Neason & Minister for Families and Communities

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 1)

Neason & Minister for Families and Communities [2023] FedCFamC1F 174

File number(s): PAC 4035 of 2021
Judgment of: HANNAM J
Date of judgment: 22 March 2023
Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PARENTING – Whether there is a significant change in circumstances to warrant a fresh hearing in respect of parenting arrangements – Consideration and application of the rule derived from Rice & Asplund (1970) FLC 90-725 – Where final orders were made following defended hearing placing the children in the care of the Minister of the Department of Communities and Justice – Where the mother seeks that one child move to live with her and other children commence family therapy – Where the Minister and ICL oppose the mother’s application – Where the children have expressed long held views to not have any contact with the maternal or paternal family – Where the children have been in stable placements for some time – Where there is limited prospect of success of the mother’s application – Where it is not in the best interests of the children to reopen the litigation – Mother’s application to reopen proceedings dismissed.
Cases cited:

Defrey & Radnor [2021] FamCAFC 67

Jarrah & Neason & Anor [2016] FamCAFC 213

Marsden & Winch [2009] FamCAFC 152

Miller & Harrington (2008) FLC 93-383

Neason & Department of Communities and Justice and Anor [2019] FamCA 649

Rice & Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725

Division: Division 1 First Instance
Number of paragraphs: 97
Date of last submission/s: 1 December 2022
Date of hearing: 20 October 2022
Place: Parramatta
Solicitor for the Applicant and Third Respondent: Mr Hill, Longman Hill Solicitors
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Andersen
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Crown Solicitors Office
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: Did not participate
Solicitor for the Independent Children's Lawyer: Mr Macdiarmid, Mark Macdiarmid Family Law Specialist

ORDERS

PAC 4035 of 2021

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

BETWEEN:

MS NEASON

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR FAMILILES AND COMMUNITIES

First Respondent

MR JARRAH

Second Respondent

MR KK

Third Respondent

INDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER

order made by:

HANNAM J

DATE OF ORDER:

22 March 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The mother’s Initiating Application filed 30 July 2021 is dismissed.

Note:   The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Section 121 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant…

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Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC1F 174
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Neason & Minister for Families and Communities, the parties were engaged in a dispute concerning the parenting arrangements of their children. The mother sought to reopen the proceedings to change the existing arrangements, arguing that there had been significant changes in the children's circumstances. The court was required to determine whether there had been a significant change in the children's circumstances such that it would be in their best interests to reconsider the parenting arrangements.

The court considered the evidence presented by the mother and found that there was insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of changed circumstances. The court also considered the potential detriment to the children caused by the litigation itself and found that the very limited prospect of success of the mother's application outweighed any potential benefits. The court held that it was not in the children's best interests to reopen the proceedings and expose them to litigation given their vulnerability and the need to protect them from the risk of further emotional and psychological harm.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the mother's application to reopen the proceedings. The court also noted that the mother's application was not supported by the Independent Children's Lawyer, who had concerns about the potential harm to the children if the proceedings were reopened. The court concluded that the existing arrangements were in the best interests of the children and that there was no significant change in their circumstances that would warrant a reconsideration of those arrangements.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The question for me to determine is whether there has been a significant change in the children’s circumstances such that it would be in their best interests for the question of their parenting arrangements to be reconsidered by the Court. Background A brief factual overview of the dispute set out by the Full Court[3] is extracted as follows:[3] Jarrah & Neason & Anor [2016] FamCAFC 213.11.The father was born in 1962 and, at the time of trial, was 52 years of age. He married his first wife in 1984. They have three sons who, at the time of trial, were 29 years, 28 years and 21 years of age ([11]).12.The mother was born in 1982 and at the time of trial was 31 years of age. She was 15 years of age and in year 9 in high school when she met the father. The mother was 18 years of age and the father was 38 years of age when they commenced a sexual relationship.13. The mother and father commenced cohabitation in 2001.14.The child M, who is the first of the parents’ five children, was born in 2002. She was 11 years of age at the time of trial.15.In 2003 or possibly 2004, Ms W, who was approximately 15 years of age, moved in with the mother and father. Ms W gave evidence at trial and was cross-examined. It was her evidence that when she was approximately 15 years of age the father sexually abused her at the parents’ home. She told the mother about the abuse some years later. The primary judge was satisfied that it was more probable than not that the father sexually abused Ms W, albeit it was unclear whether or not this occurred when she was still a child ([92]).16.The mother and father separated for the first time in late 2005. The mother informed the Department that M had been assaulted by the father which caused police to become involved with the family.17.By early 2006, the parents had reconciled and were living together. At about the same time, the mother discontinued an application for an apprehended violence order (“AVO”) against the father.18.The parents’ second child, K, was born in 2007. She was six years of age at the time of trial. 19.The mother met Ms C in a shopping centre following which she commenced spending time with the parents at their home. Ms C was called as a witness in the mother’s case and was cross-examined. The primary judge accepted her evidence that the father raped her in the parents’ home in approximately 2007 (when she was 14 years of age) and that he continued to sexually abuse her until she was 17 years of age. It was at this time (in 2010) that Ms C told the mother about what the father had done to her.20.Ms D moved in with the mother and father in 2008. She was 14 years of age when she commenced living with them. As the primary judge explained, from her first night in their home, the mother and father permitted her to share a bed with the father’s middle son, who was 10 years her senior. At least from when she was 15 years old and while Ms D lived in the parents’ home she had a sexual relationship with the father’s middle and younger sons. Within two years of moving into their home, Ms D gave birth to a daughter fathered by the father’s middle son. At the time of the child’s birth, Ms D was 15 years of age and the father’s son was 25 years of age. Ms D and the father in this appeal have subsequently had two children together. 21.The parties’ daughter, R, was born in 2009. At the time of trial she was four years of age.22.By early 2010, a variety of notifications to the effect that M had been sexually abused by a number of people had been received by the Department. Suffice to say at this stage, the notifications identified perpetrators with whom the parents facilitated contact.23.The parents’ son, U, was born in 2010. The child U was three years of age at the time of trial.24.In May 2011 the father, Ms D and her baby daughter (the father’s granddaughter) left the family home for Queensland. The mother and the children remained in Sydney. It is about this time that the relationship between the father and Ms D became sexual. Ms D was 16 years of age and the father was 49 years of age.25.By October 2011, the father, Ms D and her baby had returned to Sydney following which the relationship between the mother and father rapidly deteriorated. This coincided with incidents when the father was violent to the mother and he physically assaulted M and so distressed the child she “… was screaming and was crawling from the house” ([232]). The violence continued and it is common ground that on 4 November 2011 the mother and father separated.26.The mother and children moved into separate accommodation in late November 2011. At about the same time, the Department took Ms D’s child into care.27.On 27 February 2012, M was interviewed by a Joint Investigation Response Team (“JIRT”) concerning an allegation that she had been sexually abused by the father. Although the allegation was not substantiated, the primary judge had more evidence available to him about the matter than was then available to JIRT. For example, M told the Court expert her father “… did something bad to me … had sex to me” ([293]). The primary judge did not accept the father’s evidence that he had not sexually abused his daughter but nor was it found that he had. Rather, his Honour’s assessment was expressed as “a fear” that he had and it was thus necessary for M to be protected from the risk of sexual abuse posed by her father.28.By mid-2012, under the auspices of its “Brighter Futures Program” the Department and other agencies were significantly involved with the family, relevantly, in supporting the mother to protect her and the children from the father and to help her meet the children’s day to day needs. As to the latter, this included helping her clean the house and to understand it was important that on an ongoing basis she addressed the terrible want of hygiene in the home and that the children regularly attend school. In essence this was a multifaceted early intervention program designed to assist the mother to keep the children in her care.29.As part of this program a safety plan was prepared in April 2012 which had as an essential element that the mother not permit the father to have any contact with the children ([260]). An interim AVO had been made in November 2011 against the father for the protection of the mother and children. It was a requirement of the plan that the mother abide by the conditions of the AVO and to inform the Department or police if the father spent time with the children. Neither the mother nor the father abided by the restriction on contact contained in the AVO and the mother failed to inform the Department or police that the father had been in contact with the children. Regrettably the mother refused to co-operate in relation to securing a final AVO against the father and, when she failed to attend for the final hearing, the application for such an order was dismissed.30.The father and mother’s daughter, Z was born in 2013. The mother and father correctly deduced that her birth would provide the Department with ample proof that far from keeping the father away from the children, the mother had him intimately involved in her and thus their lives. However, in order to maintain the ruse “… the mother simply lied to the Department” about this child’s paternity and it was only as a result of testing arranged by the Department that the truth was revealed ([277]).31.A few months after the child Z was born, Ms D (then aged 18 years), gave birth to her second child, ZJ, this time to the father. Both she and the father (who was then 51 years of age) denied their relationship was sexual and, once again, it was able to be established that these denials were simple lies ([62] and [71]). The father and Ms D parented another child, a son, who was born in 2014. Ms D’s three children are in the care of the Department and have restricted supervised time with the father.32.By May 2013, in light of the ongoing child protection risks, the Brighter Futures Program ceased their involvement with the family and the Department categorised the family as a child protection case. That is to say early intervention strategies were viewed as having failed and the question to be answered was whether the children could safely remain with the mother. In essence that also became the key question for the trial.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As the Full Court said in Miller & Harrington (2008) FLC 93-383, the applicant is required to establish a prima facie case of changed circumstances[6].[6] See also Defrey & Radnor at [16].The Past Circumstances- Reasons for Previous Decision and Evidence At final hearing in 2013, the father sought orders that the parents have equal shared parental responsibility for the subject children, that the children live with the mother and spend time with him in a graduating regime with an endpoint of each alternate weekend and school holiday time. The mother proposed orders that would have seen the children live with her and that she have sole parental responsibility for them or, if the Court was not prepared to make that order, that she and the Minister equally share parental responsibility for the children. The mother sought that the children spend supervised time with the father on four occasions per year and that he otherwise be restrained from spending time with or communicating with them. At hearing, the Minister sought two alternative suits of orders depending on the findings made by the Court. The first proposal would be enlivened if the Court did not make a finding of unacceptable risk of harm to the children from remaining in the care of their mother on the basis of continuing involvement with services provided to her through the Minister. In this case it was proposed that the Minister have sole parental responsibility for the children and determine where and with whom they live, that the mother undertake an assessment of her parenting capacity and cognitive skills and in the event she failed to comply with the requests of the Minister that the proceedings be re-listed. The Minister also sought orders providing for supervised time between the children and the father, communication, and various restraints to protect the children. In the event the Court determined that there was an unacceptable risk of harm to the children if they were to live with the mother, then the Minister sought to have sole parental responsibility for the children until they reach the age of 18, that the Minister determine where and with whom the child live and various orders in relation to the children spending time and communicating with the parents and each other. The ICL sought an order that the Minister have sole parental responsibility for the children and determine the children’s residential arrangements. In the event the Minister determined that the children were to live with the mother, the ICL sought orders that the mother undertake an assessment of her parenting capacity and cognitive skills and follow all directions and participate in all services to assist her parenting as determined by the Minister and in the event the mother fails to comply, that the children spend supervised time with her on no more than four occasions per year. The ICL also sought an order that the children spend supervised time with the father no more than four times per year and that the child M not be required to attend this time.

Decision

Reasons for decision

In all of the circumstances under consideration, I am of the view that it is not in the children’s best interests to reopen the proceedings and expose them to litigation given their vulnerability and the need to protect them from the risk of further emotional and psychological harm.CONCLUSION Having regard to the foregoing matters, there is in my view insufficient evidence in the mother’s application to establish a prima facie case of changed circumstances. Further, even if I were to accept there had been changes in the children’s circumstances as contended, these changes are not sufficient to justify reopening the proceedings having regard to the very limited prospect of success of the mother’s application and the potential detriment to the children caused by the litigation itself. Accordingly, I dismiss the mother’s application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established