Supreme Court
New South Wales
Medium Neutral Citation: National Australia Bank v Salubre [2024] NSWSC 1288 Hearing dates: 02 August 2024 Date of orders: 02 August 2024 Decision date: 18 October 2024 Jurisdiction: Common Law Before: Garling J Decision: 1. Notice of Motion filed 24 July 2024 dismissed
2. Defendant/applicant to pay the costs of the plaintiff/respondent of the Notice of Motion.
Catchwords: CIVIL PROCEDURE – Default judgment – Where the defendant sought to have an order for default judgment for possession of land set aside – Where the defendant sought an order that the Sheriff be prohibited from taking action which authorised entry by the Sheriff onto the land the subject of the possession orders – Where the defendant alleges that default judgment occurred in the absence of personal service on the defendant – Where the defendant alleges that there was a basis for an equitable set-off due to proceedings in the Equity division – No basis for the Court to exercise its discretion to stay the eviction – Motion dismissed.
Legislation Cited: Australian Consumer Law
Australian Securities Investment Commission Act 2001 (Cth)
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Evidence Act 1995
Cases Cited: National Australia Bank Limited v Mary Rose Salubre [2023] NSWSC 319
National Australia Bank Limited v Mary Rose Salubre [2024] NSWSC 665
Texts Cited: Not Applicable
Category: Principal judgment Parties: National Australia Bank (P/Respondent)
Mary Rose Salubre (D/Applicant)Representation: Counsel:
Solicitors:
M Rose (P/Respondent)
Mr Archibald (D/Applicant)
Dentons Australia Pty Ltd (P/Respondent)
Lexis Lawyers (D/Applicant)
File Number(s): 2019/393388 Publication restriction: Not Applicable
JUDGMENT
-
In the course of being the Duty Judge on 1 August 2024, the Court heard a Notice of Motion filed by Mary Rose Salubre, the defendant, on 24 July 2024, seeking orders relevantly, in the following terms:
“4. Order that pursuant to section 135(2)(b) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and section 23 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), pending further order of the Court, that the Sheriff be prohibited from taking any further action on the Writ issued by the Senior Deputy Registrar of the Court on 19th June 2024, authorising entry by the Sheriff at the Sheriff’s Office, Parramatta onto the land at the whole of the land comprised in folio identifier 4/SP79889, being the land situated at, and known as Unit 4, 57-61 Penelope Lucas Lane, Rose Hill in the State of New South Wales.
5. Order pursuant to UCPR 49.19(1) that the default judgment for possession of land by the Registrar of the Court given on 12 August 2022 (“Default Judgment”) be set aside.
6. In the alternative to Order 5, order that the Default Judgment be set aside insofar as it relates to the land comprised in Certificate of Title, Folio Identifier 4/SP79889, being the land known as Unit 4, 57-61 Penelope Lucas Lane, Rose Hill in the State of New South Wales (“Property”).
7. In the alternative to Order 6, order in the nature of certiorari pursuant to s 69(1)(e) of the Supreme Court Act
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- Case
- [2024] NSWSC 1288
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter initially came before the court when the plaintiff applied for a default judgment for possession of the land. After the judgment was entered, the defendant applied to set it aside and sought an order prohibiting the Sheriff from taking any action under the judgment. This application was the subject of a hearing before the court. The defendant's application relied on the absence of personal service and the existence of equitable set-off claims in the Equity division. The court considered the application and decided on the relief sought by the defendant.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the Court should exercise its discretion to set aside the order for default judgment.
2. Whether the Court should exercise its discretion to prohibit the Sheriff from taking any action under the default judgment.
3. Whether there is a basis for an equitable set-off due to proceedings in the Equity division.
Held
1. The Court concluded that it should not exercise its discretion to set aside the order for default judgment. The motion to set aside the default judgment was dismissed.
2. The Court concluded that it should not exercise its discretion to prohibit the Sheriff from taking any action under the default judgment. The motion to prohibit the Sheriff's action was dismissed.
3. The Court concluded that there was no basis for an equitable set-off due to proceedings in the Equity division. The claim for equitable set-off was dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Court considered the defendant's application to set aside a default judgment for possession of land. The defendant argued that the default judgment was obtained without personal service and that there was an equitable set-off due to proceedings in the Equity division. The Court evaluated the defendant's arguments in light of the applicable legal principles and relevant authorities. In relation to the first issue, the Court held that the defendant had not provided sufficient grounds to exercise its discretion to set aside the default judgment. The Court noted that the defendant had not demonstrated a reasonable excuse for the delay in filing the defence, nor had they shown that there was a meritorious defence to the claim. The Court also found that the absence of personal service did not automatically entitle the defendant to set aside the judgment, as there were no exceptional circumstances justifying such a course.
Regarding the second issue, the Court held that it should not exercise its discretion to prohibit the Sheriff from taking action under the default judgment. The Court found that the defendant had not demonstrated a compelling reason to stay the eviction, as the primary concern was the enforcement of the Court's judgment. The Court noted that the defendant's financial situation and the potential hardship of eviction did not constitute a sufficient ground to interfere with the execution of the judgment.
Finally, the Court considered the defendant's claim for an equitable set-off due to proceedings in the Equity division. The Court found that there was no basis for such a set-off, as the proceedings in the Equity division did not provide a valid reason to prevent the execution of the default judgment. The Court held that the equitable set-off was not applicable in this case, as the proceedings in the Equity division did not involve the same parties or the same subject matter as the default judgment. The Court emphasised that the equitable set-off is a discretionary remedy, and the defendant had not demonstrated a sufficient basis for the Court to exercise its discretion in their favour. Therefore, the Court dismissed the defendant's claim for an equitable set-off.