JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
CITATION: NINELEN PTY LTD -v- INTERIM ADVANCE CORPORATION PTY LTD [2011] WASC 107
CORAM: LE MIERE J
HEARD: 9 DECEMBER 2010
DELIVERED : 21 APRIL 2011
FILE NO/S: CIV 2506 of 2004
Consolidated by Orders dated 9 December 2008
BETWEEN: NINELEN PTY LTD
First Plaintiff
CORVARR PTY LTD
Second PlaintiffAND
INTERIM ADVANCE CORPORATION PTY LTD
First DefendantOLIVER GEORGE DOUGLAS
Second Defendant
FILE NO/S :CIV 1676 of 2005
BETWEEN :INTERIM ADVANCE CORPORATION PTY LTD
Plaintiff
AND
NINELEN PTY LTD As Trustee for THE HELEN CARR & SONS FAMILY TRUST
First DefendantCORVARR PTY LTD As Trustee for THE DAIRY FARM TRUST
Second DefendantHELEN STEPHANIE CARR
Third DefendantANTONINO CORVAIA
Fourth Defendant
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure - Application to discontinue action - Relevant principles - Turns on own facts
Practice and procedure - Application to dismiss counterclaim for want of prosecution - Relevant principles - Turns on own facts
Legislation:
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 60(2), s 60(3)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 500(2)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 23 r 2(3)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52, s 75B(1), s 87(2)
Result:
Application to discontinue action granted
Application to dismiss counterclaim granted
Category: B
Representation:
CIV 2506 of 2004
Consolidated by Orders dated 9 December 2008
Counsel:
First Plaintiff : Mr C S Williams
Second Plaintiff : Mr C S Williams
First Defendant : Mr M Levitan
Second Defendant : Mr M Levitan
Solicitors:
First Plaintiff : Solomon Brothers
Second Plaintiff : Solomon Brothers
First Defendant : Melvyn Levitan
Second Defendant : Melvyn Levitan
CIV 1676 of 2005
Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr M Levitan
First Defendant : Mr C S Williams
Second Defendant : Mr C S Williams
Third Defendant : Mr C S Williams
Fourth Defendant : Mr C S Williams
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Melvyn Levitan
First Defendant : Solomon Brothers
Second Defendant : Solomon Brothers
Third Defendant : Solomon Brothers
Fourth Defendant : Solomon Brothers
Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):
Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124
Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd v Fieldhouse (2005) 30 WAR 398; [2005] WASCA 93
IMF (Australia) Ltd v Meadow Springs Fairway Resort Ltd (in liq) [2009] FCAFC 9; (2009) 253 ALR 240
NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power & Water Authority [2004] HCA 48; (2004) 219 CLR 90
Poulton v The Commonwealth (1952) 89 CLR 540
Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; (1997) 186 CLR 622
Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd (2004) 220 ALR 267
Skinner v Jeogla Pty Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 106
Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679
TS & B Retail Systems Pty Ltd v 3Fold Resources Pty Ltd (No 3) (2007) 158 FCR 444
LE MIERE J: The plaintiffs in these consolidated actions apply to discontinue the action against the defendants with no order as to costs. The plaintiffs…
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- Case
- [2011] WASC 107
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
In addressing the application to discontinue the action, the court considered the principles established in Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin, which emphasise that the court cannot try a hypothetical action and should avoid burdening the parties with the costs of litigation that has been avoided through settlement or extra-curial action. The court held that in this case, the prosecution of the plaintiffs' claims against Mr Douglas had become practically futile due to Mr Douglas becoming bankrupt, and thus, the proper exercise of the cost discretion was to make no order as to the cost of the proceedings. Regarding the application to dismiss the counterclaim for want of prosecution, the court applied the principles set out in Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd v Fieldhouse, considering factors such as the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, the hardship to the plaintiff, the prejudice to the defendant, and the conduct of the defendant in the litigation.
The court ultimately determined that the discretion to dismiss an action for want of prosecution is not fettered by any absolute or inflexible rules but should be exercised judicially, serving the ends of justice. The court found that Interim Advance Corporation had not demonstrated sufficient grounds to justify the dismissal of Ninelen’s counterclaim for want of prosecution, and therefore, the application was dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter was first filed in the court by Ninelen against Interim, seeking damages for alleged mismanagement of funds and breaches of fiduciary duties. Interim filed a counterclaim, which included allegations of wrongful termination and failure to fulfill contractual obligations. The case was set for a trial, but before the trial date, both parties entered into a settlement agreement. Following the settlement, Ninelen made an application to discontinue the action, while Interim sought to have Ninelen's counterclaim dismissed for want of prosecution. The court heard both applications and considered the principles relevant to determining costs orders and the dismissal of actions for want of prosecution.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the court should exercise its discretion to make no order as to the cost of the proceedings between the plaintiffs and Mr Douglas.
2. Whether the plaintiffs' application to dismiss the counterclaim for want of prosecution should be allowed.
3. Whether the principles applicable to an application to dismiss an action for want of prosecution have been properly considered in this case.
Held
1. The court decided that it should exercise its discretion to make no order as to the cost of the proceedings between the plaintiffs and Mr Douglas. The court concluded that the further prosecution of the plaintiffs' claims against Mr Douglas had become practically futile due to Mr Douglas becoming bankrupt.
2. The plaintiffs' application to dismiss the counterclaim for want of prosecution was allowed. The court found that the plaintiffs' application was not a civil proceeding against Interim and was considered a defensive measure which did not require leave.
3. The court found that the principles applicable to an application to dismiss an action for want of prosecution had been properly considered in this case. The court exercised its discretion to dismiss the counterclaim for want of prosecution based on the relevant factors outlined in the decision.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
McHugh J in Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; (1997) 186 CLR 622, considered the relevant principles for determining costs orders where there has been no hearing on the merits of the case. His Honour stated:The court cannot try a hypothetical action between the parties. To do so would burden the parties with the costs of a litigation action which by settlement or extra-curial action they had avoided. …If it appears that both parties had acted reasonably in commencing and defending the proceedings and the conduct of the parties continued to be reasonable until the litigation was settled or its further prosecution became futile, the proper exercise of the cost discretion will usually mean that the court will make no order as to the cost of the proceedings (624 - 625). In this case the further prosecution of the plaintiffs' claims against Mr Douglas have become practically futile. That is not because of anything done by the plaintiffs but rather because Mr Douglas has become bankrupt. In the circumstances of this case the proper exercise of the costs discretion is to make no order as to the cost of the proceedings between the plaintiffs and Mr Douglas. Section 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) does not prevent the plaintiffs from brining their application that the counterclaim be dismissed for want of prosecution. The plaintiffs' application is not a civil proceeding against Interim. Alternatively, the plaintiffs submit, and I accept, that their application is a defensive measure which does not require leave: Skinner v Jeogla Pty Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 106 [13] ‑ [20] (Spigelman CJ with Powell JA & Ipp AJA agreeing). The court has the inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action for want of prosecution. The principles applicable to an application to dismiss an action for want of prosecution were set out in Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd v Fieldhouse (2005) 30 WAR 398; [2005] WASCA 93 [99] ‑ [100] as follows:The general principles identified in those cases include consideration of these points:(a)whether any default has been intentional and contumelious, for example, disobedience to a peremptory order of the court or conduct amounting to an abuse of the process of the court; or (b)whether there has been inordinate and inexcusable delay on the part of the plaintiff or his or her lawyers, and, if so(c)whether such delay:(i)will give rise to a substantial risk that it is not possible to have a fair trial of the issues in the action; or (ii)is such as is likely to cause or to have caused serious prejudice to the defendants either as between themselves and the plaintiff or between each other or between them and a third party. But as with so many areas in the law, it is one thing to identify general principles and another properly to apply them. It should always be borne in mind that the power to dismiss for want of prosecution calls for the exercise of discretion. It is a discretion that must be exercised judicially but is otherwise open. It exists to serve the ends of justice. Caution should therefore be employed so that these general principles are not elevated to the level of a 'test' or a 'rule'. They are more appropriately to be seen as guidelines indicating some of the matters to which the court should have regard in exercising the discretion. The court's discretion to dismiss an action for want of prosecution is not fettered by any absolute or inflexible rules. There are however five matters to be considered which will usually be relevant to the court's decision to exercise the discretion:•the length of the delay; •the explanation for the delay;•the hardship to the plaintiff if the action is dismissed and the cause of the action left statute-barred;•the prejudice to the defendant if the action is allowed to proceed notwithstanding the delay; and•the conduct of the defendant in the litigation.Ulowski v Miller [1968] SASR 277 at 280 (FC); Dzienciol v Logie Brae Pty Ltd, unreported; FCt SCt of WA; Library No 980078; 25 February 1998.