NINAN and VALUER GENERAL
[2014] WASAT 93
•30 JULY 2014
NINAN and VALUER GENERAL [2014] WASAT 93
| STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL | Citation No: | [2014] WASAT 93 | |
| VALUATION OF LAND ACT 1978 (WA) | |||
| Case No: | DR:438/2013 | DETERMINED ON THE DOCUMENTS | |
| Coram: | MR S ELLIS (SENIOR SESSIONAL MEMBER) | 30/07/14 | |
| 15 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Applications dismissed | ||
| B | |||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | GEORGE NINAN MOLLY GEORGE VALUER GENERAL |
Catchwords: | Valuation of land Unimproved value Turns on own facts |
Legislation: | State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 84 Valuation of Land Act 1978 (WA), s 4, s 18, s 24, s 32, s 32(2), s 33 |
Case References: | Maurici v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2003] HCA 8; (2003) 212 CLR 111 Western Australian Planning Commission v Arcus Shop Fitters Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 295 |
Orders | On the application determined on the documents by Senior Sessional Member Scott Ellis, it is on 30 July 2014 ordered that: ,1. Each of applications DR 438 of 2013, DR 439 of 2013 and DR 440 of 2013 be dismissed.,2. The respondent has liberty to apply for an order for costs within 21 days. |
Summary | The applicants sought review, pursuant to s 33 of the Valuation of Land Act 1978 (WA), of valuations made by the respondent of three properties owned by the applicants in the Dawesville area. The respondent provided expert valuation evidence supporting its valuations. The applicants did not. The respondent's valuation evidence was in accordance with accepted valuation methodologies and was based on sound selection of comparable properties. The Tribunal accepted the evidence of the respondent and concluded that the valuations of Lot 276 at $540,000, Lot 227 at $370,000 and Lot 11 at $620,000 as at 1 August 2011 were correct. The applications were dismissed. |
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ACT : VALUATION OF LAND ACT 1978 (WA) CITATION : NINAN and VALUER GENERAL [2014] WASAT 93 MEMBER : MR S ELLIS (SENIOR SESSIONAL MEMBER) HEARD : DETERMINED ON THE DOCUMENTS DELIVERED : 30 JULY 2014 FILE NO/S : DR 438 of 2013
- DR 439 of 2013
DR 440 of 2013
- MOLLY GEORGE
Applicants
AND
VALUER GENERAL
Respondent
Catchwords:
Valuation of land Unimproved value Turns on own facts
Legislation:
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 84
Valuation of Land Act 1978 (WA), s 4, s 18, s 24, s 32, s 32(2), s 33
Result:
Applications dismissed
Summary of Tribunal's decision:
The applicants sought review, pursuant to s 33 of the Valuation of Land Act 1978 (WA), of valuations made by the respondent of three properties owned by the applicants in the Dawesville area. The respondent provided expert valuation evidence supporting its valuations. The applicants did not. The respondent's valuation evidence was in accordance with accepted valuation methodologies and was based on sound selection of comparable properties. The Tribunal accepted the evidence of the respondent and concluded that the valuations of Lot 276 at $540,000, Lot 227 at $370,000 and Lot 11 at $620,000 as at 1 August 2011 were correct. The applications were dismissed.
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicants : N/A
Respondent : N/A
Solicitors:
Applicants : N/A
Respondent : State Solicitor's Office
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Maurici v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2003] HCA 8; (2003) 212 CLR 111
Western Australian Planning Commission v Arcus Shop Fitters Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 295
Introduction
1 Mr George Ninan and Ms Molly George (applicants) seek review of the respondent's (Valuer General's) determination of the unimproved value of three properties owned by them.
2 Details of the applications, the properties and the values put forward by the parties are as follows:
Application Number | DR 438 of 2013 | DR 439 of 2013 | DR 440 of 2013 |
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(The values for which the applicants contend are found in their letter of 7 May 2013, which was included in the responsive materials provided to the Tribunal under cover of the applicants' letter of 31 March 2014 at Volume 5 page 1)
3 The valuations were of the value of the properties as at 1 August 2011. Having considered all the evidence provided by both parties in these proceedings, the Tribunal prefers the evidence put forward by the respondent and finds that the values of the properties as at 1 August 2011 were:
a) Lot 276: $540,000;
b) Lot 227: $370,000; and
c) Lot 11: $620,000.
4 Consequently each of the applications for review must be dismissed. Reasons are set out below.
Procedural background
5 On 23 October 2012, the applicants received rate notices from the City of Mandurah based on the respondent's valuations of the properties as at 1 August 2011. The valuations are set out in paragraph 2 above.
6 The applicants sent an email about the rate notices to Landgate on 23 October 2012 and followed that up with their 'objection package', sent by email on 5 December 2012.
7 The Valuer General initially took the view that the material from the applicants did not amount to 'objections' to the valuations because the material did not, in his opinion, comply with s 32(2) of the Valuation of Land Act 1978 (WA) (VL Act). However, the Valuer General subsequently 'upgraded' the queries to objections. The objections were then reviewed and the objections rejected. The applicants were informed of the rejections by letter dated 17 October 2013. The applicants wrote to the Valuer General on 17 October 2013 and contended that the objections had previously been rejected by the Valuer General by letter dated 2 July 2013. The applicants' letter of 17 October 2013 was treated by the Valuer General as a request for review of the valuations of the properties and the matters were referred to the Tribunal under s 33 of the VL Act.
8 Directions were made on 11 December 2013 in each of the proceedings, including directions that:
a) the initial papers for review do stand as the section 24 bundle of documents;
b) the matter be determined entirely on the documents; and
c) the three applications remain separate proceedings, but be heard and determined together, with evidence in one proceeding being evidence in the other proceedings.
9 The applicants did not attend the directions hearing on 11 December 2013, either in person or by telephone. An application under s 84 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) for review of the directions was made by email dated 11 December 2013. Insofar as that application related to the direction that the matter be determined on the documents, that application was not successful.
10 The Tribunal has had regard to all the documents on the files. However, the principal documents are:
a) three expert witness reports of Mr Russell Elkins, (one for each property) each dated 16 October 2013, prepared on behalf of the respondent (expert reports);
b) the respondent's amended consolidated statement of issues, facts and contentions dated 31 January 2014;
c) a letter from the applicants dated 31 March 2014, and enclosed 'response to the Valuer General's false contentions' comprised of seven 'volumes' (the responses);
d) a supplementary expert witness report of Mr Elkins, filed on behalf of the respondent, dated 5 May 2014 (which dealt with all three properties);
e) the Section 24 bundle of documents (which included the applicants' initial objection package). These documents dealt with all the lots the subject of these proceedings; and
f) letter dated 13 July 2014 from the applicants to the Tribunal, together with a document entitled 'Chronology of valuations & sales of lot 372 at Southport'.
Legislative background
11 One of the functions of the Valuer General under the VL Act is to determine the unimproved value of land for rating purposes from time to time (s 18 of the VL Act). That is what occurred in this case.
12 The expression 'unimproved value' is defined in s 4 of the VL Act, and relevantly means 'the site value'. 'Site value' is also defined in s 4 of the VL Act. So far as that definition is relevant to the present case, it reads:
site value of land means the capital amount that an estate of fee simple in the land might reasonably be expected to realize upon sale assuming that any improvements to the land, other than merged improvements, had not been made[.]
13 'Merged improvements' is defined to mean:
… means any works in the nature of draining, filling, excavation, grading or levelling of the land, retaining walls or other structures or works for that purpose, the removal of rocks, stone or soil, and the clearing of timber, scrub or other vegetation[.]
14 Section 32 of the VL Act provides a mechanism for internal review of valuations of the Valuer General. Section 33 provides for review by this Tribunal of decisions of the Valuer General under s 32.
General issues
15 The issue for determination is whether the decision made by the Valuer General to reject the applicants' objection is the correct and preferable decision. This involves determining whether the Valuer General's valuations of the properties are the correct valuations.
16 The respondent relied upon expert evidence from Mr Elkins. As at the date of his expert reports, Mr Elkins had been a qualified, licensed valuer for nine years, an employee of Landgate, and responsible for the Valuer General's work in Mandurah for 18 months. Before working for Landgate, he had worked for a firm of commercial valuers for 10 years while undertaking valuation work in the Mandurah area. I accept that Mr Elkins has expertise relevant to the valuation of land and, in particular, land in the Mandurah/Dawesville area. The applicants did not provide any expert valuation evidence. In the materials they provided to the Tribunal, the applicants made assertions about valuation of land in general, the value of the properties, and the appropriateness of the comparable transactions relied upon by Mr Elkins. The applicants did not have any formal qualifications or expertise in the field of valuation of property, either in the Mandurah/Dawesville area or generally. Consequently, where there is a conflict between the opinions of the applicants and the expert opinion of Mr Elkins, I prefer the evidence of Mr Elkins.
17 The applicants provided extensive and detailed materials in support of their position that the Valuer General's valuations were wrong. Some of their arguments involved the application of general contentions in respect of the properties, or were essentially the same contention in respect of each of the properties. It is convenient to deal with these more general contentions first.
18 First, the applicants argued that the respondent's valuations were wrong because they did not properly reflect information about the median price of properties in the Dawesville area as published by the Valuer General on its website. The applicants contended that this information showed that the median value of a 726m² lot in Dawesville was only $152,000 and that the value of their lots should not differ significantly from that figure (at Volume 1 of the responses, pages 16, 19, 26, 29 and 40). The applicants also put forward the argument on the basis that 'exceptional' evidence would be required to establish that the value of the applicants' properties differed substantially from the median. These contentions are rejected. Mr Elkins gave evidence that the use of statistical data in this way is not an accepted method to assess the unimproved value of individual lots, as it ignores factors specific to the individual lot which are relevant to the individual value of the lot (see his supplementary expert witness report at paragraph 2). As a matter of logic, Mr Elkins' proposition is right and the Tribunal accepts it. It is obvious that the value of lots within a suburb or area may differ significantly. In particular, the existence and extent of ocean or water views will significantly affect the value of land, as Mr Elkins explained in his supplementary report at paragraph 3. This is not to say that general trends in land values do not inform valuations of specific properties. Mr Elkins took into account market trends over time, in the section of each of his expert reports headed 'Market Summary' and in his evaluation of the properties the subject of these proceedings. The applicants' approach was not appropriate.
19 Second, the applicants drew attention to significant changes over time in the valuations of both the properties and the land in the Dawesville area in general. The following passage from page 4 of Volume 1 in the responses is an example of the argument put forward by the applicants:
C General Observations
I) The rise and fall of UV's in the particular area called Southport cannot be ignored. The value of our lot #11 (124 Sanctuary Cct) rose from $250,000 to $1 million in 2007 & then fell down to $620,000.
II) DR 162 of 2011 provided evidence to establish that Valuer General allocated UV $250,000 to our lot #11 in 2002 in a totally new locality when Dawesville median value was only $86,500.
III) The value of our lot 227 in Channel View in 2007 was $920,000 which now stands at $370,000.
IV) The facts that UV $570,000 (Lot 124 Lawrencia [L]oop of 2006 – DR162) fell down to UV $270,000 by Valuer General's own confession letter dated 4 March, 2011 should not be forgotten.
The inference which the applicants drew from these premises was:
V) Such rise and fall in certain areas should be taken as indication of land value falsification of great proportions in that area. There is no other credible explanation.
It is beyond a doubt that Southport values have been false for a long time and the values set by the Valuer General reflect only a false desire to keep them as high as possible. (Responses, Volume 1 at page 26).
21 The point is put in less temperate language in other materials provided by the applicants (for example, Volume 20 of the objection package at page 20).
22 The applicants also personally attacked Mr Elkins. For example, the applicants contended (in the responses in Volume 1 at page 35) that 'Mr Elkins invoked the evidence, more from far away land, mostly outside Dawesville to falsify land values in Southport'.
23 There was no basis for any allegation of impropriety, deliberate falsification of valuations or inappropriate links with developers on the part of the Valuer General, the Valuer General's officers or Mr Elkins. The applicants' allegations to this effect are rejected.
24 A far more likely explanation for the fluctuations in the Valuer General's valuations of land is that the valuations reflect changes in the actual value of land in the Southport area. It is common knowledge that the period 2002 to 2011 included the period of the global financial crisis, and that one of the consequences of that crisis, in some parts of the world, was a significant decline in the value of land. Mr Elkins' reports refer to change in values and the decline in values and volumes through 2008 and 2009 flowing from the global financial crisis. The applicants' approach confuses cause and effect. Valuations by the Valuer General do not cause the value of property to go up or down. Rather, valuations by the Valuer General respond to changes in the market price or value of land.
25 In each of his expert witness reports, Mr Elkins adopted what he called the 'Direct Comparison' method of valuation which is described at page 6 of his reports and then put into effect at pages 8 and 9 of each of his expert reports. This method reflects that described by the High Court in Maurici v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2003] HCA 8; (2003) 212 CLR 11 at [16] in the following terms:
… The traditional, and usually unexceptionable method is to seek out relatively contemporaneous sales of comparable properties between parties at arm's length, unaffected by special circumstances, such as, for example, a strong desire by a purchaser to buy an adjoining property, and to use those sales as a yardstick for the valuation of the relevant land.
26 I accept that the 'Direct Comparison' methodology adopted by Mr Elkins is an appropriate method for valuing the properties.
27 In Western Australian Planning Commission v Arcus Shopfitters Pty Ltd [2003] WASCA 295 (Arcus Shopfitters) at [50], McLure J commented on the selection of the comparable sales:
There is no hard and fast rule by which a valuer can draw the line that clearly separates sales that are comparable from those that are not. It is a matter of degree. Some adjustment is always necessary but too much adjustment may render it unsafe to use a sale. Where the line is to be drawn is a matter for the expert valuer to determine[.]
- Anderson and Steytler JJ agreed with McLure J (at [1] and [2]).
28 The applicants disputed that the transactions selected by Mr Elkins as comparable sales were appropriate, and contended that a number of other transactions were more appropriate comparators to determine the value of the properties. However, as stated by McLure J in Arcus Shopfitters, the selection of comparable transactions is a matter of valuation expertise. Mr Elkins was an expert valuer. The applicants led no expert evidence disputing his valuation or his selection of comparable transactions. In the absence of such expert evidence from the applicants, I accept that the transactions selected by Mr Elkins were appropriate.
29 These matters are sufficient to warrant acceptance of Mr Elkins' valuation and rejection of the applicants' position in respect of each of the valuations. However, as the parties made submissions in respect of the specifics of Mr Elkins' valuations, I propose to deal with the major specific contentions advanced by the applicants about the valuations. It is not necessary to separately consider all the transactions put forward by the applicants, and I will not do so.
Specific contentions
Lot 276
30 Mr Elkins said that Lot 276, or No 26 Surf View, Dawesville, Western Australia is located on the southern side of the Dawesville Channel, about 10 kilometres south-west of Mandurah. The land is zoned Residential R20. Lot 276 is a 596m² lot. It is northeast facing. It has a 316m², four bedroom, two bathroom, double storey, brick rendered house, built in 2008, which includes a double garage under the main roof. (Value attributable to the house does not, of course, form part of the unimproved value of the land by virtue of the definition of 'unimproved value' set out above). The lot is retained by limestone walls. There is substantial limestone and iron fencing on the northern boundary. The property has frontage to the Dawesville Channel Foreshore Reserve and has panoramic views of the channel to the north, northeast and north-west, and good ocean views to the northwest. Mr Elkins stated that he inspected the property on 14 October 2013. The description is consistent with the photographs, the deposited plan, and the various maps included in Mr Elkins' report on this property. The applicants did not disagree substantively with Mr Elkins' description of Lot 276.
31 In Appendix 5 to his report, Mr Elkins identified and gave details of the transactions which, applying the 'Direct Comparison Method', he used to value Lot 276. Mr Elkins compared each of these properties to Lot 276, noting whether he regarded it as superior to the subject land or not.
32 The applicants complained that some of the transactions relied upon by Mr Elkins were not physically close enough to the subject properties but were located in Wannanup. The applicants described these transactions as 'far away land'. This is also the effect of the passage quoted at [22] above. The transactions to which objection was taken were sales of Lot 207 Australis Circle, Wannanup and Lot 197 Specks Court, Wannanup, which Mr Elkins relied on in valuing Lots 276 and 227. I do not accept that the applicants' argument is well founded in the present case. Although, of course, Lot 207 Australis Circle and Lot 197 Specks Court are different from Lots 276 and 227, they are 'comparable'. Both are waterfront properties located on the northern side of the Dawesville Channel. Lots 276 and 227 were waterfront properties located on the southern side of the Dawesville Channel. Mr Elkins identified the respects in which he considered that the Wannanup properties were relevantly different from Lots 276 and 227. I am satisfied that the Wannanup properties were appropriate comparators.
33 The applicants also alleged that, if it was appropriate to take the Wannanup transactions into account, they revealed that the value of Lot 276 was significantly less than Mr Elkins' figure. The applicants derived a value per m² for the Wannanup properties, then applied that value per m² to Lot 276 (which is smaller than the Wannanup properties) and drew the conclusion that Lot 276 must be less valuable than the Wannanup properties. However, Mr Elkins contended that Lot 276 faced north, while the Wannanup properties faced south, and that northfacing properties had traditionally commanded a premium in the Mandurah area, so that the Wannanup properties were overall inferior to Lot 276. Mr Elkins' reasoning on this point is persuasive and I reject the applicants' argument on this point.
34 The applicants relied upon sales of Lot 280 and Lot 281 Surf View. Mr Elkins did not use these transactions as comparators.
35 It appears that Lot 280 was sold for $1,350,000 in July 2006 and subsequently sold for $400,000 in December 2012. The applicants contended that the later sale was comparable. Mr Elkins contended that, although Lot 280 was only four allotments to the west of Lot 276 and had good views, the sale of Lot 280 relied upon by the applicants was not properly comparable. Lot 280 was located opposite the local surf club. He stated that the selling agent for Lot 280 informed him that the location opposite the local surf club was considered detrimental because of the potential for noise and disruption. The selling agent also informed him that the sale was a sale by a receiver and the property had been on the market for five months. Mr Elkins contended that locational factors, such as those identified by the selling agent, could be significant detrimental factors. He noted that the property did not involve a seller acting without compulsion, and that the sale took place 16 months after the date of valuation, 1 August 2011. He did not use the property as a comparator for these reasons. The Tribunal accepts that Mr Elkins' reasons for excluding Lot 280 as a comparator are valid ones and that the exclusion of Lot 280 was reasonable.
36 The position in respect of Lot 281 was similar. It was sold for $1,150,000 in March 2006 and sold again for $320,000 in November 2012. Mr Elkins did not include the second sale as a comparator because of locational factors similar to Lot 280, the role of a receiver in conducting the sale and the timing of the sale. Again, the Tribunal considers that Mr Elkins' opinion and approach were correct.
37 Mr Elkins' selection of comparative transactions in respect of Lot 276 was reasonable. The Tribunal finds that the value of this lot was $540,000 as at 1 August 2011.
Lot 227
38 Lot 227, or No 78 Channel View, Dawesville, is a northeast facing vacant lot which has frontage to the Dawesville Channel Foreshore Reserve. It has panoramic views of the channel to the north, north-east and northwest, together with limited views of the Indian Ocean to the north-west. The lot is retained by limestone walls, has limestone and iron fencing on the northern boundary and is zoned Residential R20. This description is based on Mr Elkins' report about this property. He visited the property on 14 October 2013. In his report, Mr Elkins states that the mortgagee is exercising a power of sale and the property is on the market for $360,000. The applicants did not dispute these matters. The description is consistent with the photographs, the deposited plan, and the various maps included in Mr Elkins' report on this property.
39 There was a dispute between the parties about the area of Lot 227. The applicants contended that it had an area of 584m² but the copy of the Certificate of Title included in Mr Elkins' report shows an area of 564m², which I accept.
40 The comparable properties for this lot were the same as for the valuation of Lot 276, except that Lot 277 Surf View, Dawesville was not included and Lot 41 Enchantress Lane, Dawesville was included. Having regard to the comparable sales, and Mr Elkins' analysis of them, the value ascribed to Lot 227 is correct.
41 The applicants also raised the arguments about the Wannanup transactions in relation to Lot 227. The argument is rejected in this context for the reasons given in relation to Lot 276.
42 The applicants relied on a number of sales other than those relied on by the respondent. The applicants referred to the sale of Lot 332 Southport Boulevard for $305,000, which Mr Elkins disregarded, correctly in the opinion of the Tribunal, on the basis that it was a sale by a mortgagee in possession. The applicants referred to the sale of Lot 168 Southport Boulevard for $850,000 in February 2012, and contended that it had an unimproved value of between $150,000 and $220,000. The respondent considered that this property had an unimproved value of $190,000, which is within the applicants' range of values, but also considered that the property was significantly inferior to Lot 227 in that it only had distant ocean glimpses. The applicants also referred to the sale of Lot 376 Southport Boulevard, but Mr Elkins pointed out that this property has a number of disadvantageous qualities, compared to Lot 227; it has limited ocean views over the surf club and carpark and channel glimpses subject to further development of Lot 284 to Lot 280 Surf View. It is not an appropriate comparator.
43 Mr Elkins' selection of comparable transactions was reasonable.
44 The Tribunal finds that the value of Lot 227 was $370,000.
Lot 11
45 Lot 11, or No 104 Sanctuary Circuit, Dawesville, is a 681m² piece of land on which a 272m² three bedroom, two bathroom brick and tile house had been built. The land itself is northwest facing and enjoys frontage to a portion of the golf course, which it overlooks. The lot also has unobstructed ocean views to the west and northwest from the second story. The Lot is elevated above the road grade. It is zoned Residential R20. Mr Elkins inspected Lot 11 on 14 October 2013.
46 The unimproved value of Lot 11 does not include value attributable to the house.
47 The transactions relied upon by Mr Elkins were set out in Appendix 5 to his report in relation to this property. I am satisfied that the transactions included in Appendix 5 are comparable transactions.
48 The applicants relied upon the sale of Lot 372 Country Club Drive, Dawesville and Lot 1500 on Plan 47055. Lot 372 was a hotel site of 1.598 hectares which sold for $8,000,000 in May 2010. Lot 1500 was used as part of the golf course, had an area of 27.0497 hectares and had a 'recreational use' zoning. The applicants relied on these transactions to establish a value per square metre which, they said, was relevant to the value of their properties. I agree with Mr Elkins that neither of these properties is comparable to a single residential lot such as Lot 11. The market for and the value of land which is or can be used as a hotel or golf course is very different from the market for and value of land that can be used for a residence.
49 The applicants relied upon the sale of Lot 56 Sanctuary Circuit for $520,000 in April 2010. After discounting the value for the value of improvements, the applicants arrived at an unimproved value of Lot 11 of $170,000 to $220,000 for the property. Mr Elkins arrived at an unimproved value of $250,000 to $230,000, which he considered consistent with his valuation of Lot 11, because Lot 56 had inferior ocean views and no golf course outlook. His reasoning is persuasive.
50 The applicants relied upon the sale of Lot 5 Sanctuary Circuit for $795,000 in August 2010. Mr Elkins' investigations into the sale process indicated that the property was a sale by an anxious vendor, so he concluded that it was not a comparable transaction. This is reasonable. The applicants attributed an unimproved land value of $120,000 to $320,000 to the sale of Lot 24 Sanctuary Circuit in March 2011. The applicants attributed a value of between $600,000 and $800,000 to the improvements. After conversations with the selling agent, which indicated that there were issues with the quality of the improvement, and the maintenance, condition and presentation of the improvements, Mr Elkins attributed a value of between $295,000 and $315,000 to the improvements, giving the unimproved value of $625,000 to $605,000. In doing so, Mr Elkins, correctly in the Tribunal's view, looked at the impact which the dwelling might have on the value of the package, and sought to isolate the unimproved value. Comments about this property by the applicants were directed to the cost to replace the dwelling, which is not, in the Tribunal's view, the correct approach. The applicants relied on the sale of Lot 84 Sanctuary Circuit. Mr Elkins disregarded this transaction because it did not appear to be an arms' length transaction and because the property had significantly inferior views. The Tribunal accepts this treatment of the transaction.
51 Again, for the reasons given by Mr Elkins, the properties put forward by the applicants do not appear to be comparable transactions. The Tribunal accepts that Mr Elkins' valuation of Lot 11 was correct. Its value, as at 1 August 2011, was $620,000.
Conclusion
52 For the reasons given above, the Tribunal accepts Mr Elkins' valuations and dismissed the applications.
53 I will give the respondent liberty to make an application within 21 days for a costs order if I see fit. I note that the applicants are resident overseas.
Orders
The Tribunal makes the following orders:
1. Each of applications DR 438 of 2013, DR 439 of 2013 and DR 440 of 2013 be dismissed.
2. The respondent has liberty to apply for an order for costs within 21 days.
I certify that this and the preceding [53] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
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MR S ELLIS, SENIOR SESSIONAL MEMBER
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