National Australia Bank Limited v Murphy & Anor

Link copied
Case Copied 30 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

National Australia Bank Limited v Murphy & Anor [2018] QSC 106

PARTIES:

NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LIMITED ACN 004 044 937

(plaintiff)

v
JOHN PAUL MURPHY

(first defendant)
and

JENNIFER PATRICIA MURPHY
(second defendant)

FILE NO/S:

BS No 4178 of 2016

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Trial

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

21 May 2018

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

12, 13 and 15 February 2018

JUDGE:

Jackson J

ORDER:

The order of the Court is that:

1.   The plaintiff recover possession of all that parcel of land located at 9 Pacific Heights Court, Coolum Beach in the State of Queensland, more particularly described as Lot 15 on RP 886657, County of Canning, Parish of Maroochy, Title Reference 50048499.

2.   The counterclaim is dismissed.

3.   The defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of the proceeding.

CATCHWORDS:

CONTRACTS – GENERAL CONTRACTUAL PRINCIPLES – DISCHARGE, BREACH AND DEFENCES TO ACTION FOR BREACH – DISCHARGE BY AGREEMENT – GENERALLY – where alleged parties entered into contract(s) that had the effect of rescinding and replacing existing loan facilities and contracts – where if contract(s) made it is not disputed that repudiated by the plaintiff and terminated by the defendant – whether previously existing loan facilities and contracts remain in place

GUARANTEE AND INDEMNITY – DISCHARGE OF SURETY – DISCHARGE OF SURETY BY AGREEMENT– where alleged parties entered into contract(s) that had the effect of discharging existing guarantee – where if contract(s) made it is not disputed that repudiated by the plaintiff and terminated by the defendant – where further alleged that guarantee discharged in any event by repudiation and termination – whether guarantee discharged

MORTGAGE – MORTGAGEE’S REMEDIES – POSSESSION – PROCEEDINGS TO OBTAIN – where defendant’s property mortgaged to plaintiff – where alleged defendants owe amounts under guarantee(s) and personal liabilities subject to the mortgage – where default notice given allowing 31 days to remedy – where notice not complied with – where alleged whole amount became payable on demand – where whole amount demanded and not paid within 7 days – whether plaintiff may enforce the mortgage and take possession of the property

Land Title Act 1994 (Qld), s 78

Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd v Manasseh [2016] WASCA 41, cited
Balanced Securities Ltd v Dumayne Property Group Pty Ltd [2017] VSCA 61, cited
Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Sara Lee Household & Bodycare (Aust) Pty Ltd (2000) 201 CLR 520, cited
Concut Pty Ltd v Worrell (2000) 176 ALR 693, cited

Hillam v Iacullo (2015) 90 NSWLR 422, cited

COUNSEL:

S Couper QC, with P O’Brien for the plaintiff

A Morris QC for the defendants by direct brief

SOLICITORS:

Corrs Chambers Westgarth for the plaintiff

No appearance for the defendants

  1. The plaintiff’s claim is for recovery of possession of the land at 9 Pacific Heights Court, Coolum Beach. It is made under s 78 of the Land Title Act 1994 (Qld). The defendants are the registered owners of the…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read National Australia Bank Limited v Murphy & Anor and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2018] QSC 106
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of National Australia Bank Limited v Murphy & Anor involves a dispute between the bank and the defendants regarding the enforcement of a mortgage over the defendants' property. The defendants argue that the bank cannot enforce the mortgage because certain contracts and guarantees were discharged. The bank contends that the mortgage remains enforceable due to the defendants' failure to meet their obligations under the loan agreements.

The primary legal issues that the court needed to decide were whether the existing loan facilities and guarantees were rescinded and replaced by new contracts, and if so, whether those new contracts were effectively terminated. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the guarantee was discharged by the bank's repudiation or by agreement, and whether the bank had the right to enforce the mortgage and take possession of the property due to the defendants' defaults.

The court found that the existing loan facilities and guarantees were not rescinded by the alleged new contracts. Instead, the new contracts were repudiated by the bank and terminated by the defendants, leaving the original loan agreements and guarantees in effect. The court also determined that the guarantee was not discharged by agreement or by the bank's repudiation. Consequently, the bank was entitled to enforce the mortgage and take possession of the defendants' property because the defendants had defaulted on their payments, and the bank had given appropriate notice and demanded payment. The court dismissed the defendants' counterclaim for breach of contract and other claims, and ordered that the bank recover possession of the property and that the defendants pay the bank's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

The order of the Court is that:

1. The plaintiff recover possession of all that parcel of land located at 9 Pacific Heights Court, Coolum Beach in the State of Queensland, more particularly described as Lot 15 on RP 886657, County of Canning, Parish of Maroochy, Title Reference 50048499.

2. The counterclaim is dismissed.

3. The defendants pay the plaintiff’s costs of the proceeding.

Background

Background to the litigation

The outcome is that the defendants’ failure to pay the amounts demanded on 27 November 2015 and 14 April 2016 constituted defaults within the meaning of cl 20.1 of the standard terms of the mortgage and the plaintiff is entitled to an order for possession of the land. Further, the counterclaim must be dismissed. Facts Since March 1984, the defendants have been customers of the plaintiff. Since at least August 2003, Milglade has been a customer of the plaintiff. From about 2002, the defendants and Milglade were debtors to the plaintiff under eight loan facilities as follows: On 20 December 2004, the defendants executed a joint and several guarantee of Milglade’s performance under each of Loans 1 to 3 (“Milglade Guarantee”). On 3 November 2004, the second defendant executed a guarantee of the first defendant’s performance under Loan 4. The mortgage over the land secured the liability of the defendants under each of the guarantees. On 12 October 2011, the plaintiff terminated Loans 1, 2, 4 and 8. In April 2011, the plaintiff transferred the defendants’ and Milglade’s facilities to its Strategic Business Services team. In 2014, the first defendant and Catherine Curry dealt with the plaintiff on behalf of the defendants and Milglade in relation to a proposal to restructure the existing facilities and loans. During September 2014 to mid-January 2015, Sam Waterhouse was the plaintiff’s employee within the Strategic Business Services team who had responsibility for dealing with the defendants’ and Milglade’s facilities and loans including the restructuring of those facilities and loans. From approximately October 2014, Craig Costello was the plaintiff’s relationship manager for the defendants and Milglade. On 19 September 2014, Mr Waterhouse sent an email to Ms Curry that: (a)set out the defendants’ and Milglade’s debts at that time; (b)requested financial information; (c)requested Ms Curry to outline the entity and structure the defendants desired; and (d)stated that he would like to have an outcome to the restructure proposal, hopefully including an approval for the same, by no later than 31 October 2014. On 13 October 2014, the first defendant sent an email to Mr Waterhouse attaching copies of the defendants’ tax returns and financial reports for the years ending 30 June 2012 and 30 June 2013. On 14 October 2014, the first defendant met Mr Waterhouse and Mr Costello at the plaintiff’s office at Creek Street, Brisbane. At the 14 October 2014 meeting: (a)the parties discussed the defendants’ and Milglade’s financial position and likely progress in the future; (b)the first defendant requested that the loans other than Loan 5 be converted to interest only, and requested that Loan 5 remain as a principal and interest loan; (c)the first defendant proposed that the balances of the following loans be included in a single new loan to Milglade: (i) the three existing Milglade loans (Loans 1, 2 and 3); (ii) the first defendant’s personal overdraft (Loan 4); (iii) the defendants’ joint overdraft (Loan 8); and(iv) the first defendant’s two NAB Credit Cards (Loans 6 and 7).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Accordingly, having rejected that the existing facilities and the guarantees were rescinded on 5 November 2014, it follows, in my view, that the defendants’ termination of any contract or contracts had the effect that the parties’ rights and liabilities continue to be governed by the existing facilities and guarantees. Conclusion on the claim for possession Once that conclusion is reached, it is not seriously in dispute that there were amounts owing by the defendants both under the guarantee or guarantees and upon their personal liabilities as debtors under some of the relevant facilities, or that they did not pay amounts owing when due for payment, or that they were in default for more than one day and the plaintiff gave a default notice allowing a period of at least 31 days from the date of the notice to remedy the default, and the notice or notices were not complied with, so that the whole of the amount owing became payable on demand and was demanded and not paid within 7 days. Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to enforce the mortgage by taking possession of the land under cl 20.1 of the standard terms. It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment on the claim for possession. Counterclaim for breach of contract From the foregoing reasoning, it also follows that the declaratory relief sought by the defendants cannot be granted except for possible declarations that the plaintiff repudiated the new Milglade contract and the new home loan contract. However, the plaintiff’s repudiation of any such contract and the defendants’ acceptance of the repudiation brought any such contract to an end, so there would be no purpose served by making any such declaration. In the absence of a claim for damages for breach of contract, it follows that the counterclaim on the contract or contracts must be dismissed.[3] [3] The defendants did not submit that there should be judgment for nominal damages on their counterclaim for damages for breach of contract. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to find that the alleged contract or contracts were made or were binding in law. Other counterclaims Two causes of action alleged in the counterclaim remain for brief consideration. By one of them, the defendants allege that the plaintiff engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of s 18 of the Australian Consumer Law by the conduct engaged in through Mr Waterhouse and Mr Costello between the 19 September 2014 email sent to the first defendant and the 5 November request by Mr Waterhouse to the first defendant for authority to make the transfer of $6,500 in performance of the arrangements made on 5 November 2015, because the representations made by those gentleman were of such a nature as would induce an ordinary and reasonable person to believe that they had authority and the Milglade guarantee had been discharged.[4] However, the defendants’ case as pleaded was that if the representations made through Mr Waterhouse and Mr Costello were misleading or deceptive, they suffered loss or damage because they did not refinance the relevant debts through Ms Curry, as they would have done, had they known the truth. At the trial, the defendants did not seek to advance that case. No evidence was led that they would have sought to refinance elsewhere or had any real chance of doing so. [4] I have already found that no express representation of the discharge of the guarantee was made.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established