FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1)
Nellie & Nellie [2023] FedCFamC1F 1050
File number: SYC 8520 of 2022 Judgment of: CAMPTON J Date of judgment: 8 December 2023 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – REGISTRATION OF ARBITRAL AWARD – Where husband objects to the registration of an award pursuant to reg 67Q of the Family Law Regulations 1984 (Cth) – Consideration of circumstances in which a court would not register an award – Interpretation of the meaning of “any reason” within reg 67Q of the Family Law Regulations 1984 (Cth) – Whether a condition can be imposed upon registration – Where the refusal of an application to register an award pursuant to reg 67Q is not a discretionary determination – Where the dispute to registration presents a binary choice being either the objector demonstrates the findings of fact to establish a reason as contemplated by the scheme of the Act and the Regulations for the award not to be registered or they do not – Where it would be farcical if “any reason” for the purposes of reg 67Q(3) could be the vehicle to drive a dummy run to subsequent litigation – Application dismissed Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) Pts IIIB, VIII, ss 10SM, 13A, 13E, 13H, 13J, 13K, 79
Family Law Regulations (1984) (Cth) reg 67B, 67Q
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 14.07
Cases cited: Entezam v Devi (2021) 62 Fam LR 637; [2021] FamCA 25
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
Keaty & Swann [2023] FedCFamC1F 178
Kingdom of Spain v Infrastructure Services Luxembourg Sàrl (2023) 275 CLR 292; [2023] HCA 11
McLaughlin & McLaughlin [2023] FedCFamC2F 1160
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355; [1998] HCA 28
Safi & Rafiq [2023] FedCFamC1F 692
TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v The Judges of the Federal Court of Australia (2013) 251 CLR 533; [2013] HCA 5
Westport Insurance Corporation v Gordian Runoff Ltd (2011) 244 CLR 239; [2011] HCA 37
Division: Division 1 First Instance Number of paragraphs: 60 Date of hearing: 6 December 2023 Place: Sydney Solicitor for the Applicant: Hall Partners Counsel for the Respondent: Mr Gardiner Solicitor for the Respondent: Bay Legal ORDERS
SYC 8520 of 2022 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN: MR NELLIE
Applicant
AND: MS NELLIE
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
CAMPTON J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 DECEMBER 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The relief sought by the Husband in paragraph 1 of his Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed 29 November 2023 objecting to the registration of the arbitral award of Mr B dated 8 November 2023 is dismissed.
2.Pursuant to s 13H of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) the arbitral award be and is hereby registered.
3.The arbitral award that has by this order been registered has, pursuant to s 13H(2) of the Act, effect as…
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- Nellie & Nellie [2023] FedCFamC1F 1050
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- [2023] FedCFamC1F 1050
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the husband had not provided any factual findings relevant to the arbitration process or its corruption that would justify objecting to the registration of the arbitral award. His objections were primarily based on the outcome of the arbitration, and he did not demonstrate any error of law or other valid reason as contemplated by the scheme of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) and the Family Law Regulations 1984 (Cth). The court concluded that the husband's desire for another hearing of the dispute was not a valid reason for objecting to the registration of the arbitral award. The court dismissed the husband's application objecting to the registration of the arbitral award and ordered that the award be forthwith registered. The court also listed the husband's application for review of the registered arbitral award for case management.
The court's decision was based on the principle that the determination of an objection to registration is not an administrative act, but rather a judicial function that involves a determination of questions of legal right or legal obligation. The court rejected the husband's argument that the term "any reason" in regulation 67Q(3) provided a complete discretion to the court to decide whether or not to register an arbitral award. The court held that the statutory interpretation of the regulation should be informed by its context and purpose, and that the husband's objections did not meet the threshold for refusing registration of the arbitral award.
The final orders of the court were that the husband's application objecting to the registration of the arbitral award was dismissed, the arbitral award was registered, and the costs of each party were reserved to the determination of the balance of the relief sought in the husband's application for review of the registered arbitral award. The court also listed the husband's application for review of the registered arbitral award for case management.
Orders
Orders of the court
SYC 8520 of 2022
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)
BETWEEN:
MR NELLIE
Applicant
AND:
MS NELLIE
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
CAMPTON J
DATE OF ORDER:
8 DECEMBER 2023
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The relief sought by the Husband in paragraph 1 of his Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed 29 November 2023 objecting to the registration of the arbitral award of Mr B dated 8 November 2023 is dismissed.
2. Pursuant to s 13H of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) the arbitral award be and is hereby registered.
3. The arbitral award that has by this order been registered has, pursuant to s 13H(2) of the Act, effect as if it is a decree made by this Court.
4. The costs of each of the husband and wife of and incidental to these orders are reserved to the determination of the balance of the relief sought in the Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed 29 November 2023.
5. The relief sought by the husband in paragraphs 2 – 8 of the Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed 29 November 2023 by way of review of the registered arbitral award of Mr B dated 8 November 2023 pursuant to s 13 J of the Act be listed for case management at 2.15 pm on 12 December 2023.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The husband’s submissions recorded as follows:15. It is in these circumstances, that the decision of Safi & Rafiq [2023] FedCFamC1F 692 (22 August 2023), (being a decision of Justice Campton), emerges as first instance authority to the effect that registration of an award follows more or less by administrative operation. (It is contended in this submission however, that the determination and points of principle taken in Safi are in fact, incorrect).(Emphasis added) The husband’s contention as to the identified part of the judgment in Safi & Rafiq is inaccurate. Whether the registration of an award is an administrative or judicial function was canvassed in detail with Safi & Rafiq at [32], [36], [37], [40] – [42], including what emerges from the High Court in TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v The Judges of the Federal Court of Australia (2013) 251 CLR 533 (“TCL Air Conditioner”) that registration is a determination in accordance with judicial process and necessarily involves a determination of questions of legal right or legal obligation at least as to the existence of, and parties to, an arbitral award. An order of the competent court determining the application on the merits then operates of its own force as a court order to create a new charter by reference to which those questions are in future to be decided as between the parties to the application. That is so for an order dismissing the application just as it is for one ordering that the arbitral award be enforced. This discerned the path of reasoning to the conclusion in [59] of Safi & Rafiq, which records:The final caveat I would raise in relation to the reasons in Entezam & Devi is that, for the reasons identified at [29]–[31] above, the determination of an objection to registration is not an administrative act.(Emphasis added) The husband said that upon registration of an award the Act has “profound effects on the legal status of the award” by the operation of ss 13J and 13K of the Act. The husband submitted as to the legislation and applicable principle underscoring the foundations of his objection to the registration of an arbitral awards that:(a)By way of statutory construction, the term “any reason” in reg 67Q(3) is:9. …the intentional nature of the language employed [such that] a complete discretion in terms of the decision to register an award or not; the judicial decision-making power of a court to decide whether or not the Court would recognize [sic] an award as being of the same effect, as if it were the product of a judgment of the Court.(Emphasis added)(b)“Any reason” is informed by what he described as the “significant constraints” imposed by ss 13J and 13K of the Act to questions of law, when cast against what he described as the more ample terms on which a litigant may appeal from a s 79 determination made by a Court through grounds “attacking the legal, factual and/or discretionary errors in that decision”. Putting it simply, the husband submits that the statutory interpretation of the regulation ought to employ the “meaning of the words actually used” as the “surest guide to legislative intention”. Contained within his submissions filed 2 December 2023 are plethora of authorities as to statutory interpretation. The husband did not start with ascertaining the text of the regulation considered in light of its context and purpose. If reading the text of the regulation in context permits of more than one potential meaning, the choice between those meanings may ultimately turn on an evaluation of the relative coherence of each with the scheme of the statute and its identified objects or policies (see Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 381). The husband did little to highlight the application of those principles identified to the fact of a discretion existing (as he asserts exists) not to register an arbitral award.