Nicholls v Chief Executive, Department of Natural Resources

[1998] QLC 27

[1998] QLC 27

 

LAND COURT

BRISBANE

12 March 1998

Re:     A97-57 and A97-58

Appeals from a decision of the Chief Executive,

Department of Natural Resources -

Water Resources Act 1989

Appellants:     V.G. & M.A. Nicholls; J.D. & H.E. Lewis

and M.L. O'Dwyer     (A97-57)

E.J. Bradfield (A97-58)

J U R I S D I C T I O N  -  D E C I S I O N

The appellants have appealed to the Land Court from a decision of the chief executive, Department of Natural Resources, to transfer, renew and amend certain Waterworks Licences, under the provisions of the Water Resources Act 1989.

It was the chief executive's opinion that the Land Court does not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeals.  It is necessary therefore to decide the question of jurisdiction as a preliminary issue.

Submissions were heard in Warwick on 3 December 1997.  Mr A. Ross appeared on behalf of the chief executive and Mr L.F. Kelly for the appellants.  Leave was granted for a further written submission to be provided by Mr Ross and for Mr Kelly to respond.  The submission/s and Mr Kelly's response have been received and considered.

The appeals relate to Waterworks Licences Nos. 44231, 52422, 52423, 80758, 80759 and 80767 issued by the chief executive on 29 August 1997 to joint licensees being the principals of Esplanade Investments Pty Ltd; Elenium Pty Ltd; Darling Downs Piggery Pty Ltd and Danmeat Pty Ltd - all c/- DanPork Australia Pty Ltd.

Licences Nos. 44231, 52422 and 52423 relate to existing bores on lands described as Lot 2 on RP 93358 and Lot 4 on RP 31553, Parish of South Toolburra.  The licences had originally issued in the 1970's to a previous owner and were for the purpose of supplying the above-described lands with water for irrigation and/or stock watering and/or domestic.  The nominal, in conjunction, annual groundwater allocation was 230 ML.  As is relevant to this matter, the licences had an expiry date of 31 May 1996.

Licences Nos. 80758 and 80759 relate to proposed bores on lands described as Lot 69 M342 or Lot 70 M341357, Parish of Pratten or Lots 2 or 3 RP 31553, Parish of South Toolburra.  The licences had issued to a previous owner on 4 March 1994 to supply water to the above-described lands for the purposes of industrial, stock intensive, irrigation, stock watering and domestic.  The in-principle, in conjunction groundwater allocation, pending the drilling of the bores and the proving of supply, was 76 ML per annum.  They had expiry dates of 31 May 1997 and 31 March 1997 respectively.

Licence No. 80767 related to a proposed bore on Lot 98 ML407, Parish of Pratten.  The licence had originally issued to a previous owner on 4 March 1996 (incorrectly describing the parish in which Lot 98 was situated) to supply water to Lot 98 for the purpose of industrial, stock intensive, irrigation, stock watering and domestic with an in-principle groundwater allocation, pending the drilling of a bore and the proving of supply, of 6 ML per annum.  The licence had an expiry date of 31 March 1997.

Background to Application

According to the material supplied by the chief executive, the background to the decision to grant the application subject of the appeals was generally as follows.

On 3 April 1997 an advertisement was placed by the Department of Natural Resources in the Warwick Daily News, advising that the four companies before mentioned had conjointly made application dated 25 March 1996 for the amendment renewal and transfer of the existing licences.  The amendments sought were broadly:

(1)the amendment of the approved purposes, where necessary, to include in each licence "industrial, stock intensive, irrigation, stock watering, domestic supply";

(2)the amendment of the lands to be supplied by the licenced works and allocation;

(3)the amendment of the land on which the proposed works might be located;

(4)the amalgamation of the nominal annual allocation for each licence to a total in- conjunction allocation no greater than previously attached to the individual licences.

The description of the lands on which the existing bores were located and the existing and additional lands on which proposed bores may be located and the existing lands and additional lands to be supplied by the licence works, was notified.  Closing date and time for objections "from landholders within 0.5 km of the affected lands" was notified as being 5 p.m. on 25 April 1997.

At the time the application was advertised Esplanade Investments Pty Ltd (Esplanade) owned the land on which the existing bores were located - a property fronting the Condamine River and the Leyburn-Cunningham Road.  Elenium Pty Ltd (Elenium) owned adjoining land to the north-west, intersected by Leyburn-Cunningham Road.  It was on the eastern severance of this land where the proposed bores were originally to be located.  Danmeat Pty Ltd and Darling Downs Piggery Pty Ltd owned land adjoining one another and also that land of Elenium westerly of the Leyburn-Cunningham Road.  Broadly, the amended licences would permit, subject to conditions, the proposed bores to be located on the land of either Esplanade or Elenium, easterly of Leyburn-Cunningham Road, fronting the Condamine River, and for the in-conjunction allocation to supply the extended total aggregation of the consortium of four applicants, rather than the individual holdings of Esplanade and Elenium in the eastern severance, for all of the purposes as advertised.

Six individual objections to the application were lodged, four of those objections coming from V.G. & M.A. Nicholls; J.D. & H.E. Lewis; M.L. O'Dwyer and E.J. & P.A. Bradfield.  The Lewis' property adjoins the properties of Esplanade and Elenium on which the existing bores and two of the proposed bores were originally licensed to be located.  Part of the Nicholls' aggregation of properties adjoin the property of Darling Downs Piggery Pty Ltd, on which no bores are located or proposed to be located, but which property is included in the area to be benefited by the groundwater allocation under the amended licences.  Both the Lewis' and Nicholls' objections were received by the chief executive before the advertised objection period had closed.  M.L. O'Dwyer's property is stated to be 4,500 metres at the closest point from the affected lands and the objection was not received until 29 April 1997.  E.J. Bradfield's property is stated to be 4,850 metres at the closest point from the affected lands.  That objection was received within the advertised objection period.

The chief executive made the decision to transfer all relevant licences to the joint applicants, renew the licences and amend the licences in terms of the application.  The amended licences issued on 29 August 1997.

Additional Background Information

Mr Kelly, armed with information obtained by Mr and Mrs Lewis through application made under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 1992, for access to certain documents relating to the matter and held by the respondent, was in a position to enlarge on the background to the application. Evidence, in the form of an affidavit sworn by the appellants' solicitor, was provided, to the effect that an application to transfer Waterworks Licences, including Nos. 44231, 52422 and 52423 had been made by Esplanade on 19 August 1996. That application had been then informally amended by the chief executive's delegate to include renewal of those licences. It has already been mentioned that those licences had an expiry date of 31 May 1996. Pursuant to s.46(1) of the Water Resources Act (the Act) an application for the renewal of a licence must be in writing signed by the applicant and furnished to the chief executive on or before the date of expiration "or, at the discretion of the chief executive in a particular case, within 4 months after that date".  The application, amended to include renewal, was made before the expiration of the discretionary 4 month period.  It was suggested by the appellants, that the amendment to the application may have been invalid, in that the amendment had not been signed by the applicant.  Nevertheless, part of the thrust of the appellants' submission was that the date of that original application was important to the jurisdiction issue, for reasons which will be discussed later.

Included in the information obtained by the Lewis', was a copy of a letter written by the chief executive's delegate, on 6 March 1997 to the representative of the eventual consortium of applicants, confirming that a discussion had taken place on that day relative to the water requirements of the consortium.  The letter advised the procedure which the chief executive had decided to adopt in dealing with the consortium's Waterworks Licence requirements.  An application in those terms was sought from the joint applicants and it was that application which was received on 25 March 1997 and duly advertised.

Jurisdiction of the Land Court

The issue of jurisdiction as it was argued, relates to the intent of the legislation both before and after amendments to the Act which took effect on 9 December 1996 as well as the relevant date of the decision of the chief executive.

Section 51 of the Act makes provision for an appeal to the Land Court.   Before 9 December 1996 it relevantly provided:

"51.  (1)   A person aggrieved by a decision of the chief executive with respect to -

(a)an application for -

(i)     a licence;

(ii)the renewal of a licence;

(iii)the transfer of a licence;

(b)    an objection duly lodged to an application for a licence;

(c)any amendment, variation, cancellation, revocation or suspension of a licence;

...

may appeal therefrom to the Land Court.

....

(3)   Notwithstanding subsection (1), an appeal does not lie from a decision of the chief executive with respect to -

(d)an objection to an application for a licence to construct or use an artesian bore or a subartesian bore."

Certain of the amendments which were made to the Act to take effect from 9 December 1996, resulted from a judgment by the Court of Appeal in Stevenson v. Wenck (1996) 2 Qd.R. 84. The Court had concluded, inter alia, at p.91:

"that the expression 'aggrieved by a decision' should be given its natural meaning in s. 4.26" (now s. 51) "and not read down so as to confine the right to appeal against a grant of a licence to persons who have duly objected."

If it had been intended, as had been argued (see p.89) that unless there is an objection, there is no right of appeal, the Court suggested (at p.90):

"It would have been simple enough, had there been the legislative intention, to confine objectors' rights of appeals under s. 4.26(1) expressly in the way now submitted, by stating that an objector may appeal only with respect to a decision on the objection.  Alternatively, the drafter, if the intention were to confine the rights of appeal along the lines suggested, could have commenced the subsection with the words 'An applicant, licensee or duly qualified objector'".

Certain difficulties were then envisaged with the latter suggestion.  The Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 16 May 1995.

It should be said that the Court of Appeal recognised (at p.89) that there were "certain exceptions to the right of appeal" as set out in s.4.26(2) (now s.51(3)) none of which were relevant to the Stevenson matter.  The exception contained in s.51(3)(d) and its correct interpretation is relevant to the submissions of both the respondent and the appellants in this matter.

The amendment of 9 December 1996 to s.51(1) omitted the words "A person aggrieved by" and replaced them with "A dissatisfied person may appeal to the Land Court against" (a decision of the chief executive with respect to ...).  Subsection (13) was then added:

"(13)In subsection (1) -

'dissatisfied person' means -

(a)for a decision about an application for a licence or for the renewal of a licence - the applicant; or

(b)for a decision about the amendment, variation, cancellation, revocation or suspension of a licence - the person who was the licensee when the decision was made; or

(c)for a decision about an application for the transfer of a licence - the transferor and the transferee; or

(d)for a decision about an application under section 39 - the owner of intervening land mentioned in section 39(4); or

(e)a person who, on or before the date specified in a notice under section 42(8), had a right to object and objected to an application; or

(f)a person who is the purchaser of land from another person who, on or before the date specified in a notice under section 42(8), had a right to object to an application, but only if the purchase was settled after the date specified in the notice."

It was the chief executive's submission that the decision on objection in these matters was the decision on the application.  As an appeal does not lie from a decision with respect to an objection to an application for a licence to construct or use a subartesian bore (s.51(3)(d)), it was submitted that the appeals by the duly qualified objectors should be struck out for want of jurisdiction.  It was submitted that the objectors O'Dwyer and Bradfield were not duly qualified, in any event.  Both those objectors were the owners of land not situated as prescribed (s.42(10)(d)) being outside the minimum distance of 0.5 km from the affected land. Although those objections had been considered in the chief executive's inquiry, it was not admitted that the minimum distance had been extended as provided in s.42(11).  Furthermore the objection of O'Dwyer had not been received within the notified period.

The appellants' submission relative to s.51(3)(d) was that a decision on an objection is not one and the same as a decision on the application.  Support for that argument was found in the Stevenson judgment.  After considering a submission relating to the rights of appeal of duly qualified objectors, the Court of Appeal had found that the notices of appeal in the Stevenson matter attacked the decision to issue the licence (for a referable dam).  It found that in that respect the notices had been properly drawn.  The Court raised the possibility that a decision to grant a licence might be based on grounds which, although erroneous, have nothing to do with any objection lodged.  It was observed by the Court that in such a situation if an objector had the right of appeal only against the decision on objection, "then neither the objectors nor anyone else could appeal against such a decision".  Another possibility seen by the Court was "that a decision could be made rejecting an objection, without disposing of the application to which objection was made".  A third consideration was that on the face of it, the legislation (before s.51 was amended) gave a person aggrieved by a decision with respect to any of the matters listed, a right of appeal from that decision, whereas the argument to the contrary "would confine the rights of one class of appellant, namely an objector, to appealing against one sort of decision only."

Of course, the exception in this matter is that s.51(3)(d) goes further and specifically denies the right of appeal even against the decision on objection.

Mr Kelly for the appellants, conceded that the 9 December 1996 amendment had the effect of picking up the suggestion of the Court of Appeal with regard to the manner in which rights of appeal might be limited to certain classes of appellants, including duly qualified objectors, as opposed to the previously wider appeal rights of "persons aggrieved".  He did not concede however that the appellants O'Dwyer and Bradfield were not duly qualified objectors, at least through the prescribed distance exclusion, because it was submitted that, by considering and responding to the objections, the chief executive through his delegate, had used the discretion available to him to extend the distance prescribed as the minimum distance.

Mr Kelly's argument was that the chief executive could have decided, for example, to reject those objections and that would have been a decision on those objections from which an appeal did not lie.  Instead, it was submitted, the subject appeals were against the decision on the application not any decision on the objections, just as the Court of Appeal had decided that the appeals in the Stevenson matter were against the decision on the application and not on the objection.

Mr Kelly's submission was that an unsuccessful but duly qualified objector, against an application for a licence to construct or use an artesian bore or a subartesian bore, could remain  a "dissatisfied person" in terms of s.51(13)(e) with regard to the decision on the application.  Had the intent of the legislation, even before the amendment, been to confine the rights of an owner of land situated as prescribed, to an objection to an application for a licence for an artesian or subartesian bore, with no right of appeal against a decision to grant the application, it was Mr Kelly's submission that s.51(3)(d) would have been drafted accordingly.

In terms of the findings in Stevenson, Mr Kelly's submissions are persuasive in that the legislation could have been drafted so as to remove any doubt as to the appeal rights of an objector to an application for an artesian or subartesian bore.

It is observed that another amendment which took effect on 9 December 1996 was the inclusion of a new s.43A - "Certain decisions of the chief executive to be published in newspapers".  Section 43A(1) provided -

"This section applies to a decision of the chief executive if the decision is a decision mentioned in section 51(1) and is made under section 43."

Subsection (2) required notice of each such decision to be published in a newspaper as described.  In the explanatory notes accompanying the amendment, s.43A was described as requiring certain decisions to be published "which decisions may be appealed against under section 51(1).  This provision is the means by which a 'dissatisfied person' is informed about a decision against which the dissatisfied person may appeal."  It appears - consistent with the opinion of the chief executive at least at the date of the amendment, that an objector appeal did not lie against a decision on an application for a licence for a subartesian bore - that the decision in the subject application was not published in a newspaper.  No objector was disadvantaged, because the decision was notified to each by registered mail.

However, it is also observed that an amendment was made to s.43A which came into effect on 5 December 1997.  Subsection (1) was replaced as follows:

"(1)   This section applies to a decision, made by the chief executive under section 43, about which a person may, under section 51, appeal to the Land Court, other than a decision about constructing or using an artesian or subartesian bore."

No amendment was made to s.51(3)(d), which denies specifically the right of appeal against a decision on an objection, but the wider effect of which is seen to be arguable, based on Mr Kelly's submission.

It seems to me however that it would not be inconsistent with the reasoning in Stevenson, if, in a particular case, the decision on the objection was also the decision on the application, when denial of appeal provided by s.51(3)(d) was not enlivened by s.51(13)(e).

Conclusions - Dissatisfied Persons (s.51(13)(e))

Dealing with the appeals in A97-57 first, I have concluded that the Nicholls' and Lewis' are duly qualified objectors, being owners of land within the prescribed distance from the affected land and having lodged their objections before the date specified in the relevant notice.

The O'Dwyer objection was not lodged before that date.  Both the O'Dwyer land and the Bradfield land in Appeal A97-58 are outside the prescribed minimum distance as stated in the notice, i.e. further than 0.5 km from the affected land.  I am unable to conclude that by considering the O'Dwyer and Bradfield objections and responding to them, the chief executive had formally used the discretion available to him as provided in s.42(11) to extend the minimum distance.  The prescribed distance is such that these existing and proposed bores are not, and may not be constructed, in a watercourse, and are therefore elsewhere than in a watercourse, lake or spring.  They are other than works which would allow objections from owners of land within 8 km.  (see s.42(10)(c)).  (It was a common ground of appeal that the advertisement notifying the application was erroneous in that objection should have been available to owners of land within 8 km of the affected land.)

I have concluded that M.L. O'Dwyer and E.J. Bradfield did not have the right to object to the application.

The objection by the Lewis' was on the grounds that "application does not conform with the Act and Licensing and the unavailability of water to supply additional land and works etc."

The objection by the Nicholls' was on the ground that the application "will adversely affect those currently licensed (particularly those downstream on the creek below) - by over use."

On 29 August 1997, the date on which the licences issued, the Lewis' and Nicholls' were individually advised by the chief executive's delegate:

"After investigation of the Applications and the objections thereto, I have decided and determined the following:-

(A)  to transfer all relevant Waterworks Licences from the current Licensees to joint Licensees Esplanade Investments Pte Ltd, Elenium Pty Ltd, Darling Downs Piggery Pty Ltd and Danmeat Pty Ltd.

(B)   to renew all relevant Waterworks Licences.

(C)  to approve purposes of use under all relevant Waterworks Licences of industrial, stock intensive, irrigation, stockwatering and domestic supply.

(D)  to approve the supply of water under all relevant Waterworks Licences to the total of the lands owned by the joint Licensees.

(E)   to approve annual allocations of groundwater under the relevant Waterworks Licences in conjunction as follows:-

(a)230 megalitres per annum which is the current allocation for that part of the aggregation of lands owned by Esplanade Investments Pte Ltd; the allocation to cover the purposes of use and the supply of lands as detailed in (C) and (D) above

and

(b)82 megalitres per annum in-principle pending the drilling of bores and the proving of supply under Waterworks Licence No's 80758, 80759 and 80767 covering proposed bores; the in-principle allocation may ultimately join with the 230 megalitres referred to above to provide a total allocation of 312 megalitres per annum in conjunction for the purposes of use and the supply of lands as detailed in (C) and (D) above.

(F)   to approve subject to (G) and (H) below, the location of proposed bores under Waterworks Licences No's 80758, 80759 and 80767 to cover all lands owned by the joint Licensees that are located party or wholly on the alluvium of the Condamine River (i.e. Lot 2 RP 93358 and Lots 2, 3 and 4 RP 31553 Parish South Toolburra and Lot 69 M342, Lot 70 M341357 and Lot 98 ML407 Parish Pratten).

(G)  to require the joint Licensees to submit details of prospective drilling sites under Waterworks Licence Nos. 80758, 80759 and 80767 covering proposed bores for the investigation and approval of the Chief Executive with the drilling of any bore under these Licences being conditional on prior siting approval by the Chief Executive; that any drilling sites submitted for the consideration of the Chief Executive be a minimum distance of 200 metres from the boundary of the lands of the joint Licensees and a minimum 400 metres from neighbouring irrigation bores.

(H)  to require the joint Licensees to submit a Groundwater Development Plan to the Chief Executive which sets out proposals for the use of existing bores covered by Waterworks Licence Nos. 44231, 52422 and 52423 and the development and use of proposed bores covered by Waterworks Licence Nos. 80758, 80759 and 80767 prior to the drilling of any new bore or the commissioning for production purposes of any existing bore.

(I)    to require the metering of all bores subject of allocation and the submission of water use records on a quarterly basis.

(J) that the use of water subject of allocation to be conditional on the terms and conditions endorsed on Licence/s issued or to be issued under the Environment Protection Act."

The advice to the objectors went on to comment upon various matters under the headings Licence Application; Details of Existing Licences; Objection; Compliance and Sufficiency of Supply.  Matters relevant to the appeal procedure were advised.

As I interpret the facts, the decision on the objections was also the decision on the applications.  There can be no doubt that the intent of the legislation was to deny an objector, against an application relating to a subartesian bore, the right of appeal against the decision on the objection.  It would seem illogical then for a duly qualified objector to be given the right to appeal the same decision on the application, as a "dissatisfied person" (s.51(13)(e)).

It follows that while the grounds of appeal were clearly drawn against the decision to grant the application, they would have had the same effect had they applied to the decision on the objection but against which an appeal did not lie.  This, in my view, distinguishes the factual situation here from the hypotheses developed in the Stevenson matter.

Conclusions - Aggrieved Persons

There were additional limbs to the submissions by Mr Kelly for the appellants.  They argued that if they were not "dissatisfied persons", subsequent to the amendment of the Act, they were "persons aggrieved" by the chief executive's decision under the legislation as it existed before 9 December 1996.  They said they had vested rights of appeal flowing from the first application by Esplanade to transfer (and as amended, to renew) the Licences Nos. 44231, 52422 and 52423, initially made in August 1996 and informally amended in September 1996.  It was argued that such application could not be put aside.  If the application had been put aside then those Licences would have expired.  It was conceded that the initial application could be amended, to provide the more comprehensive application made by the joint applicants on 25 March 1997.  That application resulted from a formal request made by the chief executive's delegate in the letter to the applicants dated 6 March 1997.  Indeed, it was submitted by the appellants that the language used by the delegate in that communication, particularly with regard to statements that certain matters had been "determined", indicated that "the decision by the chief executive" had already been made by 6 March 1997 and possibly before the amended legislation came into effect.  It was submitted that as the timing of the decision was important to the standing of the appellants as "persons aggrieved", the Court should not deny the appellants the opportunity to ventilate the appeals and to hear the evidence of the delegate as to the date when the decision was in fact made.

Mr Ross for the chief executive submitted that no decision could be said to have been made on the first application, or the advertised application, until the date when the application was granted, through issue of the licences, being 29 August 1997.

It seems to me that regardless of the deliberations and discussions which might precede a decision being made, for the purposes of the Act the chief executive does not make a decision with regard to an application,  until either that decision is formally notified, or if earlier, on the date of the issue of the relevant licence.

I am not persuaded that the language in the 6 March 1997 letter to the applicants, indicated otherwise than discussions had taken place subsequent to the August 1996 application, between the chief executive's delegate, Esplanade and its consortium partners, through a representative of the consortium.  Those discussions resulted in the formalising of the procedure necessary for the consortium, including Esplanade, to seek its overall water licensing requirements.

I agree with Mr Kelly that the initial application in August 1996, by Esplanade, put in train the eventual procedure - the advertised application being, in essence, an amendment and enlargement upon the initial application.  However, I am unable to agree that the rights of appeal, if any, which vested in the appellants as a result of that initial application carried through to similar rights of appeal, if any, against the amended and enlarged application. 

First, there was no requirement for the initial application to be advertised and there were no provisions in the legislation for objection to such an application.  There is nothing harsh about that, when an existing licence is sought to be transferred to a new owner of the affected land and the licence, due to expire, is sought to be renewed without amendment.  It is difficult to envisage any argument which could be mounted to suggest that a neighbouring owner's interest would in any way be prejudiced by a decision to grant an application to transfer and renew a licence without amendment. 

That was the application situation in the subject matter when the amendment to s.51 came into effect on 9 December 1996.  The licences due to expire remained in force, because no decision on that application had been made (s.46(2)).

By following the dicta in Stevenson, an aggrieved person had the right to appeal against that decision, when it was made, regardless of the application not having been advertised or the decision not having to be notified to other than the applicant.  It is not fatal to the principle involved that a third party would probably never have known of the decision, at least in time to appeal.  It would still be necessary, even with the natural meaning of the terminology "person aggrieved" for that third party to be able to show that an interest had been prejudicially affected by the decision.

It was submitted by Mr Kelly that a decision on a preliminary issue should not be made by this Court in the absence of evidence as to the merits of the case, unless the issue was beyond doubt.  I have no doubt that a decision to grant the first application, whenever made, would not have qualified the appellants to be seen as "aggrieved persons".  In my opinion, nothing would be gained by further ventilation of that aspect of the appellants' case. 

The real issue as it relates to jurisdiction stems from the procedure which followed the initial application.  Nothing sinister is seen in the chief executive discussing water licence requirements with an applicant before making a decision on an application.  The applicant, Esplanade, clearly wished the application to later include its consortium partners and to be amended and enlarged upon, necessitating amendment, as well, to the existing licences.  That provided the window of opportunity for the appellants to object to the application as advertised.

The application amendments and their rights of objection consequences did not occur, however, until after s.51 had been amended.  The intent of the amendment was clearly to limit the classes of persons with rights of appeal.

Findings

I find that no decision was made upon the objections/application, by the chief executive, until 29 August 1997 and that any rights of appeal which vested in the appellants, as objectors, were relevant to the legislation as amended on 9 December 1996.

I do not find that M.L. O'Dwyer of E.J. Bradfield were duly qualified objectors.

I find that the appellants Lewis' and Nicholls' had the right to object and did object to the application but had no right of appeal as "dissatisfied persons" against the chief executive's decision on the application - the decision on the objection being the decision on the application.  No right of appeal lies from a decision of the chief executive with respect to an objection to an application to construct or use a subartesian bore.

Each appeal is struck out for want of jurisdiction.

RE WENCK
  MEMBER OF THE LAND COURT