National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Victoria University

[2019] FWC 2029

[2019] FWC 2029

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

REASONS FOR DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.739—Dispute resolution

National Tertiary Education Industry Union
v
Victoria University
(C2019/1677)

COMMISSIONER BISSETT MELBOURNE, 2 APRIL 2019

Alleged dispute about any matters arising under the enterprise agreement and the NES;[s186(6)].

[1] The National Tertiary Education Industry Union (NTEU) has made an application to the Fair Work Commission (Commission) to deal with a dispute it has with Victoria University (University) pursuant to s.739 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (FW Act). The application has been made in accordance with the dispute settlement procedure of the Victoria University Enterprise Agreement 2013 1 (Agreement).

[2] The dispute relates to a decision by the University to investigate NTEU member Mr Agrotis for serious misconduct and, in doing so, suspend him from his role at the University. This suspension is without pay.

[3] The NTEU seeks interim orders to the effect that the investigation into the conduct of Mr Agrotis be stopped and the suspension of Mr Agrotis be set aside until such time as the Commission hears and determines the matter in dispute.

[4] To this effect the NTEU says that the question to be answered in the arbitration of the matter is whether the University has properly enlivened the serious misconduct process under the Agreement. That is, whether the conditions necessary to commence serious misconduct procedures against Mr Agrotis and to suspend him have been made out.

[5] On 27 March 2019 I issued a decision 2 in which I found that interim orders of a form similar to those sought by the NTEU should be issued. I did so as I had determined that there was an issue to be tried and that the balance of convenience favoured the making of the interim order.

[6] In that decision I indicated that I would issue reasons for decision. These are my reasons.

The Agreement

[7] The Agreement provides as follows in relation to serious misconduct:

Definitions

62.1.13 Serious misconduct means:

(a) serious misbehaviour which constitutes a serious impediment to the carrying out of a staff member’s duties or to a staff member’s colleagues carrying out the staff member’s duties;

(b) serious dereliction of the duties required of the position;

(c) theft or fraud;

(d) conviction by a court of an offence that constitutes a serious impediment to the carrying out of a staff member’s duties or functions or to a staff member’s colleagues carrying out their duties or functions.

Examples of conduct which may constitute serious misconduct are:

•  assault;

•  repeated incidents of misconduct; or

•  serious or repeated bullying or harassment, including sexual harassment; or

•  wilful and/or gross breach of the staff member’s contract, the University’s policies and/or regulations, such that it would be unreasonable to continue the staff member’s employment...

62.4 Suspension

62.4.1 If an allegation of serious misconduct has been made against a staff member, and if the relevant senior officer considers that, prima facie, the allegations are serious enough to warrant the staff member not being at work, the relevant senior officer may, at any stage during the procedures under clause 62, suspend the staff member, either with or without pay, until the conclusion of the matter, provided that:

(i) the Vice-Chancellor may give approval so that the staff member may draw on any accrued entitlement to annual leave or long service leave for the duration of the suspension without pay;

(ii) the Vice-Chancellor may at any time direct that salary be paid, in part or in full, on the grounds of hardship for the period of the suspension or a part period; and

(iii) the Vice-Chancellor will ensure that the RAC at its first meeting, or an Investigator, consider whether suspension without pay should continue and that the RAC or Investigator will have the power to recommend the revocation of such a suspension from its date of effect.

62.4.2 During any period of suspension the staff member will be excluded from the University or any identified parts of the University, provided that he or she will be permitted reasonable access to the University to prepare the staff member’s case and to collect personal property.

[8] The Agreement also has a disputes settlement procedure at clause 59.

[9] Clause 59 of the Agreement applies to all disputes arising under the Agreement (clause 59.1). It is arguable (but not a matter for this decision) whether the disputes settlement procedure contains a status quo provision.

Background

[10] The background to the suspension of Mr Agrotis is as follows:

•  Mr Agrotis is employed as a Student Engagement Officer by the University;

•  Mr Agrotis was responsible of the organisation of a “Family Information Day” (FID) at the University on 17 February 2019;

•  Mr Agrotis made some changes to the program for the day which he communicated to management.

•  On 17 February 2019 Mr Agrotis and other members of the NTEU took part in protected industrial action;

•  There were fewer attendances at the FID than in previous years and the number of activities provided was reduced from that in previous years.

[11] On 26 February 2019 Mr Agrotis received a letter of allegations from the University. That letter said, is part:

It is alleged that you cancelled aspects of the Family Information Day without University authorisation and without proper cause, and that you deliberately concealed this action from the University and your managers.

In particular it is alleged that:

1. You failed to perform your duties to prepare for the event in accordance with reasonable and lawful directions to do so and as required of your position as Senior Student Engagement Officer (attachment 1) and role as Project Coordinator and Event Logistics for Family Information Day as outlined in the event brief (attachment 2), including failure to undertake or arrange:

•  the balloonist, music, giant games, gelato and sausage sizzle (attachment 3);

•  coffee Cart and student volunteers (see allegations 2 and 3);

•  appropriate promotion of the event; and

•  other event equipment and coordination.

2. On Thursday 14 February 2019, you instructed Duy Thang (Vincent) Dao to send an email from [email address provided] email address to volunteers for Family Information Day announcing ‘the cancellation of the VU Family Information Day volunteer opportunity’ (attachment 4 and discussions with employee)

3. You contacted the coffee cart vendor on 11 February informing it that its services were no longer required because the Family Information Day event had been cancelled

4. On Wednesday 13 February, you provided false and/or misleading advice and documentation about the preparation undertaken for Family Information Day to the Director, Student Services, Mr Leon Kerr (attachment 5)

5. You knowingly provided the information referred to in point 4 with the deliberate intention of concealing your conduct and to prevent the University from mitigating against its effects.

The effect of your unauthorised cancellations of aspects of the Family Information Day event contributed to:

•  lower attendance (approx. 150-200 people) than anticipated

•  a significant reduction in activities, amenities and content that had been expected;

•  a serious impediment to other colleagues carrying out their duties;

•  the requirement for additional or alternative resources to prepare and deliver the event.

[12] The letter of allegation then said that if the allegations were substantiated the conduct may be considered serious misconduct within the meaning of clause 62 of the Agreement, namely:

•  Serious misbehaviour which constitutes a serious impediment to carrying out of a staff member’s duties or to a staff member’s colleagues carrying out of the staff member’s duties (clause 62.1.13a); and/or

•  Serious dereliction of the duties required of the position (clause 62.1.13b).

[13] The letter also said that, if substantiated, Mr Agrotis’ conduct constituted a breach of the VU Appropriate Workplace Behaviours Policy.

[14] The letter indicated Mr Agrotis was to respond in writing to the allegations by 12 March 2019.

[15] On 26 February 2019 Mr Agrotis received a further letter from the University in which he was advised that the University had determined that the seriousness of the allegations warranted that he not attend work pending the finalisation of the investigation.

Evidence and submissions

National Tertiary Education Industry Union

[16] The NTEU submits that the allegations against Mr Agrotis fall into three distinct categories:

1. A failure to arrange or undertake certain activities in preparation for the FID including organising the attendance of a balloonist and coffee cart facilities (category 1)

2. Instructing a colleague to advise student volunteers that the FID had been cancelled (category 2); and

3. Providing false and/or misleading information knowingly with the intent to prevent the University from taking action to remedy the effects of the conduct (category 3).

[17] The NTEU submits that the serious misconduct procedures in the Agreement cannot be enlivened in circumstances where there is no rational basis for the allegations.

[18] The NTEU says that the category 1 and 2 group of allegations are not capable of meeting the definition of serious misconduct at clause 62.1.13 of the Agreement. It submits that the clause only contemplates misbehaviour of the most serious or egregious nature and neither category 1 nor category 2 conduct meet this high bar.

[19] The NTEU also says that the Agreement clause imposes a further requirement that the misbehaviour constitutes an impediment to carrying out the staff member’s or colleague’s duties and that no evidence has been provided to support the assertion that the conduct of Mr Agrotis impeded anyone in carrying out their duties.

[20] The NTEU says that to satisfy the definition of serious misconduct the conduct has to amount to a dereliction of duties. The definition of dereliction is a “shameful failure to fulfil one’s obligations”. Further, the dereliction must be serious dereliction.

[21] The NTEU says that even if the conduct in relation to category 1 and category 2 was substantiated it could not meet the definition of serious misconduct although could meet the definition of unsatisfactory performance of duties.

[22] In relation to category 3 the NTEU says that the factual basis for the allegation is wrong and that the running sheet relied on by the University was the incorrect running sheet. On this basis it says there are no grounds to assert that Mr Agrotis provided false or misleading information.

[23] The NTEU says therefore that there is an arguable case that the University did not have the grounds to properly enliven the serious misconduct procedures.

[24] The NTEU says that to suspend an employee without pay two matters must be satisfied. Firstly an allegation for serious misconduct must be (properly) made and secondly the allegations must be serious enough to warrant the staff member not being at work. The NTEU says that there is no rational basis for the allegations against Mr Agrotis. The University cannot therefore be satisfied that there could be an allegation of serious misconduct such as to meet the requirements of the first limb of clause 62.4.1 that would enliven suspension without pay of Mr Agrotis. Even if it is wrong on this the NTEU says that the misconduct could not be seen to be serious enough to warrant Mr Agrotis not being at work.

[25] Mr Agrotis provided a witness statement in which he detailed the financial and emotional stress caused by his suspension without pay. He has been required to access his long service leave to survive financially. His situation he says is exacerbated by his upcoming wedding.

[26] The NTEU also submits that Mr Agrotis will suffer reputational harm by his continued absence from the workplace.

[27] For these reasons the NTEU submits that the balance of convenience lies with granting the interim orders.

Victoria University

[28] The University submits that, as the NTEU seeks to “reverse the action the University has already taken to protect itself against further misconduct” through the suspension of Mr Agrotis, and the consequences for the University of such an order, the NTEU “must establish a strong probability of success” in order to have the relief sought by the interim order.

[29] The University submits that the dispute is about whether the university has a sufficient basis to make the allegations against Mr Agrotis and whether such allegations, if they are substantiated, are capable of meeting the definition of serious misconduct. It therefore says that it is to the NTEU to show that:

(a) The University did not have a reasonable basis to put the allegations to Mr Agrotis for his response; and

(b) The allegations are not capable of meeting the definition of serious misconduct.

[30] The University submits that in the days following the FID the University received reports that a number of components of that day had not been present. This included a balloonist, music, games, sausage sizzle, coffee cart, gelato and student volunteers. Preliminary discussions with relevant staff and third parties indicated that Mr Agrotis had been responsible for actively cancelling several of the components or had not organised the components. Mr Agrotis has admitted that he did cancel some components of the FID, including the student volunteers, but said he did so for legitimate reason. In addition Mr Agrotis said that “we decided to take on a lot of the activities ourselves” (presumably referring to staff) in circumstances where he knew that industrial action by the relevant staff was planned for the FID.

[31] The University says that Mr Agrotis misled the University about the preparation for the FID. The University says that, notwithstanding the dispute by the NTEU as to the correctness of the document relied on by the University, the document provided by Mr Agrotis to Mr Kerr on 13 February 2019 appears to be misleading. It says that Mr Agrotis’ failure to properly inform Mr Kerr was even more serious as Mr Kerr was acting in the position of Director Student Services and was heavily reliant on Mr Agrotis to properly organise and execute arrangements for the event.

[32] The University says that, on the face of the document relied on by NTEU of the changed run sheet for the FID, it is not apparent that the changes were significant or that student volunteers and third party vendors had been cancelled. For example, it says that changing “coffee cart” to “coffee station”, without further explanation, did not make it clear that the third party vendor had been cancelled. The University says it is reasonable to allege that the information was deliberately withheld from Mr Kerr or at least that Mr Agrotis allowed Mr Kerr to proceed under a misapprehension.

[33] The University submits that the circumstances provide a reasonable basis for enlivening the serious misconduct proceedings.

[34] Further, the University says that the allegations, if substantiated, provide a sufficient basis to conclude that Mr Agrotis engaged in serious misconduct within the meaning of the Agreement. The University says that if Mr Agrotis did cancel vendors and volunteers he knew were needed on the FID then such conduct would clearly be capable of constituting serious misconduct. The effect of the conduct would have consequences for the University including a serious impediment to Mr Agrotis’ colleagues carrying out their duties on the day.

[35] The failure to draw the cancellations to the attention to Mr Kerr, if substantiated would constitute a serious dereliction of duties.

[36] These two matters, the University submits, could be seen to amount to an intentional attempt to sabotage the FID. Such conduct, the University says, would be capable of constituting serious misconduct.

[37] On the basis of the above the University submits that it had reasonable grounds to allege that Mr Agrotis had:

(a) Intentionally failed to sufficiently prepare for the FID, including by cancelling volunteers and co-ordinators;

(b) Taken active steps to stop others from preparing for and attending the FID; and

(c) Misled Mr Kerr as to his actions with the intention of preventing the University from mitigating against the effects of that conduct.

[38] The University also submits that, on this basis, it was reasonable to believe that Mr Agrotis might engage in such conduct again and it was therefore reasonable to stand him down from his duties.

[39] The University submits that the NTEU has failed to demonstrate that a failure to grant the order sought by it will result in irreparable harm.

[40] Further the University says that any prejudice asserted by the NTEU if the interim order is not made is insufficient to warrant any delay in the investigation process. It says it has already commenced serious misconduct proceedings. Any reputational harm brought about by the investigation is mitigated by the confidential nature of the investigation and if the allegations are found to be untrue any reputational damage is extinguished.

[41] The University says that there is no evidence that Mr Agrotis’ health has been adversely affected by the matter and that general stress caused by such allegations is not a basis for the Commission to order that such a process be stopped.

[42] The University submits that, whilst it accepts the financial impact of the stand down without pay, should the investigation conclude that Mr Agrotis did not engage in serious misconduct his leave and any loss of pay will be reinstated. It says that the investigation does not have to be long and may well have been complete by the time of the hearing for interim orders had the NTEU not raised a dispute.

[43] Further, the University submits that, should the allegations against Mr Agrotis be found to be substantiated, he will have access to an internal appeal system and/or access to the Commission such that the balance of convenience does not support the granting of the orders.

[44] The University submits that any prejudice to Mr Agrotis is far outweighed by prejudice to the University if the proposed orders were made. This prejudice it submits would be through a delay in the investigation and legitimate concerns it has about Mr Agrotis’ performance of his duties.

Interim orders

[45] In deciding if interim orders should be issued there are two main considerations – firstly, if there is a serious issue to be tried (or matter to be determined) and, secondly, where the balance of convenience lies.

[46] These matters were considered by Bromberg J in Quinn v Overland 3 where his Honour said:

[45] In determining an application for interlocutory relief, the Court addresses two main inquiries. First, whether the applicant has made out a prima facie case in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is, there is a probability that at the trial of the action the applicant will be held entitled to relief. Second, whether the inconvenience or injury which the applicant would be likely to suffer if an injunction were refused outweighs or is outweighed by the injury which the respondent would suffer if an injunction were granted: Australian Broadcasting Corp v O’Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [65], [19].

[46] The requirement of a “prima facie case” does not mean that the applicant must show that it is more probable than not that the applicant will succeed at trial. It is sufficient that the applicant show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial. How strong the probability needs to be depends upon the nature of the rights the applicant asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order the applicant seeks. In that context there is no objection to the use of the phrase “serious question” to convey the strength of the probability: Australian Broadcasting Corp v O’Neill per Gummow and Hayne JJ at [65]-[72], Gleeson CJ and Crennan J agreeing at [19].

[47] Consistent with this decision, it is not necessary to determine that it is more probable that the NTEU would succeed in the substantive application but rather that there is a sufficient likelihood it would do so. In this respect I reject the submission of the University that the NTEU must establish a strong probability of success in its claim which suggests something greater than a sufficient likelihood.

[48] Section 589(2) of the FW Act gives the Commission power to make an interim decision. There was no submission to the contrary.

[49] Neither party suggested that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to deal with the substantive application and I am satisfied that the Commission does have jurisdiction to deal with the dispute. It should be noted that whilst the interim order is directed at stopping a serious misconduct investigation and returning Mr Agrotis to the workplace until I made the order the investigation was proceeding and Mr Agrotis was suspended from work without pay.

[50] The University says that, in deciding if I should issue interim orders the NTEU must demonstrate that the allegations against Mr Agrotis are not capable of meeting the definition of serious misconduct. Whilst noting the views of the University I consider the matter for consideration in this decision is if the NTEU can demonstrate that it is arguable that the conduct was not capable of meeting the definition of serious misconduct.

Consideration

A serious issue to be tried

[51] The matter I need to determine at this point is if it is arguable that the conduct of Mr Agrotis is not serious misconduct as defined in the Agreement such that the clause could not be enlivened.

[52] Mr Agrotis was responsible for a number of aspects of the FID.

[53] Mr Agrotis made a decision to cancel some third party services (the coffee cart), cancelled some other aspects of the day (the balloonist) and cancelled the student volunteers who would normally help on the day.

[54] Mr Agrotis says that he advised Mr Kerr of these changes in the last run through sheet. The University says that even if he did the run through sheet he relies on was at best misleading in that it did not fully explain the changes (for example the difference between a coffee cart and coffee station) or, at worst, sort to mislead Mr Kerr in circumstances where Mr Kerr was acting in his role and therefore relied on Mr Agrotis to be transparent.

[55] I have carefully considered the issues put by the NTEU and by the University.

[56] In making my findings below I must stress that I am making no finding as to the conduct of Mr Agrotis.

[57] The Agreement clause is set out above. In brief and as is relevant to this matter, serious misconduct is:

(a) serious misbehaviour which constitutes a serious impediment to the carrying out of a staff member’s duties or a colleague carrying out their duties; or

(b) serious dereliction of the duties required of the position.

[58] I am not satisfied that allegation 1, on the basis of the material before me, is capable of constituting serious misconduct. There is therefore an arguable case that this allegation is not enough to enliven the serious misconduct provision of the Agreement.

[59] In relation to allegation 2 it is not readily apparent as to how or why this would amount to serious misconduct without some more detailed evidence as to the role and expectations of student volunteers and the effect of this cancellation on the FID. For this reason there is an arguable case that the conduct in this allegation is not enough to enliven the serious misconduct provisions of the Agreement.

[60] The seriousness or otherwise of allegation 3 is dependent on the actual advice provided to the coffee vendor. That evidence is not before me. It is therefore arguable that the conduct is not such to enliven the serious misconduct provisions of the Agreement.

[61] I should make clear in relation to each of the first three allegations that my findings do not mean that on investigation the misconduct or poor performance of work raised by each of these would not lead to a view that they amounted to serious misconduct but rather that there is an arguable case that there is not enough, on its face, to view these singularly or collectively as enough to enliven the serious misconduct provisions of the Agreement in the first instance.

[62] Allegations 4 and 5 appear to be the more serious (in a strictly comparative sense) of those put against Mr Agrotis. The determination of these issues will rest on the information provided in the final run through sheet, how such information was presented, how that information could reasonably be construed and on the timelines surrounding the events.

[63] The letter of allegations suggests that Mr Agrotis’ conduct resulted in only 150-200 people attending the FID although it is difficult to see how cancelling a coffee cart or student volunteers could cause the reduction in numbers. Further, the conduct of Mr Agrotis occurred in the week before the FID, arguably in reaction to the anticipated low numbers.

[64] However, a failure to ensure Mr Kerr was properly briefed may come within the serious misconduct provisions of the Agreement. But the serious misconduct provisions require that it be serious misbehaviour or a serious dereliction of duty.

[65] Where misconduct is sought to be portrayed as serious it necessarily implies that there is some edge or aspect associated with it which raises it beyond the normal boundaries (if they can be so described) of misconduct in the conduct itself or in the consequences of the conduct. In such circumstances there will invariably be some question as to whether the misconduct has crossed that undefined line into the category of serious misconduct. In some instances this judgement will be clear. The misconduct will be readily identifiable as serious – an assault, theft, a dereliction of duties that creates an imminent risk to health and safety and so on. In this case it is not so apparent.

[66] This is a finely balanced matter. Mr Agrotis says he advised relevant managers including Mr Kerr via the revised run through sheet for the FID of changes. Mr Kerr did not understand or it was not adequately conveyed the import of the information provided to him. Certainly if the non-provision of the information was for the reasons set out in allegation 5 there is little doubt that it could fall into serious misconduct but it is not apparent on the basis of the evidence that Mr Agrotis sought to deliberately hide anything. He was certainly open in his dealing with security, for example, of the number of people expected to attend prior to the FID.

[67] Allegation 5 however appears to be an assertion as to motive of Mr Agrotis and not conduct itself with no evidence before me to support the claim. Such a motivation would need to be substantiated to enable allegation 4 to be considered as serious misconduct. The lack of evidence as to motive presents an arguable case that neither allegations 4 or 5 could enliven the serious misconduct provisions of the Agreement.

[68] I have also taken into account that conduct or misbehaviour occurs in context. This context is not apparent at this time.

[69] For these reasons I am satisfied that there is an arguable case that the conduct of Mr Agrotis could not be capable of constituting serious misconduct. That it is possible it may be so, or found to be so following an investigation, does not answer the question before me. I am therefore satisfied that there is a sufficient likelihood that the application of the NTEU would succeed.

[70] As to the question of whether the conduct of Mr Agrotis warranted the University standing him down without pay, on the basis of my finding above the grounds to stand him down are not met.

[71] I should note that, even if I had not found in favour of the NTEU in relation to the allegations, I consider that there is a real question as to whether the conduct of Mr Agrotis could be considered conduct that warranted him not being at work.

[72] The reason for removal of Mr Agrotis from the workplace is that his conduct was deemed to be serious and that the University had a concern that he may mislead his manager again. Nothing has been put to me that suggest that Mr Agrotis’ alleged conduct in this matter is part of a pattern of conduct that are such to warrant the level of concern expressed by the University. It may have such evidence but has not been put to me.

[73] For these reasons I consider that there is a reasonable question to answer as to the basis for the decision to stand Mr Agrotis down without pay.

Balance of convenience

[74] Mr Agrotis is not at work, is reliant on his annual and long service leave and is suffering from all those things that attend an allegation of serious misconduct including the reputational damage that may accrue to him from the investigation and the suspension. The University says that to grant the relief sought will result in a delay in the investigation and a serious concern as to the possible conduct of Mr Agrotis in the workplace. In this way it says it will be prejudiced should the interim order be granted.

[75] I do not consider that a finding in favour of Mr Agrotis from the allegation extinguishes any reputational damage done to him. By the time such a finding is made the investigation would have been conducted, the findings made and the suspension from work lifted, but the finding does not make those things unhappen. The effect of their existence will linger. There are, albeit and hopefully, a small number of people who will be aware of the matter but a greater number who will know of his absence who may well speculate as to the reasons. This weighs in favour of the NTEU.

[76] Further, I do not consider that Mr Agrotis has some internal appeal right should the finding go against him as to offset the prejudice to him.

[77] I do accept that there is a prejudice to Mr Agrotis in not being at work. His income is contingent on leave he has accrued which at moment appears sufficient but is reliant on factors outside his control such as the speed at which the University might conduct and conclude any investigation. He is also prejudiced by the effects of not being engaged in meaningful work at this time. This also weighs in favour of the NTEU.

[78] The University do not point to any basis for its concern as to Mr Agrotis’ conduct at work should the interim order be granted. There is nothing before me to suggest that Mr Agrotis has any history of misconduct or misbehaviour or poor performance that there can be a reasonable basis for its concern. I am not convinced that this weighs the balance of convenience to the University.

[79] In relation to the concern as to a delay in the investigation already commenced, whilst it is true that the NTEU could have waited until after the investigation and, perhaps, any internal review of an adverse finding, that does not mean it does not have the right to challenge the allegation of serious misconduct at this stage.

[80] The dispute settlement procedure of the Agreement applies to any matter arising under the Agreement. The grounds for an allegation of serious misconduct is a matter arising under the Agreement. The NTEU has a right to exercise its right to have that dispute dealt with by the Commission. If it was that it was prejudicial to have a matter brought to the Commission until certain steps had been completed an Agreement as comprehensive in nature as the Agreement before me would say so but does not.

[81] I do not accept that a delay in the investigation is prejudicial to the University. It is understandably frustrating. Whilst I agree that an investigation is best conducted close to the time of the incident the delay that may come about should the application for interim orders be granted will not be great.

Conclusion

[82] For the reasons given above I decided to grant the interim order sought by the NTEU.

[83] Again I stress this is not an indication that I have determined the dispute. That will be a matter for more fulsome submissions and hearing.

[84] The matter will be listed for Hearing on 6 May 2019.

COMMISSIONER

<PR706274>

 1   AE406376.

 2   [2019] FWC 1994.

 3 [2010] FCA 799.

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