Ninyette v The State of Western Australia

Link copied
Case Copied 18 min read

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT :   THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION:   NINYETTE -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2012] WASCA 184

CORAM:   BUSS JA

MURPHY JA
MAZZA JA

HEARD:   4 SEPTEMBER 2012

DELIVERED          :   4 SEPTEMBER 2012

PUBLISHED           :  24 SEPTEMBER 2012

FILE NO/S:   CACR 199 of 2011

BETWEEN:   BRENDON WAYNE NINYETTE

Appellant

AND

THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :SCOTT DCJ

File No  :IND 283 of 2011

Catchwords:

Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Application for leave for an extension of time to appeal against conviction - Appellant convicted of one count of doing grievous bodily harm - Propensity evidence - Admissibility of evidence of a prior conviction for doing grievous bodily harm - Whether propensity evidence had significant probative value

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA), s 248, s 297
Evidence Act 1906 (WA), s 31A

Result:

Application for leave for an extension of time  in which to appeal allowed
Appeal against conviction allowed
Retrial ordered

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Mr S B Watters

Respondent:     Mr J McGrath SC

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Thames Legal

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

APC v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 159

  1. BUSS JA: I agree with Murphy JA, for the reasons he gives, that the evidence in question was inadmissible. The evidence did not, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced at the trial, have 'significant' probative evidence within s 31A(2)(a) of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA). I therefore joined in the orders made by the court on 4 September 2012.

    MURPHY JA: 

Introduction

  1. On 4 September 2012 the court heard an appeal against conviction. The single issue was whether the judge erred in admitting, purportedly pursuant to s 31A of the Evidence Act 1906 (WA), certain evidence of prior conduct of the appellant which had taken place eight years prior to the offence with which the appellant was charged and, ultimately, convicted in this matter. The respondent did not contend that the proviso applied if error were established. The court granted leave to extend the time in which to appeal, allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction and ordered a retrial, with reasons to be published later. These are the reasons why I joined in those orders.

The prosecution case

  1. The appellant was charged with unlawfully doing grievous bodily harm contrary to s 297 of the Criminal Code (WA). Section 297(1) provided relevantly:

    (1)Any person who unlawfully does grievous bodily harm to another is guilty of a crime, and is liable to imprisonment for 10 years.

  2. Section 248(2) and (4) of the Criminal Code provided:

    (2)A harmful act done by a person is lawful if the act is done in self defence under subsection (4).

    ...

    (4)A person’s harmful act is done in self defence if -

    (a)the person believes the act is necessary to defend…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Ninyette v The State of Western Australia and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2012] WASCA 184
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Ninyette, was convicted by a jury in the Magistrates' Court of Western Australia of one count of doing grievous bodily harm. The appellant appealed against the conviction to the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The sole ground of appeal was the admissibility of evidence of a prior conviction for grievous bodily harm. The appellant argued that the evidence did not have significant probative value and its prejudicial effect could not be cured by direction.

The legal issue before the court was whether the evidence of the prior conviction for grievous bodily harm had significant probative value under Section 31A of the Evidence Act. The appellant contended that the evidence was not significant because it did not help determine the likelihood of the appellant's involvement in the current offence or his state of mind at the time of the offence. The court considered whether the prior conviction could rationally affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue, and whether the probative value of the evidence was such that fair-minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial.

The court found that the prior conviction had significant probative value as it could rationally affect the assessment of whether it was the appellant who struck the complainant, and if so, whether he was acting in self-defence. The court held that the evidence was relevant and that the prejudicial effect could be managed by direction. The appeal was dismissed.

The court did not make any orders beyond dismissing the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Section 31A of the Evidence Act is in these terms:31A. Propensity and relationship evidence(1)In this section -propensity evidence means -(a)similar fact evidence or other evidence of the conduct of the accused person; or(b)evidence of the character or reputation of the accused person or of a tendency that the accused person has or had;relationship evidence means evidence of the attitude or conduct of the accused person towards another person, or a class of persons, over a period of time.(2)Propensity evidence or relationship evidence is admissible in proceedings for an offence if the court considers -(a)that the evidence would, either by itself or having regard to other evidence adduced or to be adduced, have significant probative value; and(b)that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial, is such that fair‑minded people would think that the public interest in adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial.(3)In considering the probative value of evidence for the purposes of subsection (2) it is not open to the court to have regard to the possibility that the evidence may be the result of collusion, concoction or suggestion. The construction and operation of s 31A of the Evidence Act has been summarised most recently in this court in APC v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 159 [84] ‑ [90]. It is unnecessary to repeat or elaborate on the matters set out in that decision, or the cases to which it refers, for the purposes of the disposition of this appeal. The single ground of appeal was that the learned trial judge erred in both law and fact when, over objection, he ruled admissible evidence of a previous conviction of the appellant for grievous bodily harm. The particulars were that:(a) the evidence did not have significant probative value;(b)it could not be said that the probative value of the evidence compared to the degree of risk of an unfair trial was such that fair minded people would think that the public interest of adducing all relevant evidence of guilt must have priority over the risk of an unfair trial;(c)the prejudicial effect of the admission of the evidence could not be cured by direction. The ground, as particularised, did not assert that the 2002 incident was not 'propensity evidence' within the meaning of s 31A(1). Evidence is relevant if it could rationally affect, either directly or indirectly, the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue. I will assume, without deciding, that the fact the appellant had once, eight years earlier, used a metal implement to strike another person in the absence of self‑defence, could rationally affect the assessment of whether it was the appellant, as opposed to his nephew, who had struck the complainant with the tyre lever and if so, whether he was acting in self‑defence at the time. The substantive question in the appeal was whether the 2002 incident had significant probative value, either by itself, or having regard to other evidence, within the meaning of s 31A(2)(a), with respect to either or both of those two issues. The word 'significant' in this context has been taken to mean 'important' or 'of consequence'.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established