Ninelen Pty Ltd v Interim Advance Corporation Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   NINELEN PTY LTD -v- INTERIM ADVANCE CORPORATION PTY LTD [2011] WASC 107

CORAM:   LE MIERE J

HEARD:   9 DECEMBER 2010

DELIVERED          :   21 APRIL 2011

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2506 of 2004

Consolidated by Orders dated 9 December 2008

BETWEEN:   NINELEN PTY LTD

First Plaintiff

CORVARR PTY LTD
Second Plaintiff

AND

INTERIM ADVANCE CORPORATION PTY LTD
First Defendant

OLIVER GEORGE DOUGLAS
Second Defendant

FILE NO/S              :CIV 1676 of 2005

BETWEEN              :INTERIM ADVANCE CORPORATION PTY LTD

Plaintiff

AND

NINELEN PTY LTD As Trustee for THE HELEN CARR & SONS FAMILY TRUST
First Defendant

CORVARR PTY LTD As Trustee for THE DAIRY FARM TRUST
Second Defendant

HELEN STEPHANIE CARR
Third Defendant

ANTONINO CORVAIA
Fourth Defendant

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Application to discontinue action - Relevant principles - Turns on own facts

Practice and procedure - Application to dismiss counterclaim for want of prosecution - Relevant principles - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), s 60(2), s 60(3)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 500(2)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 23 r 2(3)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), s 52, s 75B(1), s 87(2)

Result:

Application to discontinue action granted
Application to dismiss counterclaim granted

Category:    B

Representation:

CIV 2506 of 2004

Consolidated by Orders dated 9 December 2008

Counsel:

First Plaintiff                :     Mr C S Williams

Second Plaintiff            :     Mr C S Williams

First Defendant             :     Mr M Levitan

Second Defendant         :     Mr M Levitan

Solicitors:

First Plaintiff                :     Solomon Brothers

Second Plaintiff            :     Solomon Brothers

First Defendant             :     Melvyn Levitan

Second Defendant         :     Melvyn Levitan

CIV 1676 of 2005

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr M Levitan

First Defendant             :     Mr C S Williams

Second Defendant         :     Mr C S Williams

Third Defendant           :     Mr C S Williams

Fourth Defendant          :     Mr C S Williams

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Melvyn Levitan

First Defendant             :     Solomon Brothers

Second Defendant         :     Solomon Brothers

Third Defendant           :     Solomon Brothers

Fourth Defendant          :     Solomon Brothers

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL (1996) 185 CLR 124

Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd v Fieldhouse (2005) 30 WAR 398; [2005] WASCA 93

IMF (Australia) Ltd v Meadow Springs Fairway Resort Ltd (in liq) [2009] FCAFC 9; (2009) 253 ALR 240

NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power & Water Authority [2004] HCA 48; (2004) 219 CLR 90

Poulton v The Commonwealth (1952) 89 CLR 540

Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; (1997) 186 CLR 622

Rickard Constructions Pty Ltd v Rickard Hails Moretti Pty Ltd (2004) 220 ALR 267

Skinner v Jeogla Pty Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 106

Trendtex Trading Corporation v Credit Suisse [1982] AC 679

TS & B Retail Systems Pty Ltd v 3Fold Resources Pty Ltd (No 3) (2007) 158 FCR 444

  1. LE MIERE J:  The plaintiffs in these consolidated actions apply to discontinue the action against the defendants with no order as to costs.  The plaintiffs…

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Details
Case
[2011] WASC 107
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Ninelen Pty Ltd brought an action against Interim Advance Corporation Pty Ltd, which in turn filed a counterclaim against Ninelen. The dispute arose out of a series of transactions and agreements between the parties. The case was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The primary legal issues before the court involved an application by Ninelen to discontinue their action against Interim Advance Corporation and an application by Interim Advance Corporation to dismiss Ninelen’s counterclaim for want of prosecution.

In addressing the application to discontinue the action, the court considered the principles established in Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin, which emphasise that the court cannot try a hypothetical action and should avoid burdening the parties with the costs of litigation that has been avoided through settlement or extra-curial action. The court held that in this case, the prosecution of the plaintiffs' claims against Mr Douglas had become practically futile due to Mr Douglas becoming bankrupt, and thus, the proper exercise of the cost discretion was to make no order as to the cost of the proceedings. Regarding the application to dismiss the counterclaim for want of prosecution, the court applied the principles set out in Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd v Fieldhouse, considering factors such as the length of the delay, the explanation for the delay, the hardship to the plaintiff, the prejudice to the defendant, and the conduct of the defendant in the litigation.

The court ultimately determined that the discretion to dismiss an action for want of prosecution is not fettered by any absolute or inflexible rules but should be exercised judicially, serving the ends of justice. The court found that Interim Advance Corporation had not demonstrated sufficient grounds to justify the dismissal of Ninelen’s counterclaim for want of prosecution, and therefore, the application was dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Ninelen Pty Ltd initiated legal proceedings against Interim Advance Corporation Pty Ltd. The case involved a dispute over the management of funds and alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. Ninelen claimed that Interim had mismanaged the funds and failed to properly account for the investments. Interim responded with a counterclaim, asserting that Ninelen had wrongfully terminated their agreement and had failed to fulfill its own obligations under the contract. The case progressed through various stages of litigation, including the filing of motions and submissions. However, the matter was eventually settled out of court, and both parties sought to discontinue the proceedings.

The matter was first filed in the court by Ninelen against Interim, seeking damages for alleged mismanagement of funds and breaches of fiduciary duties. Interim filed a counterclaim, which included allegations of wrongful termination and failure to fulfill contractual obligations. The case was set for a trial, but before the trial date, both parties entered into a settlement agreement. Following the settlement, Ninelen made an application to discontinue the action, while Interim sought to have Ninelen's counterclaim dismissed for want of prosecution. The court heard both applications and considered the principles relevant to determining costs orders and the dismissal of actions for want of prosecution.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the court should exercise its discretion to make no order as to the cost of the proceedings between the plaintiffs and Mr Douglas.
2. Whether the plaintiffs' application to dismiss the counterclaim for want of prosecution should be allowed.
3. Whether the principles applicable to an application to dismiss an action for want of prosecution have been properly considered in this case.

Held
1. The court decided that it should exercise its discretion to make no order as to the cost of the proceedings between the plaintiffs and Mr Douglas. The court concluded that the further prosecution of the plaintiffs' claims against Mr Douglas had become practically futile due to Mr Douglas becoming bankrupt.
2. The plaintiffs' application to dismiss the counterclaim for want of prosecution was allowed. The court found that the plaintiffs' application was not a civil proceeding against Interim and was considered a defensive measure which did not require leave.
3. The court found that the principles applicable to an application to dismiss an action for want of prosecution had been properly considered in this case. The court exercised its discretion to dismiss the counterclaim for want of prosecution based on the relevant factors outlined in the decision.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

McHugh J in Re Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs; Ex parte Lai Qin [1997] HCA 6; (1997) 186 CLR 622, considered the relevant principles for determining costs orders where there has been no hearing on the merits of the case. His Honour stated:The court cannot try a hypothetical action between the parties. To do so would burden the parties with the costs of a litigation action which by settlement or extra-curial action they had avoided. …If it appears that both parties had acted reasonably in commencing and defending the proceedings and the conduct of the parties continued to be reasonable until the litigation was settled or its further prosecution became futile, the proper exercise of the cost discretion will usually mean that the court will make no order as to the cost of the proceedings (624 - 625). In this case the further prosecution of the plaintiffs' claims against Mr Douglas have become practically futile. That is not because of anything done by the plaintiffs but rather because Mr Douglas has become bankrupt. In the circumstances of this case the proper exercise of the costs discretion is to make no order as to the cost of the proceedings between the plaintiffs and Mr Douglas. Section 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) does not prevent the plaintiffs from brining their application that the counterclaim be dismissed for want of prosecution. The plaintiffs' application is not a civil proceeding against Interim. Alternatively, the plaintiffs submit, and I accept, that their application is a defensive measure which does not require leave: Skinner v Jeogla Pty Ltd (2001) 37 ACSR 106 [13] ‑ [20] (Spigelman CJ with Powell JA & Ipp AJA agreeing). The court has the inherent jurisdiction to dismiss an action for want of prosecution. The principles applicable to an application to dismiss an action for want of prosecution were set out in Hancock Family Memorial Foundation Ltd v Fieldhouse (2005) 30 WAR 398; [2005] WASCA 93 [99] ‑ [100] as follows:The general principles identified in those cases include consideration of these points:(a)whether any default has been intentional and contumelious, for example, disobedience to a peremptory order of the court or conduct amounting to an abuse of the process of the court; or (b)whether there has been inordinate and inexcusable delay on the part of the plaintiff or his or her lawyers, and, if so(c)whether such delay:(i)will give rise to a substantial risk that it is not possible to have a fair trial of the issues in the action; or (ii)is such as is likely to cause or to have caused serious prejudice to the defendants either as between themselves and the plaintiff or between each other or between them and a third party. But as with so many areas in the law, it is one thing to identify general principles and another properly to apply them. It should always be borne in mind that the power to dismiss for want of prosecution calls for the exercise of discretion. It is a discretion that must be exercised judicially but is otherwise open. It exists to serve the ends of justice. Caution should therefore be employed so that these general principles are not elevated to the level of a 'test' or a 'rule'. They are more appropriately to be seen as guidelines indicating some of the matters to which the court should have regard in exercising the discretion. The court's discretion to dismiss an action for want of prosecution is not fettered by any absolute or inflexible rules. There are however five matters to be considered which will usually be relevant to the court's decision to exercise the discretion:•the length of the delay; •the explanation for the delay;•the hardship to the plaintiff if the action is dismissed and the cause of the action left statute-barred;•the prejudice to the defendant if the action is allowed to proceed notwithstanding the delay; and•the conduct of the defendant in the litigation.Ulowski v Miller [1968] SASR 277 at 280 (FC); Dzienciol v Logie Brae Pty Ltd, unreported; FCt SCt of WA; Library No 980078; 25 February 1998.