Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Ms Duong’s letter includes Nhat Tien’s website address in the letterhead[2]. [2] >On 4 December 2018 the Tribunal requested the Department to verify Ms Duong’s letter. The Department provided a response or “referral outcome” in December 2018 but in January 2019 the Tribunal had to make further inquiries to confirm that the Department was referring in the response to the same company. In March 2019 the Department confirmed that. The Department’s response in December 2018 indicated that a check of the Vietnamese National Business Registration website found an entry for Nhat Tien dated 16 June 2017 that recorded the number of employees to be two only. (The document included the following words in Vietnamese that the Department said referred to the total number of employees: Tổng số lao động). The response stated that given the small size of the company and that Mr Huy had worked there for about two years at the time the officer spoke to him (in August 2017) “it is reasonable [to conclude] that [Mr Huy] knew the people he was working with”. Concerning Mr Nguyen’s labour contract, the response stated that while the contract was signed on 2 May 2015, inexplicably it recorded Mr Nguyen’s national ID card issued on a future date, in June 2015. On 15 April 2019 the Tribunal issued a further invitation to Ms Ngo under s.359A inviting her to comment on or respond to the further information provided by the Department in December 2018.In the meantime, in April 2019 Ms Ngo submitted letters in support of the application, one written by her, one by a medical practitioner, and one by a Catholic bishop. The letters are primarily directed to matters that could be taken into account if waiver of PIC 4020(1) were being considered. On 29 April 2019 there was a response to the second s.359A invitation. Ms Ngo’s representative referred to Vietnamese law concerning registration for companies with two or more members/shareholders and submitted in effect that registration of a company with two or more members did not indicate that the company had only two employees. The representative noted that Ms Duong had already confirmed Mr Nguyen’s employment and said that Ms Duong was prepared to give oral evidence about that. The submission was accompanied by relevant company and business registration documents with English translations, and extracts from Law 68/2014/QH13 on Enterprises. The company documents show Ms Duong and another person (Hoang Quoc Hoi) as “contributors”. Ms Duong’s is described there as “Director”. For the following reasons, the Tribunal has concluded that the matter should be remitted for reconsideration.CONSIDERATION OF CLAIMS AND EVIDENCENon-disclosure certificate The non-disclosure certificate, given under s.375A of the Act, is dated 17 October 2017. As to the Tribunal’s obligations with regard to s.375A certificates see generally MIBP v Singh [2016] FCAFC 183. On 19 November 2018 the Tribunal provided a copy of the certificate to Ms Ngo and invited submissions as to the validity of the certificate. The Tribunal pointed out that it would in any event have regard to its obligations under s.359A of the Act. The certificate is unsigned. In a case decided on 18 April 2019 – months after the Tribunal invited submissions – the Federal Circuit Court ruled that an unsigned certificate is invalid: see El Jejieh v MHA (No.2) [2019] FCCA 840 at [23].In the circumstances it is unnecessary to say more than that the certificate purported to cover the record of “integrity checks” regarding which the Tribunal gave particulars in the first s.359A invitation. PIC 4020 The relevant part of PIC 4020 is extracted in the attachment to this decision.The issue in the review is whether Mr Nguyen meets PIC 4020 as required by cl.600.213 for the grant of the visa. PIC 4020(1) requires that there is no evidence that he has given, or caused to be given, to the Minister, an officer, the Tribunal, a relevant assessing authority, or Medical officer of the Commonwealth, a bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular in relation to the application for the visa or a visa that he held in the 12 months before the application was made.The requirements in PIC 4020(1) can be waived if there are certain compelling or compassionate reasons justifying the granting of the visa: PIC 4020(4). Has the applicant given, or caused to be given a bogus document, or information that is false or misleading in material particular?The term ‘information that is false or misleading in a material particular’ is defined in PIC 4020(5) and the term ‘bogus document’ is defined in s.5(1) of the Act: see the attachment to this decision. In contrast to the definition of ‘information that is false or misleading in a material particular’ in PIC 4020(5), the reference in the definition of bogus document to a document that was obtained because of a ‘false or misleading’ statement has no requirement that it be relevant to a criterion for the grant of the visa: Arora v MIBP [2016] FCAFC 35; Batra v MIAC [2013] FCA 274.The requirement in PIC 4020(1) not to provide a bogus document, or false or misleading information, applies whether or not the Minister became aware of the bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular because of information given by the applicant: PIC 4020(3). It also applies whether or not the document or information was provided by the applicant knowingly or unwittingly. While PIC 4020 refers to information that is false, in the sense of purposely untrue, it is not necessary for the Minister (or the Tribunal on review) to conclude that the applicant was aware the information was purposely untrue in order for PIC 4020 to be engaged. However, an element of fraud or deception by some person is necessary to attract the operation of the provision: Trivedi v MIBP [2014] FCAFC 42.It is important for the present case to note what is meant by “evidence” for the purpose of PIC 4020(1). In Talukder v MIAC [2009] FMCA 223 at [20] Edmonds FM said:The use of the word “evidence” in my view establishes that the clause requires something more than the mere existence of information suggestive of falsity. It requires some probative information. In other words, a decision maker cannot simply take any information suggestive of falsity as sufficient for the purposes of the clause. The decision maker must satisfy himself or herself that the information is acceptable as evidence pointing to false or misleading information having been given for the purposes of establishing the validity of the visa application and that the falsity or misleading information was material to the visa application.In Sharma v MIMAC [2013] FCCA 1280 at [36] Judge Manousaridis said: “[E]vidence” is used in PIC4020 to impose a requirement that whatever facts are conveyed by the material relied upon to establish that information given in connection with the application for a … visa was false or misleading in a material particular, they must be facts that are sufficiently probative to lead to that conclusion. Stated more simply, “evidence”, as that word appears in PIC4020, means material that is sufficiently probative to lead to the conclusion that information given in connection with the application for a … visa was false or misleading in a material particular. See also Talukder v MIAC [2009] FCA 916 at [20].In the Tribunal’s view, the information considered by the delegate, and the further information that is now available, is not sufficiently probative to lead to the conclusion that Mr Nguyen gave false or misleading information or a bogus document. The matter of social insurance, and what the labour contract has to say on the subject, is really a matter between Mr Nguyen and Nhat Tien, and between them and the Vietnamese Government. Even if the Tribunal were able to conclude that Mr Nguyen and Nhat Tien avoided a legal obligation to contribute to social insurance, the Tribunal would not consider there to be sufficiently probative evidence to lead to the conclusion that Mr Nguyen was not employed by Nhat Tien as he claimed to be.The June 2015 date of issue of Mr Nguyen’s national ID that appears in the labour contract signed in May 2015 is perhaps another matter. The possibilities include that there was a typographical error or that the date was inserted after the labour contract was signed after the issue date was ascertained. Still the Tribunal would not consider there to be sufficiently probative evidence to lead to the conclusion that Mr Nguyen was not employed by Nhat Tien as he claimed to be.The “material particular” for the purpose of PIC 4020(1) is Mr Nguyen’s employment and not his compliance with laws concerning social insurance. It is material because it concerns the genuineness of Mr Nguyen’s intention to stay in Australia only temporarily: see cl.600.211. The statement reportedly made by Mr Huy, an employee of Nhat Tien, in August 2017 is therefore of concern. That may be “information suggestive of falsity” on Mr Nguyen’s part. But there is the whole of the evidence to consider. That now includes Ms Duong’s letter, the business registration documents, other supporting documents, and even the Nhat Tien website. It seems possible, when the Tribunal requested inquiries be made to verify Ms Duong’s letter, that had there been a site visit or some other inquiry made directly of Ms Duong or about Ms Duong, the Department’s response may actually have been to confirm that Mr Nguyen was indeed a longstanding employee of Nhat Tien. It is not clear why the delegate considered that Mr Nguyen’s suggestion about a site visit did not address the Department’s concerns. Resources may have not allowed for a site visit. But, for whatever reason, the only further investigation undertaken was the inspection of the Vietnamese National Business Registration website. The literal translation of what appeared on the National Business Registration website may be that Nhat Tien had two employees, but this seems ambiguous when considered in the light of the business registration documents that have been submitted and the provisions of Vietnamese law that the representative referred to. In the Department’s response to the Tribunal the Department, apparently without more, drew the inference that Mr Huy must have known who the employees of Nhat Tien were. The business registration documents themselves name two persons other than Mr Huy (as “contributors” in the English translation). The inference that Mr Huy must have known everyone employed by Nhat Tien is not a reasonable inference to be drawn from the information on the National Business Registration website, in the Tribunal’s view. The Tribunal considers that the available information, including what reportedly appears on the National Business Registration website, is not sufficiently probative evidence to lead to the conclusion that Mr Nguyen was not employed by Nhat Tien as he claimed to be. Therefore, Mr Nguyen meets PIC 4020(1).In the circumstances it is not necessary for the Tribunal to consider the waiver provisions. That is, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to consider whether there are compelling circumstances that affect the interests of Australia, or where there are compassionate or compelling circumstances that affect the interests of an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident, or an eligible New Zealand citizen (as defined in r.1.03), that justify the granting of the visa. The Tribunal does observe however that it is an unfortunate state of affairs that approximately two years after Ms Ngo and Mr Nguyen were married Mr Nguyen has not been able to visit Ms Ngo in Australia and develop his thinking about possible migration. Instead, the Department’s movement records and other evidence indicate that, when Ms Ngo’s employment has permitted it, they have spent some time together in Vietnam and neighbouring countries. Ms Ngo’s letter to the Tribunal and the letters that were submitted in April in her support indicate that there are matters that would have warranted serious consideration for waiver had that been required. DECISIONThe Tribunal remits the application for a Visitor (Class FA) visa for reconsideration, with the direction that the applicant meets the following criteria for a Subclass 600 (Visitor) visa:·Public Interest Criterion 4020 for the purposes of cl.600.213 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations.John BillingsSenior MemberATTACHMENTMigration Regulations 1994Schedule 44020(1) There is no evidence before the Minister that the applicant has given, or caused to be given, to the Minister, an officer, the Tribunal during the review of a Part 5 reviewable decision, a relevant assessing authority or a Medical Officer of the Commonwealth, a bogus document or information that is false or misleading in a material particular in relation to:(a)the application for the visa; or(b)a visa that the applicant held in the period of 12 months before the application was made …(4)The Minister may waive the requirements of any or all of paragraphs (1)(a) or (b) and subclause (2) if satisfied that:(a)compelling circumstances that affect the interests of Australia; or(b)compassionate or compelling circumstances that affect the interests of an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen;justify the granting of the visa.(5)In this clause:information that is false or misleading in a material particular means information that is:(a)false or misleading at the time it is given; and(b)relevant to any of the criteria the Minister may consider when making a decision on an application, whether or not the decision is made because of that information. …Migration Act 1958s.5 Interpretation(1) In this Act, unless contrary intention appears:…bogus document, in relation to a person, means a document that the Minister reasonably suspects is a document that:(a)purports to have been, but was not, issued in respect of the person; or(b)is counterfeit or has been altered by a person who does not have authority to do so; or(c)was obtained because of a false or misleading statement, whether or not made knowingly. …