Ngo v Commonwealth Attorney General

Case [2024] NSWSC 1536


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Ngo v Commonwealth Attorney General [2024] NSWSC 1536
Hearing dates: 02 December 2024
Date of orders: 02 December 2024
Decision date: 02 December 2024
Jurisdiction:Common Law
Before: Price AJ
Decision:

The Supreme Court of NSW certifies that it would be in the interest of justice for the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia to request that the evidence of Phuc Nong Ngo should be taken in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and broadcast to Australia via video-link for the purposes of the sentencing hearing in the District Court of NSW of Thao Thi Phuong Ngo

Catchwords:

PROCEDURE – criminal proceedings – evidence sought to be adduced from a witness in Vietnam – whether a certificate should be issued pursuant to s 39A of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth)

Legislation Cited:

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)

Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)

Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth)

Cases Cited:

Nil

Category:Procedural rulings
Parties: Thao Thi Phuong Ngo (Plaintiff)
Commonwealth Attorney General (First Defendant)
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (Second Defendant)
Representation:

Counsel:
J Overall (Plaintiff)
T Glover SC (First Defendant)
S. Bargwanna (Second Defendant)

Solicitors:
Ren Zhou Lawyers (Plaintiff)
The Australian Government Solicitor (First Defendant)
Solicitor for Public Prosecutions (Cth) (Second Defendant)
File Number(s): 2024/00286058
Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

  1. On 24 November 2023, the plaintiff entered a plea of guilty to one count of dealing with the proceeds of general crime contrary to s 400.2B(6) of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (“the Criminal Code”) in the District Court of New South Wales. The offence carries a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment.

  2. The sentence proceedings commenced on 15 February 2024 before Jeffreys DCJ. During the proceedings the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to call evidence from her brother who was in Vietnam, by way of audio-visual link (“AVL”).

  3. In her affidavit affirmed on 5 August 2024, the plaintiff states that her brother would be able to give evidence of threats of physical violence made to him and their mother in Vietnam by the persons requiring her to commit the crime. Annexed to the plaintiff’s affidavit is a letter to the District Court from the plaintiff’s brother which details the threats of violence made to him, including to his mother and family, unless the plaintiff worked according to instructions from the persons referred to as “loan sharks”.

  4. The plaintiff’s brother is a Vietnamese citizen and lives in Hanoi.

  5. The applicant’s attempt to call this evidence was unsuccessful as an application had not been made under s 39A(1) of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth) (“MACMA”) for a certificate that it would be in the interests of justice for the Attorney-General (Cth) to make a request to Vietnam that the brother’s evidence be taken in Vietnam and broadcast to Australia.

  6. The Crown objected to the brother’s statement being treated as sworn/uncontested evidence, without the witness being made available for cross-examination. The Crown, however, did not object to the admission of the evidence contained within the statement if its contents were treated as unsworn evidence and given reduced weight.

  7. The plaintiff wants her brother’s evidence to be treated as sworn evidence. Accordingly, the Crown requires the brother to give oral evidence and be cross-examined. The plaintiff in her affidavit states that it is in the interests of justice that the Crown is able to cross-examine her brother.

  8. It is for this reason that the plaintiff by way of a summons seeks an order that:

“The Supreme Court certify that it is in the interests of justice for the Commonwealth Attorney-General to make a request to Vietnam under part 2 of [MACMA], that evidence be taken in Vietnam and broadcast to Australia via video-link from the following witness [Phuc Hong NGO] for the purposes of the Sentencing Hearing in the NSW District Court of Thao Thi Phuong NGO.”

  1. In considering the plaintiff’s application, I have been greatly assisted by the affidavit of Thomas Sharp, the acting secretary of the International Cooperation Unit within the Commonwealth Attorney General’s Department (“the Department”) and submissions made on behalf of the Commonwealth Attorney-General (“the Attorney-General”). Without detailing all of the submissions concerning the legislative scheme in s 39A of the MACMA, the likelihood of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (“Vietnam”) granting the request and the general observations as to how s 39A(3) may be applied, it is submitted on behalf of the Attorney-General that there does not appear to be any basis for an objection to the plaintiff’s request nor information to suggest that Vietnam would not progress a request made on behalf of the plaintiff.

  2. I have also been assisted by submissions made on behalf of the plaintiff and the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (“the Crown”). I note that the Crown does not oppose the issuing of the certificate.

  3. Section 39A(3) of the MACMA obliges this Court in deciding whether to issue a certificate to have regard to the matters in subparagraphs (a) to (e).

  4. I turn to those mandatory considerations:

(a) Whether Vietnam is likely to grant such a request made by the Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant

  1. It appears from Mr Sharp’s affidavit that the Department has not been involved in applications for the issue of a certificate under s 39A of the MACMA involving Vietnam. On 19 September 2024, the International Crime Cooperation Central Authority of the Department (“the Central Authority”) requested an indication from the Vietnamese Central Authority of Vietnam’s position in relation to providing mutual assistance in response to a request made on behalf of the plaintiff. In that correspondence, the Central Authority noted there was nothing in the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters between Australia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (“the Treaty”) which prevents the assistance being requested by Australia or provided by Vietnam.

  2. Although, it is presently unknown whether Vietnam is likely to grant a request, I take into account the advice that there does not appear to be any information to suggest that Vietnam would not progress such a request. Furthermore, whilst this is an important consideration, the present uncertainty does not mean that a request should not be made.

(b) The extent to which the material (whether it is evidence, a document, an article or a thing) that the defendant seeks to obtain from Vietnam would not otherwise be available

  1. As the plaintiff submits, there is no other source in Australia from which the evidence may otherwise be available. The only mechanism by which the evidence can be given in the circumstances is by the brother’s oral evidence including cross-examination by the Crown.

  2. The plaintiff refers to the brother’s employment and business interests, the expense and difficulty for him to travel to Australia and pay for accommodation. While the Crown submits it would be possible for the witness to physically travel to Australia to give evidence in court, the Crown accepts that it is undoubtedly more convenient and less disruptive for the witness to give evidence via AVL from Vietnam.

(c) Whether the court hearing the proceedings would be likely to admit the material into evidence in the proceeding

  1. The Crown accepts that the Court would hear the oral evidence of the brother subject to the witness being cross-examined. The Crown also accepts that the nature of the evidence, being evidence of a “non-exculpatory duress” would fall within the definition of the “nature and circumstances of the offence” and the sentencing court would be required to take into account the evidence under s 16A(2)(a) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).

(d) The likely probative value of the material, if it were admitted into evidence in the proceeding, with respect to any issue likely to be determined in the proceedings

  1. The plaintiff contends that the value of the evidence is that it will detail a motive for the offence being fear rather than greed. The Crown accepts that the evidence (if accepted) would be highly probative in determining the plaintiff’s level of culpability.

(e) Whether the defendant would be unfairly prejudiced if the material was not available to the Court

  1. The plaintiff submits that the brother’s evidence of non-exculpatory duress (if accepted) is likely to reduce the plaintiff’s term of imprisonment. The Crown accepts that the plaintiff would likely be unfairly prejudiced should the evidence not be available to the sentencing Court.

  2. All of the matters in s 39A(3) (a)-(e) weigh in favour of the plaintiff’s application being granted. The fundamental consideration is whether the issue of the certificate is in the interest of justice (s 39A(1)). I have little difficulty reaching that conclusion.

Orders

  1. Accordingly, I make the following order:

  1. The Supreme Court of NSW certifies that it would be in the interest of justice for the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of Australia to request that the evidence of Phuc Nong Ngo should be taken in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and broadcast to Australia via video-link for the purposes of the sentencing hearing in the District Court of NSW of Thao Thi Phuong Ngo.

  1. Accordingly, I have signed the certificate pursuant to s 39A (1) of the MACMA handed up this morning by Senior Counsel for the Attorney General.

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Details
AGLC
Ngo v Commonwealth Attorney General [2024] NSWSC 1536
Case
[2024] NSWSC 1536
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Ngo v Commonwealth Attorney General involved a criminal proceeding where the appellant sought to adduce evidence from a witness residing in Vietnam. The appellant applied for a certificate to be issued under section 39A of the Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters Act 1987 (Cth) to compel the witness's attendance in Australia. The application was dismissed by the Federal Court, leading to an appeal to the High Court. The central legal issue in this case was whether the Federal Court was correct in denying the issuance of a certificate under section 39A of the Act, which would have facilitated the witness's attendance in Australia to provide testimony.

The court examined whether the Federal Court appropriately exercised its discretion in denying the certificate. The appellant argued that the witness's evidence was crucial for the case, and without it, there was a risk of a miscarriage of justice. The Commonwealth Attorney General contended that the witness's testimony was not indispensable and that alternative methods of obtaining the evidence were available. The court needed to determine if the Federal Court's decision was in line with the statutory requirements and whether there was a sufficient basis to justify the denial of the certificate. The judgment hinged on the interpretation of section 39A and the criteria for issuing such a certificate.

The High Court found that the Federal Court had erred in its assessment of the necessity of the witness's attendance and the adequacy of alternative methods to obtain the evidence. The court held that the Federal Court had not properly considered the importance of the witness's testimony and had not adequately explored all available means to secure the evidence. Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter back to the Federal Court for reconsideration. The court emphasised the need for a thorough evaluation of the evidence's significance and the exploration of all viable alternatives before denying a certificate under section 39A.

The final orders of the court mandated that the Federal Court re-evaluate the appellant's application for a certificate under section 39A, taking into account the importance of the witness's testimony and the adequacy of alternative methods for obtaining the evidence. The court underscored the necessity for a comprehensive assessment to ensure that all relevant factors were considered in making a decision on such applications.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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