Noakes v Beveridge
[2014] ACTSC 177
•29 July 2014
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | Noakes v Beveridge |
Citation: | [2014] ACTSC 177 |
Hearing Date(s): | 2 June 2014 |
DecisionDate: | 29 July 2014 |
Before: | Mossop M |
Decision: | See [40] |
Category: | Interlocutory application |
Catchwords: | PERSONAL INJURY – motor vehicle accident – compulsory conference - medical reports – whether medical reports served after compulsory conference can be relied upon |
Legislation Cited: | Road Transport (Third-Party Insurance) Act 2008 (ACT) ss 139, 156 |
Cases Cited: | Best v Bardsley [2013] ACTSC 141 |
Parties: | Geoffrey Noakes ( Plaintiff) Colin Beveridge ( First Defendant) QBE Insurance Australia Ltd ( Second Defendant) |
Representation: | Counsel: Mr F Tuscano ( Plaintiff) Mr A Muller ( First and Second Defendants) |
| Solicitors: Ken Cush & Associates ( Plaintiff) Moray & Agnew ( First and Second Defendants) | |
File Number(s): | SC 497 of 2013 |
Introduction
These proceedings relate to a motor vehicle accident. The proceedings are regulated by the terms of the Road Transport (Third-Party Insurance) Act 2008 (ACT). The accident the subject of the proceedings occurred on 12 September 2011. On 16 October 2013 the plaintiff served his certificate of readiness under s 139 of the Act. The compulsory conference occurred on 23 October 2013.
The certificate of readiness was signed by the plaintiff’s solicitor and certified, relevantly:
1. We are ready for the compulsory conference.
…
3. We have obtained medical and other expert reports from each person the claimant proposes to call as a witness at the trial;…
Proceedings were commenced on 17 December 2013. On 16 April 2014 the plaintiff served reports of Dr Le Leu, an occupational physician, dated 9 April 2014 and Dr Jungfer, a psychiatrist, dated 24 February 2014. Those reports had not previously been served nor had other reports from those doctors been served.
On 17 April 2014 the proceedings came before the Deputy Registrar of the Court. The defendant indicated its objection to the plaintiff relying upon the reports served on 16 April 2014 on the basis that they had been obtained after the signing of the certificate of readiness which stated that the plaintiff had obtained medical and other expert reports from each person the claimant proposed to call as a witness at the trial.
Precisely what occurred before the Deputy Registrar is not clear. The bench sheet records:
Plaintiff required leave of court to rely on evidence (medical reports) only served on the defendants on 16 April 2014. Plaintiff may wish to file an application.
1. Direction: if plaintiff intends to rely on medical evidence served on defendants on 16 April 2014, then that application is to be filed and served by 1 May 2014.
2. Matter to be adjourned for call over before registrar on 6 May 2014 at 9:30 am.
That direction having been made, the plaintiff has applied for leave to rely upon those reports. By application in preceding dated 30 April 2014 the plaintiff seeks an order that he be permitted to rely upon the expert medical evidence of Dr Jungfer and Dr Le Leu.
Although the basis for the making of the direction by the Deputy Registrar is not clear, the application for leave to overcome the prohibition implied in the Deputy Registrar’s order provides a suitable vehicle for determining the merits of the defendant’s argument. The issue to be determined is whether the Act prevents reliance by the plaintiff on the reports and, if it does not, whether there is any other basis to refuse to permit the plaintiff to rely upon the reports.
Section 139 of the Act provides:
139Procedures before compulsory conference
(1)At least 7 days before the compulsory conference is to be held, each party for the motor accident claim must give each other party for the motor accident claim the following:
(a)a copy of each document that is relevant to the motor accident claim that has not yet been given to the other party;
(b)a statement verifying that all relevant documents in the possession of the party or the party’s lawyer have been given as required;
(c)details of the party’s legal representation;
(d)if the party has legal representation—a certificate of readiness signed by the party’s lawyer.
Note If a form is approved under s 276 for this provision, the form must be used.
(2)However, on application by a party, the court may exempt the party from an obligation to give material to another party before trial if satisfied that—
(a)giving the material would alert a person reasonably suspected of fraud to the suspicion; or
(b)there is some other good reason why the material should not be given.
Note For how documents may be given, see the Legislation Act, pt 19.5.
(3)In this section:
certificate of readiness, by a party to a motor accident claim, means a certificate under this Act stating that—
(a)the party is in all respects ready for the compulsory conference; and
(b)the party has obtained all investigative material required for the trial including witness statements from each person (other than expert witnesses) the party intends to call as a witness at the trial; and
(c)the party has obtained medical or other expert reports from each person the party proposes to call as an expert witness at the trial; and
(d)the party has fully complied with the party’s obligations to give the other parties material relevant to the motor accident claim; and
(e)the party’s lawyer has given the party a costs statement.
costs statement, by a party’s lawyer, means a statement containing—
(a)details of the legal costs (clearly identifying costs that are legal fees and costs that are disbursements) payable by the party to the party’s lawyer up to the completion of the conference; and
(b)an estimate of the party’s likely legal costs (clearly identifying costs that are legal fees and costs that are disbursements) if the motor accident claim proceeds to trial and is decided by the court; and
(c)a statement of the consequences to the party, in terms of costs, in each of the following cases:
(i) if the amount of the damages awarded by the court is equal to, or more than, the claimant’s mandatory final offer;
(ii) if the amount of the damages awarded by the court is less than the claimant’s mandatory final offer but equal to, or more than, the respondent’s mandatory final offer;
(iii) if the amount of the damages awarded by the court is equal to, or less than, the respondent’s mandatory final offer.
Note Mandatory final offers are dealt with in pt 4.8.
The effect of s 139 was previously considered by Master Harper in Macintosh v Hikechukwu [2011] ACTSC 131. At that time s 139(3) provided:
(3)Certificate of readiness, by a party to a motor vehicle claim, means a certificate stating that-
(a)the party is in all respects ready for-
(i) the compulsory conference; and
(ii) the trial; and
…
It will be observed that this differs from the current form of the Act in that the words “under this Act” have been inserted after “a certificate” and the reference to “the trial” in paragraph (a)(ii) has been deleted. I will return to the legislative history of s 139 later in these reasons.
In Macintosh the solicitors for the plaintiff had filed a qualified certificate of readiness purporting to reserve the right to obtain further evidence once proceedings were commenced. His Honour addressed what should be made of the requirement in paragraph (a) of the definition of certificate of readiness in s 139(3) in circumstances where court procedures may bring to light further evidence or material warranting the obtaining of further evidence. His Honour found that s 139 should be read as a statement that the party is ready for a compulsory conference and ready for trial to the extent practicable, taking account of the fact that proceedings have not yet been commenced. At [13]-[16] His Honour said:
13. To read s 139 literally would be to impose an impossibility on claimants, insurers and lawyers. The section must be read so as to achieve the clear intention of the legislature. That intention is that before court proceedings are commenced, the claimant and the insurer must have exchanged all relevant documents in their possession and made a genuine effort to settle the claim. Clearly, neither party will be ready for trial a week before the compulsory conference, well prior to the commencement of proceedings and probably at least a year before the trial itself. Neither party will by then have had available the various interlocutory processes available under the Court Procedures Rules: I have mentioned discovery, interrogatories and non-party production, and there may be others which will be relevant in particular cases.
14. To comply with the section, each party much sign a certificate of readiness which states what the definition requires such a certificate to state, so that a qualification such as the solicitors for the plaintiff sought to rely on in the present claim will not be acceptable. But the certificate will be read as a statement that the party is ready for a compulsory conference and ready for trial to the extent practicable, taking account of the fact that proceedings have not yet been commenced.
15. It should also be said that there is nothing in the Act which would render inadmissible at trial evidence obtained subsequently to the signing of the certificate of readiness. Whilst the signing of a certificate which was false to the knowledge of the solicitor at the time would be highly improper and might amount to professional misconduct, I can see nothing in the Act which would prevent a party from continuing to gather evidence after an unsuccessful compulsory conference. Indeed, a solicitor who failed to do so might be found to have been derelict in his or her duty to the client.
16. The effect of this interpretation of s 139 is that the solicitor signing the certificate must believe it to be true at the time it is signed, but is in no way limited by having signed the certificate to adducing in evidence at trial only the material in the solicitor’s possession at the date of signature.
His Honour’s decision was given on 19 August 2011.
In Singh v Rodden [2013] ACTSC 272 Refshauge J made an order compelling a compulsory conference to occur. After referring to the legislative history of the amended provisions His Honour said:
47. Interestingly, the provision has been modified since the decision in McIntosh v Hikechukwu, for the certificate under the section then provided that the parties had to certify that the certifying party was “in all respects ready for— ... (ii) the trial”.
48. His Honour had held in that case that such a requirement could not be read literally or it would exclude the important pre-trial procedures that are so important in preparation for trial, but are only available after proceedings had been commenced. His Honour referred to discovery and production of documents and interrogatories, recognising that these are the exception rather than the rule in motor vehicle personal injuries litigation, but also the procedures under Div 2.8.7 of the Court Procedures Rules for facilitating non-party production of documents. Another important procedure would be the subpoena of documents.
49. In any event, the provision requiring a certification of readiness for trial (as opposed to for the compulsory conference, that is, the section quoted in [47]) was omitted by the Road Transport (Third-Party Insurance) Amendment Act 2012 (ACT), which commenced on 1 January 2013. Interestingly, as though such a significant change was being slipped through, the Explanatory Statement made no express reference to the change but referred to the clauses which included that which made the change in the following rather odd way: “These clauses make technical corrections applying to some of the notes in the CTP Act in line with the provisions referred to by those notes.”
50. It seems to me that to omit such a certification of readiness for trial to be rather more than a “technical correction” and it certainly seems to me to be amending a substantive provision, rather than a note in the Road Transport (Third-Party Insurance) Act (which was the Act referred to as the CTP Act).
51. Master Harper held, however, in McIntosh v Hikechukwu, that the certificate required under s 139 could not exclude the proper – and statutorily permitted – further preparation for trial after the commencement of proceedings which would ordinarily follow a compulsory conference preceded by the certification. Indeed, the amendment to s 139, to which I ha ve referred, seems to me to reinforce the view that approach of the learned Master is correct.
The plaintiff relied upon the decisions in Macintosh and Singh. He submitted that s 139 refers to the party’s current intention and that the section does not indicate an intention to limit the way future proceedings are conducted.
The defendants submitted the intention of the Act was correctly explained in the explanatory statement to the Road Transport (Third Party Insurance) Amendment Bill 2011 which was referred to in Best v Bardsley [2013] ACTSC 141 at [15]. In that case Burns J was dealing with the submission that s 139 had the effect of requiring disclosure of certain documents held by one party despite the fact that they were subject to legal professional privilege. In the course of examining s 139 his Honour set out aspects of the argument presented by the appellant and in doing so quoted certain extrinsic materials. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of his judgment are as follows.
14. The [appellant] referred to the explanatory statement of the relevant Minister on the introduction of the Road Transport (Third Party Insurance) Bill 2007 concerning clause 133 of the Bill (now s 139 of the Act):
Before the [compulsory] conference parties must exchange a copy of the relevant documents, details of legal representation and a certificate of readiness (if represented).
15. It also sought to rely upon the explanatory statement of the relevant Minister to the Road Transport (Third Party Insurance) Amendment Bill 2011, which made amendments to s 139 in relation to compulsory conference procedures (clause 12–14):
The procedures under the [RTA] were designed to ensure that the compulsory conference does not occur until all relevant information has been disclosed to both parties under part 4.3 of the Act. The intention this (sic) is to mandate full and open disclosure between the parties given this is a compulsory statutory insurance scheme. Accordingly, holding a compulsory conference prior to this would be premature. While the parties are free to and may settle a claim at any stage, a full and open disclosure is one of the key principles in the [RTA]. Further, as all the information will have been disclosed prior to the compulsory conference, the claim will be ready for litigation in accordance with the intentions of the Act, should it not be settled at the compulsory conference (i.e there should be few circumstances in which new information arises, such as the deterioration of an injury).
Relying upon the material extracted in Best, the defendants submitted that there were two purposes of s 139: first, full exchange of information, and second, ensuring that the claim is ready for litigation. They submitted that it was that the legislature’s intention to ensure that a party had obtained all of its expert evidence and that was made clear by the requirement to certify, as required by paragraph (c) of the definition of certificate of readiness in s 139(3), that “the party has obtained medical or other expert reports from each person the party proposes to call as an expert witness at the trial”. They submitted that as at the point of signing the certificate of readiness the plaintiff was aware of the potential for a claim based on psychiatric injury and had material available to him in relation to that but, in circumstances where there was no time pressure, had made an election to proceed to a compulsory conference notwithstanding that he had not obtained reports from Dr Le Leu and Dr Jungfer.
They accepted that the submissions that were being put were inconsistent with the decision of Master Harper in Macintosh and the dicta of Refshauge J in Singh.
Consideration
The tension that arises in the operation of s 139 is that on the one hand it compels a solicitor to certify that “the party has obtained medical or other expert reports from each person the party proposes to call as an expert witness at the trial” yet on the other there will often be circumstances where there will often be very good reason why a party will need to call additional expert witnesses beyond those identified at the time of the certificate of readiness. As Master Harper pointed out in Macintosh, the latter situation will often arise for defendants because, through the compulsory processes of the Court, defendants may gain access to material which they did not previously have, which raises new issues which need to be the subject of expert evidence. The legislation itself does not make it clear how the tension is to be resolved.
The options are:
(a)a party may only call at the trial expert evidence from a person from whom a report has been obtained prior to the compulsory conference; or
(b)a party may call at the trial expert evidence from a person whose report was obtained after the compulsory conference but that capacity is subject to some qualification arising from the fact that the certification under s 139(3)(c) was given previously; or
(c)a party may call at the trial expert evidence from a person whose report was obtained after the compulsory conference notwithstanding the giving of the certificate of readiness.
In relation to option (b) above, the defendants suggested that there may not be a limitation on serving reports or records of treating doctors but that there would be a constraint on serving medico-legal reports. The basis for this distinction was not clearly articulated.
In relation to option (c) above, in addition to certain limited specific provisions of the Act which I refer to below, any consequences of a party or his lawyer of providing an inaccurate certificate or departing from the statements in the certificate would occur outside the court process, for example, through disciplinary proceedings against the lawyer signing the certificate if the lawyer did not believe it to be accurate when signed: see McIntosh at [15].
It is necessary to say something more about the legislative history of s 139. The submissions of the parties did not refer to that history in any detail.
I have pointed out above that the current form of s 139 is different to that considered in McIntosh in that the words “under this Act” have been inserted after “a certificate” and the reference to “the trial” in paragraph (a)(ii) has been deleted. These two amendments were the result of the processes of the Legislative Assembly rather than being part of proposal by the executive government implemented by the Assembly.
The amendments were made by the Road Transport (Third Party Insurance) Amendment Act 2012. The Bill for that Act (the Road Transport (Third Party Insurance) Amendment Bill 2011) was presented to the Assembly on 17 February 2011. That was several months prior to the decision in McIntosh. Clause 12 proposed to insert a note after s 139(1)(d) making it clear that a form for the certificate of readiness could be approved. Clause 13 proposed to insert an additional requirement that the respondent identify whether it accepted that the threshold for permanent impairment proposed by the Bill to be introduced had been met. Clause 14 proposed the insertion after the word “certificate” in s 139(3), the words “under this Act”. The effect of the changes proposed in clauses 12 and 14 would be to make it clear that the certificate of readiness was one under the Act and not to be confused with the certificate of readiness referred to in the Court Procedures Rules 2006. The explanatory statement addressed the amendments in some detail. In the quote below I have omitted the paragraphs that deal with clause 13 because it was not ultimately passed by the Assembly.
Clauses 12-14
These clauses make minor technical and consequential changes to s139 of the CTP Act in relation to the compulsory conference procedures.
Specifically, clauses 12 and 14 clarify the existing law with regard to the certificate of readiness as part of the compulsory conference procedures in s139 of the CTP Act.
The procedures under the CTP Act are designed to ensure that the compulsory conference does not occur until all relevant information has been disclosed to both parties under part 4.3 of the Act. The intention this is to mandate full and open disclosure between the parties given this is a compulsory statutory insurance scheme. Accordingly, holding a compulsory conference prior to this would be premature. While the parties are free to and may settle a claim at any stage, full and open disclosure is one of the key principles in the CTP Act. Further, as all the information will have been disclosed prior to the compulsory conference, the claim will be ready for litigation in accordance with the intentions of the Act, should it not be settled at the compulsory conference (ie there should be few circumstances in which new information arises, such as the deterioration of an injury).
The amendments in clauses 12 and 14 make it clear that the certificate of readiness is a term used for the purposes of the CTP Act. The local legal profession had asked for clarification of the procedures in light of the forms already used in the Supreme Court of the ACT. Further, the provision will be amended to specify that the certificate may be an approved form under the CTP Act. This will mean that parties whose lawyer is required to sign the certificate of readiness under s139 (1) (d) because they legally represent that party in a claim, must ensure that the approved form under the CTP Act is used.
...
Two points are of significance in relation to this extract of the Explanatory Statement.
First, the second and fourth paragraphs quoted above make it clear that the amendment to clarify what sort of certificate of readiness was being talked about in the Act was introduced as a result of feedback from the legal profession well before the decision in McIntosh.
Second, the statement in the third paragraph (which was that set out in the extract from Best above) did not actually relate to either of the amendments in clause 12 or 14. In so far as the paragraph could be deployed in support of the defendants’ current arguments ‑ because it refers to the limited circumstances in which further information might arise after the compulsory conference ‑ the author of the explanatory statement is merely commenting on the existing legislation previously passed by the Assembly and not explaining the intention behind the amendments proposed in clauses 12 and 14. It is not open under s 142 of the Legislation Act 2001 to use extrinsic material from 2011 to explain the operation or intention of the legislature when it enacted the provisions of the Road Transport (Third Party Insurance) Act in 2008: Hunter Resources Ltd v Melville (1988) 164 CLR 234 at 241.
Following the presentation of the Road Transport (Third Party Insurance) Amendment Bill 2011 to the Assembly it was a long time before it was debated. Ultimately the most important provisions of the Bill, so far as the executive government was concerned, were negatived in the Assembly. Clause 13 of the Bill was negatived: Australian Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 24 August 2012, 3648.
During the detail stage of the debate on the Bill a member of the Liberal Party (Mr Smyth) proposed a new clause 14A substituting paragraph (a) of the definition of certificate of readiness in s 139(3) so that it referred to being ready for the conference rather than being ready for the conference and the trial. This was explained to the Assembly as follows:
This amendment is about preparations for compulsory conferences. There is an anomaly in the act in relation to the way in which matters are prepared for conferences and for trial. Section 139(3)(a) at present requires a certificate of readiness that the matter is ready for trial. In reality, however, it is more than likely that at that point there are various matters that still cannot be confirmed. Hence, while the logic of the process is to facilitate a compulsory conference to see if the matter can be resolved before going to trial, the act requires that the matter be ready for trial at the point before the conference can be held. At present, therefore, if parties wish to dispense with a compulsory conference, they have to incur a cost by applying to the court to exempt the matter.
Mr Smyth then referred to the costs incurred in making an application to dispense with the compulsory conference and the fact that the equivalent requirement in Queensland legislation had been repealed.
The amendment was supported by the ACT Greens and opposed by the government members. It was passed by the Assembly.
The success of this amendment in the Assembly removes one of the elements of the definition of certificate of readiness (the reference to being ready “in all respects for ... the trial”) which could have supported the proposition that there was to be derived from s 139 a restriction on the capacity of parties to rely upon evidence obtained after the compulsory conference. It also underscores the impermissibility of reliance upon the statements in the Explanatory Memorandum as to the intended operation of the pre-court procedures provisions of the Act.
The features of the Act that are relevant to considering which of the options identified above reflects the proper interpretation of the Act are as follows:
(a)The intention of the Act to provide a process which puts the parties in as good a position as possible to settle the claim at the conference through the exchange of information and reports. This is reflected in the provisions for:
(i)exchange of information; and
(ii)the requirements for certification in s 139 generally but s 139(3)(c) in particular.
(b)The absence of any provision addressing the consequences of the signing of a certificate, namely:
(i)whether the content of the certificate constrains the party’s subsequent conduct of proceedings in court; and
(ii)particularly, whether statements of the certificate constrain the capacity of a party to put on new expert material.
(c)The precise use of language in the definition of certificate of readiness in s 139(3) which is consistent with the statements in the certificate being statements of present intention (paragraph (b) “intends to call”, paragraph (c) “proposes to call”) rather than binding obligation (“will call”).
(d)The provisions relating to costs which, although not expressly referring to the calling of new expert witnesses, do appear to contemplate that additional evidence will be gathered after the compulsory conference. Section 156 is a provision relating to cases where the award of damages other than damages for non economic loss is $50,000 or less. Section 156(5) imposes a limitation on the award of costs “related to investigations or gathering of evidence by the party after… the end of the compulsory conference”. This recognises that a party may conduct further investigations or gather evidence but that costs may only be awarded where “an award of damages is affected by factors that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the exchange of mandatory final offers”. This provision does not expressly refer to new expert witnesses but is sufficient to cover obtaining reports from new expert witnesses and imposes a costs consequence.
(e)Section 156(6), which is to be read in conjunction with s 156(5), contemplates that an award of damages may be affected by factors which were not reasonably foreseeable by a party at the time of making the party’s mandatory final offer. The example given is a situation of sudden and unexpected deterioration in a claimant’s medical condition. That is a situation which may involve new expert evidence and appears to be inconsistent with the proposition that the party could not call evidence from a new expert witness. The example is not exhaustive and may extend but not limit the scope of s 156(6): Legislation Act 2001 s 132(1).
In my view although the provisions of the Act can be stated as generally requiring full disclosure and encouraging settlement without the need for litigation, the regime is an intricate one involving a balance by the legislature between competing interests and considerations. That is particularly so in relation to the tension between full pre-conference preparation and the capacity of parties to run post-conference litigation in a manner perceived to advance their interests to the fullest extent permitted. The interpretation of the Act must be approached carefully by examination of the specific provisions enacted by the legislature. When those provisions are examined they indicate that there is no prohibition imposed upon obtaining new expert evidence, there is some indication that the legislature contemplated that additional evidence will be obtained after the compulsory conference and mandatory final offer and there are, in some cases, modest cost disincentives in doing so. In my view there is nothing in the Act which would permit an implication that new expert evidence was not permitted to be relied upon. Further, it cannot be said that seeking to rely upon such new evidence amounted to an abuse of the Court’s process.
This approach is consistent with the approach taken by Master Harper in Macintosh and endorsed by Refshauge J in Singh, namely that the provisions of the Act as amended do not limit the capacity of a party to lead evidence from expert witnesses whose reports were not served prior to the compulsory conference and mandatory final offers. That does not detract from the obligation of a party to certify as required by s 139(3), although it means that there are only limited consequences of having a party’s evidence less than completely prepared.
As a consequence, in my view, the terms of the statute give effect to what I have described in option (c) above. Given that the legislation does not preclude a party putting on additional expert evidence and a party is, in the absence of some legislative constraint, entitled to put on evidence in accordance with the Court Procedures Rules and any direction of the Court, I can see no basis upon which the plaintiff is precluded from putting on such evidence. Notwithstanding that there was no good explanation as to why the reports of Dr Le Leu and Dr Jungfer were not obtained prior to the compulsory conference, in the light of my conclusion about the effect of the provisions of the Act there is no basis to refuse the plaintiff the leave that the Registrar’s direction required.
Before concluding these reasons I should comment on the form of the certificate signed in the present case. Section 139 requires that the certificate of readiness be signed by the party’s lawyer: s 139(1)(d) and that it states the various things in s 139(3) in relation to “the party”. The certificate in this case provided:
“We certify that:
1. We are ready for the compulsory conference” etc
It was signed by the plaintiff’s solicitor. In my view it did not comply with the requirements of s 139 in that it failed to certify that “the party”, that is, the plaintiff, had done the various things in s 139(3). Who the “we” referred to was not clear. Although not of significance in the present case, in my view the certificate should closely follow the statutory language which is designed to provide a degree of accountability of the party in its conduct of the case and of the lawyer who signs the certificate. Looseness of language is inconsistent with that kind of accountability.
In relation to costs each party accepted that the costs of this application would follow the event. As a result of my conclusion the defendant should pay the plaintiff’s costs of the application. Those costs will include the costs of the mention before me on 30 May 2014 which I had reserved.
Orders
The appropriate orders are therefore:
1. The plaintiff is granted leave to rely upon the expert medical evidence of Dr Jungfer and Dr Le Leu notwithstanding that those reports were not served prior to the compulsory conference which occurred on 23 October 2013.
2. The defendant is to pay the plaintiff’s costs of the application including the costs reserved on 30 May 2014.
| I certify that the preceding forty [40] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Master Mossop. Associate: Date: |
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