Niblett v Broadbent (Ruling)

[2025] VCC 1468

IN THE COUNTY COURT OF VICTORIA

AT MELBOURNE

COMMON LAW DIVISION

Revised
Not Restricted
Suitable for Publication

APPEALS AND POST SENTENCE APPLICATIONS LIST

Case No. AP-25-0284

DEAN NIBLETT	Appellant
v
MAUREEN BROADBENT	Respondent

---

JUDGE:	S. Davis
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	30 September 2025
DATE OF RULING:	8 October 2025
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	Niblett v Broadbent (Ruling)
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2025] VCC 1468

RULING
---

Subject:PERSONAL SAFETY INTERVENTION ORDER REHEARING

Catchwords:              Rehearing of Personal Safety Intervention Order (“PSIO”) made in the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria – whether the appellant committed prohibited behaviour or if he did, whether any such behaviour was likely to continue in the future – Magistrate’s final PSIO set aside – application for PSIO dismissed

Legislation Cited:      Personal Safety Intervention Order Act 2010 (Vic)

Ruling:  The Magistrates’ order made on 4 February 2025 is set aside and respondent’s application for a PSIO is dismissed.

---

APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Appellant	In person
For the Respondent	Ms L Thies	Doogue + George Criminal Lawyers

HER HONOUR:

Introduction

1Ms Maureen Broadbent applied for a final Personal Safety Intervention Order  (“PSIO”) against Mr Dean Niblett on 8 September 2023. Mr Niblett lived in the upstairs section of Ms Broadbent’s house on The Esplanade, Mornington, between 2012 and 2024. Ms Broadbent occupied the ground floor of the premises. An interim PSIO was made against Mr Niblett on 15 September 2023. There were a number of further hearings during which Ms Broadbent sought to vary the interim order. 

2After a contested hearing on 4 February 2025 before His Honour Magistrate Burns at which each party represented themselves, His Honour Magistrate Burns granted the PSIO sought by Ms Broadbent for a period of 5 years which was set to expire at midnight on 3 February 2030.

3Mr Niblett filed a Notice of Appeal on 6 March 2025. Timetabling orders were made and a preliminary hearing was listed on 19 August 2025 to determine if this Court’s jurisdiction was enlivened. The parties were invited to make submissions concerning whether any factual, legal or discretionary error had been made by His Honour Magistrate Burns.

4The parties represented themselves at the preliminary hearing on 19 August 2025.  Mr Niblett relied on a number of Grounds of Appeal including: denial of procedural fairness; failure to properly consider evidence; and that the learned Magistrate’s reasoning was not supported by the evidence.[1]

[1] Mr Niblett also relied on multiple character references.

5Ms Broadbent submitted that the learned Magistrate’s decision was correctly made.

6At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing, after considering all of the material provided by parties and their oral submissions, I determined that the jurisdiction of this Court was enlivened and gave my reasons for that decision ex-tempore at the time. In essence, I dismissed the ground concerning procedural fairness, but found that this Court’s jurisdiction was enlivened because the reasons for the decision of the learned Magistrate did not disclose factual findings on disputed matters, failed to disclose a proper path of reasoning, and relied merely on the unfavourable view taken of the way in which Mr Niblett conducted his cross-examination of Ms Broadbent.

7In the light of that determination, the matter was set down for rehearing on 30 September 2025. It was determined that in relation to the matters relied upon and ventilated before His Honour Magistrate Burns, a transcript of the Magistrates’ Court hearing would form the factual foundation of the rehearing,[2] together with any additional evidence and submissions from the parties.

[2] Transcript of Proceedings (“T”), Maureen Broadbent v Dean Niblett (Magistrate’s Court of Victoria, P11928396, Magistrate Burns, 4 February 2025).

8The parties were also invited to submit any further evidence and/or submissions in relation to the period since the making of the PSIO by His Honour Magistrate Burns which are relevant to the consideration as to whether or not, upon a rehearing, the same order should be made.

9Ms Broadbent filed an affidavit of further matters relied upon, sworn 24 September 2025, with a number of exhibits. Mr Niblett filed a statutory declaration dated 29 September 2025 along with a number of exhibits.

Legal framework

10Section 96 of the Personal Safety Intervention Order Act 2010 (Vic) (“the Act”) provides that an appeal is conducted by way of a rehearing and empowers this court to confirm, set aside or vary the decision of the Magistrate.

11When considering whether to impose a final order under s 61(1) of the Act, the court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that:

(a)    the respondent has—

(i)         committed prohibited behaviour against the affected person and—

(A)     is likely to continue to do so or do so again; and

(B)     the respondent's prohibited behaviour would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety; or

(ii)     stalked the affected person and is likely to continue to do so or do so again; and

(b)     the respondent and the affected person are not family members; and
(c)     it is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case to make a final order.

12In section 4 of the Act, “property” is defined as including: property of a person; property that is situated where a person lives or works; and property that is being used by the person, whether or not it is owned by that person.

13Section 5 of the Act defines prohibited behaviour as any one of the following conduct: assault; sexual assault; harassment; property damage or interference; making a serious threat.

14Section 7 of the Act defines harassment as “a course of conduct by a person towards another that is demeaning, derogatory or intimidating and includes such conduct that is carried on or by a third person”.

15Section 8 of the Act defines property damage or interference. The damage or interference, including threats of same, must be “repeated, intentional”.

16It follows that the Court cannot make the orders sought by Ms Broadbent unless it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Mr Niblett not only has committed prohibited behaviour against Ms Broadbent in the past but is also likely to continue to do so again and such prohibited behaviour would cause a reasonable person to fear for their safety. The court must also be satisfied that it is appropriate in all the circumstances to make a final order.

The rehearing

17At the rehearing, Ms Broadbent was represented by counsel and Mr Niblett represented himself.

18The parties were content to rely on the transcript of the hearing before His Honour Magistrate Burns as a record of the matters ventilated at that time. They relied on the additional material they have filed since then, and made further submissions.  

19I have listened to the recording of the hearing before His Honour Magistrate Burns and have perused all of the documents filed by the parties for that hearing. I have considered all of the additional material filed for the purpose of the rehearing. I have also considered the oral submissions made by Ms Broadbent’s counsel and Mr Niblett at the conclusion of the rehearing.

20I note that Ms Broadbent’s counsel sought the making of a PSIO largely in its current form but submitted that the distance condition should stipulate 10 metres rather than 50 metres. Mr Niblett submitted that the final order should be set aside.[3]

[3] Mr Niblett was invited to provide a written response to the proposed conditions of any final order. His response canvassed irrelevant matters and was not considered.

Evidence

A. Obstructing Ms Broadbent’s access to her living space from the front entrance hall

21It was alleged that in May 2023, Mr Niblett obstructed Ms Broadbent’s access from the front door to the ground floor area occupied by her via an internal door by putting a lock on that internal door. Mr Niblett admitted doing so. However, he said that Ms Broadbent had two other exclusive entrances to her living space apart from that door. He put the lock on the door after teenagers accessed the house via those exclusive entrances, went through Ms Broadbent’s living space and the internal door, then accessed his living space upstairs and ransacked it.  

B. Denying access to tradespeople

22Ms Broadbent stated in her evidence that she attempted to bring her mother to Australia from England in December 2023 but when her mother arrived, the property was unsafe and lacked safe access. Ms Broadbent also alleged that Mr Niblett denied access to repair an eave that had been damaged for several months. When the tradesperson arrived at the door, Mr Niblett did not answer. Ms Broadbent said that the tradesperson was unable to access the house due to Mr Niblett’s belongings blocking access to the front door.

23In cross-examination, Mr Niblett put to Ms Broadbent that she was lying and she did not bring her mother to her home from England because her mother had been living in Tasmania with Ms Broadbent’s brother for some time. Ms Broadbent admitted that her mother lived with her brother in Tasmania.

24At the rehearing on 30 September 2025, Ms Broadbent’s counsel alleged that in March and April 2023, Mr Niblett had denied repairmen access to his living space,  preventing the roof from being repaired. Mr Niblett denied that he had refused access and said that roof repairs did not require access to his living space. In any event, he said, the relevant roof repairs were not carried out in the property until 2025.

25It was alleged that Mr Niblett had denied access to various tradespeople for property maintenance whilst he was a tenant in Ms Broadbent’s house. Mr Niblett denied that he had prevented access to the property on any occasion and said that he would have “loved things to be repaired”.

C. Causing damage to electrical box

26Ms Broadbent alleged that in June 2023, Mr Niblett had damaged the property’s electrical box by bending the metal door.  

27Mr Niblett’s evidence was that Ms Broadbent turned off his electricity, water and gas supply for two months in the middle of winter and padlocked the electrical box to prevent his access to it. Ms Broadbent denied this but admitted that a tradesperson had put a lock on it. She denied that this was under her instruction.

28Mr Niblett stated that VCAT ordered Ms Broadbent to reconnect the utilities. Ms Broadbent agreed that this was the case. She said that at the time, however,  her emergency electrician was unable to access the property as there was severe water damage from flooding upstairs.

29Mr Niblett admitted to bending the metal door to turn these amenities on again before bending the box’s door back into place. He alleged that in December 2023 Ms Broadbent bent the door once again in order to photograph the state of the box. He denied being responsible for the damage shown in her photograph. Ms Broadbent relied on the evidence of Janice Godden to the effect that the door to the electricity box was already bent when she and Ms Broadbent took the photograph in question.

D. Making loud noises and playing music

30Ms Broadbent alleged that Mr Niblett would continually make loud noises such as banging and playing music, particularly in the early hours of the morning. Ms Broadbent claims that this was intentional on the basis that she had complained to him about the disturbance. Mr Niblett said that that banging was a result of the broken eave outside of his bedroom banging against the house. He admitted that he at times would play music.

E. Moving yucca tree debris to the front of the house

31Ms Broadbent relied on an incident in October 2023. Her evidence was to the effect that, at her request, a neighbour had cut down various yucca trees on her property and “put them sort of along the edge of the garden”[4] to be removed a few days later. She said that she asked Mr Niblett not to drive over them. She alleged that Mr Niblett deliberately moved the debris to the front of the steps to her home, causing her to fall over them one night when putting out her rubbish, and to suffer injury by way of bruising to the face, neck and arms.[5]  She alleged that after she fell, she lay on the ground for approximately 20 minutes before getting up to phone her neighbour for help. She said that Mr Niblett scoffed, laughed and jeered at her, saying “you deserve that”[6] from the decking upstairs.

[4] T10/L5-6.

[5] Ms Broadbent provided the Court with a number of images of bruising she said was sustained as a result of the fall and claimed to have worn a neck brace for four weeks.

[6] T13/L7-10.

32Mr Niblett denied that he had moved the yucca trees. He said that his evidence was that he arrived by car at the time of her fall, that she got up within 15 seconds, approached his car in what appeared to be an intoxicated state, and yelled abuse at him.

F. Pushing her against a wall, trying to steal her car keys and remote control

33Ms Broadbent alleged that in November 2023 she was pushed against a wall by Mr Niblett when he attempted to steal her car keys and remote control. Mr Niblett denied the allegation and said that he was not in the garage but was accosted by Ms Broadbent as he was putting the green bin out for collection.

G. Putting security cameras around the property

34Ms Broadbent alleged that Mr Niblett installed 13 video cameras around the house to watch her, which she found intimidating. She alleged that police had attended, but did not say when, and told Mr Niblett to remove the cameras.

35Mr Niblett’s evidence was that five cameras were installed for security purposes in 2012, with Ms Broadbent’s knowledge. Two of the cameras were dummy cameras facing the back yard. Only one of two cameras facing the front yard was operational. Mr Niblett said he installed it to protect his car, which was parked at the front of the property. Mr Niblett said that he did not recall police attending or ordering him to take down the security cameras.

H. Causing her to call police

36Ms Broadbent alleged that due to Mr Niblett’s conduct, which she described as violent, aggressive and abusive,[7] she had called the police many times. Mr Niblett insisted that she would ring the police on many occasions instead of calling him by phone, just so that she could later say: “I called the police on him so many times”.[8]

[7] T38/L11-24.

[8] T37/L5-6.

37Ms Broadbent admitted that she had never had to call the police for any violence or anger displayed by Mr Niblett towards her.[9]

J. General allegations against Mr Niblett

[9] T39/L13-15.

38Ms Broadbent accused Mr Niblett of having a violent character and alleged that during his tenancy he became coercive, controlling and psychologically abusive of her. She alleged that Mr Niblett placed his possessions around the whole house and not just in the rooms he was supposed to be using. She alleged that since COVID, Mr Niblett had become more aggressive and the property damage inside became horrendous, causing her to lose sleep.

39Mr Niblett denied these allegations. He submitted that of all her allegations, the only ones which involved alleged direct conduct by him were those alleging damage to the metre box and moving of the yucca trees. Mr Niblett suggested that Ms Broadbent was a habitual drinker. She denied this. Tanya Harris gave evidence about an incident where Ms Broadbent came upstairs to Mr Niblett’s living space, ranting at him, and acting aggressively.

K. Further conduct since 4 February 2025

40The parties were invited to provide any further affidavits or submissions concerning the period between 4 February 2025 and the date of the rehearing.

41Mr Niblett indicated at the rehearing that he left Ms Broadbent’s property in August 2024[10] and went to live with a good friend at 1 Webb Street, Mornington, an address which he said is more than 50 metres from Ms Broadbent’s home. On 23 May 2025 he moved from that address to an undisclosed address further away from Ms Broadbent’s house.  He said that he has not spoken to or approached or engaged with Ms Broadbent in any way since 4 February 2025. He said that he once saw her by chance at a shopping centre where they made eye contact but he did not speak to her.

[10] See also T1/L34.

42In her recent affidavit dated 24 September 2025, Ms Broadbent complained of seeing Mr Niblett’s vehicle either parked in or driving down Webb Street on a number of occasions in April and May this year, and seeing Mr Niblett in the residence at 1 Webb Street, either at the window or on the balcony. She alleges that by living at 1 Webb Street he was in breach of the PSIO. In the light of the fact that there are breach proceedings on foot elsewhere, I put this allegation to one side.

43Ms Broadbent also alleged that since the PSIO was made on 4 February 2025, she discovered damage to the floor and walls of the house which she claimed were maliciously caused by Mr Niblett. She also claimed her entitlement to a large sum of unpaid rental from Mr Niblett but stated that she is reluctant to pursue these matters because she has found the current intervention order proceedings distressing and destabilising.

44She stated that she fears that without the protection of the intervention order, Mr Niblett will continue to engage in behaviour that she finds frightening, such as visiting 1 Webb Street or driving in that street.

45In his written submissions, Mr Niblett stated:

For a number of years I have been forced to defend myself against unrelenting and unsubstantiated allegations by Ms Broadbent. These have included ongoing false statement involving obsessively repeated claims of violence, property damage and constant defamation of an extremely severe nature. This has affected my mental health and livelihood, my personal and professional reputation as well as my financial position to a large degree.

46Mr Niblett noted that Ms Broadbent alleged at VCAT in 2023 that he had maliciously flooded her property. He indicated that  her case was struck out by VCAT upon discovery that she relied on photographs which were falsified. He stated that since that time Ms Broadbent had been obsessed with making false claims against him.

47Mr Niblett stated that he bears no ill-will towards Ms Broadbent but just wants to get on with his life. He stated that since February 2025 he has done everything he can and continues to do everything he can to avoid any contact with her.  However, he fears Ms Broadbent’s continued obsession with him and her pursuit of him in legal proceedings will bring them into further contact. He regrets being unable to afford legal representation for the rehearing.

48There were further allegations, which rise no higher than mere speculation, by Mr Niblett of Ms Broadbent’s involvement in a fire bombing of Mr Niblett’s car in March 2024, and by Ms Broadbent of Mr Niblett’s involvement in a break-in at her house in March 2025. As there is no evidence before me about these matters, I put them to one side.

Submissions

49Ms Broadbent’s counsel made final submissions to the following effect. On the whole, Mr Niblett’s conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for their safety. Despite Mr Niblett having moved out of Ms Broadbent’s property and out of 1 Webb Street, his continued presence in the immediate area to visit friends increases the risk of an incident taking place. The fact that Ms Broadbent and Mr Niblett have seen each other at a shopping centre and gone their separate ways shows that the current order in place is working to prevent ongoing harassment or intimidation by Mr Niblett. For these reasons, the PSIO remains necessary to prevent further prohibited behaviour from Mr Niblett. Counsel submitted that the PSIO made by the learned Magistrate should be made again largely in the same terms, apart from substituting a distance condition of 10 metres for the current distance condition of 50 metres.

50As stated above, Mr Niblett’s submission was that that the final order should be set aside.

Findings and reasons

51I note that Ms Broadbent has not particularised the sections under which she claims the various incidents of conduct satisfy the definition of “prohibited behaviour” in section 5 of the Act. I have done my best to consider the allegations as falling within three possible, relevant, categories: assault, harassment, and property damage or interference.

52Having considered all of the evidence and submissions before me, I make the following findings.

Allegation A

53I find that Mr Niblett, as he conceded, did lock the relevant door, but I do not consider this to be prohibited conduct for the following reasons.

54A plain reading of the definition of “property” in section 4 of the Act suggests that it is confined to personal property, in other words, belongings, and does not include real estate. This construction is reinforced by the examples of “property damage or interference” in section 8 of the Act, which are: withholding the person’s food or medication; preventing the person accessing his or her wheelchair; threatening to kill or injure the person’s pet.

55I consider on the evidence that Mr Niblett’s putting a lock on the door did not prevent Ms Broadbent accessing any of her personal property, as she was able to do so via other entrances. This allegation is not made out.

Allegation B

56Given the vagueness of the allegations and Mr Niblett’s denials of such conduct, I am not satisfied that the alleged conduct occurred. Even if it occurred on one occasion, the conduct would not constitute prohibited behaviour as it was not repeated, intentional nor involved substantial interference with any of Ms Broadbent’s personal property.

Allegation C

57I note Mr Niblett’s concession that on one occasion he forced open the padlock to restore power to the house in mid-winter.  Even assuming that the electrical box attached to the residence is personal property of Ms Broadbent’s, I consider that the conduct does not meet the definition of property damage or interference because it was not “repeated”, as required under the definition in section 8 of the Act. This allegation is not made out.  

Allegation D

58I accept Mr Niblett’s evidence concerning the source of the banging noise of which Ms Broadbent complained and I find that he was not responsible for it. As for the loud music, I note Mr Niblett’s concession that he did play music upstairs. On the evidence, I am not satisfied that his doing so constituted harassment of Ms Broadbent in the sense of being demeaning, derogatory or intimidating, as required under section 7 of the Act. This allegation is not made out.

Allegation E

59I note that Mr Niblett denied moving the yucca trees at all. I note that there is no evidence of any witness to the effect that he did so. I am unable to be satisfied that he moved them at all, let alone to the location alleged by Ms Broadbent (that is, to a location in front of the steps to her home).  As to the circumstances of Ms Broadbent’s fall near the front steps of her home in October 2023, on the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that there was any conduct by Mr Niblett which was a cause of Ms Broadbent’s fall or injury on that night. This allegation is not made out.

Allegation F

60Mr Niblett denied the alleged conduct and said he was not in the garage and had no reason to want or to take Ms Broadbent’s car keys or remote control. Further he said that Ms Broadbent accosted him whilst he was putting the green bin out for his collection. Given the seriousness of this allegation, I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities on the material before me that he assaulted Ms Broadbent.

Allegation G

61I accept Mr Niblett’s evidence concerning the number of security cameras in place, the purpose for their installation and his evidence that Ms Broadbent knew of their existence and their purpose. There is no evidence before me as to whether or not these cameras were removed or not nor when. In any event, I am not satisfied that the installation of the security cameras of the two or three operational security cameras constituted prohibited conduct by Mr Niblett. This is because, given the stated purpose for the installation of those cameras, namely to secure property belonging to Mr Niblett and Ms Broadbent, such conduct is not intimidating conduct and does not meet definition of “harassment” in section 7 of the Act, nor does Mr Niblett’s conduct in my view meet the definition of “property damage or interference”, in section 8 of the Act.

Allegation H

62I note Ms Broadbent’s concession that she had never called police to intervene for alleged anger or violence displayed towards her by Mr Niblett. In these circumstances, I find that this allegation is not made out.

Allegation J

63The general allegations made by Ms Broadbent were not particularised. I accept that there was a deterioration in the relationship between Mr Niblett and Ms Broadbent,[11] at least from the time she asked him to vacate the premises in late 2022 and he refused to do so. I accept that after his refusal to leave the premises, the parties were involved in a number of legal disputes concerning his ongoing residence at Ms Broadbent’s house.

[11] This resulted in various proceedings at VCAT.

64I note that Ms Broadbent did not cite specific examples of the “coercive, controlling”[12] behaviour nor “psychological and emotional abuse”[13] which she alleged. In these circumstances, I put these matters to one side.

[12] T5/L21-22.

[13] T33/L28.

65To the extent that Ms Broadbent’s complaint was of conduct involving damage to the house or using too much space, I consider that neither of these matters engages the definition of prohibited behaviour in section 5 of the Act and I put these matters to one side.

66There is no evidence before me to the effect that Mr Niblett has a violent character. Mr Niblett denied on this allegation and relied on Ms Broadbent’s concession in relation to allegation H that she had never witnessed him being violent towards her. I note my finding above that allegation F was not made out. For these reasons, this part of the general allegations is not made out.

67For the above reasons, I find that allegations J are not made out.

Allegation K

68In relation to any alleged prohibited conduct since 4 February 2025, I make no findings concerning the parts of Mr Niblett’s conduct (that is, residing at 1 Webb Street) which are the subject of breach proceedings currently on foot.

69However, I note that he no longer resides at 1 Webb Street, has had no contact with Ms Broadbent since 2 February 2025 and wants to move forward without any further contact with her and to bring an end to any litigation involving her.

70I note that Mr Niblett has never been precluded from driving in Webb street, or parking his car in that street, or visiting his friend at Webb street, save for having to comply with the 50 metre distance condition of the order.

71I note Ms Broadbent’s extensive recording of a number occasions of which Ms Niblett has visited or parked in Webb street to see his friend. I accept that she is preoccupied by Mr Niblett’s whereabouts and would like him not to be in her vicinity. However, this concern cannot dictate the outcome of her application. The outcome of her application depends on consideration of the whole of the evidence and whether the relevant requirements for the making of the order have been satisfied.

72It follows from the findings made above about each of the allegations A to K, that I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there was any prohibited behaviour by Mr Niblett in the past. On the additional material before me at the rehearing, particularly the fact that since 4 February 2025 Mr Niblett has had no further contact with Ms Broadbent, and wants no further contact with her, and that he moved from 1 Webb Street on 23 May 2025, I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that there is a likelihood of Mr Niblett committing prohibited behaviour in the future.

Conclusion

73For these reasons, the order made by His Honour Magistrate Burns on 4 February 2025 is set aside. This carries with it the revocation of any interim order currently in place against Mr Niblett in favour of Ms Broadbent.

74I direct that the Registrar of the County Court of Victoria notify the Registrar of the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria of the revocation of the PSIO and the dismissal of Ms Broadbent’s application for a PSIO.