Nepal v Minister for Immigration - [2014] FCCA 2463

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEPAL v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR

[2014] FCCA 2463

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Migration Review Tribunal – hearing dates – claim about representation – illnesses of person allegedly representing the applicant – no discretion to allow unqualified persons to represent – assistance to court by friend.

Legislation:

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), s.44.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.65, 276, 280.

Judicial Act 1903 (Cth).

Applicant:

ARUN NEPAL

First Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent:

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number:

BRG 510 of 2013

Judgment of:

Judge Coates

Hearing date:

17 October 2014

Date of Last Submission:

17 October 2014

Delivered at:

Brisbane

Delivered on:

27 October 2014

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicant:

In person

Counsel for the Respondents:

Ms A J Stoker

Solicitors for the Respondents:

Clayton Utz

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT BRISBANE

BRG 510 of 2013

ARUN NEPAL

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

MIGRATION REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

On 26 April 2013, the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) affirmed a decision of the delegate for the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, then known as the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship, not to grant Mr Arun Nepal a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa under s.65 of the Migration Act 1958.
Mr Nepal comes from the country of Nepal.
In response to that, Mr Otto Remely filed an application on 20 May 2013, seeking review of the decision.
Mr Nepal and Mr Remely claim they are in a de facto relationship.
There have been numerous appearances since then.
At all times Mr Remely had been informed by the court that he could not be the applicant and that Mr Nepal had to make the application, a path the Minister would not object to even though it was out of time.
On 31 July 2013, Mr Remely filed an application that Mr Nepal be joined as a party.
That matter was subsequently decided by the Federal Court of Australia on appeal which substituted Mr Nepal as the applicant.
The appeal decision also upheld this court’s decision that:
a) Mr Remely was not a person who could be an applicant, and
b) Mr Remely could not represent Mr Nepal by exercising a power of attorney for Mr Nepal.
On Friday, 17 October 2014, I mentioned the matter.
The mention was to merely set a date for the hearing of the substantive review application, after deciding whether the final hearing could proceed by telephone.
I allowed Mr Nepal to appear by telephone from Bundaberg, where he lives with Mr Remely, because:
a)There has been a history whereby Mr Nepal and Mr Remely have not appeared personally;
b)The issues seemed uncomplicated, and
c)Such a simple appearance could be efficiently conducted by telephone.
Because of alleged numerous difficulties in having Mr Nepal appear in Brisbane, and because the Federal Circuit Court also serves litigants who live in regional Australia, I raised the issue of hearing the matter at Bundaberg, where the parties live.
I wanted to set the matter down for hearing at Bundaberg, on Monday 1 December 2014. I canvassed the date with the parties because of previous statements by Mr Remely that he would have to check his diary to ensure he did not have a medical or other important health appointment.
During the mention, Mr Remely did not say that he was otherwise occupied on 1 December 2014, keeping in mind that he is not a party, although he is in a relationship with the applicant.
However, he objected to attending court personally, insisting that pursuant to this court’s rules the matter may be and must be heard by telephone.
Mr Nepal does not object to the matter being heard in Bundaberg, however, he does object to appearing personally in court.
Prior to the mention on Friday 17 October 2014, but well after the Federal Court heard his appeal in relation to joining the proceedings, he filed an application to have all future hearings, including the final hearing, conducted by telephone. That was filed On Wednesday 17 September 2014.
Mr Nepal did not give evidence by affidavit as to why he needs the matter conducted by telephone.
The supporting affidavit was filed by Mr Remely.
Mr Remely’s evidence goes to two matters – firstly that he is representing Mr Nepal, and secondly, that he, Mr Remely, cannot possibly appear in person because of his medical conditions and consequently, Mr Nepal cannot appear because he does not understand the proceedings and is afraid to go alone.
I asked Mr Nepal whether he understood the English language and a question as to whether he had read the appeal decision of Logan J in this matter, an issue I will come back too.
The issues of Mr Remely representing the applicant and the issue of appearing by telephone, are separate issues, but also closely linked.
As to representation, Mr Remely is not a legal practitioner, however, he insists that a number of Acts of Parliament, combined, allow him to represent Mr Nepal. Mr Remely gave submissions which equate to him having a right to represent Mr Nepal. Mr Remely’s affidavit filed 1 September 2014, at paragraph 2, states:
“My partner of more than five years now, Mr Arun Nepal, who is the applicant in these proceedings has a right to be heard and has appointed me to represent him under s.276(d) of the Migration Act 1958(Cth)…”
There is no question arising as to the first statement about Mr Nepal having the right to be heard. He does have that right. He will be heard. But this issue of Mr Remely representing him has characterised this case, as the last major hearing in this court, among other matters, also dealt with his insistence that he had a right to represent Mr Nepal because he exercised those rights as his power of attorney.
I tried to reduce the arguments before me, and thus the length of time for this particular part of the case, by allowing Mr Remely to assist, in much the same way as a McKenzie friend would assist, whether he is called a McKenzie friend or not. I must say I had always regarded his assistance to Mr Nepal in that manner.
I was unsuccessful in shortening this part of the hearing, as Mr Remely vehemently objected to being described as a McKenzie friend or in any other manner other than being Mr Nepal’s representative. He was immovable on this subject.
He stated in his affidavit filed 1 September 2014 that he had been “appointed” pursuant to s.276(d) of the Migration Act to represent Mr Nepal. He was asserting a right to represent Mr Nepal.
His case was that as he was Mr Nepal’s representative, his personal difficulties in appearing in court to make representations on behalf of Mr Nepal must be taken into account, so that the case should be conducted over the telephone. By referring to representations, he is referring to both factual and legal representations.
In lengthy oral submissions on 17 October 2014, Mr Remely expanded his submissions as being the representative.
Of the Migration Act, I heard Mr Remely refer to ss.203, 276 & 280 of the Migration Act. I will come to ss.276 and 280, but I will quote what he said about s.203, which is in the transcript from about line 12 on page 26: “That can really be done the way I said. It’s very simple. It’s a telephone hearing…very clear issues. There is a section 203 and s.203(a) are essential issues of this application and as the Migration Review Tribunal…to consider 203 and consequently and subsequently there was a notification error which is explained in another document that I’ve foiled. And I would suggest, your Honour, that you read those documents, please The other…”.
I have included this part of the transcript as it appears and it coincides with my recollection of what I head. There are parts when the submissions are not clear to the transcriber as indicated.
This type of submission clearly identifies a major issue in this matter if it is heard by telephone, being:
a) Not all of the submissions made by Mr Remely are clear and this particular appearance is not the only example;
b) He refers to documents which will need to be identified, and
c) The reference to s.203 just makes no sense at all, because that section of the Migration Act refers to the deportation of visa holders convicted of criminal offences.
That mistakes like this occur, and they could be mistakes on my part because of the difficulty the telephone appearance caused, are issues which I need to be able to properly address, and are a clear indication as to why telephone appearances in this particular matter are difficult to conduct.
When matters like this arise, it also makes proper control of the proceeding difficult or impossible.
However, I need to consider Mr Remely’s case as to whether he has the power to be appointed as a representative.
Section 44 of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act1999 (Cth) applies to representation, and states:
“s.44 Representation
A party to a proceeding before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia is not entitled to be represented by another person unless:
(a) under the Judiciary Act 1903, the other person is entitled to practise as a barrister or solicitor, or both, in a federal court; or
(b) under the regulations, the other person is taken to be an authorised representative; or
(c) another law of the Commonwealth authorises the other person to represent the party.”
Mr Remely did not refer me to the Judiciary Act 1903 or any regulation. He relies on s.44(c), his case being that the various sections of the Migration Act, being another law of the Commonwealth, authorises him to represent the applicant Mr Nepal.
He then referred me to s.276 of the Migration Act.
It is headed Immigration Assistance. It states:
“s.276 Immigration assistance
(1)    For the purposes of this Part, a person gives immigration assistance if the person uses, or purports to use, knowledge of, or experience in, migration procedure to assist a visa applicant or cancellation review applicant by:
(a)    preparing, or helping to prepare, the visa application or cancellation review application; or
(b)    advising the visa applicant or cancellation review applicant about the visa application or cancellation review application; or
(c)     preparing for proceedings before a court or review authority in relation to the visa application or cancellation review application; or
(d)    representing the visa applicant or cancellation review applicant in proceedings before a court or review authority in relation to the visa application or cancellation review application.
(2)    For the purposes of this Part, a person also gives immigration assistance if the person uses, or purports to use, knowledge of, or experience in, migration procedure to assist another person by:
(a)    preparing, or helping to prepare, a document indicating that the other person nominates or sponsors a visa applicant for the purposes of the regulations; or
(b)    advising the other person about nominating or sponsoring a visa applicant for the purposes of the regulations; or
(c)     representing the other person in proceedings before a court or review authority that relate to the visa for which the other person was nominating or sponsoring a visa applicant (or seeking to nominate or sponsor a visa applicant) for the purposes of the regulations.
(2A) For the purposes of this Part, a person also gives immigration assistance if the person uses, or purports to use, knowledge of, or experience in, migration procedure to assist another person by:
(a)    preparing, or helping to prepare, a request to the Minister to exercise his or her power under section 351, 391, 417, 454 or 501J in respect of a decision (whether or not the decision relates to the other person); or
(aa) preparing, or helping to prepare, a request to the Minister to exercise a power under section 195A, 197AB or 197AD (whether or not the exercise of the power would relate to the other person); or
(b)    advising the other person about making a request referred to in paragraph (a) or (aa).
(3)    Despite subsections (1), (2) and (2A), a person does not give immigration assistance if he or she merely:
(a)    does clerical work to prepare (or help prepare) an application or other document; or
(b)    provides translation or interpretation services to help prepare an application or other document; or
(c)     advises another person that the other person must apply for a visa; or

(d) passes on to another person information produced by a third person, without giving substantial comment on or explanation of the information.

(4) A person also does not give immigration assistance in the

I have set this section out in full because it is obvious that Mr Remely considers his representation as being “immigration assistance” within terms of the section. The term “immigration assistance” is not defined in the Act, but the nature of such assistance to a person is a concept readily understood by reference in the section and includes acts such as preparation, advising and representing people applying for visas or challenging decisions about visas, including before courts exercising appropriate jurisdiction.
Section 276(1)(d), as seen from the section I have included above, refers to representation in a court, which is a key part of Mr Remely’s case.
However, it cannot be taken that the section authorises any act of representation to be performed by one person for another, although I suspect that is what Mr Remely is implying in his case.
That is because s.280 sets out restrictions on people giving immigration assistance. It restricts the giving of “immigration assistance” by persons who are not registered migration agents.
The section then excludes certain people from its restrictions, including parliamentarians and lawyers discharging their legal duties, as well as others.
Mr Remely made submissions as to what part of s.280 he relied on and it took a number of attempts for me to understand what he was identifying.
I thought he was referring to subsection 5 but that would not make sense, as it allows for “immigration assistance” on issues not applicable to Mr Nepal’s application. That section goes to people giving advice if not for reward, but is limited to matters in s.276(2A). Those matters are not applicable in Mr Nepal’s case.
Listening to the recording of the submissions, he clarified his position and was referring to, as I understood the case, s.280, one, five, C – I have spelled this out because in searching the Act, there is s.280(5C). There is a difficulty in following Mr Remely’s submissions and hearing by telephone magnifies those difficulties. He confirmed it was s.280(5C) he was relying on.
Section 280(5C) states:
“This section does not prevent a person sponsoring a visa applicant for the purposes of the regulations from giving immigration assistance to the applicant.”
Mr Remely is not a sponsoring party, in that he is not an employer sponsoring an employee or a family member sponsoring another member, as far as I understand those terms.
The submission by the Minister’s representative was that Mr Remely has misconceived the sections, because the sections come under Part 3 of the Migration Act and apply to those who can give advice, being registered migration agents and those who are exempt from the need for such registration. Mr Remely is not a person the Act applies to, other than excluding him from representing applicants. The sections come under the heading of Part 3, Migration Agents and Immigration Assistance.
Mr Remely did not take me to any argument that such an interpretation by the Minister’s lawyer must be incorrect.
I was not taken to the Judiciary Act by Mr Remely.
That important Act applies to the status of legal practitioners in relation to proceedings and representation.
The Act sets out when a practitioner may appear in a Commonwealth court and addresses the wider issue which is not apparent in Mr Remely’s argument, that the Migration Act allows legal practitioners to appear and that their status is governed by the Judiciary Act. Further, the Act sets out when a registered migration agent can give “immigration assistance”.
There is a range of legal duties and ethical issues which accompany representation encompassed by the Judiciary Act, even though not stated as such.
The Migration Act does not diminish those responsibilities of a representative, and exemptions of people specified in s.280 does not of course negative the responsibility they have in an appearance before a court or a tribunal. The issue of representation is one of public policy, and one which on my reading of the provisions of the various acts put forward by Mr Remely, do not give him the right to represent the applicant.
As I read the Acts I was referred to, there is no discretion available to the court to allow a non-qualified person to represent another party in court.
The court can and has exercised a discretion to allow Mr Remely to give submissions in the capacity of, or in a similar manner similar as a McKenzie friend would, and that is a matter which he seemed to be unwilling to accept.
But Mr Remely also relied on his medical conditions to avoid having Mr Nepal appear personally before the court for his application, and I did not take it that should he fail on his case about being able to represent Mr Nepal, then his medical conditions are a separate issue.
In taking me through his affidavit filed 1 September 2014, I had difficulty identifying his references to medical certificates.
I was taken to annexure A, where Mr Remely identified what he said was evidence from his doctor, Dr Anura Tennakoon.
It was apparent that I was looking at a different annexure which carried the heading annexure A.
I discovered that is because in opening the affidavit, there are two documents which carry the heading annexure A. One is annexure A to Mr Remely’s affidavit and one is annexure A to the affidavit of Dr Tennakoon.
That is because the document which purports to be an affidavit of Dr Tennakoon is attached to Mr Remely’s affidavit as annexure B.
I point this out because this type of documentary issue is apparent in the numerous documents filed by Mr Remely over the course of these proceedings. Identification of documents is another difficulty the court has in trying to deal with these very important matters by telephone.
In any case, putting aside the fact as to whether there is medical evidence properly before the court, as I have the power to do in proceeding on a less formal basis, the submission was clearly that the medical evidence was that Mr Remely could not attend court.
Also included in that affidavit filed 1 September 2014 is an application, at annexure D, called an interlocutory application, which I was not taken to by either party during the telephone appearance on 17 October 2014. That is an application for Mr Nepal’s “bridging Visa WE issues 2 April 2014 be amended”. The application goes on to seek orders that the conditions attached to the current visa preventing Mr Nepal from engaging in employment be deleted. The application is said to seek the removal of other conditions, but these are not specified. As I state, I was not asked to deal with that application, but I am sure that I will be asked to deal with that application. It is another reason why telephone appearances about applications which are important to Mr Nepal become extremely difficult to manage by telephone. I should state that Logan J referred to that application in his judgment delivered 23 May 2014, at paragraph 50, where he stated the application was misconceived but in light of the orders he was about to make, the application was unnecessary. If that matter has not been finalised, and I am asked to deal with that matter, I will do so at an appropriate time. But I need to point out that I do not understand why the application was attached to Mr Remely’s affidavit filed 1 September 2014 and trying to deal with numerous matters, relevant or not, by telephone, becomes difficult, if not impossible. It is the flood of material, some of which is irreverent, which causes the possibility of mistaking the case which Mr Nepal may present on his substantive application about the Tribunal’s decision, which he needs to challenge.

Returning to the medical conditions of Mr Remely.
There are three sets of doctors’ materials he relies on to state he cannot attend at court.
Annexure C is a copy of what is said to be a cardiology report. It is not Mr Remely’s document but it about him. The report was completed on 12 July 2012 and is apparently a discharge summary from a hospital. I am expected on one hand to take into account medical notes, yet on the other, in Mr Remely’s own submission, I am not a doctor, yet I wanted to overrule what the doctors are stating about his capacity to attend court. That is not the case. I want to determine matters on evidence properly before the court, if such matters require evidence to be filed.
Whatever the cardiology report may mean, I accept that I am not medically qualified and although I can read about the heart condition applicable to Mr Remely as at 12 July 2012, the report itself does not assist me in understanding his position of not being able to attend at court.
He also attached a report from Dr Tennakoon, dated 3 April 2014.
Apart from touching on various conditions, Dr Tennakoon states:
“… Due to his disabilities he needs lot (sic) of support and I understand he currently get (sic) from his his (sic) partner. He finds it difficult to travel long distances and go on public transport due to his medical problems and mobility impairments. It would be better if he could limit travelling”.
The first sentence mentions the support he needs, although that is not particularised. The doctor offers no evidence as to his partner helping him, but I assume that could be the case if Mr Remely’s evidence is accepted. If the sentence means that the applicant assists Mr Remely to get from point A to point B, then an appearance in court will not disturb the arrangement.
The next sentence states nothing more than Mr Remely’s difficulty in travelling long distances and on public transport. The third sentence states it would be better if he limited travelling. I stress report refers to Mr Remely’s own decisions to limit his own travel.
The statement does not say Mr Remely cannot travel.
Although there was no description by Dr Tennakoon as to what travelling a long distance would be, the Bundaberg court, as far as I can determine is about 2.8 kilometres from Mr Remely’s residence at King Street, Bundaberg.
I asked Mr Remely whether he travels further to his doctor, a question he avoided answering. He could avoid answering that question because of the difficulty the court has in controlling its procedures in this matter because of the telephone appearance. The address of the doctor is in Maryborough Street, which on a perusal of Google maps appears to be further from Mr Remely’s residence than the court, which in Quay Street.
There was no real challenge to the fact that the court is not very far from Mr Remely’s residence, however, I do not lose sight of the fact that the evidence Mr Remely relies on, despite his interpretation of it, does not prevent him from travelling.
The next statement of Dr Teenakoon attached to his affidavit, dated 2 May 2014, appears to be an inadmissible statement about the existence of a de facto relationship between Mr Remely and Mr Nepal. It is inadmissible because it is not relevant to any question before the court, although if I am incorrect in that proposition in the final hearing, I may have to consider whether the statement has relevance. I will state that I do not think it is doubted on the untested evidence that there is what is called a de facto relationship.
Dr Teenakoon states that since attending on his practice, Mr Remely’s health has progressively deteriorated and that he is “totally reliant on Arun to assist him in his living activities”.
The statement refers to medical conditions – vertigo, restricted mobility, blindness in the right eye and restricted vision in the left eye, on-going pain and that he is on strong painkilling medication.
The doctor states:
“Due to his conditions it is impossible for Otto to walk further than a few insecure steps let alone extended travel or lengthy official attendances and I would strongly advise against such activities. Due to his medication he also frequently has difficulties to remain concentrated and focused”.
Based on that paragraph, I asked Mr Remely whether he used a wheelchair and he confirmed that he did.
The court at Bundaberg has disabled access and lifts for people who use a wheelchair.
He does not have to then take any steps.
He does not have to undertake extended travel.
I suspect this evidence was prepared because of the issue raised by Logan J in the appeal judgment when he stated that the matter before him may have to be held in Brisbane, and that is why there is a reference to not being able to undertake extended travel.
I agree that Mr Remely does not remain focused on the issues in question at any particular time.
That is why, in the interests of determining the matter so that I could hear the application in an appropriate manner, I offered to attend at the Bundaberg court.
At a previous mention before me, Mr Remely said words to the effect when that proposition was raised that he would have to check that he did not have a medical appointment or something of that nature – which was not ruling out an appearance in Bundaberg despite medical issues.
The comment that he cannot attend to “lengthy official attendances” is a set of circumstances applicable to Mr Remely only.
I guess it really refers to a court appearance.
But I need to clarify this important point, Mr Remely is not himself required to appear in a court proceeding in regard to this application.
The applicant is required to appear in court, and only because the applicant wants a question resolved in relation to the Migration Review Tribunal decision.
I understand the evidence of Dr Teenakoon, but at no stage does any of his evidence state Mr Remely cannot attend court, it merely states that he has numerous difficulties.
The applicant does not want to appear in court without him, he told me, but inevitably, the court needs to be able to determine his application.
When hearing the appeal, Logan J made the following observation, at paragraph 36:
“…Even so, there is still a necessary degree of difference to the orderly conduct of a judicial proceeding which must attend the making of any submissions. When a proceeding is conducted by telephone and when the issue is one which is so deeply personal even following when one is permitted and not permitted to make submissions and deferring to judicial control of proceedings can be difficult for a litigant in person. That difficulty was on display on 14 May 2014”.
It is this aspect of being able to control this proceeding which causes me to exercise the discretion I have pursuant to s.68 of the Federal Circuit Court Act in not allowing the matter to proceed by telephone, at least if Mr Nepal remains unrepresented.
Some matters can be readily conducted by telephone, however, if I allow this matter to proceed by telephone link, then:
a)There is the very strong probability that the court will be taken into irrelevant areas;
b)Such diversions will be difficult to control if the parties are not in person because the telephone link is such that when one person is talking, they cannot hear directions being given by the court and when a person talks on without any control, as could occur here, the court will in effect lose control of the proceeding;
c)Despite Mr Remely’s submissions on 17 October 2014 that there are not many documents to peruse, there are in fact many filed documents and I have doubts that determining what is actually relevant to the application challenging the Tribunal decision will be effective over the telephone;
d)If Mr Remely chooses to attend personally in Bundaberg to assist the applicant, then the court can allow appropriate rests to be given if such is needed;
e)As the applicant does not have a legal representative, there are possibly some questions which he and he alone must answer, especially in relation to submissions made;
f)The court is aware of Mr Nepal’s lack of English language, and offered an interpreter, which he turned down, however, that does not mean that he should be put in a position whereby he cannot understand the nature of the proceedings;
g)There have been claims previously by Mr Remely that he has not been able to hear things by telephone and I am conscious that the parties should be present so as to get over such claims;
h)There have also been claims by Mr Remely that material has not been served on him and again that is good reason for the parties to be in each other’s presence in court so those difficulties, if they arise again, can be attended to;
i)There have been claims by Mr Remely that the court has been misled previously by submissions made by the Minister’s legal representatives and that is good reason for having the parties before the court, personally;
j)Mr Remely is resourceful in putting forward matters for consideration, and these need to be heard, but in a fashion which is orderly and where the proceedings of the court are not delayed unduly because of repetition of submissions. In my view, such cannot be achieved by telephone appearances in this particular matter;
k)While Mr Remely is passionate for his cause, the court has to be able control proceedings in an orderly manner. Unless the parties are before the court in person, I have little confidence that the matter can be properly controlled, and
l)There is no evidence of anything preventing Mr Nepal from appearing personally.
There is also an issue which concerned me greatly. I asked a question of Mr Nepal on Friday 14 October, 2014. I was at liberty to ask a question, as to whether he needs an interpreter, because that goes to his understanding of the English language. He answered to the effect that he understands the language. I asked whether he had read the judgment of Logan J in his appeal matter. Given that Mr Nepal was not represented by a lawyer, I am entitled to ask questions relevant to issues, including as to his understanding of English and the case. At that stage Mr Remely answered and I got the impression that he was refusing to allow Mr Nepal to speak. He denied that when I asked whether that was the case, but it is an example of the pressing need to have the applicant, who is not legally represented or represented by a registered migration agent, before the court. Observation of circumstances plays an important part in proceedings, whether it is regarding evidence or observing reactions.
Also, Mr Remely made it quite clear that he and Mr Nepal were not going to appear in court personally. In my view, such was a challenging statement. I need Mr Nepal to understand that should he not attend court, there will be the possibility that I will be asked to consider dismissing his application, which would mean that the decision of the Tribunal remains unchallenged. I understand he may be afraid of a court appearance as stated by Mr Remely, on the basis that he does not understand the proceeding, but I wonder if he has sought some free advice from a community legal centre, since I am told that he cannot get legal assistance otherwise. I raise this matter because it seems to me that he has had time and still has time. If he cannot afford to travel, it may be he could obtain such advice by telephone.
Finally, because the complaint has always been that Mr Nepal cannot afford legal assistance, I am going to offer a referral to a pro bono service pursuant to this court’s rules. It may be that such advice can be obtained without charge. I am loath to make an order without agreement, because there is no obligation on Mr Nepal to seek advice even if it could be offered for free.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and four (104) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Coates

Associate:

Date: 27 October 2014