Re: ROSS STEWART NORGARD as Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of FRANCESCO
CANDELORO LA ROSA and LINDA ROBYN LA ROSA
And: ROCOM PTY LIMITED
No. 12 of 1990
FED No. 444
Appeal
COURT
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
Northrop(1), Davies(1) and Lee(2) JJ.
CATCHWORDS
Appeal - bankruptcy - transactions involving disposition of monies by bankrupt - whether disposition a "settlement" within the meaning of sub-s. 120(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 - nature of a "settlement".
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss.5 and 121; sub-ss.120(1) and (8); para.120(1)(a)
Barton v. Official Receiver (1984) 4 FCR 380; (1986) 161 CLR 75
Re Kastropil; ex parte The Official Trustee in Bankruptcy, Unreported (Federal Court of Australia, 14 July 1989)
Re Estate of La Rosa; ex parte Norgard v. Gillbanks, Unreported (Federal Court of Australia, 23 October 1989)
Re Player; ex parte Harvey (1885) 15 QBD 682
In re Plummer (1900) 2 QB 790
Sharrment Pty. Limited v. Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1988) 82 ALR 530
HEARING
PERTH
#DATE 16:8:1990
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr G.A. Palmer QC and
Mr G. Murphy
Solicitors for the Appellant: Messrs Blake Dawson Waldron
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N. Hasluck QC and
Mr P. Bogue
Solicitors for the Respondent: Messrs Bogue and Pass
ORDER
The appeal be dismissed.
The appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
JUDGE1
This is an appeal from the judgment of a single judge of the Court. His Honour dismissed with costs an application seeking recovery by the Trustee in Bankrputcy of the estate of Francesco Candeloro La Rosa ("La Rosa") and his wife, Linda Robyn La Rosa, of sums totalling $290,000, the payment of which was alleged to have been a settlement by the La Rosas in favour of the respondent, Rocom Pty Limited ("Rocom") in May 1988.
In this appeal, we are concerned only with the operation of s.120 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), which provides, inter alia:-
"(1) A settlement of property, whether made before or after the commencement of this Act, not being -
(a) a settlement made before and in consideration of marriage, or made in favour of a purchaser or encumbrancer in good faith and for valuable consideration; . . .
is, if the settlor becomes a bankrupt and the settlement came into operation after, or within 2 years before, the commencement of the bankruptcy, void as against the trustee in the bankruptcy."
(8) In this section, 'settlement of property' includes any disposition of property."
The term "property" defined in s.5 is as follows:-
"'property' means real or personal property of every description, whether situate in Australia or elsewhere, and includes any estate, interest or profit, whether present or future, vested or contingent, arising out of or incident to any such real or personal property."
In May 1988, the La Rosas traded…
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- Case
- [1990] FCA 444
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine the precise nature of a "settlement" within the context of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 and whether the transactions in question met the criteria for such a settlement. The court examined the legislative intent behind the Act and considered the definitions and interpretations provided in relevant case law. The primary focus was on whether the transactions were made with the intent to defeat creditors, as this is a critical element in establishing a settlement under the Act. The court meticulously analysed the evidence and the nature of the transactions to ascertain whether they were indeed settlements that could be voided.
Upon thorough analysis, the court found that the transactions in question did not constitute a settlement within the meaning of subsection 120(1) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966. The court concluded that the transactions did not exhibit the requisite intent to defeat creditors and did not meet the statutory criteria for a settlement. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the appellants were ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. This decision highlights the importance of understanding the specific statutory definitions and the intent behind financial transactions in the context of bankruptcy law.
Orders
Orders of the court
The appeal be dismissed.
The appellant pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi