Nicholson and Repatriation Commission
[2007] AATA 1518
•6 July 2007
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2007] AATA 1518
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No Q200600328
VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION ) Re GEORGE NICHOLSON Applicant
And
REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Mr P McDermott, RFD, Senior Member
Dr GJ Maynard, MemberDate6 July 2007
PlaceBrisbane
Decision The Tribunal affirms the decision under review. ...................[Sgd]...........................
Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS’ ENTITLEMENTS – operational service – claim that anxiety disorder, alcohol abuse, and hypertension are war-caused – consideration of Statements of Principles – decision under review affirmed
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (Cth) ss 6, 9, 13, 23, 24, 120, 120A, 196A, 196B
Repatriation Commission v Cooke (1998) 52 ALD 1
Repatriation Commission v Smith (1987) 15 FCR 327
Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82
Stoddart v Repatriation Commission (2003) 197 ALR 283
Conway v Repatriation Commission (2003) 37 AAR 486REASONS FOR DECISION
6 July 2007 Mr P McDermott, RFD, Senior Member
Dr GJ Maynard, MemberIntroduction
1. Mr George Nicholson was engaged in operational service with the Australian Army in Vietnam. We have to consider whether his claimed conditions of anxiety disorder, alcohol abuse, and hypertension are war-caused conditions.
Decisions
2. On 7 April 2005 the Repatriation Commission (“the Commission”) made a decision that various claimed conditions (anxiety disorder, alcohol abuse, irritable bowel syndrome and hypertension) were not war-caused. The Commission assessed Mr Watt as being entitled to a pension at 100% of the general rate.
3. Mr Nicholson sought a review of this decision from the Veterans’ Review Board. On 21 April 2006 the Veterans’ Review Board affirmed the decision.
4. Mr Nicholson has now applied to this Tribunal to review the decision of the Veterans’ Review Board.
Issues before the Tribunal
5. At the hearing the applicant withdrew his claim for the acceptance of irritable bowel syndrome.
6. We have to decide whether the claimed conditions of anxiety disorder, alcohol abuse and hypertension are war-caused for the purposes of s 9 of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (“the Act”).
7. We also have to consider whether the rate of pension payable to Mr Nicholson is correctly assessed.
Date of Effect
8. We consider that if Mr Nicholson is successful in his application, the date of effect is 20 June 2004.
Background
9. Mr Nicholson served in the Australian Army from 18 April 1967 until 17 April 1969 when his period of enlistment terminated.
10. For the purposes of the Act he has operational service from 15 April 1968 to 2 April 1969. During this period he was posted as a driver to 33 Dental Unit in Vietnam.
11. Mr Nicholson is currently in receipt of pension at 100% of the general rate for a number of accepted conditions.
12. Mr Nicholson asserts in the present proceedings that certain stressful events occurred during his operational service, and caused the conditions on which his claim is based.
13. Mr Nicholson, who gave oral evidence, verified the contents of two statements that were admitted into evidence. One statement details his post-army employment history until he ceased work in 2000. His last employment was as a groundsman in a caravan park [exhibit A1, statement dated 14 July 2006].
14. Another statement that was admitted in evidence is a “stressor statement” which lists the “stressors” that Mr Nicholson states that he experienced whilst on operational service in Vietnam [exhibit A2, statement dated 14 July 2006].
15. Mr Nicholson in his statement said that since his tour of duty he has had “busy legs” [A2, para 12]. We are satisfied after hearing evidence from his solicitor that this is indeed a reference to his restless legs syndrome.
16. Mr Nicholson also stated that since his tour of duty he “has had difficulty sleeping and had to cease work because of his service disabilities [exhibit A2, para 12].
17. Mr Nicholson stated: “[d]uring the whole of my service in Vietnam I was petrified and felt I could have been killed at any time. I could never tell the difference between the good and bad Vietnamese” [exhibit A2, para 10].
Stressor Statement
18. We will examine the stressors that are outlined in the stressor statement of Mr Nicholson.
19. “Blown up bridge incident”. One incident that Mr Nicholson has referred to occurred when he was driving to Nui Dat delivering dental supplies from a US Army Base. Mr Nicholson stated that this involved driving on roads which were classed as “red routes”. These were roads which could only be driven on in the company of a US convoy. On one occasion he was approaching a bridge that had been blown up.
20. In oral testimony, but not in his “stressor statement”, Mr Nicholson stated that the bridge was collapsing as he approached it. There was nobody to be seen at this location.
21. Mr Nicholson stated that he was forced to drive around the collapsed bridge through a swamp. He stated that in driving around that site, they were following the convoy and not on “some track”.
22. Mr Nicholson stated that he had been informed that land mines could have been laid in the vicinity of the bridge. Mr Nicholson stated that he was petrified that he could have been blown up or shot by a sniper. In his oral testimony, he stated that he was “really stressed out, uptight, scared”. He said that he “did not know what would happen”, and “it was not a nice feeling”. On that occasion there were four people in the vehicle including himself as driver.
23. In his evidence Nicholson stated that the worst event that he saw was this bridge incident.
24. “Hospital visit incidents”. Mr Nicholson as the driver for a dentist, a Major Goodwin, was taken to the hospitals in Vung Tau and Nui Dat. When he arrived at the hospital he saw people with severe injuries including people with arms missing. In his “stressor statement”, he said that when he “saw these severe injuries I was horrified and felt sick” [exhibit A2, para 8].
25. “Medivac arrivals”. Mr Nicholson stated that when Medivacs arrived in Vung Tau and Nui Dat he saw people with “severe injuries”. He stated: “[a]lthough I was sickened and horrified I attended in case I was needed to help” [exhibit A2. para. 9].
26. “Flat tyre incident”. Another incident that was mentioned by Mr Nicholson was when he was on another trip on the “red routes’ when the vehicle that he was driving developed a flat tyre. Mr Nicholson stated that “we” (himself and the others in his vehicle) were left alone while the tyre was changed. Mr Nicholson stated that the convoy “kept going and left us behind”.
27. In his “stressor statement” about the flat tyre incident, Mr Nicholson said that he thought that he “would be shot or attacked by the Vietnam villagers” [exhibit A2, para 5]. In oral evidence, he stated that “it was quite spooky” as “people were staring at us”. Mr Nicholson stated that he changed the tyre on the vehicle as the other passengers watched. He remarked that he “could not get the spare wheel on quick enough” and that he “wanted to get going”. He remarked that he was “scared”, and that it was a “scary experience”.
Evidence of Medical Witnesses
28. The first medical witness was Dr Roger Parkington, an orthopaedic surgeon. Dr Parkington examined Mr Nicholson on 21 August 2006. Dr Parkington provided a report of that examination on 21 August 2006. That report was admitted into evidence [exhibit A3]. In his evidence Dr Parkington verified the accuracy of his report and stated that he did not wish to make any changes to his report.
29. Dr Parkington considers that Mr Nicholson suffers from age-related degenerative disease in the lumbosacral spine. Dr Parkington also did not think that the symptoms and physical signs of Mr Nicholson that he found were of such a severity as to have contributed to him ceasing remunerative employment in 2000. Dr Parkington does not consider that it was Mr Nicholson’s backache that caused him to cease work in 2000 although he mentioned that he suffers from multiple other conditions which prevent him from working.
30. Dr Parkington also reported that the orthopaedic disabilities of Mr Nicholson were not of sufficient severity to prevent Mr Nicholson from working part-time, either 8 or 20 hours per week.
31. The next medical witness was Dr Maxwell Katz, a consultant psychiatrist. Dr Katz has examined Mr Nicholson on a number of occasions and provided a number of reports that were admitted in evidence: report, 7 December 2000 [exhibit A, fol 14]; report, 6 October 2004 [exhibit A, fol 118]; report, 18 November 2004 [exhibit A, fol 126]; report, 21 July 2005 [exhibit A, fol 135]; report, 23 November 2006 [exhibit A4].
32. Dr Katz, in his report of 21 July 2005, has concluded that Mr Nicholson ceased employment due to his alcohol abuse and anxiety disorder. Dr Katz also mentioned other conditions at p 6 of his report. He considers that the alcohol abuse and anxiety disorder resulted from Mr Nicholson’s service in Vietnam. Dr Katz also then reported that Mr Nicholson is presently more stabilised on the combination of Efexor and Endep which assist Mr Nicholson with his sleep and restless legs syndrome. Dr Katz also opined that Mr Nicholson was using alcohol as a form of self-medication.
33. Dr J Sowby, a specialist in occupational medicine, was called to give evidence by the respondent. Dr Sowby stated that he examined Mr Nicholson on 31 July 2006. He prepared two reports which were admitted into evidence: report, 31 July 2006 [exhibit R2]; report, 2 November 2006 [exhibit R3].
34. Dr Sowby has concluded that the accepted conditions of Mr Nicholson render him unable to perform remunerative work for 8 hours a week. He also considers that the orthopaedic conditions of Mr Nicholson would preclude him from performing heavy manual activities, though should not preclude him from performing tasks of a light/medium nature such as courier and process-type work activities.
35. The final medical witness was Dr P Morris, a consultant psychiatrist. Dr Morris had examined Mr Nicholson on 21 August 2006. The report of Dr Morris of 23 October 2006 was admitted in evidence [exhibit R1].
36. Dr Morris stated that Mr Nicholson suffers from a long history of alcohol abuse and dependence. Dr Morris considers that the alcohol dependence and abuse began during his army service in Vietnam. Dr Morris has concluded that Mr Nicholson no longer suffers from alcohol abuse but he does suffer from mild alcohol dependence.
37. Dr Morris gave his opinion on the ability of Mr Nicholson to work. Dr Morris concludes that the current alcohol dependence of Mr Nicholson precludes him from working full time. He concluded that Mr Nicholson could work up to 10-15 hours per week in suitable positions. Dr Morris stated that the main limitation of Mr Nicholson is his poor gait and balance [exhibit R1, p 5].
38. Dr Morris in his report had considered that Mr Nicholson did suffer from an adjustment disorder or depressive illness following the breakdown in his marriage (which was then 27 years ago). Dr Morris considered that this condition has now resolved.
Legislative Background
39. Section 9 of the Act provides for when an injury or disease is taken to be war-caused, and provides relevantly as follows:
“9 War-caused injuries or diseases
(1) Subject to this section, for the purposes of this Act, an injury suffered by a veteran shall be taken to be a war-caused injury, or a disease contracted by a veteran shall be taken to be a war-caused disease, if:
(a) the injury suffered, or disease contracted, by the veteran resulted from an occurrence that happened while the veteran was rendering operational service;
(b) the injury suffered, or disease contracted, by the veteran arose out of, or was attributable to, any eligible war service rendered by the veteran; …”
40. The expression “operational service” is defined in ss 6 to 6F of the Act. Under s 6C, a person renders operational service if he or she is, inter alia, allotted for continuous full-time service in an operational area. There is no issue that the applicant has not rendered operational service.
41. Section 13(1) of the Act provides, in effect, that where a veteran has become incapacitated from a war-caused injury or a war-caused disease, the Commonwealth is liable to pay a pension by way of compensation to the veteran.
42. As the applicant has performed operational service, as defined in s 6 of the Act, the determination of whether his asserted conditions are war-caused is to be made by applying ss 120(1) and 120(3) of the Act. Those sections provide relevantly as follows:
120 Standard of proof
(1) Where a claim under Part II for a pension in respect of the incapacity from injury or disease of a veteran, or of the death of a veteran, relates to the operational service rendered by the veteran, the Commission shall determine that the injury was a war-caused injury, that the disease was a war-caused disease or that the death of the veteran was war-caused, as the case may be, unless it is satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for making that determination.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.
…
(3) In applying subsection (1) or (2) in respect of the incapacity of a person from injury or disease, or in respect of the death of a person, related to service rendered by the person, the Commission shall be satisfied, beyond reasonable doubt, that there is no sufficient ground for determining:
(a) that the injury was a war-caused injury or a defence-caused injury;
(b) that the disease was a war-caused disease or a defence-caused disease; or
(c) that the death was war-caused or defence-caused;
as the case may be, if the Commission, after consideration of the whole of the material before it, is of the opinion that the material before it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person.
Note: This subsection is affected by section 120A.”
43. Under s 120A of the Act, in the case of applications lodged after 1 June 1994, where the Repatriation Medical Authority (“RMA”) has made a Statement of Principles (SoP) in respect of a particular kind of injury or disease, the reasonableness of an hypothesis is to be assessed by reference to that SoP. This follows from s 120A(3), which provides:
“(3) For the purposes of subsection 120(3), a hypothesis connecting an injury suffered by a person, a disease contracted by a person or the death of a person with the circumstances of any particular service rendered by the person is reasonable only if there is in force:
(a) a Statement of Principles determined under subsection 196B(2) or (11); or
(b) a determination of the Commission under subsection 180A(2);
that upholds the hypothesis.
Note: See subsection (4) about the application of this sub-section.”
44. Subsection (4) of s 120A excludes the operation of subsection (3) in certain circumstances which are not relevant to the present proceedings.
45. Section 196A of the Act provides for the establishment of the RMA. Section 196B of the Act provides that if the RMA is of the view that there is sound medical-scientific evidence that indicates that a particular kind of injury, disease or death can be related to operational service rendered by veterans, the RMA must determine a SoP in respect of that kind of injury, disease or death setting out the factors that must as a minimum exist, and which of those factors must be related to service rendered by a person, before it can be said that a reasonable hypothesis has been raised connecting an injury, disease or death of that kind with the circumstances of the veteran’s service. The reference in s 196B(2) to a particular kind of injury, disease or death being “related to operational service” is expounded in s 196B(14). This provides relevantly, in effect, that a factor causing or contributing to an injury is “related to service” rendered by a person if it resulted from an occurrence that happened while the person was rendering that service, or if it arose out of, or was attributable to, that service.
Consideration
46. We have to initially give consideration to whether the claimed conditions of Mr Nicholson have been appropriately diagnosed.
47. In considering this application we are bound by a decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia that the issue of whether a disease exists is to be decided to the reasonable satisfaction of the Commission: see Repatriation Commission v Cooke (1998) 52 ALD 1 at 6. This is the standard that is prescribed by s 120(4) of the Act, which is the civil standard of proof: see Repatriation Commission v Smith (1987) 15 FCR 327.
48. We are reasonably satisfied that Mr Nicholson has alcohol dependence. This is the conclusion of both Dr Katz and Dr Morris who have examined Mr Nicholson.
49. We are not reasonably satisfied that Mr Nicholson has an anxiety disorder. We appreciate that there is a divergence of opinion between Dr Katz and Dr Morris on this question. We have already mentioned that Dr Morris had considered that Mr Nicholson did suffer from an adjustment disorder or depressive illness following the breakdown in his marriage (which was then 27 years ago). However, Dr Morris considered that this condition has now resolved.
50. We appreciate that Dr Katz in his report of 21 July 2005 asserts that Mr Nicholson satisfies the diagnostic criteria for generalised anxiety disorder. However, that report does not explain how the diagnostic criteria are fulfilled in this case.
51. We prefer to place reliance upon the report of Dr Morris rather than that of Dr Katz. Dr Morris examined Mr Nicholson on 21 August 2006. His report of 23 October 2006 represents a recent considered assessment of the psychiatric condition of Mr Nicholson. We also consider that his report is a fair evaluation of the condition of Mr Nicholson. Dr Morris took a detailed history from Mr Nicholson. Dr Morris also gave his opinions whilst he was in possession of the reports of Dr Katz. Dr Katz in his evidence did not challenge the conclusion of Dr Morris.
52. We are reasonably satisfied from the evidence of his general practitioner that Mr Nicholson has hypertension and that the onset of this condition was about 1994 [T4, fol 106].
53. The conditions of alcohol dependence and hypertension are the subject of SoPs.
54. We have to consider whether the contentions of the applicant satisfy the following SoPs:
·Hypertension: Instrument No 35 of 2003 as amended by Instrument No 3 of 2004;
- Alcohol Dependence or Alcohol Abuse: Instrument No 76 of 1998;
As we are not reasonably satisfied that Mr Nicholson has an anxiety disorder we do not have to consider the following SoP:
- Anxiety Disorder: Instrument No 1 of 2000.
55. We observe that where a SoP exists we must apply the test prescribed by s120A(3) of the Act, as explained in Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82 at 97-98:
“1 The Tribunal must consider all the material which is before it and determine whether that material points to a hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person. No question of fact finding arises at this stage. If no such hypothesis arises, the application must fail.
2 If the material does raise such a hypothesis, the Tribunal must then ascertain whether there is in force an SoP determined by the Authority under s 196B(2) or (11). If no such SoP is in force, the hypothesis will be taken not to be reasonable and, in consequence, the application must fail.
3 If an SoP is in force, the Tribunal must then form the opinion whether the hypothesis raised is a reasonable one. It will do so if the hypothesis fits, that is to say, is consistent with the "template" to be found in the SoP. The hypothesis raised before it must thus contain one or more of the factors which the Authority has determined to be the minimum which must exist, and be related to the person’s service (as required by ss 196B(2)(d) and (e)). If the hypothesis does contain these factors, it could neither be said to be contrary to proved or known scientific facts, nor otherwise fanciful. If the hypothesis fails to fit within the template, it will be deemed not to be “reasonable” and the claim will fail.
4 The Tribunal must then proceed to consider under s 120(1) whether it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the death was not war-caused, or in the case of a claim for incapacity, that the incapacity did not arise from a war-caused injury. If not so satisfied, the claim must succeed. If the Tribunal is so satisfied, the claim must fail. It is only at this stage of the process that the Tribunal will be required to find facts from the material before it. In so doing, no question of onus of proof or the application of any presumption will be involved.”
56. We are satisfied that the evidence before us points to a hypothesis connecting the hypertension and alcohol dependence of the applicant with his operational service. Accordingly the “first step” in Repatriation Commission v Deledio is satisfied.
57. The “second step” in Repatriation Commission v Deledio requires us to ascertain whether there is a SoP which has been determined by the RMA. We have already mentioned that SoPs have been determined by the RMA pursuant to s 196B(2) of the Act in respect of the conditions in question:
·Hypertension: Instrument No 35 of 2003 as amended by Instrument No 3 of 2004;
- Alcohol Dependence or Alcohol Abuse: Instrument No 76 of 1998.
58. We must now turn to the third step as enunciated in Deledio. This entails determining whether the relevant hypothesis complies with one or more of the factors referred to in the relevant SoPs.
Alcohol Dependence or Alcohol Abuse
59. Under clause 4 of the Alcohol Dependence or Alcohol Abuse SoP: Instrument No 76 of 1998, at least one of the factors set out in clause 5 must be related to the relevant service (being operational service) by the veteran.
60. In Clause 5 the relevant factors which are in contention are factors 5(a) and (b).
61. We conclude that factor 5(a) is not established as Mr Nicholson does not suffer from a psychiatric disorder being any Axis 1 or 2 disorder of mental health which attracts a diagnosis under the DSM–IV: see definition of “psychiatric disorder” in clause 8 of the Alcohol Dependence or Alcohol Abuse SoP.
62. In considering the Alcohol Dependence or Alcohol Abuse SoP we have also considered the evidence of Mr Nicholson which appears in his stressor statement.
63. We do not consider that the events that Mr Nicholson has outlined in the stressor statement fit into the category of a “severe stressor” within the meaning of that expression in that SoP. Factor 5(b) of the Alcohol Abuse SoP: Instrument No 76 of 1998 requires that there must be evidence of an applicant “experiencing a severe stressor”. This must occur within two years immediately prior to the clinical onset of alcohol dependence or alcohol abuse.
64. For the purposes of the Alcohol Dependence or Alcohol Abuse SoP, the expression in factor 5(b) “experiencing a severe stressor” has been interpreted as having regard to the definition in clause 8. We cannot conclude that after considering the “stressor statement” and the other evidence of Mr Nicholson, that he experienced, witnessed or was confronted with an event or events that involved actual or threat of death or serious injury, or a threat to Mr Nicholson’s or another person’s physical integrity, which event or events might evoke intense fear, helplessness or horror.
65. We have been guided by the observations of Mansfield J in Stoddart v Repatriation Commission (2003) 197 ALR 283 at [55]. We do not consider that each event judged objectively from the point of view of a reasonable person in the position of the applicant was capable of and did convey (on a subjective basis) the risk of death or serious injury or a threat to physical integrity. We do not conclude that Mr Nicholson experienced or was confronted with an event that involved threat of death or serious injury, or a threat to physical integrity. We, however, appreciate that these events would have been unpleasant for Mr Nicholson to see.
66. We also consider that factor 5(c) of the Alcohol Dependence or Alcohol Abuse SoP is not established in this case as we have already concluded that Mr Nicholson does not suffer from a psychiatric disorder being any Axis 1 or 2 disorder of mental health which attracts a diagnosis under DSM–IV: see definition of “psychiatric disorder” in clause 8 of the Alcohol Dependence or Alcohol Abuse SoP.
Hypertension
67. We also have to consider the Hypertension SoP: Instrument No 35 of 2003 as amended by Instrument No 3 of 2004.
68. Under clause 4 of the Hypertension SoP at least one of the factors set out in clause 5 must be related to the relevant service (being operational service) by the veteran.
69. We have examined factor 5(b) of the Hypertension SoP as amended, which was in force at the date of the claim. This factor requires that a veteran must consume an average of at least 200 grams per week of alcohol for a continuous period of at least 6 months immediately before the clinical onset of hypertension, which cannot be decreased to less than an average of 200 grams per week of alcohol.
70. There is material before us that Mr Nicholson has consumed at least 200 grams per week of alcohol per week in the six months before the clinical onset of hypertension in 1994. On the material that has been placed before us we are satisfied that the “template” in factor 5(b) is satisfied. His alcohol questionnaire discloses that this level of consumption has been stable.
71. We accordingly consider that factor 5(b) of the Hypertension SoP has been established.
72. We do not consider that factor 5(n) of the Hypertension SoP has been established. For this factor to be established a veteran must be suffering from a clinically significant anxiety disorder for the six months immediately before the clinical onset of hypertension. There is no material before us that Mr Nicholson had a clinically significant anxiety disorder for the six months period immediately before the clinical onset of hypertension in 1994.
73. For these reasons we consider that the “third step” in Repatriation Commission v Deledio is satisfied by the establishment of Factor 5(b) of the Hypertension SoP.
74. We therefore have to proceed to consider the “fourth step” in Repatriation Commission v Deledio. We are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the hypertension of Mr Nicholson was not war-caused. Mr Nicholson has himself cited “peer pressure” and “boredom” as reasons for his drinking [ex A, fol 10 and 49]. We have also given consideration to an event in which he claimed to have seen an ambush [exhibit A, fol 149] which is not mentioned in the “stressor statement” that was admitted into evidence [exhibit A2, statement dated 14 July 2006]. We do not consider that this event actually occurred. It was certainly not mentioned in the evidence-in-chief of Mr Nicholson.
75. We also have to consider whether Mr Nicholson is paid a pension at the correct rate. We have considered, in accordance with the contentions of Mr Nicholson, whether there is material before us which would justify the payment of a pension at the special rate.
76. We consider that s 23(3)(b) and s 24(2)(b) of the Act precludes the payment of pension to Mr Nicholson at either the intermediate or special rate. This is because we consider that Mr Nicholson ceased employment because of a disagreement with his employer who failed to keep on his fellow employee and not for any medical reason. On his own evidence he then went on sickness benefits. We have carefully reviewed all the material which is before us to ascertain whether Mr Nicholson has sought employment [see Conway v Repatriation Commission (2003) 37 AAR 486 at [9] per Dowsett J]. There was no suggestion that Mr Nicholson had even sought alternative employment after he left his caravan park employment This in our view has the consequence that he was not genuinely seeking employment as required by s 23(3)(b) and s 24(2)(b) of the Act.
77. We consider that there is merit in the suggestion of Dr Morris that Mr Nicholson be assessed by a neurologist [ex R1, p 4]. Although this suggestion was made in 2006, it does not yet appear to have been acted on.
Decision
78. For the above reasons, we affirm the decision under review.
I certify that the 78 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Mr P McDermott, RFD, Senior Member and Dr GJ Maynard, Member
Signed: .....................................................................................
Legal Research OfficerDate/s of Hearing 21 February 2007
Date of Decision 6 July 2007
Counsel for the Applicant Mr N Jarro
Solicitor for the Applicant Haney Lawyers
Respondent Mr M Smith, departmental advocate
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