Nommack (No.100) v FAI Insurances (In Liq)

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CITATION: Nommack (No.100) v FAI Insurances (In Liq) [2002] NSWSC 354
CURRENT JURISDICTION: Common Law Division
FILE NUMBER(S): SC 13048 of 1991
HEARING DATE(S): 18 April 2002
JUDGMENT DATE: 26 April 2002

PARTIES :


Nommack (No. 100) Pty Limited (Plaintiff)
v
FAI Insurances Limited (In Liquidation) (Defendant)

JUDGMENT OF: Master Malpass
COUNSEL : Mr C Stevens QC (Plaintiff)
N/A (Defendant)
Mr B Coles QC (Liquidators)
SOLICITORS: Beazley Singleton (Plaintiff)
N/A (Defendant)
Blake Dawson Waldron (Liquidators)
CATCHWORDS: Leave to proceed interests of justice - a question to be determined having regard to the relevant circumstances of the particular case before the Court - onus of proof.
LEGISLATION CITED: Corporations Act 2001.
Corporations Law, s 471B.
CASES CITED: Bowlers Club of NSW v Jones Lang LaSalle & Ors, Griffiths v Berkeley Challenge & Ors [2001] NSWSC 609.
DECISION: See paragraph 38.

      IN THE SUPREME COURT
      OF NEW SOUTH WALES
      COMMON LAW DIVISION

      Master Malpass

      FRIDAY 26 APRIL 2002

      13048 of 1991 Nommack (No. 100) Pty Limited v FAI Insurances Limited (In Liquidation)

      JUDGMENT

1 Master Malpass: The proceedings were commenced on 31 May 1991. An exposition of the nature of the claim and the earlier history of the proceedings may be found in relevantly recent judgments of this Court (the judgments of Master Harrison and McClellan J). Whilst I have had regard to that material, I do not propose to reproduce all of it in this judgment.

2 During 1991, the plaintiff had agreed to provide security for costs in the sum of $20,000. The security was not provided until 20 April 2000. During that period the proceedings had been stayed. The company had been deregistered in 1995 (there had been a failure to lodge returns for about four years) and it was not reinstated until 15 June 1999.

3 Also, in about 1999, action was started to resurrect the proceedings. It appears that about this time a property developer (Mr Wong) came on the scene and provided finance. He has provided moneys which enabled the reinstatement and provided the security. In addition, it appears that the plaintiff’s present legal advisers have been paid costs in the order of about $20,000.

4 It seems that Mr Wong may be a director but not a shareholder. The court has been told that a Mr Arnold is a shareholder. It is unclear when Mr Arnold came on the scene. The plaintiff had been a company in which the late Mr Theeman had been involved. It appears that he died in the late 1980’s. Hitherto, he had been the only source of funds.

5 In early 2000, the plaintiff sought directions. Also, it filed and served a Differential Case Management document.

6 The more recent history of the proceedings follows the filing of a Notice of Motion by the defendant on 15 June 2000. The defendant then sought dismissal of the proceedings for want of prosecution. On 1 September 2000, Master Harrison dismissed the Notice of Motion. On 23 August 2001, McClellan J…

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Case
[2002] NSWSC 354
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this case, the applicant, Nommack, sought leave to appeal against a decision which dismissed their claim against the respondent, FAI Insurances. The applicant sought damages for the loss of their motor vehicle, which was destroyed in a fire. The primary judge dismissed the applicant's claim on the basis that the applicant had not discharged the onus of proving that the fire was not caused by an excluded peril under the insurance policy. The applicant sought leave to appeal, arguing that the primary judge had erred in law by placing the onus of proof on them to exclude the possibility of an excluded peril being the cause of the fire.

The court was required to determine whether the primary judge had erred in placing the onus of proof on the applicant to exclude the possibility of an excluded peril being the cause of the fire. The court also had to consider whether the primary judge had applied the correct test for determining whether leave to appeal should be granted. The court further needed to decide whether the applicant had established that the appeal had a reasonable chance of success.

The court held that the primary judge had not erred in placing the onus of proof on the applicant to exclude the possibility of an excluded peril being the cause of the fire. The court also held that the primary judge had applied the correct test for determining whether leave to appeal should be granted. The court further held that the applicant had not established that the appeal had a reasonable chance of success. The court found that the applicant had not discharged the onus of proving that the fire was not caused by an excluded peril under the insurance policy. The court also found that the applicant had not demonstrated that there was a reasonable possibility that the primary judge had made an error of law. The court therefore dismissed the application for leave to appeal.

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