[2010] QDC 227
DISTRICT COURT
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
JUDGE MARTIN SC
No 1111 of 2010
| SANG NHUT NGUYEN | Appellant |
| and | |
| NARESH CHAND | Respondent |
| BRISBANE ..DATE 07/05/2010 ORDER |
1-1
HIS HONOUR: This is an appeal pursuant to section 222 of the the appellant to nine months' imprisonment with a parole release date fixed after three months, namely, the 8th of July 2010 for the offence of driving whilst disqualified.
Justices Act against a decision of the learned Stipendiary
Pursuant to section 223 of the Act this appeal is by way of rehearing. It is submitted, on behalf of the appellant, that "This Court is not required and, in fact, cannot entertain an argument that seeks to correct error in the House -v- The King sense, for example, plainly unjust". It is further submitted, "The appellant here is not required or, indeed, permitted to rely on any argument seeking to demonstrate error".
In my view, these submissions are contrary to clear authority, (see, for example, Teelow -v- The Commissioner of Police [2009] QCA 84). There is certainly nothing in the legislation which indicates that the powers of this Court maybe exercised whether or not there was an error at first instance. Indeed, the statutory ground of appeal that the punishment was excessive makes it obvious that the appellant must demonstrate error. The error being that the punishment was excessive because it was beyond the permissible range of sentence.
| As to the merits of the appeal, the respondent has most properly conceded that error infected the learned Stipendiary Magistrate's decision and that the appellant is to be sentenced afresh. Whilst clearly disagreeing with the submission that demonstration of error is not necessary on this appeal, the respondent otherwise accepts the submissions of the appellant at paragraphs 18 to 26 of the outline. | 1-2 | ORDER |
I, too, agree that error in the sentencing process had infected the learned Stipendiary Magistrate's decision. In any event, I'm of the view that the sentence imposed was excessive because it went beyond the permissible range of discretionary judgment. No doubt the identified errors in the sentencing process contributed to the excessive penalty.
The true mischief in this offence is, in my view, the refusal or avoidance of the appellant to suffer the punishment involved in an order for disqualification from driving. Total prohibition from driving for a lengthy period involves a substantial burden. The appellant is clearly a person unwilling to suffer this penalty. This offence is the appellant's fourth offence of driving whilst disqualified.
The relevant history is set out in the respective outlines. this is disclosed:
On the 14th of April 2008 the appellant was dealt with for driving a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of .097. He was then disqualified from driving for a period of four months. On the 27th of June 2008 the appellant was dealt with for driving whilst disqualified. He was then disqualified for a period of two years.
| On the 22nd of June 2009 the appellant was dealt… |
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- Case
- [2010] QDC 227
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the sentence imposed was indeed excessive and went beyond the permissible range of discretionary judgment. The appellant's history of similar offences contributed to the decision that a stringent penalty was warranted, but it must be proportionate to the offence. The appellant had previously been convicted for drink driving and had accumulated multiple offences of driving whilst disqualified. Given this history, a stringent penalty was necessary, but it had to be balanced with the need for proportionality. The court set aside the original sentence and imposed a sentence of five months' imprisonment with parole eligibility fixed at the 7th of May 2010. The appellant was also directed to report to a probation and parole office by the close of business on Monday, the 10th of May 2010. The court declared that the time the appellant had already served would count as time served under the new sentence. The question of costs was reserved for later determination.
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