Nathan Cox v Seventy Seventh Claybank Pty Ltd T/A Westpoint Motor Company

[2016] FWC 4075

[2016] FWC 4075

The attached document replaces the document previously issued with the above code on 22 June 2016.

The date of signing is amended to read 22 June 2016.

On page 7 paragraph [21] is renumbered [27]. The following paragraphs are renumbered [28] to [52].

Janet Hall

Associate to Deputy President Kovacic

Dated 22 June 2016

[2016] FWC 4075

FAIR WORK COMMISSION

DECISION

Fair Work Act 2009
s.394—Unfair dismissal

Nathan Cox
v
Seventy Seventh Claybank Pty Ltd T/A Westpoint Motor Company
(U2016/288)

DEPUTY PRESIDENT KOVACIC MELBOURNE, 22 JUNE 2016

Application for relief from unfair dismissal – jurisdictional objection – small business employer – dismissal was consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code – jurisdictional objection dismissed – dismissal found to be unjust – compensation ordered in lieu of reinstatement.

[1] On 21 January 2016 Mr Nathan Cox (the Applicant) made an application under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) alleging that the termination of his employment by Seventy Seventh Claybank Pty Ltd T/A Westpoint Motor Company (the Respondent) on 20 January 2016 was unfair.

[2] In its Form F3 – Employer Response to Unfair Dismissal Application the Respondent raised a jurisdictional objection, contending that it was a small business and that Mr Cox’s dismissal was consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code (the Code).

[3] The Respondent’s jurisdictional objection and the merits of the application were heard on 18 May 2016. At the hearing, Mr Cox appeared and gave evidence on his own behalf. Mr Stephen Freeman, a former employer of Mr Cox, and Mr Philip Makings, the Respondent’s former Workshop Manager, both gave evidence for Mr Cox. Mr Colin Sands, the Respondent’s Dealer Principal, and Ms Malinda West, the Respondent’s Office Manager, both appeared for and gave evidence on behalf of the Respondent. Ms Karli Stevens, who works in the Respondent’s service and administration department, and Mr Adrian Doyle, the Respondent’s Service Manager, also gave evidence for the Respondent.

[4] For the reasons set out below, I have found that Mr Cox was not dismissed in accordance with the Code. Accordingly, the Respondent’s jurisdictional objection is dismissed. I further find that while there was a valid reason for Mr Cox’s dismissal, the dismissal was unjust. As to remedy, I do not consider reinstatement appropriate and order compensation of $3,188.00 less applicable tax in lieu of reinstatement.

Background

[5] Mr Cox commenced employment with the Respondent on 28 April 2013 as a motor mechanic. Mr Cox was given two weeks’ notice of termination on 20 January 2016. Mr Cox provided the Respondent with a medical certificate on 21 January 2016 which stated that he was unfit for work for the duration of the notice period.

The Applicant’s case

[6] Mr Cox stated in his application that he considered his dismissal unfair for a number of reasons, including that he had not had any performance counselling sessions, he had never received any written warnings and there was no record of any verbal warnings. At the hearing, Mr Cox relied upon his witness statement (see below). Mr Cox did not seek reinstatement, instead seeking compensation in lieu of reinstatement.

[7] Mr Freeman employed Mr Cox for the period May 2011 to May 2013. Mr Freeman’s witness statement 1 was effectively a reference for Mr Cox. Mr Freeman was not required for cross-examination.

[8] Mr Makings deposed in his witness statement 2 that Mr Cox worked satisfactorily as a motor mechanic under his supervision, adding that Mr Cox’s work ethic was good but that he needed some guidance on technical issues. In his oral evidence, Mr Makings attested that:

• Mr Cox’s work was good, adding that Mr Cox was not the best mechanic in the workshop;



• the standard of Mr Cox’s work was reasonable;



• there were times when he spoke to Mr Cox about incidents, just as there were times he spoke to everyone about incidents;



• issues he discussed with Mr Cox and everyone in the workshop included overfilling vehicles with oil, leaving dirty handprints and footprints on/in vehicles and the need for Mr Cox to understand what he was doing;



• Mr Cox was not dealt with differently to other employees in terms of access to training; and



• with regard to the incident in which a vehicle came off the hoist, while he did not witness the incident or subsequently undertake an investigation he considered the incident to be an accident.

[9] In his witness statement 3 Mr Cox deposed, inter alia, that:

• he had worked for the Respondent for a period of three years during which he had not received any written warnings, disciplinary correspondence, caution letters or any training or guidance;



• he had not taken excessive days off or taken leave without permission as asserted by the Respondent;



• at no stage had he given the Respondent notice, either verbally or in writing; and



• he considered that Mr Sands had a personal vendetta against him for pursuing alleged underpayments.

[10] At the hearing, in response to a question from the Fair Work Commission (the Commission), Mr Cox stated that he had been spoken to “a couple of times” about jobs that had come back but that he was never warned that his employment was at risk if his performance did not improve. As to the performance issues raised with him, they concerned his stories, i.e. the details of the work performed recorded on the repair order/job sheet, consistently not being not good enough, a sump plug being loose and an issue regarding brake pads. Mr Cox was also cross examined about a number of repair jobs on which he worked where the vehicles were returned 4 as a result of issues with the work. The incidents involved issues such as the vehicle being overfilled with oil, a loose sump plug, a gearbox with almost no oil and a cooler fan sensor not being reconnected. Mr Cox disputed each of these incidents, attesting that as he had not inspected the vehicles when they were returned and prior to any remedial work being completed he could not confirm the alleged poor work. Mr Cox also questioned how some of the vehicles could have been driven in some of the circumstances described. Beyond this, Mr Cox reiterated that he had not given the Respondent notice, attesting that he had said he was looking for another job.

The Respondent’s case

[11] The Respondent stated in its Form F3 that Mr Cox had been dismissed as his work was not up to standard, adding that after numerous verbal warnings there was no change in Mr Cox’s work behaviour. More specifically, the Respondent stated that both Mr Sands and Mr Doyle had spoken to Mr Cox about letting vehicles go to customers with low brake pads, loose sump plugs, excessively out of oil, lights not working, wiper blades unserviceable and in a dirty condition. At the hearing, the Respondent submitted that it had tried desperately to get Mr Cox to do the job it wanted and that it had given him plenty of chances to come up to standard. However, while the Respondent submitted that it had spoken to Mr Cox on numerous occasions about his work, it acknowledged that it had failed to improve the quality of Mr Cox’s work and contended that in the end it had no choice but to sack Mr Cox.

[12] Mr Sands deposed in his witness statement 5 that both he and Mr Doyle had numerous talks with Mr Cox regarding his conduct and workmanship. Mr Sands also deposed that there were numerous unhappy customers and complaints, adding that some customers had indicated that they would not return to the Respondent due to the workmanship. Mr Sands also stated that the Respondent made every attempt to assist Mr Cox with his problems, but that there was no effort on Mr Cox’s behalf to improve. Mr Sands was not required for cross examination.

[13] Ms West’s evidence was that she witnessed lots of discussions between Messrs Cox, Sands and Doyle regarding Mr Cox’s work performance and that she heard and witnessed lots of incidents of vehicles being brought back due to the lack of service work provided, with most of the returned vehicles having originally been worked on by Mr Cox 6. In her oral evidence, Ms West reiterated key aspects of her witness statement. Beyond that, Ms West attested that:

• she heard Mr Sands say to Mr Cox on one occasion that if his performance did not improve he was not going to have a job, though she could not recall precisely when the comment was made;



• there were lots of serious conversations with Mr Cox about vehicles he worked on being returned; and



• Mr Sands had informed her that he did not want to dismiss Mr Cox because he had a family.

[14] Ms Stephens deposed in her witness statement 7 that she had worked with the Respondent for two years and over this period a number of vehicles were returned due to poor workmanship and servicing errors, with 90 per cent of the vehicles that were returned for these reasons having been worked on by Mr Cox. Ms Stephens further deposed that she witnessed Mr Doyle have a few conversations with Mr Cox regarding his errors, with Mr Cox always apologetic and indicating he will try better next time yet the errors continued to occur. At the hearing, Ms Stephens attested that she heard performance issues raised with Mr Cox on about five or six occasions over the last six to 12 months and that she heard Mr Cox being advised that his performance needed to pick up or there would be no job for him.

[15] Mr Doyle stated in his witness statement 8 that he had numerous talks to Mr Cox about his work ethic and work performance, adding that he advised Mr Cox a number of times to slow down and double check his work to avoid customer comebacks. Despite these conversations, Mr Doyle deposed that there was no improvement by Mr Cox. Mr Doyle also deposed that he told Mr Cox on a number of occasion that if he did not improve his work performance that there would be no job at the Respondent for him.

[16] At the hearing, Mr Doyle attested among other things that:

• over the 11 month period he had been employed by the Respondent, he had spoken to Mr Cox about his work performance on eight or nine occasions;



• during those conversations with Mr Cox he did not believe that he said to Mr Cox that his job was at risk;



• he believed that Mr Cox knew that his job was on the line; and



• he had prepared a warning letter after Christmas 2015 but decided not to give the letter to Mr Cox as he believed that Mr Cox’s performance would improve after the Christmas break.

[17] When questioned by the Commission about the apparent inconsistency between his oral evidence and his witness statement as to whether or not Mr Cox had been warned that his job was at risk, Mr Doyle answered that his oral evidence was correct, i.e. he did not say to Mr Cox that his job was at risk.

The statutory framework

[18] The Commission exercises its powers in relation to an application for an unfair dismissal remedy pursuant to Part 3-2 of the Act. The relevant provisions from Part 3-2 of the Act are set out below.

“385 What is an unfair dismissal

A person has been unfairly dismissed if the FWC is satisfied that:

(a) the person has been dismissed; and
(b) the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable; and
(c) the dismissal was not consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code; and
(d) the dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy.

Note: For the definition of consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code: see section 388.

387 Criteria for considering harshness etc.

In considering whether it is satisfied that a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the FWC must take into account:

(a) whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person’s capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); and
(b) whether the person was notified of that reason; and
(c) whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person; and
(d) any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; and
(e) if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person—whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal; and
(f) the degree to which the size of the employer’s enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
(g) the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and
(h) any other matters that the FWC considers relevant.

388 The Small Business Fair Dismissal Code

(1) The Minister may, by legislative instrument, declare a Small Business Fair Dismissal Code.

(2) A person’s dismissal was consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code if:

(a) immediately before the time of the dismissal or at the time the person was given notice of the dismissal (whichever happened first), the person’s employer was a small business employer; and
(b) the employer complied with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code in relation to the dismissal.

[19] The Code declared by the Minister pursuant to s.388(1) of the Act is as follows:

“Summary Dismissal

It is fair for an employer to dismiss an employee without notice or warning when the employer believes on reasonable grounds that the employee’s conduct is sufficiently serious to justify immediate dismissal. Serious misconduct includes theft, fraud, violence and serious breaches of occupational health and safety procedures. For a dismissal to be deemed fair it is sufficient, though not essential, that an allegation of theft, fraud or violence be reported to the police. Of course, the employer must have reasonable grounds for making the report.

Other Dismissal

In other cases, the small business employer must give the employee a reason why he or she is at risk of being dismissed. The reason must be a valid reason based on the employee’s conduct or capacity to do the job.

The employee must be warned verbally or preferably in writing, that he or she risks being dismissed if there is no improvement.

The small business employer must provide the employee with an opportunity to respond to the warning and give the employee a reasonable chance to rectify the problem, having regard to the employee’s response. Rectifying the problem might involve the employer providing additional training and ensuring the employee knows the employer’s job expectations.

Procedural Matters

In discussions with an employee in circumstances where dismissal is possible, the employee can have another person present to assist. However, the other person cannot be a lawyer acting in a professional capacity.

A small business employer will be required to provide evidence of compliance with the Code if the employee makes a claim for unfair dismissal to Fair Work Australia, including evidence that a warning has been given (except in cases of summary dismissal). Evidence may include a completed checklist, copies of written warning(s), a statement of termination or signed witness statements.” (Underlining added)

Was the Applicant’s dismissal consistent with the Code?

[20] It was not disputed that the Respondent was a small business employer as per s.23 of the Act. Accordingly, the threshold issue to be determined is whether Mr Cox’s dismissal was consistent with the Code. If it was, by virtue of s.385(c) of the Act the dismissal was not unfair and Mr Cox’s application will be dismissed. If, however, I find that Mr Cox’s dismissal was not consistent with the Code, then I will need to consider whether his dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. I will deal with the threshold issue first.

[21] In this case Mr Cox was not summarily dismissed, so the summary dismissal aspect of the Code does not apply.

[22] As can be seen from above, the Code requires in respect of other dismissals “The employee must be warned verbally or preferably in writing, that he or she risks being dismissed if there is no improvement.” Mr Cox attested that he was never warned that his employment was at risk if his performance did not improve. Further:

• Mr Sands’ evidence does not explicitly indicate that Mr Cox was warned that his employment was at risk if his performance did not improve;



• Mr Doyle attested that he did not say to Mr Cox that his job was at risk and that while he had prepared a warning letter to give to Mr Cox he did not give the letter to him; and



• both Ms West and Ms Stephens attested that they overheard conversations in which Mr Cox was told that his performance needed to pick up or there would be no job for him with the Respondent.

[23] The absence of any explicit reference to a warning in Mr Sands’ evidence together with Mr Doyle’s evidence in my view supports a finding that Mr Cox was not warned that his job was at risk if his performance did not improve. While I note the evidence of Ms West and Ms Stephens, given that they were not part of the conversations in which the warning was alleged to have been given to Mr Cox I attach less weight to their evidence in this regard, particularly given the abovementioned evidence of Messrs Sands and Doyle.

[24] For the above reasons, I find that Mr Cox’s dismissal was not consistent with the Code. Accordingly, the Respondent’s jurisdictional objection is dismissed.

[25] I now need to consider whether Mr Cox’s dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.

Was the dismissal harsh, unjust or unreasonable?

[26] In considering whether a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the Act requires the Commission to have regard to the criteria set out in s.387. I will now address these criteria.

(a) Whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person’s capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees)

[27] In Rode v Burwood Mitsubishi 9 (Rode) a Full Bench of the then Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC) canvassed the meaning of valid reason in the context of the relevant provisions of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 citing Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd.10 The following is an extract from the Full Bench’s decision in Rode.

“[17] In relation to the meaning of “valid reason” the following remarks of Northrop J in Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd are relevant:

“Section 170DE(1) refers to a ‘valid reason, or valid reasons’, but the Act does not give a meaning to those phrases or the adjective ‘valid’. A reference to dictionaries shows that the word ‘valid’ has a number of different meanings depending on the context in which it is used. In The Shorter Oxford Dictionary, the relevant meaning given is: ‘2. Of an argument, assertion, objection, etc; well founded and applicable, sound, defensible: Effective, having some force, pertinency, or value.’ In The Macquarie Dictionary the relevant meaning is ‘sound, just or wellfounded; a valid reason’.

In its context in s 170DE(1), the adjective ‘valid’ should be given the meaning of sound, defensible or wellfounded. A reason which is capricious, fanciful, spiteful or prejudiced could never be a valid reason for the purposes of s 170DE(1). At the same time the reason must be valid in the context of the employee’s capacity or conduct or based upon the operational requirements of the employer’s business. Further, in considering whether a reason is valid, it must be remembered that the requirement applies in the practical sphere of the relationship between an employer and an employee where each has rights and privileges and duties and obligations conferred and imposed on them. The provisions must ‘be applied in a practical, commonsense way to ensure that’ the employer and employee are each treated fairly, see what was said by Wilcox CJ in Gibson v Bosmac Pty Ltd, when considering the construction and application of a s 170DC.”

[18] While Selvachandran was decided under the former statutory scheme the above observations remain relevant in the context of s.170CG(3)(a). A valid reason is one which is sound, defensible or well founded. A reason for termination which is capricious, fanciful, spiteful or prejudiced is not a valid reason for the purpose of s.170CG(3)(a).

[19] We agree with the appellant’s submission that in order to constitute a valid reason within the meaning of s.170CG(3)(a) the reason for termination must be defensible or justifiable on an objective analysis of the relevant facts. It is not sufficient for an employer to simply show that he or she acted in the belief that the termination was for a valid reason.”

[28] Based on the material before the Commission, it is clear that:

• Mr Cox’s poor work resulted in a number of vehicles being returned to the Respondent for remedial repairs;



• the poor workmanship included basic errors such as loose sump plugs;



• Mr Cox had been spoken to on at least five and up to nine occasions over the past 11 months regarding the need to improve the quality of his work;



• despite those discussions, the quality of Mr Cox’s work failed to improve;



• Mr Cox acknowledged that he had been spoken to regarding his work performance “a couple of times”; and



• Mr Cox was treated no differently to other employees in terms of access to training.

[29] That material overwhelmingly points to significant and continuing issues regarding the quality of Mr Cox’s work which not only had cost implications for the Respondent in terms of rework but also had the potential to cause reputational damage and loss of clientele.

[30] The above analysis supports a finding that there was a valid reason for Mr Cox’s dismissal based on his performance. Further, drawing on the language in Rode, I am satisfied that Mr Cox’s termination was not “capricious, fanciful, spiteful or prejudiced.”

(b) Whether the person was notified of that reason

[31] Neither party made any direct submissions regarding this factor. However, in his application Mr Cox stated that the reasons given to him by the Respondent for his dismissal were “Due to many Verbal Warnings to improve my performance, and my employer has stated that I have not taken any steps to improve my performance.” 11

[32] This supports a finding that Mr Cox was informed of the reason for his dismissal. This weighs against a finding that his dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable.

(c) Whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person

[33] Neither party directly addressed this factor in their submissions. However, based on the material before the Commission it does not appear that Mr Cox was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to his capacity or conduct prior to his dismissal. This factor favours Mr Cox.

(d) Any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal

[34] Again neither party addressed this factor in their submissions.I am therefore unable to form a definitive view regarding this factor. As such,I consider it to be a neutral consideration.

(e) If the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person—whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal

[35] While issues regarding his performance were raised with Mr Cox by both Mr Sands and Mr Doyle, as previously determined, Mr Cox was not formally warned that his employment was at risk if his performance did not improve. Accordingly, this factor favours Mr Cox.

(f) The degree to which the size of the employer’s enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal

(g) The degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal

[36] Neither party made any submissions regarding these factors. As previously noted, it was not disputed that the Respondent is a small business. Further, the Respondent does not employ any dedicated human resource specialists. In my view, both of these factors impacted on the procedures followed by the Respondent in effecting Mr Cox’s dismissal. That impact manifested in the absence of any formal warnings to Mr Cox and the absence of any documentation regarding the various performance discussions which the Respondent had with Mr Cox. These factors favour the Respondent.

(h) Any other matters that FWC considers relevant

[37] Neither party made any submissions regarding this factor, though the Respondent did make some unsubstantiated allegations relating to drug use. Accordingly, I consider this factor to be a neutral consideration.

Finding

[38] Drawing on the above analysis, I find that there was a valid reason for Mr Cox’s dismissal, that Mr Cox was notified of the reason but was not given an opportunity to respond, that Mr Cox had not been formally warned about his performance before his dismissal, that the size of the Respondent’s enterprise and the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists did impact on the procedures followed by the Respondent in effecting Mr Cox’s dismissal and that there are no other relevant matters. I further find that the remaining consideration in s.387 is a neutral consideration in this case.

[39] Against that background, and despite there being valid reason for his dismissal, I find the Mr Cox’s dismissal was unjust because procedure followed by the Respondent in this case was flawed in that the Respondent failed to warn Mr Cox that his employment was at risk if his performance did not improve. As such, I now need to consider the issue of remedy.

Remedy

[40] At the hearing the disdain which Mr Cox had for Mr Sands was apparent, with Mr Cox stating at one stage in his evidence in response to a question by Mr Sands that he was looking for another job “because I detest working for you.” In those circumstances I am satisfied that reinstatement would not be appropriate.

[41] Section 390 of the Act deals with when the Commission may order a remedy for unfair dismissal and provides at ss.390(3):

“(3) The FWC must not order the payment of compensation to the person unless:

(a) the FWC is satisfied that reinstatement of the person is inappropriate; and
(b) the FWC considers an order for payment of compensation is appropriate in all the circumstances of the case.”

[42] The criteria relevant to the deciding of the amount of compensation are set out in s.392(2) of the Act.

Remuneration that would have been received (s.392(2)(c))

[43] It is clear that the Respondent had significant concerns regarding Mr Cox’s performance over an extended period and that it raised those concerns with Mr Cox. Further, it was not disputed that Mr Cox was prior to his dismissal looking for a job elsewhere. Against that background, I consider it likely that Mr Cox would only have continued to be employed by the Respondent for a further eight weeks. Based on a pay slip attached to Mr Cox’s witness statement, Mr Cox’s gross weekly wage was $836.00 per week. Over an eight week period, Mr Cox therefore would have earned $6,688.00.

Remuneration earned (s.392(2)(e))

[44] Mr Cox stated at the hearing that he had earned $3,500 over the period mid-March to mid-May 2016. Mr Cox provided a reference prepared by his employer which confirmed that he had been employed for a two month period but did not specify the amount Mr Cox earned over that period. The proposed amount of compensation needs to be reduced by the above amount.

Income reasonably likely to be earned (s.392(2)(f))

[45] As Mr Cox was unlikely to secure alternative employment in the short term, I consider that no deduction on this ground is warranted.

Other matters (s.392(2)(g))

[46] There are no other matters that I consider relevant.

Viability (s.392(2)(a))

[47] There is no material before the Commission indicating that the proposed order would affect the viability of the Respondent’s enterprise.

Length of service (s.392(2)(b))

[48] Mr Cox was employed by the Respondent for a period approaching three years. I do not consider that this period of service provides a basis for reducing the proposed amount of compensation.

Mitigation efforts (s.392(2)(d))

[49] Mr Cox stated at the hearing that he had applied for a range of jobs in Bairnsdale and beyond without success. Against that background, I consider that no deduction on this ground is warranted.

Misconduct (s.392(3))

[50] As Mr Cox was not dismissed for misconduct, I do not consider that any deduction on this ground is warranted.

Compensation cap (s.392(5))

[51] The proposed amount of compensation of $3,188.00 (i.e. $6,688.00 less $3,500.00) less applicable tax is less than the compensation cap for Mr Cox as per s.392(5) of the Act.

Conclusion

[52] For the reasons outlined above, I find that Mr Cox was not dismissed in accordance with the Code. Accordingly, the Respondent’s jurisdictional objection is dismissed. I further find that while there was a valid reason for Mr Cox’s dismissal, the dismissal was unjust. As to remedy, I do not consider reinstatement appropriate and order compensation of $3,188.00 less applicable tax in lieu of reinstatement. An order to that effect will be issued in conjunction with this decision.

Appearances:

N. Cox on his own behalf.

C. Sands and M. West for Seventy Seventh Claybank Pty Ltd T/A Westpoint Motor Company.

Hearing details:

2016.

Bairnsdale:

May 18.

 1   Exhibit 1

 2   Exhibit 2

 3   Exhibit 4

 4   Exhibits 7-11

 5   Exhibit 12

 6   Exhibit 13

 7   Exhibit 14

 8   Exhibit 15

 9   Print R4471

 10 (1995) 62 IR 371

 11   Form F2 – Unfair Dismissal Application at Item 3.1

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