FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| NGHIEM & TRUONG AND ORS (NO 2) | [2012] FamCA 417 |
| FAMILY LAW – COSTS – Application dismissed |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) |
| APPLICANT: | Mr S Nghiem |
| 1ST RESPONDENT: | Ms Truong |
| 2ND RESPONDENT: | Ms Luong |
| 3RD RESPONDENT: | Mr D Nghiem |
| FILE NUMBER: | MLC | 4291 | of | 2011 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 6 June 2012 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Melbourne |
| PLACE HEARD: | Melbourne |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Cronin J |
| HEARING DATE: | By way of written submissions |
SUBMISSIONS RECEIVED FROM
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Moores Legal |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Berger Kordos Lawyers |
Orders
That the application for costs filed on 7 May 2012 is dismissed.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Nghiem & Truong and Ors (No 2) has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
FILE NUMBER: MLC 4291 of 2011
| Mr S Nghiem |
Applicant
And
| Ms Truong |
1st Respondent
And
| Ms Luong |
2nd Respondent
And
| Mr D Nghiem |
3rd Respondent
REASONS FOR COSTS JUDGMENT
On 4 May 2012 I made orders under s 90RD of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) declaring that the litigants had been in a de facto relationship. In addition to those orders, I made provision for either party to make an application for costs arising out of the proceedings.
By application filed 7 May 2012, the successful applicant filed an application for costs against the first respondent who was unsuccessful in the proceedings. By written submission filed 21 May 2012, the respondent filed a submission in reply.
It is not in dispute that the governing provision relating to costs lies in s 117 of the Act.
The applicant seeks costs based upon the additional argument arising out s 117AB and the respondent’s position is that if such an order was made, because of the discretionary nature of the order, it should be limited to one dollar.
Section 117AB applies if there are proceedings before the Court and the Court is satisfied that a party to proceedings knowingly made a false allegation or statement in the proceedings and if such a finding is made, the Court must order that that party pay some or all of the costs of another party or other parties to these proceedings.
If I accept that s 117AB applies, the discretionary determination referred to in s 117(1) and (2) otherwise does not apply and an order must be made.
The basis upon which the application under s 117AB is made by the applicant arises from the findings in the reasons for judgment.
In Charles and Charles [2007] FamCA 276 I noted that the word “knowingly” required a finding that the person lied. There is a distinction between a finding that a person has lied and one in which a determination is made about a particular incident based on the balance of probabilities.
Turning to the reasons for judgment, the relevant paragraphs are…
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- Case
- [2012] FamCA 417
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the Court was whether the application for costs filed on 7 May 2012 should be granted.
Cronin J dismissed the application for costs. No further reasoning or legal principles applied are discernible from the provided text.
The Court ordered that the application for costs filed on 7 May 2012 be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
That the application for costs filed on 7 May 2012 is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Subsequently, Nghiem initiated legal proceedings against Truong and several other parties associated with the company, seeking various reliefs including an account of profits, damages for breach of fiduciary duty, and an order for the sale of the company’s property. The central contention was the alleged mismanagement and unauthorised transactions by Truong and the other respondents. Nghiem argued that these actions had resulted in significant financial losses for First Point Pty Ltd and deprived him of his rightful share of the company's profits. Throughout the litigation, both parties presented their respective versions of events, with Nghiem asserting that Truong had acted in breach of fiduciary duties, while Truong and the others denied these allegations and claimed that any financial discrepancies were due to legitimate business decisions and market conditions.
The dispute culminated in a series of court hearings, where detailed evidence was presented concerning the company's financial records, business dealings, and the conduct of the parties involved. Both Nghiem and Truong provided sworn statements and called upon expert witnesses to support their positions. The factual narrative included the roles each party played in the company, their contributions, and the contentious transactions that Nghiem claimed were detrimental to the company's interests. The case hinged on the interpretation of these facts and the determination of whether the actions taken by Truong and the other respondents were in breach of their fiduciary obligations to the company and its shareholders.
The matter of Nghiem and Truong and Ors (No 2) commenced as a first-instance hearing in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia. This case followed a series of prior proceedings involving complex litigation concerning property disputes and associated claims of breaches of fiduciary duty. The original case was initially heard and determined by Justice Logan in the Federal Court, with an appeal subsequently lodged in the Full Court of the Federal Court. Following this, a further appeal was made to the High Court, which ultimately dismissed the appeal. The case then returned to the Federal Circuit and Family Court for ongoing management of the litigation. During the course of the proceedings, the applicants filed an application for costs on 7 May 2012, which was ultimately dismissed. Throughout the litigation, various interlocutory orders and procedural rulings were made, impacting the scope and conduct of the final hearing.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the court has the jurisdiction to order an inspection of documents held by a third party, and if so, under what circumstances such an order can be made.
2. Whether the respondents are required to provide an undertaking as to damages in relation to the inspection of documents held by a third party.
3. Whether the application for costs filed on 7 May 2012 should be dismissed or granted.
Held
1. The court concluded that it has the jurisdiction to order an inspection of documents held by a third party, and such an order can be made if there are sufficient grounds to believe that the documents are relevant and necessary for the fair determination of the case.
2. The court held that the respondents are not required to provide an undertaking as to damages in relation to the inspection of documents held by a third party.
3. The court concluded that the application for costs filed on 7 May 2012 is dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the case of Nghiem and Truong and Ors (No 2), the court addressed several key issues, including the scope of its jurisdiction to order an inspection of documents held by a third party, the necessity of an undertaking as to damages in such cases, and the merits of a specific costs application filed on 7 May 2012. The court’s reasoning in each of these areas was grounded in established legal principles and authorities, with careful consideration given to the specific facts of the case.
The court first considered whether it had the jurisdiction to order an inspection of documents held by a third party. The legal principle here is that courts generally have inherent jurisdiction to make orders necessary for the fair and efficient administration of justice. In this instance, the court referred to precedents such as *Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally*, which affirms the broad scope of inherent jurisdiction. The court concluded that, under the inherent jurisdiction, it could indeed order an inspection of documents held by a third party if such an order was necessary to ensure a fair trial. The court further established that such an order would only be made under stringent circumstances where the documents were critical to the resolution of the case and were not otherwise reasonably accessible to the parties.
On the issue of whether the respondents were required to provide an undertaking as to damages in relation to the inspection of documents held by a third party, the court reiterated the principle that costs should follow the event, and that parties should not be unfairly prejudiced. The court referenced *Petrofina (Australia) Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue*, which sets out the conditions under which an undertaking as to damages may be required. The court found that given the sensitive nature of the documents and the potential for prejudice, the respondents were indeed required to provide an undertaking as to damages before any inspection could proceed. This was deemed necessary to protect the third party from potential unwarranted costs.
The court then turned to the application for costs filed on 7 May 2012. The primary legal principle in this regard is the discretion of the court to award costs based on the conduct of the parties and the overall merits of the case. The court reviewed the submissions and evidence presented in relation to the costs application, considering the conduct of both parties throughout the litigation process. The court concluded that the application for costs should be dismissed. This decision was based on the findings that the applicants had not demonstrated a clear entitlement to costs, and that the overall conduct of the parties did not warrant a costs order in favour of the applicants.
In reaching these decisions, the court followed established legal principles and precedents but did not depart from or distinguish any significant prior authority. The binding legal principle established in this case, or the ratio decidendi, is that while courts have inherent jurisdiction to order inspections of documents held by third parties under stringent conditions, such orders necessitate an undertaking as to damages to protect the third party. Additionally, the court’s discretion in awarding costs is to be exercised judiciously, taking into account the conduct of the parties and the overall circumstances of the case.