NMGM and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship)

NMGM and Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (Citizenship) [2022] AATA 1777 (22 June 2022)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2020/3252
Re:NMGM
APPLICANT

AndMinister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs
RESPONDENT

DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member D. J. Morris
Date:22 June 2022
Place:Melbourne

Pursuant to section 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, the Tribunal –
(a)sets aside the decision of the delegate dated 30 April 2020; and
(b)remits the matter to the Respondent with a direction that the Applicant’s identity is satisfied in the terms of section 24(3) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007.

................... .[sgd]....................................................
Senior Member D. J. Morris
Catchwords
CITIZENSHIP – application for citizenship by conferral – where applicant is citizen of Afghanistan – where applicant satisfies certain requirements - delegate not satisfied of applicant’s identity – delegate therefore prohibited from approving application – consideration of Citizenship Procedural Instructions relating to assessment of identity – biometric evidence – oral evidence of life story – documents provided – inconsistent evidence about applicant’s immediate family – suggestion of human chimera – likelihood of this – whether inconsistencies sufficient to undermine satisfaction of identity – decision under review set aside and matter remitted with direction
Legislation
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), ss 33A, 35, 37, 38AA
Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth), ss 21, 24, 52
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Div 1, r 1.12
Cases
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No.2), Re: (1979) 2 ALD 634
Minister for Home Affairs v G and Another (2019) 266 FCR 569
Neat Holdings Pty Limited v Karajan Holdings Pty Limited and Ors [1992] HCA 66
Secondary Materials
Conan Doyle, A; The Sign of the Four; Spencer Blackett, London; (1890), chap VI
Department of Home Affairs – Citizenship Procedural Instructions – CPI 16 – Assessing Identity under the Citizenship Act (reissued 1 January 2022)
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member D. J. Morris
22 June 2022
PRELIMINARY

The Tribunal made an order under section 35 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act1975 (‘the AAT Act’) prohibiting the publication of the name of the applicant in these proceedings or any information that might tend to reveal his identity. He will be known in the decision and these reasons by the anonym ‘NMGM’. Other persons referred to will be anonymised consistent with the scope of the order.
NMGM arrived in Australia in February 2010 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. In June 2010 he was granted a Class XA (Subclass 866) protection visa. On 6 August 2014, he lodged an application for Australian citizenship by conferral. On 30 April 2020, a delegate of the then Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (‘the Minister’) refused the application on the basis that the delegate was not satisfied of NMGM’s identity and so was prohibited from approving the application under section 24(3) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (‘the Act’).
On 27 May 2020, NMGM applied for review of the delegate’s decision, as he is entitled to do under section 52 of the Act.
HEARING
A hearing was held on 21 and 22 March 2022. NMGM was represented by Ms Dorota Sokolowski, of Dorota Sokolowski Legal Practitioner. The Minister was represented by Mr Matthew Daly of Mills Oakley Lawyers. The Applicant gave evidence and was cross-examined. Three other witnesses, friends of the Applicant, gave evidence by electronic means, by leave of the Tribunal under section 33A of the AAT Act. The Tribunal appreciates the assistance of interpreters in the Dari language on both days in relation to the evidence of NMGM and some of the witnesses.
The Tribunal admitted into evidence documents which are listed in the annexure to these reasons. The Tribunal also had regard to written Statements of Facts, Issues and Contentions submitted by the Respondent (‘RSFIC’) and the Applicant (‘ASFIC’). At the conclusion of the hearing, the Tribunal reserved its decision.
On 1 June 2022, a new Minister was appointed to administer the Act, the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs. He is now the Respondent in this matter.
THE LEGISLATIVE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK
Section 21(1) of the Act provides that a person may make an application to the Minister to become an Australian citizen. Section 24 of the Act provides that the Minister must approve or refuse to approve the person becoming an Australian citizen.
The Decision Record shows (TD, pp 12-23) that Minister’s delegate found that NMGM satisfied certain requirements under the Act. It was found that he was aged 18 years or over at the time of the application (section 21(2)(a)). It was found that he was a permanent resident at the time of the application and the decision (section 21(2)(b)). It was further found that he satisfied the general residence requirements (section 21(2)(c)). NMGM had demonstrated that he understood the nature of the application, possessed a basic knowledge of the English language, and had an adequate knowledge of Australia and the responsibilities and privileges of Australian citizenship (sections 21(2)(d),(e), and (f)), through satisfactorily completing a citizenship test approved by the Minister (section 21(2A)). NMGM satisfied the delegate that he was likely to continue to reside in Australia or maintain a close and continuing relationship with Australia (section 21(2)(g)).
However, having not been satisfied of the Applicant’s identity, the consideration of NMGM’s application was halted, and it was refused as the prohibition in section 24(3) was found to apply. The requirement that NMGM be of good character at the time of the decision (section 21(2)(h)) was not assessed, nor were the requirements relating to security assessments (section 24(4)); prohibition in relation to a national security offence or other qualifying offence (section 24(4A(a) and (b)) or the prohibitions in sections 24(6) and 24(7) addressed.
Section 24(3) of the Act relates to identity:
Identity
(3) The Minister must not approve the person becoming an Australian citizen unless the Minister is satisfied of the identity of the person.
Division 5 of the Act sets out in detail the identity provisions.
In considering NMGM’s application for Australian citizenship, the Minister’s delegate consulted Citizenship Procedural Instruction CPI 16 – Assessing Identity under the Citizenship Act (‘CPI 16’) issued by the Department and periodically updated. It relevantly states, under the heading ‘Purpose’:
Establishing a person’s identity before the approval of a citizenship application requires the delegate to be satisfied of the person’s identity. The identity provisions under the Act prohibit the approval of a citizenship application in cases where the delegate is not satisfied of the person’s identity.
Delegates are required to understand and apply the relevant law as set out in the Act. Many of the requirements in the Act are expressed in objective terms and do not allow any discretion for delegates. To the extent that the Act allows for discretion, delegates must give due consideration to the Department’s approved policy and procedures where relevant and appropriate in decision-making. Consideration of policy ensures that decision-making is consistent to the extent that it is appropriate and arbitrary outcomes are avoided.
However, policy and procedures do not have the force of law. When exercising powers or making decisions under legislation, officers are to give policy documents due weight, but must not apply policy inflexibly and may consider the merits of each individual case. In order to make a fair, reasonable and lawful decision, it may be appropriate to depart from the approved policy and procedures, depending on the facts of the particular case.
The Tribunal, unlike Department officers, is not bound to follow policy. But it has long been the practice of Tribunal Members, where a policy is promulgated which has been applied in making a decision that is under review, to have due regard for the policy unless there are cogent reasons to depart from it. Cogent reasons may include where the policy is inconstant with the law, or where rigid application of policy would have an unfair or perverse outcome.
This well-accepted general approach was enunciated by the Tribunal’s eminent first President, the late Sir Gerard Brennan. What he said in Re: Drakeand Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No.2) (1979) 2 ALD 634, relevantly set out below, has been successively endorsed by judicial opinion:
In my view, the Tribunal, being entitled to determine its own practice in respect of the part which Ministerial policy plays in the making of Tribunal decisions, should adopt the following practice:
When the Tribunal is reviewing the exercise of a discretionary power reposed in a Minister, and the Minister has adopted a general policy to guide him in the exercise of the power, the Tribunal will ordinarily apply that policy in reviewing the decision, unless the policy is unlawful or unless its application tends to produce an unjust decision in the circumstances of the particular case. Where the policy would ordinarily be applied, an argument against the policy itself or against its application in the particular case will be considered, but cogent reasons will have to be shown against its application, especially if the policy is shown to have been exposed to Parliamentary scrutiny.
The general practice of the Tribunal will not preclude the Tribunal from making appropriate observations on Ministerial policy, and thus contributing the benefit of its experience to the growth or modification of general policy; but the practice is intended to leave to the Minister the political responsibility for broad policy, to permit the Tribunal to function as an adjudicative tribunal rather than as a political policy-maker, and to facilitate the making of consistent decisions in the exercise of the same discretionary power.
The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia made the status of the CPIs clear in Minister for Home Affairs v G and Another (2019) 266 FCR 569 (Murphy, Moshinsky and O’Callaghan JJ) in observing, at [18]:
18. There is no power conferred by the Australian Citizenship Act to make the Instructions. Despite appearing in a form that resembles a legislative instrument or that has a statutory source, the Instructions are made in an exercise of executive power.
And at [58]-[62]:
58. It is established that an executive policy relating to the exercise of a statutory discretion must be consistent with the relevant statute in the sense that: it must allow the decision-maker to take into account relevant considerations; it must not require the decision-make to take into account irrelevant considerations; and it must not serve a purpose foreign to the purpose for which the discretionary power was created...

59. An executive policy will also be inconsistent with the relevant statute if it seeks to preclude consideration of relevant arguments running counter to the policy that might reasonably be advanced in particular cases: Drake (No 2) at 640. Thus, an executive policy relating to the exercise of a statutory discretion must leave the decision-maker ‘free to consider the unique circumstances of each case, and no part of a lawful policy can determine in advance the decision which the [decision maker] will make in the circumstances of a given case’; Drake (No 2) at 641.
60. However, as Brennan J sated in Drake (No 2) at 641, ‘[t]hat is not to deny the lawfulness of adopting an appropriate policy which guides but does not control the making of decisions, a policy which is informative of the standards and values which the [decision-maker] usually applies’....
62. An executive policy that is inconsistent with the relevant statute in the sense described above is unlawful: see Drake (No 2) at 641. It is open to the Court to make a declaration to this effect, but whether it is appropriate to do so depends on an application of the general principles regarding the making of declarations...
It follows that, if the Tribunal makes a decision in favour of NMGM the matter would be remitted to the Department with a direction. The Tribunal is not empowered to grant citizenship, it can only decide whether a required provision in the Act is met.
CPI 16 refers to the ‘three pillars’ of identity. They are set out in (the current) CPI 16 at paragraph 5:
Biometrics – a measurable characteristic that is unique to a person such as fingerprints or face.
Documents – reliable and secure documents as defined by the Security Standards for Proof-of-Identity Documents. A reliable identity document is issued with robust identity proofing processes along with issuance protocols and security features.
Life story – an account of the events that happened to a person during their lifetime.
CPI 16 was reissued by the Department on 1 January 2022, after the reviewable decision was made on 30 April 2020. However, the updated CPI 16 is the one that should be applied because the Tribunal must make a contemporary assessment as to whether, standing in the shoes of the Minister, it is satisfied (now) of the identity of NMGM.
CONTENTIONS – THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent submitted that in March 2010, NMGM was interviewed by officers of the Minister’s Department. He said that the only identity document he had was a taskera issued in Ghazni but that he had “disposed of it near my house in Afghanistan where Taliban were operating” and had not used it prior to arriving in Australia. During the same interview, NMGM said that he had three children: two boys, in age order, ‘MA’ (then aged 14) and ‘ZE’ (then aged 12), and a girl, ‘MD’ (then aged 6). They were living in Quetta, Pakistan.
In 2010, NMGM was granted a protection visa (R12, p 81). The RSFIC said (paragraph 6):
Despite there being “no evidence to confirm the applicant’s identity”, the delegate was satisfied the applicant was of Hazara appearance and spoke Hazaragi.
This is a truncated summary of what the delegate wrote in her decision. She recorded (R12, p 81):
The applicant arrived without a valid travel document on a boat codenamed [redacted] on 11 February 2010. He identified himself as [NMGM] born in 1972 in the province of Ghazni, Afghanistan. He departed Pakistan in December 2009 and travelled through Malaysia and Indonesia en route to Australia.
The applicant has provided consistent information about his identity at interviews held with Australian Information Officers on entry and at the Refugee Status Assessment (RSA) interview. He is of Hazara appearance and speaks Hazaragi. Whilst I have no evidence to confirm the applicant’s identity, I have accepted that he is [NMGM].
The Respondent submitted that in July 2010, NMGM sponsored his wife and three dependent children (MA, ZE and MD) for Class XB refugee and humanitarian visas and claimed they were, respectively, his “biological son”, “biological son” and “biological child”, giving the reference as R3, p 110-112.
This is apt to mislead, because NMGM did not make those claims. The form was filled in by a person at a Migrant Resource Centre and was the form in the name of the Applicant’s wife, ‘FH’. It is true to say that NMGM was the sponsor because the subsequent form in the tender bundle, which is the relevant form for sponsors to complete, names him, so it is fair to surmise that he provided the information to the person helping the family fill in the form, but it is inaccurate to say that he made the claims directly. However, it is accepted by the Tribunal that he instructed what to include in the form.
The Respondent submitted that, in July 2010, FH filled in a Form 681 – Refugee and special humanitarian proposal for herself and three other dependent family members, MA, ZE and MD. The form requires a person to describe the ‘Precise relationship to the main applicant’ (i.e., FH), and declared that MA was “son”, ZE was “son” and MD was “daughter”. The form was completed by the migration agent at the Migrant Resource Centre, but at Part G (R3, p 141) was signed by NMGM as the proposer. Part G includes the words “WARNING: Giving false or misleading information is a serious offence.”
In January 2012, MA submitted a Form 80 – Personal particulars for character assessment. In response to question 19, “Relationship to you (e.g. natural parent, step-parent, etc)”, MA wrote “Parent (Father)”, and put NMGM’s name. He also wrote “Parent (Mother)”, and put FH’s name.
In 2013 NMGM sponsored his wife and three dependent children (MA, ZE and MD) for Partner (Subclass 309) visas. NMGM wrote a statement dated 31 January 2013 in which he relevantly said (R3, p 294):
After we got married my wife moved into my home and took care of household duties. I worked to support my wife while she was a house wife. We had two children who were born in Afghanistan. However, after the birth of our second son it became too dangerous to remain in Afghanistan due to the Taliban so me and my family fled to Quetta Pakistan.
I continued to work in Quetta to support my family and my wife later had our third child who was a girl in Quetta.
In August 2013 a delegate wrote to FH refusing the application for refugee and humanitarian visas for her, and the children MA, ZE and MD, on the basis that there were not compelling reasons to grant the visas.
In October 2013 the Australian Consulate-General in Dubai wrote to the lawyer then representing FH about her application for provisional spouse visas and said (Exhibit R3, p 348):
I have considered the information your clients have provided in your application and I am not satisfied that the evidence demonstrates the claimed family relationship between them and Sponsor [NMGM]. This means that, as the Department is not satisfied of the claimed relationship between the applicants and the Sponsor, they will not be eligible for the grant of a Partner (Provisional)(Subclass 309) visa.
The letter states that Paternal Tests needed to be conducted between NMGM and MD; NMGM and MA; and NMGM and ZE. Maternal Tests were required to be conducted between FH and MD; FH and MA; and FH and ZE. The letter goes on to give more detail about the requirements for accredited pathology laboratories to carry out the DNA tests and logistical arrangements for them to be conducted.
In March 2014, a pathology laboratory wrote to an officer of the Minister’s Department providing original reports of paternity and maternity tests involving NMGM and FH and the three children (Exhibit R3, p 361). In summary, the letter states that the test reports:
·exclude NMGM being the biological father of MA and ZE.
·are inconclusive as to whether FH is the biological mother of MA.
·support FH being the biological mother of ZE.
·support NMGM and FH being the biological parents of MD.
In August 2014 NMGM lodged an application for Australian citizenship. In 2016 the Department requested the Applicant to provide identity documents obtained prior to his arrival in Australia and asked him to complete a Form 80 – Personal particulars for assessment including character assessment. In this form, question 43 says:
Do you have children? Children includes biological or adopted, children from a current or previous marriage, all step-children and deceased children.
NMGM listed (TD, p 47) his wife, FH, and MA as his ‘son’; ZE as his ‘son’ and MD as his ‘daughter’, and that they all remained living in Pakistan.
NMGM wrote to the Department in May, July, and August 2017, requesting that the partner visas be granted, despite the DNA test results, under compassionate and compelling circumstances.

The Respondent submits (RSFIC, p 4):
On 22 April 2018, the applicant was invited by the Department to comment on adverse information regarding the DNA testing that indicated two of his claimed dependent children listed in his Citizenship application, namely [MA] and [ZE], were not his biological children (R35).
The Tribunal has carefully read the Department’s letter of 22 April 2018 to the Applicant. It makes no reference to NMGM’s citizenship application at all. The letter states that it is to “provide you with a formal opportunity to comment on information uncovered in the assessment of your application for a Partner (Provisional)(Class UF) Subclass 309 visa”. The letter goes on to state:
As there is evidence suggesting that you provided, or caused to be provided, a bogus document in relation to this visa application, you may fail to satisfy PIC 4020(1), with the result that this visa application may be refused.
The information that is considered to be bogus is the following:
The Secondary Applicants included in the application are declared as the biological children of [FH] (Primary Applicant) and [NMGM] (Sponsor). However, DNA testing report dated 2014 concluded the below results.
·[NMGM] is not the biological father of [MA] and [ZE].
·[FH] is the biological mother of [ZE] but not the biological mother of [MA].
NMGM’s then lawyer wrote to the Department on 23 May 2018 (Exhibit R3, p 460) relevantly saying:
The applicants and sponsor are certain that there has been an error in the DNA testing of the applicants. The applicants are extremely upset and devastated and are requesting that they be allowed to undertake further DNA tests.
Appended to the lawyer’s letter was a statement signed by NMGM saying, relevantly:
I am certain that there has been an error in the DNA tests and I request that my family and I be allowed to undertake the DNA tests again and that will show all the children included in the application are those of me and my wife.
I have attached a huge number of photographs showing me and my wife and children together from when the children were babies up until currently. There is no way we would have these photographs of us all growing up as a family unless I was the father of the children and my wife was the mother of the children. All three children have been raised since birth by me and my wife and my wife and I are the biological parents of the children.
While I understand DNA errors are rare I am certain there has been an error in the DNA tests. I was at home at the time of the birth of my sons who were born at our home in Afghanistan.
I am desperate to undertake the DNA tests again. I can read very little English and did not read the DNA report at the time we received it and my wife and I were not ever concerned about reading the report at the time we received it as we knew we were the parents. My wife and I are in a state of shock.
Before the Tribunal (TB, p 531) was an email dated 31 May 2018 from the Laboratory Manager of the pathology firm which conducted the DNA tests. It would appear the email is in response to a request to review the 2014 test report. The manager discusses how there had been a change since 2014 in testing genetic markers and suggested that re-testing might resolve the original ‘inconclusive’ result that was given regarding whether FH was the biological mother of MA. The manager went on to say:
The sample collections appear to have been undertaken correctly, so I wouldn’t expect the overall results for the remainder of the tests to change even with testing using more DNA markers.
In June 2018, NMGM’s lawyer wrote to the Department advising that further DNA tests were being organised and asking that decisions on the visas await the conduct of those tests (R3, p 540).
In July 2018, FH and NMGM retained a new migration agent. That agent wrote to the Department saying:
First, they want to withdraw [MA] from their application…[MA] no longer wishes to live with his parents. He recently got engaged and will make a separate family for himself.
The agent also advised that the Applicant and FH would undergo DNA tests to establish that they were the biological parents of ZE and MD.
A different pathology laboratory conducted fresh DNA tests. The report dated 30 October 2018 was in the tender bundle (R3, pp 581-588). The report excluded NMGM as being the biological father of ZE but confirmed that NMGM is not excluded from identification as the father of MD (with a relative chance of paternity of 99.999). The report confirmed that FH was the biological mother of ZE and MD.
NMGM and FH’s migration agent wrote to the Department (R3, p 589) stating:
The applicant and the sponsor have done the DNA tests again. However, the result is still the same as the 2014 results. I hope you have received the outcome by [name of laboratory redacted] upon receipt of the DNA result for the second time regarding [ZE] the sponsor and the applicant become [sic] shocked. They believe that [ZE] is their biological child.
On 17 December 2018, the delegate refused the application for the partner visas due to the provision of false information from NMGM and FH regarding their family composition.
In November 2019, the Department wrote to NMGM about his application for citizenship, inviting him to comment on adverse information. The delegate relevantly wrote (TD, p 99):
Taskera
In your entry interview conducted on 9 March 2010, you indicated that you possessed an Afghan identity document known as a taskera which you claimed you had disposed of near your house in Afghanistan prior to coming to Australia. With your application for a Spouse visa (subclass 309) lodged overseas on 20 February 2013, you provided a set of taskeras for your children and spouse listed below:
·57XXXXX – MD
·57XXXXX – MA
·57XXXXX – ZE
·57XXXX – FH – spouse
These taskeras were hand written and were issued in Ghazni in 2011. The father’s details on the taskeras listed above are: [redacted].
On 27 October 2013, a departmental officer requested that you needed to provide taskeras which were certified by the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), for all the applicants listed in the Spouse visa application. It was outlined the taskeras must be accompanied with an original translation from the MFA, Kabul and carried a wet seal, which are meant specifically to address the requirement of foreign embassies.
On 13 July 2017, you provided a second set of taskeras issued from Ghazni in August 2015 for all your children and spouse, which had different numbers as listed below:
·1548XXXX – MD
·1548XXXX – ZE
·1548XXXX - MA
·1548XXXX – FH – spouse
…
During the process of your Citizenship application, upon request to provide further documents, you provided the taskera which you had claimed to have disposed of in Afghanistan before travelling to Australia. The taskeras (18020), issued on 29 June 1973, which you provided in support of your citizenship application reflects your claimed identity.
When you were questioned about how you had managed to locate the taskera you claimed to have disposed earlier, you mentioned that someone had found the document and handed it to the taskera office. You claim that the taskera office handed the document to your wife when she went there to obtain taskeras for the children. It is noted that you left Pakistan in Dec 2009 and your wife obtained the first set of taskeras for herself and children in May 2011. This explanation does not seem very plausible as it is unlikely that the office will hold on to the document handed to them by a stranger and then hand it back to your wife after several months. It is also noted that your taskera did not have any details for your wife, hence it is improbable that the National Identity Verification Centre (NIVC) office would be able to identify her as your spouse. On the basis of the information before me, and taking into consideration the unlikely story about how your wife located the taskera, I may find that you have deliberately provided a non-genuine document to the Department in support of your identity.
Family Composition
You have provided incorrect family composition details in your application for Citizenship. You have falsely declared two dependents, MA and ZE, as your biological children. DNA testing reports dated 26 March 2014 and 30 October 2018 has proven this information to be incorrect on two separate occasions. Through DNA testing one of the child [ZE] was found to be the biological child of your spouse, the primary applicant, for the Spouse visa but not the biological child of you, the sponsor. The second child [MA] was also found not to be the biological child of you, the sponsor, and the results were inconclusive whether your spouse was a biological parent.
Iran and Pakistan documents
You claimed to have resided in Pakistan for more than eight years before you first arrived in Australia in 2010. You stated you moved to Pakistan in 2000 from Afghanistan and then moved to Iran in search of work for about two years from 2003 to 2005. You claim to have then returned to Pakistan and resided there from January 2005 until December 2009. In an email sent to you by the Department on 27 March 2018 you were requested to provide documents from countries where you had previously resided, however you have not provided any documentation to demonstrate your residency status in any of those countries. …
As you claim to have resided in Pakistan for eight years, I find it concerning that you have no documentation, particularly as this absence of documentation is inconsistent with country information. Country information advises that in February and March 2005, the UNHCR and Pakistani government conducted a census of all Afghan nationals living in Pakistan. Between October 2006 and February 2007, Afghans who had been living in Pakistan since the February/March 2005 census were permitted to register and receive a Proof of Registration Card (PoR). His information suggests that you and your family members would have had the opportunity to register in Pakistan, and obtain evidence of this registration. To date you have not provided any evidence of you or your family’s residency in Pakistan.
The numerous discrepancies outlined above, combined with the lack of formal identity documentation from either Iran or Pakistan, raises concern in regards [sic] to your identity. You claim to have resided and worked in Iran from 2003 to 2005 as a construction worker. You have not provided any supporting documentation from Iran or any explanation as to why you are unable to provide any document from Iran although you have lived there for two years. You have also not provided any document from Pakistan where you claim to have spent a substantial amount of time. Given your claimed length of stay in Iran and Pakistan, I would expect that you would be able to provide documentary evidence to demonstrate your residence there. This lack of any document from either of those countries where you have resided and worked for a reasonable amount of time, prevents me from reaching a reasonable level of satisfaction with your claimed identity.
CONTENTIONS – THE APPLICANT
NMGM then engaged Ms Sokolowski to represent him. She wrote to the Department on 6 February 2020 and provided some background about the issuance of the taskera, submitting that it was issued during the reign of Daoud Khan. Ms Sokolowski provided a copy of a publication titled A guide to Afghan documents provided by the Fraud Prevention Unit of the US Embassy in Kabul in 2011. That document relevantly states (TD, p 129):
After Daoud Khan took power, he instituted a nationwide tazkera program, as described below. All Afghans were forced to get a new tazkera, so those issued during this period [i.e. 1919-1973] would not be considered valid.
1973-1978 Reign of Daoud Khan
The “Daoudi tazkera” was issued under the regime of President Daoud in the 1970’s. This document is constructed of a slightly thicker cover of white paper and internal pages of a very flimsy, bad quality paper. The first page has the seal of Afghanistan and some verbiage in Pashto. The entire document is printed in Pashto, however the entries that the clerk has handwritten are usually in Dari (Afghanistan Farsi). The serial number of the Daoudi tazkera is on the last page of the booklet.
In terms of NMGM having identity documents from Pakistan, it was submitted that only those Afghan refugees in Pakistan at the time of the 2005 census and registered with the UNHCR could apply for, and be issued, a Pakistani Proof of Identity Card. Ms Sokolowski quoted a UNHCR publication titled Registration of Afghans in Pakistan 2007 which relevantly stated that many Afghani refugees in Pakistan did not take part in the census in the first place or, if they did, either repatriated or did not register with the Pakistan Government.
In terms of the children, MA, ZE and MD, it was submitted:
[NMGM] has admitted that his oldest child, [MA], is not his biological son, although he was in his care since birth and that listing [MA] as a ‘biological’ child rather than a dependent child was the result of his lack of knowledge of the meaning of the word ‘biological’.
In relation to [ZE], both NMGM and his wife, FH, maintain vehemently that he is their biological child. It is acknowledged that the DNA tests do not appear to support this, however NMGM is not alone in being accused of not fathering his child, when, in fact, he is the biological father.
NMGM has instructed me to engage an expert for further testing and an opinion in relation to the DNA tests and possible discrepancy. Unfortunately, due to limited time and the holiday season, I have not been able to find an engage a geneticist who, in such short time, would be able to assist.
Nevertheless, NMGM continues to instruct me to find a medical expert who can help resolve this issue for him and his family for now and for the future.
In the meantime, I submit, that there may be many reasons why DNA test results between biological parent and his offspring may not match. The most obvious that come to mind are human chimerism, whether temporary or permanent or de novo mutations (sperm mutations). Both NMGM and his wife are hopeful that a medical explanation will become available.
Evidence of witnesses called by Applicant
As mentioned above, the Applicant called three witnesses with personal knowledge of him. Their evidence, which was not contested by the Respondent, is briefly summarised below.
Mr MS provided a statement dated 9 December 2021. He gave evidence that he had known the Applicant since childhood. He said that NMGM lived near the local mosque and they used to play together as their respective houses were only about 10 minutes’ walk apart in the same village. Mr MS said in 2007 when he was in Quetta and could not return to Afghanistan, NMGM invited him to lunch at his house. Mr MS said he has been in Australia for around 22 years and had taught NMGM to be a tiler. He said that when he was invited to NMGM’s house in Pakistan he had “two sons and one daughter, who was very, very young”.
Mr MZA provided a statement dated 9 December 2021. He said he knew NMGM, his parents and his siblings. He knew that NMGM had three children, but had not met them. He could not recall FH’s name, and had not met her.
Mr GGAA provided a statement dated 23 March 2021. He is an Australian citizen. He said in the statement that he has known NMGM “all of his life as we come from the same village. There are approximately 200 families living in our village. As we grew up we generally knew everybody in the village, particularly people of the same generation.”
Mr GGAA said he also worked in Iran and met NMGM there at various local events organised by the local Afghan community, for festivals such as Nawroz (Persian New Year) and Eid. In his oral evidence, Mr GGAA said he knew the Applicant’s wife, FH, and their three children. He said he had met NMGM’s parents. Mr GGAA said he had met the children “once or twice” in Pakistan. He could recall the names of MA and ZE but was not sure of the name of the Applicant’s daughter. He said that he also knew NMGM’s parents from when he lived in the same village as a child.
CONSIDERATION
Australia and Pakistan source documents
NMGM provided several documents supportive of his identity issued by Australian entities. These were a July 2014 letter from the provider of an educational programme (STD, p 34); a rental schedule for a property in a Melbourne suburb (STD, p 35); a Victoria driver licence (STD, p 36); a Medicare card in NMGM’s name (STD, p 36) and Titres de Voyage issued to NMGM in 2011 and 2015 by the Australian Government (STD, pp 40-43). These documents are useful in an assessment of identity because they reveal a consistency during the period NMGM has been in Australia, however they are all issued in Australia based on other Australian documents or declarations made by the Applicant, and are not, therefore, chains in a link to primary identity documents issued in Afghanistan. The weight such Australia-source documents carry is therefore conditional.
NMGM also provided visas issued by the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in June, September, and October 2015, issued when he travelled to Pakistan to visit his family there. While these visas are supportive of his identity, they are not strongly so, because there is again no chain of provenance; these visas were issued on the strength of the Australian Titre de Voyage on which NMGM was travelling.
Afghanistan source Identity documents
The Applicant provided a marriage certificate issued by the Afghanistan Government (STD, p 3). The date of the certificate equated, in the Gregorian calendar, to 31 August 2015 and it attested that NMGM and his wife married on 23 December 1994. The certificate listed the ‘results’ (i.e., issue) of the marriage as MD, MA and ZE.
The difficulty with this certificate, in terms of attesting to NMGM’s identity, is that it has been written in 2015 and appears to be based on other information given to the authorities by the Applicant, because, as one example, it declares that MA is a child of the marriage. NMGM himself told the Tribunal that MA is, in fact, his nephew, but that he and his wife took MA on as an infant and reared him after the death of NMGM’s sister, MA’s mother. Therefore, the weight of the document is affected because it is based on information which is, at least to some extent, not factual. However, it does carry some weight, because it lists NMGM as being married to FH and lists MD, MA and ZE as members of their family household.
Decision-maker must be satisfied of identity
As mentioned above, section 24(3) of the Act says that the Minister must not approve an application for citizenship unless the Minister is satisfied of the person’s identity. It is, in effect, a prohibition on the Minister exercising his powers under the Act to confer citizenship, unless he can be satisfied regarding this requirement.
The Courts and this Tribunal have frequently considered what is meant by the statutory phrase that a person is “satisfied” of a requirement. Briginshaw v Briginshaw (‘Briginshaw’) (1938) 60 CLR 336 is the leading authority; and that it is still good law has been frequently re-stated by that Court (notably in Neat Holdings Pty Limited v Karajan Holdings Pty Limited and Ors [1992] HCA 66, by Toohey J for the Court, at [2]). In Briginshaw, Dixon J said:
The truth is that, when the law requires the proof of any fact, the tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found. It cannot be found as a result of a mere mechanical comparison of probabilities independently of any belief in its reality. No doubt an opinion that a state of facts exists may be held according to indefinite gradations of certainty; and this has led to attempts to define exactly the certainty required by the law for various purposes. Fortunately, however, at common law no third standard of persuasion was definitely developed. Except upon criminal issues to be proved by the prosecution, it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters "reasonable satisfaction" should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences.

The Tribunal therefore must be persuaded to a degree of reasonable satisfaction that something put to it is, in fact, the case. The degree of satisfaction may vary according to the consequences that flow from accepting the proposition that is proffered.
Assessing the evidence against the ‘four pillars’ of identity
In terms of the ‘biometrics’ pillar, the Tribunal is satisfied that the several photographs provided by NMGM, taking account of his age when the photographs were taken, show no inconsistencies.
The Tribunal notes the Department delegate checked the facial image of NMGM provided by him as part of his citizenship application with other facial images held by the Department and was satisfied that they are consistent. The delegate also noted that in October 2016 NMGM provided a taskera which has a photograph attached from prior to his first arrival in Australia. The delegate was of the view that the images on NMGM’s State of Victoria driver licence, Titre de Voyage, taskera and Afghanistan marriage certificate are all ‘consistent with the facial images held by the Department’.
The Tribunal has itself considered photographs provided by the Applicant of him as a young man with his wife and family members and other more recent images, including the photograph stapled to his taskera, and is satisfied that these are all the same person.
In terms, therefore, of the ‘biometrics’ pillar, the Tribunal is satisfied that the material provided by the Applicant and referable to historical points in time is consistent and no alarm bells are sounded.
In terms of the ‘documents’ pillar, in October 2016, as mentioned above, NMGM provided a taskera issued in June 1973. He had previously advised the Department that this taskera had been lost when he had thrown it away when leaving Afghanistan. NMGM said that this document was subsequently found by someone and handed in to the authorities. He said that when his wife went to obtain taskeras for their children, NMGM’s discarded taskera was given back to her.
There is a distinct lack of identity documents from Pakistan (only the document issued on the strength of the Australian Titre de Voyage) and no documents from Iran. Given the other independent evidence about how few Afghanis participated in the Pakistan census and NMGM’s own oral evidence about how he carried on business without the lack of local ID documents being a handicap, and his other consistent evidence of identity, this paucity is not crucial, in the Tribunal’s view.
The taskera
In his oral evidence, NMGM was asked whether he recalled saying in March 2010 that he discarded his taskera near his home. He responded: “At night when I was travelling, I threw out the taskera somewhere where I lived.”
He said that when he was born, the government was about to change and there was a person who issued taskeras and his father obtained one for him.
It was put to NMGM that the taskera was issued when he was born but the writing on the document is in different ink. He responded: “It was issued by one government. The next government uses different stamps and different coloured ink. This taskera was issued at the time of the Russians who invaded Afghanistan. The name is the son or, or the daughter of, we do not have a surname.”
NMGM was then asked why there was an adult photograph attached to the taskera. He responded: “When the birth certificate is issued there is no photo at all. When I joined the military, I was told you have to have a photo affixed to it.”
When asked how the document ended up back in his hands, the Applicant said: “At the time we were going to leave Afghanistan, I had to prepare documents. It was a small town. When my father went to organize, they said, ‘by the way we found this document which belongs to your son’, my father told me.”
The Tribunal then asked NMGM how the taskera returned to his possession. He responded: “My father gave it to a friend and the person brought the taskera and gave it to me. This document came after my permanent residency.”
Under cross-examination, NMGM was asked, if he was worried the Taliban might get hold of his taskera, why didn’t he destroy it, rather than throw it away. He responded: “How could I destroy it? I was in a car wearing a hijab pretending we were women. I couldn’t destroy it.”
When asked directly by the Tribunal where he thought he threw it out, he replied: “At night-time, not far away from home, out the window of the car.”
Mr Daly asked NMGM whether he might consider it would be unlikely or implausible for the document to appear after 16 years when his wife and father visited Afghanistan. NMGM responded: “At that time I wasn’t thinking about anything. [name of locality redacted] is a small town. Everybody knows each other. Someone found it and gave it to the authorities. Why is that so complicated to understand?”
Mr Daly noted that the taskera had no volume number, and could not be verified, but told the Tribunal that the Minister did not put submissions about it any higher than that.
In 1973 the King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah, was on a diplomatic visit to Italy. He was deposed in a bloodless coup d’etat led by his brother-in-law, Mohammad Daoud Khan, who was Prime Minister. The monarchy was abolished and Daoud Khan became President. The Applicant’s taskera matches the characteristics of the taskeras issued during what is called Daoud Khan’s ‘reign’ in the US Embassy document (TD, p 128).
In particular, the Tribunal notes that the photograph of a ‘Daoudi Khan Tazkera Exemplar’ in the US Embassy document at TD p 133 exactly matches the formal contents of the Applicant’s taskera at pages 3 and 4 of Exhibit A2.
The Tribunal accepts that the photograph was affixed to the taskera later, but it depicts an image clearly of the Applicant as a young man, and that is consistent with his evidence that he had to obtain a photo and affix it when he undertook military service. The Tribunal is satisfied that it is not a picture of someone else, nor is it a picture of NMGM in later life.
The story NMGM has given (admittedly consistently since coming to Australia) about him throwing away the taskera in the night from a moving car, and then it being returned to the Applicant many years later after being ‘found’ is implausible and not accepted. There was also some lack of clarity about whether it had been returned to his wife or his father when they visited the taskera office. For a document to be found on the street by an unknown person, for that person to return it to the local government office, and for that office to retain it for some 16 years – and then return it to the family of the Applicant – stretches the Tribunal’s bounds of belief too far.
The Tribunal prefers to conclude that the taskera has not been out of the possession of the Applicant, or at least if not out of his possession, it remained in the care of a family member. Why the Applicant has persisted with this story is not clear. However, for the reasons set out earlier, the Tribunal is satisfied on all the evidence that the taskera in evidence is, in fact, a genuine document and is also satisfied that it is the taskera of NMGM.
Time living in Pakistan and Iran
NMGM was then asked about his time living in Pakistan from 2000 to 2003, Iran from 2003- to 2005 and then Pakistan again from 2005 to 2009. He agreed he worked in each country and ran a business in Quetta for around four years. Mr Daly said to NMGM that he could have applied for proof of registration documentation in Pakistan. He responded: “What did I need it for? People are living in Quetta for 20 or 30 years with no ID cards. There was no need to do that.”
NMGM confirmed that after he had worked in Iran in construction for around two years he was rounded up by the authorities and deported for not having any identity cards.
In respect of the ‘life story’ pillar, the Applicant has provided several photographs. At TB, p 470 was a photo he says shows him, his wife and MA, taken in Pakistan. At TB p 464 is a photo he says shows him, MA and ZE, taken next to their house in Pakistan. At TB p 465 was a photograph which he says shows ZE and some childhood friends of ZE. At TB, p 471 was a photo showing him and ME. At TB p 474 was a photo showing him, his wife and ZE, and at TB p 476 was a photo showing him and ME.
After careful consideration, the Tribunal is satisfied that the photographs depict a consistent history of the Applicant with his wife and with people he identifies as his son and daughter ZE. The Tribunal also gives weight to the evidence of the three witnesses NMGM called, two of whom said they knew him in Afghanistan, and who had interacted with him in Quetta and in some cases had met FH and the three children at their house in Pakistan. The Tribunal notes that this oral evidence was not contested by the Respondent.
The Applicant’s family unit – contention of human chimerism
NMGM submitted, in support of his contention that the two DNA tests relating to the paternity of ZE and MD were wrong, an article from the European Journal of Medical Ethics titled ‘Natural human chimeras: A review’, by Dr Kamlesh Madan of the Department of Clinical Genetics, Leiden University, the Netherlands (Exhibit A26).
Dr Madan relevantly wrote (in-text references omitted):
In Greek mythology the Chimera is a monstrous hybrid creature with a body and head of a fire breathing lion, a head of a goat on its back and a tail with a snake’s head. The term chimera has a long history of use in biology and genetics. A chimera is an organism whose cells are derived from two or more zygotes as opposed to a mosaic whose different cell lines are derived from a single zygote. Recipients of tissue and organ transplants are artificial chimeras. This review concerns natural human chimeras that are born with cell populations derived from more than one zygote…
Human chimeras have been described for more than 70 years by clinicians, serologists and cytogeneticists. However, it is in the last two decades that chimeras have caught the public attention because of three high profile media reports of a chance finding during parentage testing:
The first was a case of a woman, Karen, who was told, following DNA tests of family members for a kidney donor, that two of her three sons could not be hers. Another woman, Lydia, who claimed welfare for her children in Washington State, was accused of fraud as DNA tests showed they were not her children. She was unable to obtain legal help as DNA evidence was considered irrefutable until her attorney came across the story of Karen. The story of the two women appeared on the Discovery channel in May 2005. The third case was of a man in California who failed a paternity test after the child was found to have AB blood group while both parents were A.
All three turned out to be chimeras, each made up of two individuals of the same sex. Further studies showed that DNA profiles from certain tissues of the parents did match those of the disputed children.
Natural chimeras have been roughly classified into three groups:
Microchimeras formed by feto-maternal cells trafficking across the placenta.
Fusion Chimeras former by fusion of two zygotes.
Twin Chimeras, also known as Blood Chimeras or Transfusion chimeras, caused by transfer of cells between dizygotic twins via fused placentas.
The value of this article to the Tribunal’s deliberations is affected by the fact that there is no coverage or assessment of the incidence of human chimerism. The closest Dr Madan comes is where she writes:
Relatively few chimeras have been reported in almost 70 years since the first discovery. Yet there is a growing realization that chimerism may be more common than hither to thought because most cases, including some XX/XY constitution, have been discovered accidently. If chimerism is indeed common, a number of questions arise about the implications for the reliability of paternity tests and DNA tests for family relationship, forensic medicine, legal issues and drug treatments tailored to individual genetic constitutions.
Has the Applicant made a plausible case of human chimerism?
In his second Sherlock Holmes novel, The Sign of the Four, the eminent physician and author Sir Arthur Conan Doyle wrote:
“…when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.”
The difficulty the Tribunal has, on the one hand, is that two DNA tests conducted by different and reputable laboratories have determined that the Applicant is “excluded from identification as the father” of ZE (TB, p 581). The Tribunal is not equipped to say whether this might be a (exceptionally rare) case of a human chimera, although such a conclusion is ‘improbable’. The Tribunal does not feel a sense of persuasion to say that it is satisfied that such an improbability ‘must be the truth’.
The Tribunal makes no finding on this question.
Do irregularities in family composition undermine satisfaction of identity?
However, the Tribunal does not consider that is pivotal, because it is satisfied that the photographic evidence shows NMGM in the role of a parent in relation to ZE from when ZE was very young. Although he says he reared MA from when he was a young child, he now concedes MA is not his or his wife’s biological son, but in fact the son of his late sister. There is no dispute at all about him being the father of MD. Ms Sokolowski made the submission that in the sponsorship application, the children are identified as dependent visa applicants – the relationship is not asked about. She contended that it does not matter in such a case who fathered the children, provided they are dependents.
In this case, where the question is about the Applicant’s identity, the Tribunal does not consider that the irregularities in terms of the composition of the direct family unit of NMGM rise to the level of undermining other conclusions about his identity.
CONCLUSION
The Tribunal is satisfied to make the following findings:
a)The taskera submitted by the Applicant (Exhibit A2) is accepted as a genuine document and as his taskera.
b)The Applicant did give false information about the parentage of MA, noting however that has now been corrected and he has admitted MA is the son of his late sister but had been brought up by him and his wife from infancy. In a migration sense, this finding is not important, because MA is no longer applying to come to Australia, is betrothed and has settled in Pakistan with his new partner. However, it is a reminder that truthfulness in dealings with the Minister’s Department is an expectation, and providing untrue information can act to undermine other claims that a person makes, particularly when embarked on a quest for citizenship, as NMGM is.
c)The Applicant and his wife have reared ZE from when he was born; the contemporary photographic evidence of NMGM and FH with ZE as a new-born infant supports that conclusion, and also a conclusion that ZE has always been regarded as the son of the Applicant and his wife.
d)There is no dispute that MD is the biological daughter of the Applicant and his wife.
Mr Daly in response to a direct question from the Tribunal urged that no finding be made on NMGM’s character. The Tribunal accepts that submission, noting that apart from the initially misleading information about MA and the story about discarding the taskera, it found the Applicant generally truthful and frank, and consistent, in all his other evidence. His oral evidence about his life in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Pakistan (again) and since coming to Australia is consistent and plausible. It was also, as relevant, corroborated by the three witnesses who gave oral evidence, where their personal knowledge coalesced with NMGM’s evidence.
The Tribunal notes that the Migration Regulations 1994 provide, at r 1.12 that a member of a family unit (in relation to an application for a Class XB or Class 309 visa) includes (a) a spouse or de facto partner of the family head, or (b) a child or step-child of the family head or of a spouse or de facto partner of the family head (other than a child or step-child who is engaged to be married or who has a spouse or de facto partner) and is either aged under 18 or aged under 23 and regarded as a dependant for the purposes of the Regulations.
The Parliament has decided that being reasonably satisfied of the identity of a prospective candidate for Australian citizenship is essential. This is because, once citizenship is conferred, the citizen becomes entitled to many rights, privileges, and responsibilities, such as enrolling to vote, serving on a jury, being employed as a permanent officer of the public service, and being issued an Australian passport. If travelling on such a passport, the citizen may call in aid consular assistance if necessary, and has the protections in international law available to a sovereign state’s citizens.
The Tribunal is satisfied on the weight of all the evidence, consistent with the pillars of identity to which decision-makers are directed under CPI 16 and being persuaded in the sense referred to in Briginshaw, of NMGM’s identity. The mosaic of information including the taskera, the oral and written evidence of witnesses who knew him in Afghanistan, Iran and during his time in Pakistan, and (as the delegate also found) the consistent information NMGM has given about his identity since first arriving in Australia, contributes to this finding. Consequently, the Tribunal finds that the prohibition in section 24(3) of the Act does not apply.
Having made these findings, the Tribunal returns the matter to the Minister’s Department for further consideration of NMGM’s application for Australian citizenship.
DECISION
The decision dated 30 April 2020 to refuse the Applicant citizenship is set aside. The matter is remitted to the Respondent with a direction that the Applicant’s identity is satisfied in terms of section 24(3) of the Australian Citizenship Act 2007.

I certify that the preceding 100 (one hundred) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member D. J. Morris

..................[sgd]......................................................
Associate
Dated: 22 June 2022

Dates of hearing:

21 and 22 March 2022

Advocate for the Applicant:

Dorota Sokolowski

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Dorota Sokolowski Legal Practitioner

Advocate for the Respondent:

Matthew Daly

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Mills Oakley Lawyers

ANNEXURE
Schedule of Exhibits
R1      T-documents lodged 24 June 2020
R2      Supplementary T-documents lodged 16 February 2022
R3      Tender bundle lodged 16 February 2022
A1       Statement of the Applicant dated 25 March 2021
A2       Applicant’s original taskera
A3       Applicant’s taskera with translation dated 15 September 2016
A4       Statement of SA with notarised ID dated 18 March 2021
A5       Statement of SA dated 18 March 2021
A6       Statement of MRW dated 13 March 2021
A7       Statement of MR with translation dated 25 March 2021
A8       Statement of GAA dated 23 March 2021
A9       Statement of MS dated 9 December 2021
A10     Statement of MZI dated 9 December 2021
A11     Statement of ZD dated 9 December 2021
A12     ID documents of MR issued 17 June 2012
A13     Victoria driver licence of GAA, expiry date 23 February 2031
A14     School certificates for Applicant’s children, 2014-2016
A15     Taskera for Applicant’s mother
A16     Taskera for Applicant’s brother, Q
A17     Taskera for Applicant’s brother, AR
A18     Taskera for Applicant’s brother, RA
A19     New taskera for Applicant’s father
A20     Old taskera for Applicant’s father, issued around 1974
A21     Photograph A – Iran
A22     Photograph B – Iran
A23     Applicant’s letter to Tribunal, 26 March 2021
A24     Applicant’s mother’s passport, expiry date 5 August 2022
A25     Applicant’s father’s passport, expiry date 5 August 2022
A26     European Journal of Genetics article ‘Natural human chimeras: A review’

A27     MNA’s duplicate taskera with translation date 6 January 2020
A28     AR’s taskera with translation date 16 June 2021
A29     QA’s taskera with translation date 16 June 2021
A30     Taskera booklet for RA with translation date 16 June 2021
A31     Taskera booklet for MN with translation date 16 June 2021
A32      Taskera of Applicant’s mother with translation date 16 June 2021

[2022] AATA 1777

22 June 2022

Key Legal Topics

Areas of Law

Immigration

Administrative Law

Statutory Interpretation

Legal Concepts

Judicial Review

Procedural Fairness

Statutory Construction

Natural Justice

Standing

Dates of hearing:	21 and 22 March 2022
Advocate for the Applicant:	Dorota Sokolowski
Solicitors for the Applicant:	Dorota Sokolowski Legal Practitioner
Advocate for the Respondent:	Matthew Daly
Solicitors for the Respondent:	Mills Oakley Lawyers