbitration, and the arbitrator issued an award. Northbuild subsequently sought to enforce the award in court.

The key legal issue before the court was whether the arbitrator's award was sufficiently clear and specific to be enforced as a money order under the relevant legislation. The court had to determine if the award met the criteria of being for the payment of money and specifying the sum to be paid. Northbuild argued that the award was clear and should be enforced as it stood, while Discovery Beach contended that the award was ambiguous and required clarification either from the court or the arbitrator.

The court examined the language of the award and found that while the arbitrator's intention seemed to be to order the payment of specific sums, the wording of the award did not explicitly state the amounts due. The court noted that the award did not specify the exact sums owed and contained language that referred to future conduct, which was inconsistent with a straightforward money order. The court considered the authority of Margulies Brothers Ltd v Dafnis Thomaides & Co (UK) Ltd, which held that an award must be for the payment of money and specify the sum. However, it also noted the decision in Jugoslavenska Oceanska Plovidba v Castle Investment Co Inc, which suggested that the requirement for an award to be in the same terms as a court judgment should not be strictly interpreted. Despite this, the court concluded that the award in this case was not sufficiently clear to be enforced as it stood and required further clarification.

The court ultimately determined that the award was ambiguous and that further steps were necessary to clarify the sums due and owing. It was held that an application to the arbitrator or the court would be required to correct the award to specify the exact amounts payable. The court did not enforce the award as it stood and left it to the parties to seek the necessary clarification.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Again, this discussion assumes that the award is for the payment of money. I return to the arbitrator’s ruling on page 1 of the Award. I note that paragraphs a) to e) of the ruling are identical to the five unlettered paragraphs in paragraph 92 under the heading “DECISION”. They are introduced by the words “For the reasons set out above, I rule that:”. Paragraph a) of the ruling concerns the construction of clause 8.1 of the Interim Agreement and is declaratory in nature. Paragraph b) is different in form. It orders that the respondent “make no deduction from payments to” the applicant with respect to the variation orders under consideration. Elsewhere in the award, as the above discussion shows, the arbitrator has found that moneys are due and owing and that the deductions made in respect of the subject variation orders were unlawful. There is an express finding that the applicant is entitled to payment of the amounts deducted by the variation orders and that such deduction has been made “without agreement or determination by expert determination or litigation”.[7][7]Paragraphs 79 and 81. Having regard to the foregoing, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the arbitrator intended to make an award for the payment of money and understood that he was doing so. The language of his ruling (b) however falls short of that objective. There is an obvious distinction between an order not to make deductions from payments and an order to make payments without deduction. It is unfortunate also that the arbitrator did not specify the sum or sums implicitly found to be payable in his award and that he has included the qualifying words “until such time …” at the end of paragraph (b). Those words refer to future conduct and are incompatible with the view that paragraph (b), properly construed, is a simple money order. Mr Hastie relied on a decision of Lord Diplock, then Mr Justice Diplock, in Margulies Brothers Ltd v Dafnis Thomaides & Co (UK ) Ltd[8] for the proposition that, for an award to be enforced pursuant to a provision such as section 33, it had to be for the payment of money and specify the sum to be paid. The case supports that proposition. In the course of his reasons, Diplock J observed[9] In response to the difficulty posed by this authority, Mr Dunning referred to JugoslavenskaOceanska Plovidba v Castle Investment Co Inc.[10] In that case, the Court had under consideration the question whether an arbitrator’s award expressed in a foreign currency could be enforced as an order of the Court under s 26 of the Arbitration Act 1950 (UK). At first instance, Kerr J had regarded himself bound by authorities, including Margulies, to conclude that the award, to be enforceable, had to be capable of being entered as a judgment in the precise terms as the award. On appeal, Lord Denning MR noted that the words in s 26[11] “to the same effect” should not be treated as meaning “in the same terms”. He and the other members of the Court concluded that there was no difficulty in converting the foreign currency sums stipulated in the award to sterling for the purposes of entering judgment. [10][1974] 1 QB 292 (CA).[11]Which is very similar in terms to s 33 of the Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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