Niroda Holdings Pty Ltd v Road Contractors Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   NIRODA HOLDINGS PTY LTD -v- ROAD CONTRACTORS PTY LTD [2018] WASC 10

CORAM:   ACTING MASTER STRK

HEARD:   21 JUNE 2017

DELIVERED          :   16 JANUARY 2018

FILE NO/S:   COR 31 of 2017

BETWEEN:   NIRODA HOLDINGS PTY LTD

Plaintiff

AND

ROAD CONTRACTORS PTY LTD
Defendant

Catchwords:

Corporations law - Application to set aside statutory demand - Genuine dispute - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 459G, s 459H, s 459J

Result:

Statutory demand set aside

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr L F G Swanson

Defendant:     Mr A P Rumsley

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Hotchkin Hanly Lawyers

Defendant:     Western Legal

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Central City Pty Ltd v Montevento Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] WASCA 5

Chadwick Industries (South Coast) Pty Ltd v Condensing Vaporisers Pty Ltd (1994) 13 ACSR 37

Createc Pty Ltd v Design Signs Pty Ltd [2009] WASCA 85

Laing O'Rourke Australia Construction Pty Ltd v Samsung C&T Corporation [2016] WASCA 130; (2016) 50 WAR 399

Mibor Investments Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1994] 2 VR 290

Sopov v Kane Constructions Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] VSCA 141; (2009) 24 VR 510

Turner Corporation (WA) Pty Ltd v Blackburne & Dixon Pty Ltd [1999] WASCA 294

  1. ACTING MASTER STRK:  This is an application by the plaintiff to set aside a statutory demand issued by the defendant dated 2 February 2017.  The application was brought within 21 days.

  2. The plaintiff is a company that carries on the business of land development.  The defendant is a company that carries on the business of civil construction services.[1]

    [1] Affidavit of Robert Casella sworn 23 February 2017 [3], [6].

  3. The plaintiff's application was supported by two affidavits.  The first affidavit was sworn on 23 February 2017 by Robert Casella, sole director and company secretary of the plaintiff (the Casella affidavit).  The second affidavit was sworn by Colin Ryk Kleyweg on 28 March 2017, managing director and principal civil engineer of KC Traffic and Transport Pty Ltd (KCTT) (the Kleyweg affidavit).

  4. The plaintiff also relies upon submissions filed on 27 April 2017 and its responsive submissions filed on 16 June 2017.

  5. A copy of the statutory demand appears as attachment RC17 of the Casella affidavit.  The statutory demand refers to the amount of $181,319.72, being the total sum of debts described in the schedule to the statutory demand, particularised as follows:[2]

    Claim   $170,085.32

    Interest from 1 March 2016 to 2 February 2017   $11,234.40

    Daily Interest until payment of the sum claimed   $38.08

    Total   $181,319.72

    [2] The total sum of the debts described in the schedule to the statutory demand is in fact $181,357.80, and not $181,319.72.

  6. By the statutory demand, the defendant says that it is owed the amount of $170,085.32 pursuant to a contract numbered [KC00319.013], executed by the plaintiff and dated 26 November 2015, together with interest at the Business Reference Rate of 6.70% + 1%, from 1 March 2016 until payment of the…

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Details
Case
[2018] WASC 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Niroda Holdings Pty Ltd filed an application to set aside a statutory demand issued by Road Contractors Pty Ltd. The dispute concerns the validity and amount of a debt claimed by Road Contractors under a terminated contract for civil and earthworks at various projects in Western Australia. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of Western Australia.

The primary legal issue was whether a genuine dispute existed regarding the existence and amount of the debt claimed by Road Contractors. This hinged on the interpretation of a contract clause that governed progress payments and whether it survived the termination of the contract. Niroda argued that the clause did not survive the termination, and the debt, if any, should be assessed on a quantum meruit basis for work completed up to the termination date. Road Contractors, on the other hand, argued that the clause continued to apply post-termination, and a debt was due based on their final payment claim.

The court considered the language of the contract and the intentions of the parties at the time of termination. It found that the clause in question was intended to operate during the contract and did not survive its termination. The court further held that there was no clear agreement between the parties on how to assess the debt after termination, and thus, any claim for payment should be assessed on a quantum meruit basis. The court rejected Road Contractors' arguments that a post-termination payment clause existed or that the parties had agreed to continue applying the progress payment clause after termination.

As a result, the court allowed Niroda's application to set aside the statutory demand. The court found that a genuine dispute existed as to the existence and amount of the debt claimed by Road Contractors, and thus, the statutory demand was invalid.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The plaintiff says that a genuine dispute arises as to the existence and amount of the debt which the demand relates.[7] The defendant outlines problems with the plaintiff's position. The parties' positions are summarised as follows.[7] The explanation of the plaintiff's basis for asserting the existence of a genuine dispute is substantively taken from the plaintiff's submissions filed on 27 April 2017 [14] ‑ [ 27].(a)The plaintiff engaged the defendant to perform civil works and earthworks at various development projects in Como, Baldivis and North Dandalup in Western Australia during 2015 and 2016.(b)The defendant claims that the debt the subject of the statutory demand is due and payable and arises pursuant to an agreement dated 26 November 2015 (North Dandalup Contract), and the operation of cl 42.1 of the Australian Standard General Conditions of Contract (AS 2124-1992) (Conditions of Contract), which was incorporated into the North Dandalup Contract.[8][8] In the statutory demand, the North Dandalup Contract is referred to as contract numbered [KC00319.013] dated 26 November 2015.(c)The plaintiff and the defendant also entered into a contract for the provision of civil works and earthworks at a development in Baldivis, Western Australia (Baldivis Contract) in or about January 2015.(d)Between November 2015 and January 2016, the defendant performed works for the plaintiff pursuant to the North Dandalup Contract. The rights and obligations of the parties relating to progress payments that operated while the North Dandalup Contract was on-foot were governed by the operation of cl 42.1 of the Conditions of Contract.(e)On or about 31 January 2016, the parties mutually terminated the North Dandalup Contract. The plaintiff says that the termination was due to the defendant's performance.(f)On 2 February 2016, after the North Dandalup Contract was mutually terminated by the parties, the defendant submitted its final claim for payment for works up to 31 January 2016.(g)The Superintendent under the North Dandalup Contract and the Baldivis Contract was KCTT.(h)Clause 42.1 of the North Dandalup Contract, as amended, states:[9][9] Clause 42.1 of the North Dandalup Contract is reproduced at [6] of the Howard affidavit; which forms part of RC17 of the Casella affidavit, page 210.Subject to the provisions of the Contract, within 28 days after the receipt by the Superintendent of a claim for payment or within 14 days of issue by the Superintendent of the Superintendent's payment certificate, whichever is the earlier, the Principal shall pay to the Contractor or the Contractor shall pay to the Principal, as the case may be an amount of not less than the amount shown in the Certificate as due to the Contractor or to the Principal as the case may be, or if no payment certificate has been issued, the Principal shall pay the amount of the Contractor's claim.(i)The defendant asserts that cl 42.1 of the North Dandalup Contract survives termination of the North Dandalup Contract, and relies upon the purported failure by the Superintendent to issue a payment certificate as the source of the debt the subject of the statutory demand. The defendant says that the operation of the deeming provision within cl 42.1, in circumstances where no payment certificate was issued, results in a debt 'due and payable' by the plaintiff to the defendant in the amount of its 2 February 2016 payment claim.(j)The plaintiff asserts that the clear purpose of cl 42.1 is for progress payments, to ensure that payment is made while work is on-going. However, the parties elected to mutually terminate the North Dandalup Contract. As there was no clear intention or agreement to the contrary, the operation of the payment claim regime under cl 42.1 cannot and did not survive termination, and cannot now be relied upon by the defendant to support a statutory demand alleging that a debt is due and payable.(k)The plaintiff further says that there is no evidence that the parties expressly agreed what sum, if any, would properly be due to the defendant, and, in particular, how any claim for payment ought to be processed as at the date of termination. As the agreement for payment of a fixed sum as consideration for a fixed scope of work fell away by reason of the termination, the plaintiff says it follows that:(i)the amount due, if any, from the plaintiff to the defendant would be the value of the works completed to the date of termination, less all payments made prior to that date, by way of a quantum meruit; and(ii)if the Superintendent had any role in provisionally assessing what sum, if any, was payable, that obligation was subject to an implied term that he do so within a reasonable time, and subject to the express obligation under the Contract to do so in good faith.[10](l)The defendant in its submissions filed 27 April 2017 says that there are two problems which are fatal to the plaintiff's asserted position. First, the plaintiff relies on a decision of the Court of Appeal in Laing O'Rourke Australia Construction Pty Ltd v Samsung C&T Corporation,[11] which dealt with a payment clause which would expressly apply after termination and a payment clause which operated during the contract, with only parts expressed to survive termination.[12] The defendant says that, in contrast, the North Dandalup Contract did not have a similar post termination payment provision and as such the decision can be distinguished. Secondly, the defendant says that the plaintiff agreed with the letter of the Superintendent that claims up to 1 February 2016 would be assessed and paid.[13] The defendant says that after terminating the North Dandalup Contract from 1 February 2016, the plaintiff agreed with the Superintendent that 'all works completed up to the 1st of February 2016 will be assessed and a final certificate will be issued for payment and shall be agreed as the final payment'.[14] The defendant says that if there was any question as to whether cl 42.1 continued to apply after 1 February 2016, the Superintendent's letter, co‑signed by Mr Casella, confirms that it did continue to apply.(m)The plaintiff, by its responsive submissions filed 16 June 2017, asserts that the defendant has misdescribed the evidence, and identifies what it says is the misdescribed evidence, and the proper application of legal principles.[15] The plaintiff also says that if the defendant seeks to rely on cl 42 on the basis that it survives termination, it must establish by evidence that a progress certificate was due from the Superintendent, because any liability for payment on the part of the plaintiff is expressed to be 'subject to the provisions of the Contract', but in this case, fails to establish the same.[16][10] Plaintiff's submissions filed on 27 April 2017 [27]. The plaintiff cited in support of its contention at (a) Sopov v Kane Constructions Pty Ltd (No 2) [2009] VSCA 141; (2009) 24 VR 510 [12] (Maxwell P, Kellam JA & Whelan AJA).[11] Laing O'Rourke Australia Construction Pty Ltd v Samsung C&T Corporation [2016] WASCA 130; (2016) 50 WAR 399.[12] Laing O'Rourke Australia Construction Pty Ltd v Samsung C&T Corporation [20] ‑ [21] (Martin CJ, McLure P & Newnes JA agreeing).[13] Defendant's outline of submissions [12].[14] Defendant's outline of submissions [13], citing the Casella affidavit at page 180.[15] Plaintiff's responsive submissions [16] ‑ [23].[16] Plaintiff's responsive submissions [11] ‑ [14].