FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Nguyen v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 143
File number(s): MLG 3051 of 2019 Judgment of: JUDGE MANSINI Date of judgment: 7 February 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – partner visa – where Applicant did not meet Schedule 3 (cl.3001) criterion – whether the Tribunal erred in its consideration not to apply the criterion for compelling reasons – where Tribunal mistakenly considered policy as a mandatory consideration – material error established – application allowed with costs. Legislation: Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) Sch 2, cl.820.211, Sch 3, cl.3001.
Migration Regulations (Amendment)1996 No. 75
Cases cited: LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12
MZYPZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 478
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 38 Date of hearing: 4 July 2024 Place: Melbourne Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Chia Solicitor for the Applicant: JLe Lawyers Counsel for the Respondents: Mr Lessing Solicitor for the Respondents: Sparke Helmore Lawyers ORDERS
MLG3051 of 2019 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: THI HA NHI NGUYEN
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE MANSINI
DATE OF ORDER:
7 FEBRUARY 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the First Respondent to the proceedings be amended to Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.
2.The name of the Second Respondent to the proceedings be amended to Administrative Review Tribunal.
3.A writ of certiorari issue quashing the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made on 16 August 2019 in Case Number 1709574.
4.A writ of mandamus issue directed to the Administrative Review Tribunal requiring it to reconsider and determine the Applicant’s application for review according to law.
5.The First Respondent pay the Applicant’s costs fixed in the amount of $8,371.30.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Judge Mansini
IN SUMMARY
Before the Court is an application for judicial review of an administrative decision to refuse a partner visa.
For the reasons that follow, the application is allowed with costs.
CONTEXT
The Applicant is a citizen of Vietnam who arrived in Australia on 2 April 2012.
On 21 March 2016, the Applicant married an Australian citizen (sponsor).
On 25 January 2017, the Applicant applied for a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) (subclass 820) visa and Partner (Residence) (BS-801) visa (the visa) on the basis of her relationship with the sponsor. At the time of the visa application, the Applicant’s last substantive visa…
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 143
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine if the Tribunal’s error was material and whether it could have affected the outcome of the decision. The evidence presented showed that the applicant had an Australian-citizen child and had been in a relationship with the sponsor for over two years. These facts aligned with the legislature's examples of strongly compassionate reasons that could justify a waiver of the visa criteria. The court concluded that the identified error was material and conceivably could have affected the Tribunal's assessment. Consequently, the court found that the Tribunal had erred in its consideration of the compelling reasons for not applying the Schedule 3 criterion.
The court allowed the application with costs. The First Respondent argued that there was no basis for the Tribunal to consider policy as a visa criterion or mandatory consideration, as it had correctly identified the interpretation of "compelling reasons" and had based its decision on the whole of the evidence. However, the court held that the error was material and could have influenced the outcome, leading to the allowance of the application with costs. The court did not find it necessary to address the remaining grounds of review.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Whilst critical of the Applicant’s failure to expressly particularise the Tribunal’s use of policy at [53], the First Respondent addressed the claim in writing and orally. In this respect, they contended that there was no basis to infer that the Tribunal had regard to policy as a visa criterion or mandatory consideration, where the Tribunal had correctly identified the authoritative interpretation of “compelling reasons”, set out the applicable statute and repeatedly identified that its decision had been based on the whole of the evidence. Consideration The legislation provided that the Applicant did not meet the visa criteria at cl.820.211(d)(ii) unless the Minister reached the state of satisfaction that there were compelling reasons for not applying those criteria. The Tribunal’s task entailed an evaluative judgement: MZYPZ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2012] FCA 478 (Bromberg J) at [11]-[13]. The Explanatory Statement does not have legislative force and does not mandate conditions of waiver for purposes of cl.820.211(d)(ii). Nonetheless, it provides guidance as to the intention of the legislature which was to afford greater flexibility to the Minister by introduction of a waiver that was expected only to be exercised where there are reasons of a strongly compassionate nature. In the present case, there is an Australian-citizen child of the relationship and the Applicant and her sponsor were at the time of the decision already in a long-standing relationship for longer than 2 years. Accordingly, both of the legislature’s examples of reasons of a “strongly compassionate” nature cited in the Explanatory Statement were satisfied by the Applicant in the present case and she relied on both of them in support of her claim for waiver on the basis of “compelling reasons”. Before embarking on its assessment of the evidence, the Tribunal correctly identified the question before it and then referred to case authorities for the propositions that “compelling reasons” is not defined in the legislation, the reasons should be sufficiently convincing to move a decision maker to exercise its discretion to waive the visa criteria under this provision, and circumstances which constitute “compelling reasons” can arise at any time: at [33] to[34] of the decision record. The Tribunal then turned to outline the various reasons why the Applicant sought that the cl.3001 criterion not be applied in her case, which encompassed a range of circumstances both financial and emotional, and explanations given orally: at [35] to [37]. At [38] to [56], the Tribunal evaluated the Applicant’s evidence and made findings. At paragraph [45], the Tribunal stated that “Emotional hardship of itself as a result of separation is not, in the Tribunal’s view a compelling reason”. When read in context, I consider the better view is that this aspect of the reasons conveyed the Tribunal member’s subjective view that the Applicant’s circumstances of emotional hardship as a result of separation from her sponsor did not (of itself, or alone, or without more) constitute a compelling reason to waive the cl.3001 criterion. In this respect, the Tribunal’s approach was consistent with the guidance provided by the Explanatory Statement.