Nationwide Oil Pty Ltd & Anor v. Interline Hydrocarbon Inc

Case

[2005] QSC 331

02/11/2005

No judgment structure available for this case.

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CIVIL JURISDICTION
  [2005] QSC 331
BYRNE J

No BS8259 of 2005

NATIONWIDE OIL PTY LTD
ACN 066 383 364

First Applicant

and

BRENZIL PTY LTD
ACN 051 348 353

and

INTERLINE HYDROCARBON INC

and

IMF (AUSTRALIA LTD)
ACN 067 298 088

Second Applicant

First Respondent

Second Respondent

BRISBANE

..DATE 02/11/2005

JUDGMENT

HIS HONOUR:  The defendants seek a stay of the plaintiff's

claim.  They contend that its prosecution with the financial

support of IMF (Australia) Pty Ltd ("IMF") constitutes an

abuse of the Court's process.

The plaintiff claims against Nationwide Oil Pty Ltd moneys due

and owing pursuant to, or damages for breach of, an agreement

concerning the design, construction and assembly of a waste

oil refinery in Sydney.  It makes other claims against both

defendants:  for example, for royalties pursuant to claimed

contractual entitlements.

The argument has proceeded on the assumption that the

plaintiff's claims are fairly arguable and will, if

successful, result in judgments for substantial sums.

The defendants have counterclaimed for relief which includes

an amount alleged to exceed the value of the plaintiff's

claims.  Nationwide seeks to set-off its counterclaim in

extinguishment of the plaintiff's claim.  The contentions

advanced in the counterclaim are also, for the purposes of

this application, taken to be fairly arguable.

The plaintiff is impecunious.  It lacks the resources to

satisfy any judgment for a money sum that may be obtained by a

defendant on the counterclaim.

The defendants successfully applied for security for costs in

respect of the plaintiff's claim.  The security ordered has

been provided.  It is not suggested that the fund is now or

may in future be insufficient to meet any liability of the

plaintiff in costs in connection with the prosecution of its

claim, should that claim fail.

IMF and the plaintiff are parties to a funding agreement.

Under it, IMF is entitled to receive, from a successful

outcome for the plaintiff, reimbursement of moneys it has

expended in facilitating the prosecution of the plaintiff's

claim to judgment, and up to one-third of the total benefits

the plaintiff derives from the case.

Because the plaintiff is impecunious and no other corporation

or person is liable to satisfy any judgment the defendants may

obtain on the counterclaim, the defendants inevitably confront

this prospect:  that the plaintiff, funded as it will be by

IMF, prosecutes its claim to judgment, but should a judgment

on the counterclaim exceed the amount of any judgment in the

plaintiff's favour, the defendants (in particular the second

defendant) will receive nothing.  In the circumstances,

appropriately enough, the argument has also proceeded on the

assumption that such an outcome is on the cards.

The defendants contend that the existence of that possibility

means that the intervention of IMF in the plaintiff's

proceedings constitutes an abuse of process.  Two propositions

are advanced.

First it is said that, by funding this case, IMF is engaged in

"litigation trafficking" which, therefore, constitutes an

abuse of process. 

Secondly, the defendants contend that the involvement of IMF

as a speculator for a profit to be derived from success on the

plaintiff's claims, without exposure by IMF to the burden of

having to satisfy any judgment on the counterclaim, "is a

cynical exploitation of the Court's process for profit rather

than involving the use of the Court's process to vindicate

rights and achieve a fair balance".  The mere fact that

neither IMF nor anyone else (other than the plaintiff) is

exposed to the prospect of having to satisfy any liability in

the event of success by a defendant on the counterclaim is

said to mean that the prosecution of the plaintiff's claim

involves the use of Court process as an agent of oppression,

converting the Court's procedure into an instrument of

potential injustice and unfairness.  According to the

defendants, such unfairness emerges from a consideration of

the course that settlement negotiations might take:  more

particularly, that the defendants will know that success on

their counterclaim is meaningless (at least beyond the extent

to which it might extinguish any liability to the plaintiff

established on the claim).  Only if IMF, having intermeddled

in the prosecution of the plaintiff's claim with a view to

profit, assumes liability to the defendants on their

counterclaim can an abuse of the Court's process be avoided,

or so it is said.

Now, there is no suggestion that, by the terms of the funding

agreement or otherwise, IMF's involvement involves the risk of

some inappropriate conduct in the litigation.

Rather, the alleged abuse of process is said to arise from the

probability that the defendants will not realise anything in

respect of a judgment on the counterclaim.

The mere fact that IMF's business is the funding of litigation

cannot mean that its financial support in the prosecution of

the plaintiff's apparently valuable claim through to a

judgment constitutes an abuse of the Court's process.

Without more, external funding is not tantamount to such an

abuse.  Were it otherwise, legislatively supported regimes for

State legal aid, administered through legal aid commissions,

would attract much the same opprobrium (even though legal aid

is not provided in the expectation of deriving a profit). 

Moreover, even if IMF's only interest in the litigation is

fairly characterised as an investment, if that matters, the

same is not true of the plaintiff, which stands to reap

substantial rewards from the successful prosecution of its

claim.

In QPSX v. Ericsson (2005) 219 ALR 1, French J, in a

comprehensive review of the modern authorities, identifies

"economic benefits to be derived from legitimate litigation

funding arrangements" - see paragraph 54 - which are scarcely

contrary to public policy.  His Honour also points out that

whether an agreement may be unenforceable as champertous is

not to the point in deciding whether the supported proceedings

amount to an abuse of process.

The objection that there is here involved some "trafficking"

in litigation which, of itself, exposes an abuse of process is

incorrect.

The next question is whether the current IMF funding

arrangements, involving as they do that IMF will not be liable

on the counterclaim, constitute, as it was put, a cynical

manipulation of Court procedures with a view to obtaining

profit which deserves to be characterised as an abuse of

process.

The predicament the defendants confront - non-recovery on a

judgment on a counterclaim for compensation overtopping the

plaintiff's claim - has always inhered in the contractual

arrangements the parties put in place initially.

The defendants did not, it seems, take guarantees from the

plaintiff's directors, shareholders or holding company.  Nor

did they conclude an arrangement to secure the value of any

future litigious claim. 

In other words, an ordinary business risk to which the

defendants were exposed from the outset by the contractual

arrangements they were content to conclude has materialised.

The defendants have always been exposed to the risk that the

plaintiff might, in the event of litigation, obtain from an

external source - as examples, directors, shareholders or a

financial institution such as a bank - enough money to fund a

case to trial and to meet any order for security for costs,

but no more.  When the contracts among the parties were

entered into, tney were content to accept that any monetary

claim they might make in connection with the contracts with

the plaintiff would neither be secured, nor enforceable

against anyone else. 

As it happens, the consequential business risk has eventuated.

And no abuse of process is involved in a state of affairs

which leaves the defendants still unsecured in respect of the

value of the counterclaim, and entangled in litigation against

another party which, despite recourse to external funding,

will likely never have more money than is needed to take its

case to judgment.

The application is dismissed.

Further order that the applicants pay the respondent's costs

of and incidental to the application, to be assessed.

-----

Actions
Download as PDF Download as Word Document


Cases Citing This Decision

0

Cases Cited

1

Statutory Material Cited

0