Nepali v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Nepali v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] FCA 62

Appeal from: Nepali v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCCA 1180
File number: NSD 712 of 2019
Judge: PERRAM J
Date of judgment: 7 February 2020
Catchwords:

MIGRATION – appeal from Federal Circuit Court – whether Court erred in dismissing application for judicial review of decision of Administrative Appeals Tribunal to refuse to issue Appellants Regional Employer Nomination (Permanent) (Class RN) (Subclass 187) visas – where employer’s nomination of First Appellant refused – where Tribunal issued Appellants a letter under Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 359A inviting comment on effect of nomination refusal on visa application – where no response received from Appellants and Tribunal proceeded to refuse application without a hearing – whether denial of a hearing constituted denial of procedural fairness – whether primary judge failed to consider evidence in its totality – whether primary judge’s decision affected by bias

MIGRATION – where Appellants submitted that letter sent under s 359A was sent to their migration agent who never passed it onto them – application of ‘authorised recipient’ provision in s 379G

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 359A, 359C, 360, 363A, 379A, 379C, 379G

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) regs 4.17, 5.19, Sch 2 cll 187.233, 187.234, 187.311

Migration (LIN 19/047: Specification of Occupations—Subclass 187 Visa) Instrument 2019 (Cth)

Cases cited: VNAA v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 134; 136 FCR 407
Date of hearing: 19 November 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 33
Counsel for the Appellants: The First Appellant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter and made submissions on behalf of all Appellants
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mr L Dennis of Minter Ellison
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 712 of 2019
BETWEEN:

NAVIN NEPALI

First Appellant

AMITA RISAL

Second Appellant

NICHOLAS NEPALI

Third Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

PERRAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 FEBRUARY 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The First and Second Appellants pay the First Respondent’s costs as taxed or agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

PERRAM J:

BACKGROUND

  1. This is an appeal from the Federal Circuit Court.  The underlying dispute concerns whether the Appellants, who are a family, are entitled to permanent residency visas.  It was determined by a delegate of the First Respondent (‘the Minister’) and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) that the First Appellant, who is the husband, was not entitled to the substantive visa for which he had applied and that his wife, the Second Appellant, and their son, the Third Appellant, were not entitled to visas as members of the…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 62
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Nepali v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involved an appeal by the Appellants against the Federal Circuit Court's dismissal of their application for judicial review of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's decision to refuse their Regional Employer Nomination (Permanent) (Class RN) (Subclass 187) visas. The Appellants argued that the Tribunal's decision-making process was flawed and that the refusal of their employer's nomination and subsequent refusal of their visa application was unjust.

The central legal issues were whether the Tribunal's refusal to issue the Appellants a hearing before deciding their visa application constituted a denial of procedural fairness and whether the primary judge had failed to consider all relevant evidence in its totality. Additionally, the Appellants contended that the primary judge's decision may have been influenced by bias. The Court examined the Tribunal's correspondence with the Appellants, particularly a letter under section 359A of the Migration Act 1958, which invited the Appellants to comment on the effect of their employer's nomination refusal on their visa application. The Appellants' argument that the letter was sent to their migration agent but never passed on to them was considered in light of section 379G, which addresses the concept of an 'authorised recipient'.

The Court found that the Tribunal's correspondence clearly outlined the legal consequences of not responding to the letter, and there was no indication that the Appellants had not received it. The Court further held that the evidence presented to the primary judge, including the Appellants' failure to respond to the Tribunal's correspondence, was sufficient to justify the Tribunal's decision. The Court was satisfied that the primary judge had considered the evidence comprehensively and that there was no evidence of bias in the judge's reasons for judgment.

The Court dismissed the appeal and ordered the Appellants to pay the First Respondent's costs, as taxed or agreed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The First and Second Appellants pay the First Respondent’s costs as taxed or agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

So the Tribunal explicitly identified the effect of cl 187.223(3) and it explicitly foreshadowed that if that were correct it could affirm the decision under review. And, a little later in the same letter, the Tribunal indicated that if the Appellants did not respond in the set timeframe, it could affirm the decision under review without a further hearing:If we do not receive your comments or response within the period allowed or as extended, we may make a decision on the review without taking any further action to obtain your views on the information. You will also lose any entitlement you might otherwise have had under the Migration Act 1958 to appear before us to give evidence and present arguments.(Emphasis original.) In that regard, it was foreshadowing the effect of s 359C(2) (extracted at [15] above). It follows that I agree with the learned primary judge’s analysis. And, subject to the argument I deal with below, like his Honour, I do not think that it can be said that the letter of 3 February 2017 was not received by the Appellants. In relation to the third ground, the Appellants did not identify in this Court what the evidence in its totality or cumulatively was. However, the relevant evidence on the application before the primary judge consisted of the letter of 3 February 2017, the ancillary evidence about its delivery and the fact that it had not been responded to. Having read all of the appeal papers I do not see how anything else in them could detract from (or even add to) the legal consequences of those facts. I do not therefore accept the submission that his Honour had failed to consider the evidence cumulatively or in its totality. Likewise, I am unable to identify anything which his Honour took into account which was irrelevant or to conceive of some other material beyond the correspondence which might have been relevant to the s 359C(2) issue. In relation to the fourth ground, I was not taken to the transcript before the primary judge and the only material upon which to assess the suggestion that his Honour was biased is his Honour’s reasons for judgment. Nothing in those reasons discloses anything which might remotely ground an allegation that his Honour had not brought a fair mind to the determination of the case. There is, in that circumstance, no substance in the submission that the decision was affected by bias. At the hearing of the present appeal on 19 November 2019 the First Appellant submitted that the reason for the Appellants’ non-response to the letter of 3 February 2017 was that it was sent to their migration agent, and the migration agent failed to pass the letter onto them. Relevantly to that submission, s 379G(1) of the Act provides:Authorised recipient(1)If:(a)a person (the applicant) applies for review of a Part 5-reviewable decision; and(b)the applicant gives the Tribunal written notice of the name and address of another person (the authorised recipient) authorised by the applicant to receive documents in connection with the review;the Tribunal must give the authorised recipient, instead of the applicant, any document that it would otherwise have given to the applicant.Note:If the Tribunal gives a person a document by a method specified in section 379A, the person is taken to have received the document at the time specified in section 379C in respect of that method.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established