NBBZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NBBZ v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs
[2004] FCAFC 312

MIGRATION – appeal from single judge – failure to take relevant consideration into account – whether speculation as to reason for deceit formed part of Refugee Review Tribunal’s reasoning – whether error in approach of trial judge

MIGRATION – appeal from single judge – obligation of Refugee Review Tribunal to treat applicants fairly – s 424A Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – questions to appellant at Tribunal hearing based on document disclosed to appellant after hearing – whether obligation to treat applicant fairly required document to be disclosed prior to hearing

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) subs 36(1), 36(2) and s 424A

NAHV of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 129 FCR 214 followed
Paul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 396 approved
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs; Ex parte Applicant S20/2002 (2003) 198 ALR 59 cited

NBBZ v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS and REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

N 1127 of 2004

BRANSON, RD NICHOLSON and NORTH JJ
24 NOVEMBER 2004
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1127 of 2004

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT

BETWEEN:

NBBZ
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

BRANSON, RD NICHOLSON AND NORTH JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

24 NOVEMBER 2004

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

2.The appellant pay the respondents’ costs.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 1127 of 2004

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT

BETWEEN:

NBBZ
APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

BRANSON, RD NICHOLSON AND NORTH JJ

DATE:

24 NOVEMBER 2004

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT

INTRODUCTION

  1. This appeal calls for consideration of the process of reasoning followed by the Refugee Review Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’) in affirming a decision that the appellant not be granted a protection visa. The appellant has contended that, having regard to the process of reasoning followed by the Tribunal, the Tribunal failed to take into account a relevant matter and failed to comply with s 424A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘the Act’).

  2. On 30 June 2004 a judge of the Court (Emmett J) dismissed an application for judicial review of a decision of the Tribunal made on 9 January 2004.  By its decision the Tribunal had affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent not to grant the appellant a protection visa.

  3. The class of visa known as the protection visa is created by subs 36(1) of the Act. For present purposes the relevant criterion that the appellant was required to satisfy to be granted the visa is the criterion specified in par 36(2)(a) of the Act. That criterion requires that the…

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Details
Case
[2004] FCAFC 312
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of NBBZ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs involved the appellant, a non-citizen from Sri Lanka, who applied for a protection visa under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant claimed he feared returning to Sri Lanka due to threats and persecution his family had experienced. The Tribunal rejected the appellant's claim, finding his evidence unconvincing and concluding that he had a well-founded fear of persecution. The appellant appealed to the Federal Court, arguing that the Tribunal failed to consider relevant evidence and breached procedural fairness.

The primary legal issues in the case were whether the Tribunal properly considered all relevant factors in assessing the appellant's credibility and whether it provided adequate procedural fairness by disclosing certain information before the hearing. The appellant argued that the Tribunal should have considered the possibility that he entered Australia under a false passport or a genuine passport with a false name. Additionally, the appellant claimed that he was denied procedural fairness by not being given particulars of the log of the NYK Pride ahead of the hearing.

The court examined the Tribunal's reasons for decision and found that while the Tribunal did not explicitly address all possible scenarios regarding the appellant's entry into Australia, it did not reject these possibilities outright. The court concluded that as long as these scenarios remained open, the relevance of the documentary evidence in question was equivocal. Regarding procedural fairness, the court held that the Tribunal was entitled to test the appellant's credibility through cross-examination and was not required to warn him of contradictory material before the hearing, especially since the Tribunal gave the appellant an opportunity to explain the material before making its decision.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal's reasons for decision were not flawed to the extent argued by the appellant. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

2. The appellant pay the respondents’ costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The class of visa known as the protection visa is created by subs 36(1) of the Act. For present purposes the relevant criterion that the appellant was required to satisfy to be granted the visa is the criterion specified in par 36(2)(a) of the Act. That criterion requires that the visa applicant be:‘a non‑citizen in Australia to whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugees Protocol.’BACKGROUND FACTS On 14 October 2002 the appellant signed an application for a protection visa. In a statement attached to the application form the appellant stated that he feared returning to his country, Sri Lanka, as members of his family had been killed during the election campaign of December 2001. The statement contained an explanation of the circumstances in which his Singhalese father came to marry his Muslim mother. It also stated that his father, a Kandy businessman, had given a lot of his time to providing assistance to all elements of the Sri Lankan community and to the Muslim Congress. As a consequence his father had been threatened and had suffered discrimination and persecution, especially at election time. The statement outlined increasing harassment of the appellant’s family leading to a critical incident on 5 December 2001. On that day, according to the statement, six men came to the appellant’s home and attacked the family; the appellant’s brother was killed, his father shot in the leg and the appellant himself hit on the head with an iron bar and his collarbone broken. His father, the statement asserts, subsequently disappeared and is now dead. The statement asserts that the appellant thereafter left Sri Lanka and travelled to Thailand on a false passport with the help of a smuggler. The statement contains the following account of the appellant’s travel from Thailand to Australia:‘31.I and four others, 3 men and one woman, left by lorry truck to Cambodia where we stopped a few times before we arrived in Phnom Penh. We then went by a boat through the Mekong and arrived in Saigon on 20 July 2002. The five of us stayed in a small room in Saigon. On 3rd of august 2002 two men left for Italy.32.As I had no money, I had to remain with the Tamil person in Saigon.33.One girl and one male as well as me were put on a ship that was going to Australia. The ship made about 6 stops on the journey from Saigon to Australia. Whenever it stopped I had to hide in a metal that had been used for storing oil. Otherwise I hid in the engine room with the other two people. During the trip to Australia all three of us were treated very badly. The man and the woman got off in Singapore. I continued on to Australia.34.I arrived in Australia on 26 August 2002. It had taken about 19 days to travel to Australia and I hid in the engine for all of that time. Whenever we stopped at a port I had to hide in the barrel. One time I had to hide for two days.’ The first respondent’s delegate found that the appellant’s fear of persecution in Sri Lanka was not well‑founded as he could safely relocate to Colombo. The appellant sought review by the Tribunal of the decision of the delegate.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The Tribunal’s reasons for decision do not refer to a letter dated 15 October 2002 that the appellant received from the Department. By that letter the Department asserted that it was unable to locate any entry record for him based on the details provided in his application for a protection visa.REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE It was contended before the learned primary judge that, on a fair reading of the Tribunal’s reasons for decision, it approached the critical issue of the appellant’s credibility on the basis that there were only two possibilities as to the appellant’s entry into Australia. Those two possibilities were said to be:(a) the appellant arrived as a stowaway, as he claimed; or(b)the appellant entered Australia legally under a passport in the name by which he is known to the Department and the Tribunal. It was further contended that, on this approach, the Tribunal failed to take into account a relevant matter by failing to give consideration to the letter of 15 October 2002. The letter of 15 October 2002 tends to establish that the appellant did not enter Australia through a recognised entry point using a passport in the name by which he is known to the Department and the Tribunal. The primary judge, however, identified at least two other possibilities concerning the appellant’s entry into Australia, namely:(c) the appellant entered Australia under a false passport; or(d)the appellant entered Australia under a genuine passport but has adopted a false name in his dealings with the Department and the Tribunal.His Honour rejected a contention that the language of the Tribunal’s reasons for decision demonstrate that the Tribunal did not have regard to either of the above possibilities. At [50] the primary judge concluded:‘The reasoning of the Tribunal gives rise to some disquiet in so far as there is no express finding by the Tribunal that the applicant may have come to Australia on a genuine passport and adopted a false name or may have come to Australia on a false passport. However, the Tribunal did not expressly reject those possibilities. It is only if it rejected those possibilities that the documents in question would become clearly relevant to the Tribunal’s assessment of the applicant’s credibility. So long as those possibilities are open, the question of whether there had been no entry into Australia by a person using the applicant’s name and a Sri Lankan passport is quite equivocal. I consider, on balance, that this ground is not made out.’ The primary judge also rejected a contention that the appellant was denied procedural fairness by the Tribunal because he was not given particulars of the log of the NYK Pride ahead of the hearing of 7 November 2003. His Honour held that the Tribunal was entitled to test an applicant’s credibility by cross‑examination and was not obliged to warn of contradictory material held by it. His Honour noted that, before the Tribunal made its decision, it gave the appellant a chance to explain the material that had been obtained from the NYK Line.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Pursuant to leave granted during the course of argument on this appeal, the appellant has filed an amended notice of appeal. Two grounds are set out in the amended notice of appeal, namely:‘The learned trial Judge erred by failing to find that the Tribunal had not taken into account a relevant consideration, namely the fact that the Departmental records showed that no person using the Appellant’s stated identity entered Australia on his own passport (the record is the letter of 15 October 2002).The learned trial Judge erred by failing to find that the Tribunal breached section 424A of the Migration Act, or alternatively, denied the Appellant procedural fairness, by not putting to the Appellant, prior to the hearing on 7 November 2003, the particulars which were provided on 12 November 2003.’CONSIDERATIONGround 1 The first issue for consideration in respect of this ground of appeal is the proper construction of the reasons for decision of the Tribunal. Mr Prince, pro bono counsel for the appellant, contended that, in effect, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellant is a person to whom Australia owes protection obligations under the Refugees Convention because it was satisfied that he was seeking to avoid disclosure of his passport. That is, because it was satisfied that he had entered Australia at a recognised point of entry on a passport in his own name being the name by which he is known by the Department and the Tribunal. We do not read the reasons for decision of the Tribunal in the way contended for by the appellant. After outlining the appellant’s claim to have travelled to Australia on the NYK Pride, and his response to the information that the NYK Pride had not docked at Saigon, the Tribunal recorded a finding that the appellant’s evidence was not convincing or truthful. It then recorded its satisfaction that the appellant had sought to mislead the Department and the Tribunal as to the circumstances of his arrival in Australia. The Tribunal noted that its satisfaction that the appellant had sought to mislead the Department and the Tribunal had relevance in relation to his identity and to his movements during the time that he claimed to have been involved in incidents that led to his fleeing Sri Lanka. It observed that the appellant had been given ample opportunity to offer a ‘benign reason’ for his misleading the Department and the Tribunal but had not done so. By a ‘benign reason’ we understand the Tribunal to mean a reason consistent with the appellant having a well‑founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason in Sri Lanka. The Tribunal goes on in its reasons for decision to record that it ‘consider[s] that it is likely that the [appellant] was seeking to avoid disclosing his passport’. In our view, the Tribunal is here speculating as to the likely reason for the appellant having sought, as it had already concluded that he had, to mislead the Department and the Tribunal. However, we do not understand the outcome of the Tribunal’s speculation to be any part of its reasoning process. That reasoning process, as we read the Tribunal’s decision, is as follows:(a)the appellant lied about how he travelled to Australia;(b)the lies were intended to mislead the Department and the Tribunal on a topic relevant to the establishment of his identity and his movements on or about December 2001 (ie the time of the incidents said by him to be critical to his decision to flee Sri Lanka);(c)it is likely that the appellant lied to avoid disclosing his passport (in whatever name it had been issued);(d)even if this was not the reason that he lied, his purpose was not benign in the sense of being consistent with his having a well‑founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason in Sri Lanka;(e)in the circumstances, his credibility was so damaged that the Tribunal could give little weight to his claim to fear persecution in Sri Lanka;(f)consequently the Tribunal was not satisfied that he has a well‑founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason in Sri Lanka.