New England Biolabs, Inc v F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

New England Biolabs, Inc v F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG [2004] FCA 1651

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY – patents – appeal from decision of Commissioner of Patents to allow amendments – Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 40, 102, 104 – whether as a result of amendments certain claims would not fall within scope of claims of specification before amendment – no impermissible broadening of claims – no requirement in the Patents Act that the best method disclosed in a specification must actually have been performed by the applicant

Patents Act 1990 (Cth), ss 40, 102, 104.

F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG v Commissioner of Patents [2000] FCA 1845 cited
New England Biolabs Inc v Commissioner of Patents (2001) 110 FCR 357 cited
AMP Incorporated v Commissioner of Patents (1974) 3 ALR 283 cited

NEW ENGLAND BIOLABS, INC v F. HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE AG

N1305 OF 2003

EMMETT J
15 DECEMBER 2004
SYDNEY

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1305 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS

BETWEEN:

NEW ENGLAND BIOLABS, INC
APPLICANT

AND:

F. HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE AG
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

EMMETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 DECEMBER 2004

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N1305 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM THE COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS

BETWEEN:

NEW ENGLAND BIOLABS, INC
APPLICANT

AND:

F. HOFFMANN-LA ROCHE AG
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

EMMETT J

DATE:

15 DECEMBER 2004

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. This is another stage in the dispute concerning Patent Application No. 632857 (‘the Patent Application’), which relates to a purified thermostable DNA polymerase. This proceeding is an appeal under s 104(7) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (‘the Act’) from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents allowing amendments at the behest of the respondent, F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG (‘Hoffmann’). The amendments were opposed by the applicant, New England Biolabs, Inc (‘NEB’).

    PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

  2. The Patent Application was filed on 8 October 1990. It was advertised as accepted on 14 January 1993 and notice of opposition was filed by NEB on 14 April 1993. On 12 November 1997, a delegate of the Commissioner upheld the opposition in relation to certain claims but rejected the opposition in relation to the balance of the claims. While the Commissioner’s delegate reserved to Hoffmann the right to request amendments, that right was not taken up at that stage. Rather, both parties appealed to this Court under s 60 of the Act in so far as the delegate’s decision was contrary to its interests.

  3. The appeals under s 60 came before me and, on 28 April 2000, in giving a ruling on the admissibility of evidence in the course of the hearing of the appeals, I expressed my views as to the nature of an appeal in opposition proceedings: see F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG v New England…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCA 1651
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This appeal involves the dispute over Patent Application No. 632857, which concerns a purified thermostable DNA polymerase. The applicant, New England Biolabs, Inc (NEB), opposed the respondent, F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG (Hoffmann), in allowing amendments to the patent application. The Commissioner of Patents had granted leave for the amendments, which NEB opposed. The central legal issue in this appeal was whether the Commissioner’s delegate had correctly exercised the discretion to grant leave for the amendments and if the proposed amendments would result in a broader claim than permitted by the Patents Act 1990. Specifically, the Court needed to determine whether the proposed amendments would make Claim 86 broader than Claim 3, which would contravene the statutory provisions.

The Court considered the statutory framework and the specific language of the claims in the Patent Application. It found that Claim 3, when read in conjunction with Claim 1, was broader than Claim 86. Therefore, the proposed amendments would not result in Claim 86 being broader than Claim 3, which would otherwise contravene sections 102(1) and 102(2)(a) of the Act. The Court concluded that the Commissioner’s delegate had not erred in granting leave for the amendments. The Court further found that NEB’s arguments concerning inequitable conduct did not affect the discretion to grant leave for amendments.

As a result of this reasoning, the Court dismissed the appeal. The Court determined that none of the grounds relied upon by NEB had been substantiated, and therefore, the appeal was dismissed with costs.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1.

The appeal be dismissed with costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

This is another stage in the dispute concerning Patent Application No. 632857 (‘the Patent Application’), which relates to a purified thermostable DNA polymerase. This proceeding is an appeal under s 104(7) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (‘the Act’) from a decision of the Commissioner of Patents allowing amendments at the behest of the respondent, F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG (‘Hoffmann’). The amendments were opposed by the applicant, New England Biolabs, Inc (‘NEB’). PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The Patent Application was filed on 8 October 1990. It was advertised as accepted on 14 January 1993 and notice of opposition was filed by NEB on 14 April 1993. On 12 November 1997, a delegate of the Commissioner upheld the opposition in relation to certain claims but rejected the opposition in relation to the balance of the claims. While the Commissioner’s delegate reserved to Hoffmann the right to request amendments, that right was not taken up at that stage. Rather, both parties appealed to this Court under s 60 of the Act in so far as the delegate’s decision was contrary to its interests. The appeals under s 60 came before me and, on 28 April 2000, in giving a ruling on the admissibility of evidence in the course of the hearing of the appeals, I expressed my views as to the nature of an appeal in opposition proceedings: see F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG v New England Biolabs, Inc. (2000) 99 FCR 56; [2000] FCA 283. As a consequence, NEB discontinued its appeal and its opposition to Hoffmann’s appeal and gave an undertaking to apply to the Court for revocation within three days after the grant of any patent pursuant to the Patent Application. However, no order has yet been made on Hoffmann’s appeal. Hoffmann had originally foreshadowed an application to the Court for orders directing amendment of its complete specification. However, at a directions hearing, following the discontinuance by NEB, I tentatively expressed the view that the Court may not have power to direct amendment: F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG v Commissioner of Patents [2000] FCA 1845 at [7] and [8]. Hoffmann therefore abandoned its application to the Court for orders directing amendment and on 19 June 2000 filed a request to the Commissioner to amend the specification pursuant to s 104. I concluded that it was in the public interest to ensure that any amendment that might affect the validity of any patent should be made prior to grant. Accordingly, I deferred the consideration of Hoffmann’s appeal until after Hoffmann’s amendment application under s 104 had been dealt with. A delegate of the Commissioner granted Hoffmann leave to amend on 20 October 2000 and that leave was advertised on 9 November 2000. On 9 February 2001 NEB filed a notice of opposition to the amendments. NEB also appealed to this Court under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) seeking to impugn the Commissioner’s decision to grant leave to amend on the ground that the Commissioner’s delegate failed to have regard to what was described by NEB as ‘inequitable conduct’. That proceeding also came before me and I concluded that the Commissioner has no discretionary power at the stage of granting leave to amend. The Commissioner’s decision to grant leave was confirmed: see New England Biolabs Inc v Commissioner of Patents (2001) 110 FCR 357; [2001] FCA 787.

Decision

Reasons for decision

EMMETT J
That phrase must be considered in the light of Claim 3. Claim 3, construed by reading the language of Claim 1 into it, is as follows:A purified thermostable DNA polymerase isolated from Thermus aquaticus, said polymerase having a molecular weight of about 86,000 to 95,000 daltons as compared to phosphorylase B by SDS-PAGE.That is to say, Claim 86, without the qualification would, in effect, be the same as Claim 3. Thus, Claim 3 is broader than, and includes, Claim 86. It follows that Claim 86 following the proposed amendments would not be broader than Claim 3 and ss 102(1) and 102(2)(a) would not preclude the proposed amendments.CONCLUSION None of the grounds relied on by NEB has been made out. It follows that the appeal should be dismissed with costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: EMMETT J

The court considered whether the Commissioner of Patents has the discretionary power to grant leave to amend the specification at the stage of granting leave. The court noted that the Commissioner's decision to grant leave was not subject to judicial review until after the amendment had been made. The court concluded that the Commissioner did indeed have the authority to grant such leave at that stage, as the power to grant leave to amend is a discretionary one vested in the Commissioner.

The court then turned to the question of whether the proposed amendments to the specification would broaden the claims, which would be precluded by sections 102(1) and 102(2)(a) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth). The court examined the proposed amendments in light of the existing claims, particularly Claim 3. The court found that Claim 3, as construed, included the content of Claim 86. Therefore, the proposed amendments would not broaden the claims, as they would not introduce new subject matter that was not already covered by Claim 3. Consequently, sections 102(1) and 102(2)(a) of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) did not preclude the amendments.

In reaching its decision, the court applied the principles of statutory interpretation and the specific provisions of the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) concerning amendments to patent specifications. The court followed established authority on the Commissioner's discretionary powers and the scope of permissible amendments under the Act. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the Commissioner of Patents has the discretion to grant leave to amend a specification at the stage of granting leave, and such amendments do not necessarily broaden the claims if they are consistent with the scope of existing claims.