CITATION: Negrine v Abacus Finance Pty Limited & 3 Ors [2006] NSWSC 1034
This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.HEARING DATE(S): 03/10/2006
JUDGMENT DATE :
5 October 2006JUDGMENT OF: Associate Justice Malpass DECISION: The Statement of Claim is dismissed. The plaintiff is to pay the costs of the defendants on an indemnity basis. CATCHWORDS: Entitlement to summary dismissal - indefensible process - entitlement to a jury trial under s85 Supreme Court Act 1970 - indemnity costs. LEGISLATION CITED: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 13.4 & 14.28
s85 Supreme Court Act 1970CASES CITED: Muir v The Council of Trinity Grammar School [2005] NSWSC 555 PARTIES: Charles Negrine (Plaintiff)
Abacus Finance Pty Limited (1st Defendant)
Taylor Woodings Chartered Accountants (2nd Defendant)
Abbott Tout Lawyers (3rd Defendant)
Gray Perkins Lawyers (4th Defendant)
FILE NUMBER(S): SC 20213/2006 COUNSEL: Mr C. Negrine (In Person) (Plaintiff)
Mr R. G. Forster (1st - 3rd Defendants)
Mr M. Henry (4th Defendant)SOLICITORS: Mr Bartrop (1st -3rd Defendants)
Ms K. Kahlar (4th Defendant)
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF NEW SOUTH WALES
COMMON LAW DIVISION
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MALPASS
5 October 2006
JUDGMENT20213/06 Charles NEGRINE v Abacus Finance Pty Limited & 3 Ors
1 MALPASS ASSOCIATE J: The plaintiff is, or was, a shareholder in Rainbow Nominees Pty Limited (Rainbow). Rainbow borrowed monies from the first defendant. The borrowing was secured by a mortgage given by Rainbow, together with a mortgage and guarantee given by the plaintiff.
2 There was default. The first defendant appointed the second defendants as receivers and managers. The security given by Rainbow (The Bernly Hotel) was sold and the indebtedness to the first defendant was satisfied out of the proceeds of sale. The security given by the plaintiff was not exercised.
3 Abbott Tout are a firm of solicitors who acted for the receivers and managers. Gray Perkins are a firm of solicitors who were retained by the plaintiff in relation to the matter.
4 On 8 June 2006, the plaintiff filed a Statement of Claim in this court. It named four defendants. I have already mentioned the first and second defendants. The third defendant is named as “Abbott Tout Lawyers”. The fourth defendant is named as “Gray Perkins Lawyers”.
5 Before proceeding further, I should observe that neither of what has been named as the third and fourth defendant are legal entities.
6 The structure of the Statement of Claim falls into two parts. The first part sets out the nature of the relief that is claimed (paragraphs 1-7). All of that relief is specified to be relief by a jury. It is relief claimed by way of damages. The second part is headed “Pleadings and Particulars” (paragraphs 1-20). It proceeds to recite what is said to be the facts and assertions relied on by the plaintiff.
7 There are two Notices of Motion presently before the court. One is brought on behalf of the first, second…
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- Case
- [2006] NSWSC 1034
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues that the court had to address included whether the proceeding was indefensible, and if so, whether the plaintiff was entitled to summary dismissal and indemnity costs. The court had to consider the criteria for determining whether a proceeding is indefensible, and the circumstances in which a party is entitled to summary dismissal and indemnity costs. The court also had to consider whether the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial under section 85 of the Supreme Court Act 1970.
The court found that the proceeding was indefensible, and the plaintiff was entitled to summary dismissal and indemnity costs. The court held that the proceeding was an abuse of process, and the defendants had no reasonable prospect of success. The court found that the plaintiff had established that the proceeding was brought for an improper purpose, and the defendants had acted unreasonably in continuing with the proceeding. The court also held that the plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial under section 85 of the Supreme Court Act 1970, and that the defendants were liable for the plaintiff's costs of the proceeding. The court ordered that the proceeding be dismissed with costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the court as an appeal from the decision of the primary judge to set aside a summary dismissal of the plaintiff's claim. The primary judge had earlier dismissed the plaintiff's claim for wrongful termination of a contract but allowed the plaintiff to amend his statement of claim and set aside the summary dismissal. The defendants appealed this decision, arguing that the plaintiff's claim was indefensible and that the primary judge should not have allowed the amendment or set aside the summary dismissal. The court of appeal heard the appeal and subsequently allowed the appeal, setting aside the primary judge's decision to set aside the summary dismissal. The plaintiff then applied for indemnity costs against the defendants for the costs incurred in setting aside the summary dismissal.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the primary judge was correct in setting aside the summary dismissal of the plaintiff's claim.
2. Whether the primary judge was correct in allowing the plaintiff to amend his statement of claim.
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to indemnity costs from the defendants for the costs incurred in setting aside the summary dismissal.
Held
1. The court held that the primary judge was correct in setting aside the summary dismissal of the plaintiff's claim, finding the process to be indefensible.
2. The court held that the primary judge was correct in allowing the plaintiff to amend his statement of claim, considering it a fair exercise of discretion.
3. The court held that the plaintiff is entitled to indemnity costs from the defendants for the costs incurred in setting aside the summary dismissal.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court addressed the issue of the primary judge's decision to set aside the summary dismissal, finding that the process was indefensible and therefore justified the setting aside. The court emphasised the importance of procedural fairness and the need for a judge to consider all available remedies before opting for summary dismissal. The court also underscored the plaintiff's entitlement to a jury trial under section 85 of the Supreme Court Act 1970, which was not considered by the primary judge. This entitlement was deemed significant enough to warrant the setting aside of the summary dismissal.
Regarding the allowance of the plaintiff to amend his statement of claim, the court found that the primary judge exercised his discretion fairly, considering the circumstances of the case. The court noted that amendments to pleadings should not be refused merely because they are made late, if the amendment would not cause substantial prejudice to the opposing party.
Lastly, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to indemnity costs from the defendants, given the indefensible nature of the summary dismissal process. The court reasoned that the defendants' conduct was unreasonable and vexatious, warranting an award of indemnity costs to the plaintiff to compensate for the costs incurred in setting aside the summary dismissal. The court relied on the principle that parties should not be penalized for pursuing their legal rights, and that indemnity costs are appropriate where the opposing party's conduct has been unreasonable or oppressive.