Noble v Winter in the City Events Pty Ltd

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[2004] QDC 567

DISTRICT COURT

CIVIL JURISDICTION

JUDGE ROBIN QC

No 2509 of 2002

RHYAN NOBLE by her Litigation Guardian TERRI NOBLE Plaintiff

and

WINTER IN THE CITY EVENTS PTY LTD Defendant

BRISBANE

..DATE 01/10/2004

ORDER

Catchwords: Practice and procedure - application to join sole director of defendant company as additional defendant under UCPR r 69 - no limitation issues, so that a separate proceeding could be commenced against him - his contention that a claim against him had no reasonable prospects of success rejected.

HIS HONOUR:  This is an application by the plaintiff, an infant, suing by her Litigation Guardian, under Rule 69, for the addition of a second defendant.

As required by Rule 70 sub-rule 2, service was effected on both the existing defendant company which did not appear when called and the proposed new defendant who did appear and vigorously contested the application.  He is Mr Alfio Bucceri, the sole director of the present defendant.

On the 1st of July 2001, the plaintiff was injured in the course of a tobogganing activity at an event held in Brisbane which featured a slope covered in artificial snow.  The action appeared to be proceeding satisfactorily, the defendant having admitted that it conducted the relevant event.  It came to the notice of the plaintiff and/or her lawyers that the defendant company may well be without assets to satisfy a judgment and that its insurer had declined cover.  That is the explanation for the interest in joining Mr Bucceri.

Notwithstanding the time that has elapsed between the date of the injury and today, there is no limitations issue, given that at the time when she was hurt, the plaintiff was only nine.  That means that for several years yet the plaintiff is entitled to bring a fresh proceeding against Mr Bucceri.

In my opinion, having regard not only to common sense but also the philosophy of the UCPR set out in Rule 5, it would be indefensible to require the plaintiff to commence a new

proceeding.  No inconvenience is shown to or even alleged to flow from inclusion of Mr Bucceri in the existing one.

It is accepted by Mr Farrell who appeared for Mr Bucceri that there is really no distinction between the present application and one that might be imagined as being brought by his client if sued in a new proceeding for a summary judgment against the plaintiff under Rule 293.  He would bear the onus of establishing the action had no reasonable prospects of success.  If he could discharge such an onus today, I think he would be entitled to have the application refused.

The proposed amended statement of claim would allege the following against Mr Bucceri.

"3A. At all material times:

(a)  the Second Defendant was the sole director of the First Defendant;

(b)  the second Defendant was thereby responsible for arranging for the First Defendant to discharge the duty pleaded in paragraph 3 hereof;

(c)  the Second Defendant, or ought to have known, the…

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Details
Case
[2004] QDC 567
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Noble v Winter in the City Events Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, an infant, sought to join the sole director of the defendant company as an additional defendant in an ongoing personal injury claim. The plaintiff's application was made under Rule 69 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules. The court had to determine whether the application should be granted, allowing the addition of the sole director as a defendant in the existing proceeding, or whether a separate proceeding should be initiated against him. The defendant director contested the application, arguing that the claim against him had no reasonable prospects of success.

The court considered the issue of whether it was appropriate to join the director as a defendant in the existing proceeding, given that the plaintiff was an infant and had not yet reached the age of majority. The court noted that there was no limitation issue, as the plaintiff was still entitled to bring a fresh proceeding against the director for several years. The court found that it would be indefensible to require the plaintiff to commence a new proceeding, as no inconvenience was shown or alleged to flow from including the director in the existing one. The court also considered the philosophy of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, which emphasizes common sense and practicality.

The court further examined the circumstances under which a director of a company could be held personally liable for the torts of a company. The court noted that the extent of a director's personal involvement in the company's tort had to be carefully examined. The court considered various authorities on the subject, including the Court of Appeal's decision in C Evans and Sons Limited v. Spritebrand Limited, and the recent consideration of the issue by Redlich J in Johnson Mathey (Australia) Pty Ltd v. Dascorp Pty Ltd.

In the present case, the court found that the plaintiff may establish that the director had personal responsibility for the design of relevant arrangements and for ensuring that others entrusted with setting them up and operating them were appropriately instructed as to how that could be done safely. The court noted that the director had the potential to be regarded as having the kind of personal responsibility that the plaintiff sought to attach to him. However, the court made no judgment in relation to that and approached the matter as one in which the plaintiff may sue whomever she will.

The court concluded that the application should be granted, allowing the addition of the sole director as a defendant in the existing proceeding. The court placed the plaintiff on notice that the director contended he had no business being brought into this action at all. If the director ultimately establishes that he is correct, it may go hard against the plaintiff or her litigation guardian. The court's final order granted the application, allowing the plaintiff to join the sole director of the defendant company as an additional defendant in the existing proceeding.

Background

Background to the litigation

This case involves an application by the plaintiff, an infant, to join the sole director of the defendant company, Winter in the City Events Pty Ltd, as an additional defendant in a personal injury claim. The plaintiff was injured during a tobogganing activity at an event organised by the defendant company, which featured a slope covered in artificial snow. The plaintiff's litigation guardian, Terri Noble, is seeking to join Alfio Bucceri, the sole director of Winter in the City Events Pty Ltd, as a defendant due to concerns that the company may not have sufficient assets to satisfy a judgment and that its insurer had declined coverage. The plaintiff was nine years old at the time of the injury, which means she can still bring a fresh proceeding against Mr Bucceri. The case raises the issue of when a director of a company may be held personally liable for the torts of a company.

The application to join Mr Bucceri was contested, and the Court considered the possibility of the plaintiff suing whomever she wished, as per the decision in Cooper v. Dexter. The Court also took into account the philosophy of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, which encourages the resolution of disputes in a single proceeding where possible. The Court found that there were no limitations issues and that no inconvenience would be caused by the inclusion of Mr Bucceri in the existing proceeding. However, the Court also noted that if Mr Bucceri could establish that the claim against him had no reasonable prospects of success, the application could be refused. The proposed amended statement of claim would allege that Mr Bucceri, as the sole director of the defendant company, was responsible for ensuring the company discharged its duty of care to participants in the tobogganing activity and that he owed a duty to take reasonable care for the plaintiff's safety. The case will now proceed with Mr Bucceri as an additional defendant, and the plaintiff may establish that he had personal responsibility for the design of the relevant arrangements and ensuring that others were appropriately instructed as to how to operate them safely.

This case involves an application by the plaintiff, an infant, represented by her litigation guardian, to join the sole director of the defendant company, Mr Alfio Bucceri, as an additional defendant under Rule 69 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR). The plaintiff, who was injured during a tobogganing event in Brisbane, believes that the defendant company may not have sufficient assets to satisfy a potential judgment and that its insurer has declined coverage. The application was contested by Mr Bucceri, who appeared in court. The District Court found that there was no limitation issue as the plaintiff was nine years old at the time of the incident and, therefore, still had several years before she would be unable to bring a fresh proceeding against Mr Bucceri. The Court considered it indefensible to require the plaintiff to commence a new proceeding and found no inconvenience in including Mr Bucceri in the existing one. The Court acknowledged the interesting question of when a director of a company may be held personally liable for the torts of the company but found that it was not inclined to permit the joinder of Mr Bucceri in circumstances where the claim against him appeared hopeless or without reasonable prospects of success. The application was granted, and the plaintiff was placed on notice that Mr Bucceri contended he had no business being brought into this action at all.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Is it permissible to join a sole director of a company as an additional defendant under UCPR Rule 69, when there are no limitation issues, and the plaintiff intends to bring a separate proceeding against him?
2. What are the circumstances under which a director of a company may be held personally liable for the torts of a company?
3. Can a director be held personally liable for the acts of a company without proof of knowledge or recklessness, if the director authorized, directed, and procured the acts complained of?
4. Is there a personal duty of care owed by a director to individuals participating in the company's activities, when the director is aware of the risks associated with the activity?
5. Can a director be held liable for the actions of a company if they have personal responsibility for the design of relevant arrangements and ensuring that others entrusted with setting them up and operating them are appropriately instructed as to how that can be done safely?

Held
1. It is permissible to join a sole director of a company as an additional defendant under UCPR Rule 69, when there are no limitation issues, and the plaintiff intends to bring a separate proceeding against him. The court concluded that it would be indefensible to require the plaintiff to commence a new proceeding and granted the application.
2. A director of a company may be held personally liable for the torts of a company if they have personally involved themselves in circumstances that resulted in harm to the plaintiff. The extent of personal involvement must be carefully examined.
3. A director can be held personally liable for the acts of a company without proof of knowledge or recklessness, if the director authorized, directed, and procured the acts complained of. This is based on the principle that the director's personal involvement in the tort is sufficient to establish liability.
4. A personal duty of care may be owed by a director to individuals participating in the company's activities if the director is aware of the risks associated with the activity and fails to take reasonable care to prevent injury.
5. A director can be held liable for the actions of a company if they have personal responsibility for the design of relevant arrangements and ensuring that others entrusted with setting them up and operating them are appropriately instructed as to how that can be done safely. This is based on the director's involvement in the design and management of the arrangements.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The case of Noble v Winter in the City Events Pty Ltd revolves around an application by the plaintiff, a minor, suing by her Litigation Guardian, to join the sole director of the defendant company, Mr Alfio Bucceri, as an additional defendant. The plaintiff seeks to join Mr Bucceri under UCPR Rule 69, primarily due to concerns about the defendant company's financial status and its insurer's refusal to cover the claim. The court's reasoning is grounded in the philosophy of the UCPR, as outlined in Rule 5, which aims to facilitate just, quick, and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.

In denying Mr Bucceri's contention that the claim against him has no reasonable prospects of success, the court emphasizes the importance of not requiring the plaintiff to initiate a new proceeding, given the absence of any limitation issues. The plaintiff, being a minor at the time of the incident, has several years before she reaches adulthood to bring a fresh proceeding against Mr Bucceri. The court finds no inconvenience or allegation of inconvenience arising from the inclusion of Mr Bucceri in the existing proceeding.

The court also examines the circumstances under which a director of a company may be held personally liable for the torts of a company. While it is easier to establish personal liability in cases where the company is a "one man" affair, it does not necessarily follow that the director is always liable. The case of Trevor Ivory Limited v. Anderson highlights that a director may not be personally liable even in a one-man company scenario, as the primary judge's conclusion was successfully appealed.

The court relies on the leading case of C Evans and Sons Limited v. Spritebrand Limited to determine when a director can be held personally liable for the tortious acts of a company. The court finds that if a director has authorized, directed, and procured the acts complained of, it is not an essential precondition of his liability that he knew the acts were tortious or was reckless as to whether or not they were likely to be tortious. However, the court acknowledges that the circumstances and the judgment ultimately made will depend on the extent to which a director has personally involved himself in the events leading to the injured plaintiff's misfortune.

The court also considers whether a personal duty of care is owed by a director to individuals participating in the company's activities when the director is aware of the risks associated with the activity. The court finds that in certain circumstances, a director may owe a personal duty of care to individuals participating in the company's activities, as seen in the case of Yuille v. B&B Fisheries (Leigh) Ltd and Bates. In this case, the second defendant, who was the alter ego of the company, was held liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff due to his knowledge of the defects in the vessel and the failure of management to make adequate provisions for periodical inspection.

Lastly, the court considers whether a director can be held liable for the actions of a company if they have personal responsibility for the design of relevant arrangements and ensuring that others entrusted with setting them up and operating them are appropriately instructed as to how that can be done safely. The court finds that this may be a relevant factor in determining the extent of a director's personal responsibility, although it makes no judgment on the matter at this stage.

In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of this case is that a director of a company may be held personally liable for the torts of a company if they have authorized, directed, and procured the acts complained of, and if they had personal responsibility for the design of relevant arrangements and ensuring that others entrusted with setting them up and operating them were appropriately instructed as to how that could be done safely. However, it is not an essential precondition of the director's liability that they knew the acts were tortious or were reckless as to whether or not they were likely to be tortious. The court's decision in this case is in line with the philosophy of the UCPR and aims to facilitate just, quick, and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.