FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Nisic & Keitel [2024] FedCFamC1F 96
File number(s): BRC 1547 of 2020 Judgment of: HOWARD J Date of judgment: 28 February 2024 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – Where the children were born in Queensland and have always lived in Town B with the mother and the father – Where the mother was born in Country C and seeks the permission of the Court to relocate the residence of the children to Country C – Where the father opposes the application and seeks an order that the children remain living in Town B – Best interests – Parental responsibility – Equal time – Mother’s application for permission to relocate the residence of the children to Country C refused. Legislation: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 140
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 60DA, 65DAA
Mental Health Act 2016 (Qld)
Cases cited: Adamson & Adamson [2014] FamCAFC 232
Baghti & Baghti & Ors [2015] FamCAFC 71
Beckham v Desprez (2015) 55 Fam LR 310
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336
Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67
Cox v Pedrana (2013) 48 Fam LR 651
Eagle & Scarlett (No.2) [2020] FamCAFC 291
Goode & Goode (2006) FLC 93-286
Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral Co Pty Ltd [1983] 3 NSWLR 378
Johanson & Johanson [2022] FedCFamC1A 74
LC v TC (1998) 23 Fam LR 75
Masson v Parsons (2019) 266 CLR 554
MRR v GR (2010) 240 CLR 461
Sayer v Radcliffe [2012] FamCAFC 209
Taylor & Barker (2007) FLC 93-345
U v U (2002) 211 CLR 238
Whisprun Pty Ltd & Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 164 Date of last submission/s: 16 August 2023 Date of hearing: 4, 5 and 6 July 2023 Place: Brisbane Counsel for the applicant mother: Mr Alexander and with him Ms Ferguson Solicitor for the applicant: Wilsons The Family Lawyer Counsel for the respondent: Mr McGregor Solicitor for the respondent: Damien Greer Lawyers Counsel for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: Ms Wardle Solicitor for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: Forest Glen Lawyers ORDERS
BRC 1547 of 2020 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MS NISIC
Applicant
AND: MR KEITEL
Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
ORDER MADE BY:
HOWARD J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 FEBRUARY 2024
THE COURT ORDERS:
1.That by no later than 4:00pm on 13 March 2024, the Applicant, the Respondent and the Independent Children’s Lawyer shall each provide a copy of a proposed Final Order (reflecting the Reasons for Judgment) to the Court at …@....
2.That by the same time and date stated in Order 1 each party and the Independent Children’s Lawyer shall exchange copies of their proposed Final Order.
3.That the parties and the Independent Children’s Lawyer shall attempt to reach an agreed position in relation to the wording of the Final Order (reflecting the Reasons for Judgment) and…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court meticulously examined the evidence provided, including expert reports and testimonies from both parents. It noted that while the mother's mental health condition had minor impacts on her daily functioning, it did not significantly impair her parental capacity. The court also highlighted that the mother had acknowledged the children's attachment to their father and the potential difficulty of separation. The court was particularly influenced by the mother's candid admission that she had a fulfilling life, job, and social connections in Town B, which suggested that the primary motivation for the relocation was her personal desire rather than a necessity for the children's well-being. Based on these findings, the court concluded that maintaining the children in Town B, with an arrangement ensuring equal parenting time, was in their best interests. This decision aligned with the views of the father and the Independent Children's Lawyer.
In its decision, the court emphasised the paramount importance of the children maintaining a meaningful relationship with both parents and protecting them from harm. The court decided against making specific findings on allegations of historical family violence and alcohol consumption, as neither parent pursued these issues as significant risk factors during the proceedings. The court also referenced established legal principles, such as those from the High Court's decision in Whisprun Pty Ltd & Dixon, to justify its approach to unpursued allegations. Ultimately, the court ordered that the children remain in Town B and directed the parties to propose final orders reflecting these reasons. If the parties could not agree on the wording, the matter was to be listed for further submissions.
Orders
Orders of the court
BRC 1547 of 2020
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN:
MS NISIC
Applicant
AND:
MR KEITEL
Respondent
INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
ORDER MADE BY:
HOWARD J
DATE OF ORDER:
28 FEBRUARY 2024
THE COURT ORDERS:
1. That by no later than 4:00pm on 13 March 2024, the Applicant, the Respondent and the Independent Children’s Lawyer shall each provide a copy of a proposed Final Order (reflecting the Reasons for Judgment) to the Court at …@....
2. That by the same time and date stated in Order 1 each party and the Independent Children’s Lawyer shall exchange copies of their proposed Final Order.
3. That the parties and the Independent Children’s Lawyer shall attempt to reach an agreed position in relation to the wording of the Final Order (reflecting the Reasons for Judgment) and in the event that an agreement as to the wording is reached then the Independent Children’s Lawyer shall send a copy of same to the Court by no later than 4:00pm on 20 March 2024.
4. That in the event it is not possible to reach an agreed position in relation to the wording of the Final Order the matter shall be listed for Mention and each party shall attend personally along with their legal representatives (if any) on a date to be fixed by the Court so that the Court can hear further submissions in relation to the wording of the Final Order.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Section 60CC of the Act states how the Court is to determine what is in a child's best interests. The primary considerations are set out in s 60CC(2) and s 60CC(2A). Those two subsections state: “(2) The primary considerations are:(a)the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child’s parents; and(b)the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence.Note: Making these considerations the primary ones is consistent with the objects of this Part set out in paragraphs 60B(1)(a) and (b).(2A)In applying the considerations set out in subsection (2), the court is to give greater weight to the consideration set out in paragraph (2)(b).” There were a number of important matters in this case that were not in issue. Both parents agreed that there are benefits to the children in having a meaningful relationship with the other parent. Further, I do note that both parents provided evidence in relation to family violence and certain other risk issues. In particular, the mother documented evidence of family violence that she said the father perpetrated during the course of the relationship. The mother also provided evidence in relation to the father's excessive consumption of alcohol during the course of the relationship. The existence of family violence and the excessive consumption of alcohol would normally loom large in a parenting case when the Court is considering the question of risk of harm to the children. But that is not the way that this trial was conducted by these parents. In particular, the mother did not pursue a case against the father that her allegations of historical family violence were now in any way a risk factor for the children or for any person. Furthermore, the mother conceded that the father's consumption of alcohol[5] no longer presented any form of risk of harm to the children in the care of the father.[5] The mother's allegation was that there had been (historically) excessive consumption of alcohol by the father. Neither the mother nor the father pursued any risk issues relating to family violence or alcohol consumption. In those circumstances, I do not consider that it is either necessary or appropriate for the Court to make findings in relation to the specific allegations relating to family violence and in relation to the father’s consumption of alcohol. I note what the High Court had to say in the case of Whisprun Pty Ltd & Dixon (2003) 200 ALR 447 ("Whisprun"). At [62] the Court stated, inter alia:- “[62] …A judge’s reasons are not required to mention every fact or argument relied on by the losing party as relevant to an issue. Judgments of trial judges would soon become longer than they already are if a judge’s failure to mention such facts and arguments would be evidence that he or she had not properly considered the losing party’s case.”[6][6] Per Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ. This decision of the High Court in Whisprun is consistent with an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in New South Wales – Housing Commission of New South Wales v Tatmar Pastoral [1983] 3 NSWLR 378 (“Tatmar Pastoral”). At pp.385–386 Mahoney JA stated at stated, inter alia:- “It is not the duty of the judge to decide every matter which is raised in argument. He may decide a case in a way which does not require the determination of a particular submission: in such a case he may put it aside or, as Lord Scarman said, merely salute it in passing…”