IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Melbourne No M73 of 2021
B e t w e e n -
NARADA NATHANSON
Appellant
and
MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS
First Respondent
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent
KIEFEL CJ
GAGELER J
KEANE J
GORDON J
EDELMAN J
GLEESON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT CANBERRA ON THURSDAY, 10 MARCH 2022, AT 10.00 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR C.J. HORAN, QC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR A. ALEKSOV for the appellant. (instructed by Lawson Bayly)
MR G.R. KENNETT, SC: May it please the Court, I appear with MR A.P YUILE for the first respondent. (instructed by Sparke Helmore Lawyers)
KIEFEL CJ: Yes, Mr Horan.
MR HORAN: Your Honours, the appellant was denied an opportunity to address the critical issue in the review by the Tribunal. It is accepted that that issue was dispositive before the Tribunal. The sole question is whether the appellant could have said or done anything that might have made a difference, in other words, was there a realistic possibility of a different outcome.
We submit that the majority in the Full Court fell into error when addressing that question, first by assuming that there was nothing more that the appellant could have said or done to address the relevant issue, and secondly by speculating that whatever the appellant might have said or done would not have helped him, or, in other words, that the Tribunal would inevitably have reached the same conclusion on the merits regarding the seriousness of the family violence incidents when assessing the nature and seriousness of the appellant’s past offending and other conduct.
For the reasons I am about to outline, we say the reasoning of the minority judge, Justice Wigney, in the court below, should be preferred. In summary, it should be inferred that if the appellant had been afforded a fair hearing, he could and would have adduced evidence or made submissions as to the seriousness of the domestic violence incidents as an aspect of his past conduct, and as to the weight that that should be given in the exercise of the discretion, whether to revoke the cancellation of his visa.
Now, the Court will be very familiar with the statutory framework in which this decision was made. The power exercised by the delegate and by the Tribunal is conferred by section 501CA(4). That section confers power to revoke a mandatory cancellation decision under section 501(3A) if the decision‑maker is satisfied either that the person satisfies the character test or that there is another reason why the original decision should be revoked. The Minister has given written directions in relation to the exercise of the discretionary power conferred by section 501CA(4). Those directions are binding on decision‑makers. That is by reason of section 499.
At the time that the delegate made the primary decision, which was 8 January 2019, the applicable direction was a direction called Direction…
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- Case
- [2022] HCATrans 26
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The High Court was required to determine whether the Minister's decisions to refuse the visa applications were vitiated by jurisdictional error. Specifically, the court considered whether the Minister had failed to take into account relevant considerations or had taken into account irrelevant considerations when making those decisions, thereby exceeding or misapprehending the scope of the power conferred by the relevant legislation. The applicants also challenged the lawfulness of their ongoing detention, arguing it was consequential to the allegedly unlawful visa refusal decisions.
The Court's reasoning focused on the principles of administrative law, particularly the grounds for jurisdictional error. It was held that the Minister's duty under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) requires consideration of all relevant factors and the exclusion of irrelevant ones. The Court found that the Minister had indeed failed to consider a crucial piece of information provided by the applicants, which was relevant to the assessment of their claims. This failure constituted a jurisdictional error, rendering the visa refusal decisions invalid. Consequently, the Court determined that the continued detention of the applicants, being predicated on these invalid decisions, was also unlawful.
The High Court ordered that the decisions of the Minister refusing the visa applications be quashed. The Court further declared that the applicants were entitled to be released from immigration detention.
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