Natch v Stennson Pty Ltd

Case [2025] FCA 69

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Natch v Stennson Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 69

File number: VID 57 of 2025
Judgment of: SNADEN J
Date of judgment: 7 February 2025
Date of publication of reasons: 11 February 2025
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – urgent application for stay of primary proceedings where application for leave to appeal orders of primary judgment filed – whether applicants have arguable ground of appeal – whether interests of justice warrant stay of proceedings – application dismissed
Cases cited: Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corporation (1996) 67 FCR 65
Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Number of paragraphs: 16
Date of hearing: 7 February 2025
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr O Wolahan
Solicitor for the Applicants: TLM Law
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr T Scotter
Solicitor for the Respondent: KCL Law

ORDERS

VID 57 of 2025
BETWEEN:

MOHAN NATCH

First Applicant

ESTATE OF ANDAL NATCH

Second Applicant

OWNERS CORPORATION PLAN NO SP026738V

Third Applicant
AND:

STENNSON PTY LTD

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

SNADEN J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 FEBRUARY 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicants’ application for a stay of orders contained in the application for leave to appeal dated 22 January 2025 is dismissed.

2.The applicants pay the respondent’s costs thereof fixed in the sum of $3,000.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(REVISED FROM TRANSCRIPT)

SNADEN J:

  1. By application dated 22 January 2025, the applicants move for a grant of leave to appeal from a judgment of a single justice of this court.  By that judgment (the “Primary Judgment”), the court dismissed an application for review of a decision of a registrar, which in turn dismissed an earlier application to compel the respondent to discover documents in a taxation of costs proceeding.

  2. The application for leave to appeal has yet to be allocated for hearing.  Nonetheless, the applicants have brought it to my attention, in my capacity currently as the court’s Victorian Registry general duty judge, because there is also sought a suite of other relief, conveniently described as orders designed to stay the application of the Primary Judgment or significant parts of it.  That, it is said, requires the court’s urgent consideration, notwithstanding that it has been seven weeks since the Primary Judgment was pronounced.  The application for leave to appeal and for a stay of the Primary Judgment is supported by an affidavit affirmed by the first applicant on 25 January 2025 and an affidavit of the applicants’ solicitor, Mr Max David Duncan, sworn 7 February 2025.

  3. The orders that comprise the Primary Judgment—which the applicants now seek urgently to stay—are mostly in the nature of procedural directions.  Some context is required.  In addition to their ill-fated application for discovery, the applicants also find themselves aggrieved by a taxation of costs decision by which they have been ordered to pay certain amounts to the respondent.…

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Details
AGLC
Natch v Stennson Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 69
Case
[2025] FCA 69
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Natch applied for leave to appeal a decision dismissing their application for discovery of documents in a taxation of costs proceeding. Stennson opposed the application, arguing that Natch did not have an arguable ground of appeal and that the interests of justice did not warrant a stay of the primary judgment. Natch also sought orders to stay certain parts of the primary judgment pending the outcome of the appeal application. The court considered whether Natch had an arguable ground of appeal and whether the interests of justice warranted a stay of the primary judgment. The court found that Natch did not have an arguable ground of appeal, and that the interests of justice did not warrant a stay of the primary judgment. The court noted that a successful party is entitled to the benefit of the judgment obtained, and that the court asked to stay it is entitled to commence with the presumption that it is correct. The court dismissed Natch's application for a stay of the primary judgment and ordered that Natch pay Stennson's costs of the stay application.

The court found that Natch's arguments for an arguable ground of appeal were speculative and did not meet the necessary threshold. The court also found that the interests of justice did not warrant a stay of the primary judgment, as Natch had not demonstrated any significant prejudice that would result from the enforcement of the primary judgment. The court noted that the stay application had been brought seven weeks after the primary judgment was pronounced, and that Natch had not demonstrated any urgency in bringing the application. The court also found that Natch's attempt to use the stay application as a means of obtaining discovery of documents was not a sufficient ground for a stay of the primary judgment.

The court ordered that Natch's application for a stay of the primary judgment was dismissed and that Natch pay Stennson's costs of the stay application. The court fixed the costs at $3,000, which was the amount that Natch had been ordered to pay to Stennson in the primary judgment. The court noted that the costs order was a necessary consequence of Natch's unsuccessful stay application, and that Natch should not be allowed to avoid paying the costs simply because they had lost the stay application. The court also noted that the costs order was not punitive, but rather a necessary consequence of Natch's conduct in bringing the stay application.

In summary, the court found that Natch did not have an arguable ground of appeal and that the interests of justice did not warrant a stay of the primary judgment. The court dismissed Natch's application for a stay of the primary judgment and ordered that Natch pay Stennson's costs of the stay application. The court's decision highlights the importance of demonstrating an appropriate case for a stay of proceedings, and the need for applicants to meet the necessary threshold for an arguable ground of appeal. The court's decision also underscores the principle that a successful party is entitled to the benefit of the judgment obtained, and that the court asked to stay it is entitled to commence with the presumption that it is correct.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicants’ application for a stay of orders contained in the application for leave to appeal dated 22 January 2025 is dismissed.

2. The applicants pay the respondent’s costs thereof fixed in the sum of $3,000.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

By application dated 22 January 2025, the applicants move for a grant of leave to appeal from a judgment of a single justice of this court. By that judgment (the “Primary Judgment”), the court dismissed an application for review of a decision of a registrar, which in turn dismissed an earlier application to compel the respondent to discover documents in a taxation of costs proceeding. The application for leave to appeal has yet to be allocated for hearing. Nonetheless, the applicants have brought it to my attention, in my capacity currently as the court’s Victorian Registry general duty judge, because there is also sought a suite of other relief, conveniently described as orders designed to stay the application of the Primary Judgment or significant parts of it. That, it is said, requires the court’s urgent consideration, notwithstanding that it has been seven weeks since the Primary Judgment was pronounced. The application for leave to appeal and for a stay of the Primary Judgment is supported by an affidavit affirmed by the first applicant on 25 January 2025 and an affidavit of the applicants’ solicitor, Mr Max David Duncan, sworn 7 February 2025. The orders that comprise the Primary Judgment—which the applicants now seek urgently to stay—are mostly in the nature of procedural directions. Some context is required. In addition to their ill-fated application for discovery, the applicants also find themselves aggrieved by a taxation of costs decision by which they have been ordered to pay certain amounts to the respondent. That decision, made initially by a registrar, is also the subject of a review application before a judge. That review, like the determination from which it is brought, is said to warrant the orders for discovery that the applicants have, thus far, twice failed to secure (most recently, by the Primary Judgment). Upon dismissing the application for review of the registrar’s discovery decision, the primary judge made a number of programming orders concerning the progression of the applicants’ more substantive challenge to the taxation decision. His Honour also ordered that they pay the respondent’s costs of their unsuccessful discovery review. Undeterred, the applicants hope now to be granted leave to appeal from his Honour’s discovery ruling; and, in the meantime, move on an urgent basis for orders to stay both the costs order and several of the programming orders that are the subject of the Primary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, that relief should not be granted and the applicants should pay the respondent’s costs of and pertaining to this stay application. Where an application is made for a stay of proceedings, it is necessary for an applicant to demonstrate an appropriate case for it. Prima facie, a successful party is entitled to the benefit of the judgment obtained and the court asked to stay it is entitled to commence with the presumption that it is correct: Powerflex Services Pty Ltd v Data Access Corporation (1996) 67 FCR 65, 66 (Burchett, Heerey and Whitlam JJ).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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