Nationwide v Pryce - [2001] NTSC 27

Nationwide v Pryce [2001] NTSC 27
PARTIES:NATIONWIDE NEWS PTY LTD

v
LEONARD DAVID PRYCE

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
JURISDICTION:  SUPREME COURT OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION
FILE NO:  JA 51 of 2000 (9914983)
DELIVERED:  19 April 2001
HEARING DATES:  11 April 2001
JUDGMENT OF:  GALLOP A/J
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Appellant:Mr M Abbott QC
Respondent:  Mr W J Karczewski
Solicitors:
Appellant:Ward Keller
Respondent:  Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Judgment category classification:        B
Number of pages:  16

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN
Nationwide v Pryce [2001] NTSC 27

No. JA 51 of 2000

IN THE MATTER of an appeal under the Justices Act

BETWEEN:
NATIONWIDE NEWS PTY LTD

Appellant
AND:
LEONARD DAVID PRYCE

Respondent

CORAM: GALLOP A/J
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Delivered 19 April 2001)

This is an appeal against a conviction in the Court of Summary Jurisdiction at Alice Springs on 20 July 2000 for an offence against s 11(2) of the Sexual Offences (Evidence and Procedure) Act.

The terms of the complaint are as follows:-
“NATIONWIDE NEWS PTY LTD, () of 2 HOLT STREET, SURREY HILL NSW.
On the 30^th day of March 1999
At ALICE SPRINGS in the Northern Territory of Australia.
1. By a statement published in the Centralian Advocate otherwise than in a report concerning an examination of witnesses or a trial, revealed the address and the place of employment of a complainant involved in a sexual offence matter.”
By letter dated 30 November 1999, the prosecution supplied requested particulars in the following terms:-
“The particulars in relation to the complaints concerning the abovenamed are that on 30^th March 1999 at Alice Springs in the Northern Territory in a statement published in the Australian Advocate, the statement revealed the address and the place of employment of Dr Claire McGrath, a complainant in a sexual offence matter of Police v Timothy Giles. Claire McGrath was a medical practitioner at Kintore in the Northern Territory in March 1999. She was sexually assaulted by Timothy Giles at Kintore on 26^th March 1999.”
The hearing of the complaint was held on 3 December 1999. At the end of the prosecution case, senior counsel for the appellant applied for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that a prima facie case had not been made out. Several grounds were relied upon.
On 17 February 2000, the Magistrate held that a prima facie case had been established.
On 2 June 2000, senior counsel for the appellant announced that the appellant did not propose to call any evidence and made several submissions in support of the complaint being dismissed because the Magistrate should not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of several elements of the prosecution case. The Magistrate reserved her decision.
On 20 July 2000, the Magistrate found the appellant guilty of the offence and adjourned the further hearing for sentence to a date to be fixed.
On 25 August 2000, the Magistrate imposed a…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2001] NTSC 27
Decision Date: 19 April 2001

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Nationwide v Pryce involved an appeal by the defendant against a conviction in the Magistrates Court. The nature of the dispute centred on the sufficiency of the evidence presented to support the conviction. The appeal was heard by the Supreme Court of the relevant jurisdiction. The legal issues before the court revolved around whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish the elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt, and whether the appeal should be dismissed despite the possibility that the point raised might be decided in favour of the appellant if no substantial miscarriage of justice had occurred. These issues were framed in light of the statutory provisions concerning the standard of proof and the procedure on appeal.

The court examined the evidence presented in the original proceedings and considered the submissions made by the appellant's counsel. The counsel argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove the elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The court referred to the High Court's decision in May v O’Sullivan, which clarified that the question of whether there is a case to answer is a question of law, and does not affect the onus of proof which rests on the prosecution. The court further explained that even if a prima facie case is made, the defendant may not be convicted in the absence of a satisfactory answer, unless the tribunal is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. The court considered whether the evidence was sufficient to meet this standard, and whether the appeal should be dismissed despite the possibility of a favourable outcome for the appellant.

In its decision, the court found that the evidence presented did not meet the required standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the conviction was quashed. The court also noted that it was not necessary to remit the case for further hearing, as the evidence was clearly insufficient to support the conviction. The court dismissed the appeal on the basis that the error in the conviction did not amount to a substantial miscarriage of justice.

The final orders of the court were to quash the conviction and dismiss the appeal. The court did not order a remittal of the case for further hearing, as it was satisfied that the error identified was sufficient to warrant the quashing of the conviction without the need for additional evidence or proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Sections 176 and 177 are relevant.“176. Evidence on appealSubject to section 176A, no evidence shall be received on the hearing of the appeal other than such documents or exhibits as are mentioned in sections 174 and 175 and a record, made by means of sound-recording apparatus or shorthand, of the depositions of a witness in the relevant proceeding produced out of the custody of the clerk for the relevant district, except by consent of the parties.”“177. Procedure and power of Supreme Court on appeal(1) Every appeal shall be heard and determined by the Supreme Court in a summary way, and according to the rules of practice in force with reference to the proceedings of the Court in that behalf, and the Supreme Court shall have all the powers and duties, as to amendment and otherwise, of the Justices whose decision is appealed from.(2) Upon the hearing of the appeal the Supreme Court may –(a) adjourn the hearing from time to time;(b)mitigate or increase any penalty, forfeiture, or sum;(c)affirm, quash, or vary the conviction, order, or adjudication appealed from, or substitute or make any conviction, order, or adjudication which ought to have been made in the first instance;(d)remit the case for hearing or for further hearing before the Court of Summary Jurisdiction;(e)make such further or other order as to costs or otherwise as it thinks fit; or(f)notwithstanding that it is of the opinion that the point raised in the appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred.(3) …”THE APPEAL On the hearing of the appeal, senior counsel for the appellant acknowledged that his submissions against the sufficiency of the evidence to support proof of the elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt were the same submissions which had been rejected in support of the submission of no prima facie case. The application of the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt was explained in May v O’Sullivan (1955) 92 CLR 654 where the High Court said at 658:-“When, at the close of the case for the prosecution, a submission is made that there is “no case to answer”, the question to be decided is not whether on the evidence as it stands the defendant ought to be convicted, but whether on the evidence as it stands he could lawfully be convicted. This is really a question of law. Unless there is some special statutory provision on the subject, a ruling that there is a “case to answer” has no effect whatever on the onus of proof, which rests on the prosecution from beginning to end. After the prosecution has adduced evidence sufficient to support proof of the issue, the defendant may or may not call evidence. Whether he does or not, the question to be decided in the end by the tribunal is whether, on the whole of the evidence before it, it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty. This is a question of fact. In deciding this question it may in some cases be legitimate, as is pointed out in Wilson v Buttery (1926) SASR 150 for it to take into account the fact that the defendant has not given evidence as a consideration making the inference of guilt from the evidence for the prosecution less unsafe than it might otherwise possibly appear: cf. Morgan v Babcock & Wilcox, per Isaacs J (1929) 43 CLR 163, at 178. But to say this is a very different thing from saying that the onus of proof shifts. A magistrate who has decided that there is a “case to answer” may quite consistently, if no evidence is called for the defendant, refuse to convict on the evidence for the prosecution. The prosecution may have made “a prima facie case”, but it does not follow that in the absence of a “satisfactory answer” the defendant should be convicted.”

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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