Nash v The State of South Australia - [2022] SASC 4

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Appeal to a Single Judge)
NASH v THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA & ANOR
[2022] SASC 4
Judgment of the Honourable Justice Parker
20 January 2022
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - EXECUTION AGAINST PROPERTY - WARRANTS OF SEIZURE AND SALE
COURTS AND JUDGES - JUDGES - DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST OR BIAS - REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF BIAS GENERALLY
Appeal against two decisions made by a Master of the Supreme Court.
The matter has a long history. In 2011, judgment was entered against the appellant in respect of liquidated claim for professional fees brought by the second respondent. There were subsequent enforcement proceedings brought by the second respondent to recover the judgment sum, resulting in an order for a warrant of sale over commercial property in which the appellant is the registered proprietor (the Property). Subsequently, the appellant lodged a caveat over the Property.
The Property failed to sell at public auction. The second respondent then applied to the Supreme Court to have the caveat removed from the certificate of title. That application came before the Master and the appellant made an application seeking that the Master recuse himself on the ground of apprehended bias.
The Master made two decisions. The first decision was a refusal to recuse himself on the ground of apprehended bias. The second decision was to removal of a caveat.
In his Notice of Appeal, the appellant advanced four grounds which were, inter alia:
(1) The Master erred in failing to recuse himself on the grounds of bias.
(2)The Master erred in ordering the removal of the caveat lodged by the appellant over the Property.

(3) The Master erred in ordering an extension of the warrant of sale for the Property.
[…]
(4)“[T]he learned MASTER erred, contrary to LAW, as there was no basis or method for reaching the conclusion given, and no evidence to support it”.

The appellant also sought an extension of time to lodge the appeal.
Held, per Parker J, granting an extension of time but refusing permission to appeal:
[…]

1. There is no basis to the complaint of a reasonable apprehension of bias against the Master.
2.Section 7 of the Enforcement of Judgments Act confers power upon the Sheriff to sell property pursuant to a warrant issued by a court. The noting of the warrant of sale on the certificate of title to the subject land under s 105 of the RPA simply provides the judgment creditor with the protection of a statutory caveat pending sale of the land. The powers of the Sheriff remain available regardless of whether the warrant has been noted on the certificate of title or whether that notation has expired provided that, where necessary, a court has extended the period of operation of the warrant under the Enforcement of Judgments Act.
3.The fact that the warrant and its notation on the certificate of title both referred to the business name of the second respondent in addition to his name as a natural person did not affect the validity or enforceability of the warrant in any way.

Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 105, 110; Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 1992 (SA) R 133(3); Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) UCR 201.5, 213.1(1)(a), 235.1; Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991 (SA) s 7; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) R 316(8), referred to.
Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR, applied.
Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488, considered.

NASH v THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA & ANOR
[2022] SASC 4
Single Judge Appeal: Civil

PARKER J: This is an appeal against two decisions made by a Master of this Court. The first decision was the refusal of the Master to recuse himself on the ground of apprehended bias. The second decision was the removal of a caveat lodged by the appellant, Mr Peter Nash, over a property at 455 - 463 South Road, Keswick (the Property).
Background
These proceedings have a lengthy history dating back to 2011. A dispute arose between the appellant and the second respondent, Mr Colin Field, concerning a liquidated claim for professional fees brought by the latter. The fees were payable by the appellant to the second respondent in his capacity as a registered psychologist for a report prepared about the testamentary capacity of the appellant’s late mother when she executed her will. The purpose of the report was for use as evidence in proceedings brought by the executors seeking the grant of probate in solemn form.
On 16 November 2011, Magistrate Millard entered judgment in favour of the second respondent in the sum of $4,875.71, together with costs of $734.53. His Honour determined that final judgment should be entered following the failure of the appellant to attend at trial that day. The appellant then sought review of the Magistrate’s decision in the District Court. That application was dismissed by Judge Beazley on 17 September 2014. The judgment sum remains unpaid.
Thereafter, several attempts were made to serve an investigation summons on the appellant. After service was effected on 13 May 2015, the appellant failed to appear. On 18 June 2015 an order was made for the issue of a warrant of arrest. All attempts to serve the warrant were unsuccessful. On 22 August 2018, Magistrate Kennewell granted leave to the second respondent to enforce the judgment.
After the commencement of the enforcement process, the appellant sought orders in the Magistrates Court staying the execution of the warrant for sale of the Property. Magistrate Adair refused the application on 7 March 2019. The appellant then sought a review of that decision, and also review of the decision made by Magistrate Kennewell on 22 August 2018. He also sought an order staying the execution of the warrant for sale. On 3 July 2019, Judge Durrant dismissed the application for review and refused the stay application.
The proceedings that are the subject of the current appeal were commenced on 26 August 2020. The appellant again sought a stay of the execution of the warrant of sale. The Master declined to grant that application on 31 August 2020. Two days later, the appellant lodged a caveat on the title of the subject land in the following terms:
THE CAVEATOR CLAIMING in interest in fee simple as registered proprietor. I have an equitable interest in the land that can be protected by caveat. In (sic) have an action in the Supreme Court, where I am suing [P. Nash v The South Australian Government & Anor] for trespass, nuisance and damages. I claim the warrant of sale is unlawful and tainted by fraud.
The Sheriff conducted a public auction, but the property did not sell. The State of South Australia then applied to the Magistrates Court for permission for the Sheriff to sell the property other than by way of public auction. It was suggested by the Crown that the caveat complicated the sale process. The second respondent then applied to have the caveat removed from the certificate of title.
Prior to the hearing of the second respondent’s application, the appellant filed an application seeking that the Master recuse himself on the ground of apprehended bias.
The Master’s reasons
The Master delivered written reasons on 30 March 2021 that addressed the two applications before the Court. Those being the second respondent’s application seeking removal of the caveat and that brought by the appellant seeking that the Master recuse himself from hearing the matter.
The Master held that the appellant had not established facts and circumstances which would give rise to an apprehension of bias. At its highest, the appellant said that he had informed Registry staff that he did not want the application listed before his Honour. The Master held that this was not a relevant fact. On that basis, his Honour declined to recuse himself.
The Master observed that the party seeking retention of a caveat carries the onus of establishing that it is inappropriate to remove the caveat. His Honour found that the appellant had failed to establish that there was a serious question to be tried in relation to the appellant’s claim that the warrant of sale is unlawful and tainted by fraud.
The warrant of sale had been issued and extended from time-to-time by a Magistrate, there were no proceedings on foot to set aside the warrant and all challenges by the appellant to the judgment and subsequent warrant had failed. On that basis, his Honour held that the premise on which the caveat was based fails, and therefore the caveat should be removed.
Grounds of appeal
The appellant has advanced four grounds of appeal. They may be briefly stated as follows:
(1)The Master erred in failing to recuse himself on the grounds of bias.
(2)The Master erred in ordering the removal of the caveat number 13363719 lodged by the appellant over the Property.
(3)The Master erred in ordering an extension of the warrant of sale for the Property.
(4)“[T]he learned MASTER erred, contrary to LAW, as there was no basis or method for reaching the conclusion given, and no evidence to support it”.
Extension of time
The judgment of the Master was delivered on 30 March 2021. The notice of appeal was not filed until 25 May 2021. Thus, the appeal can only proceed if the appellant is granted an extension of time.
The appellant’s submissions
The appellant indicated in his oral submissions that he had lodged the appeal out of time for several reasons. They were that the Registry had not given a prompt decision on his application for waiver of the filing fee, he had limited access to the Supreme Court Library to conduct necessary research because of the Covid restrictions and he had experienced difficulty in lodging his application online.
The appellant contends that the fact that the Master did not have the lower court file, and in particular the warrant of sale, before him amounts to bias. The appellant further submits that the Master did not appropriately consider his arguments before deciding the matter. The appellant also contends that because the Master had read the judgments previously handed down in relation to the matter, his Honour was biased.
The appellant acknowledged that a litigant was not entitled to nominate a particular judicial officer to conduct proceedings. However, he submitted that he had asked the Registry not to list the matter before the Master because, in his opinion, his Honour was biased and had not listened to his arguments on an earlier occasion.
Apparently in support of his contention that the warrant was affected by fraud and corruption, the appellant referred in his written and oral submissions to certain allegations that have been widely publicised. As such issues could have no possible relevance to the validity of a warrant issued to recover a civil debt arising from a private professional engagement, I declined to hear submissions on these matters. After the appellant was informed that judgment was soon to be delivered, he forwarded several email communications to the Court. These have been compiled into what he has described as two written submissions (FDN 10 and 11). The appellant was not entitled to provide or file those documents with the Court after judgment was reserved and the Court cannot have regard to them in deciding the appeal. In essence, the documents repeat and, to some extent, enlarge upon the allegations that he had previously made of fraud and corruption affecting the warrant of sale. The documents are not relevant to the issues considered in the appeal. It became necessary for me to direct that no further submissions were to be filed.
The appellant submits that the warrant of sale is not valid because the judgment creditor is listed as “Colin D FIELD Trading As: COLIN D FIELD REGISTERED PSYCHOLOGIST 48566533940” and a trading name is not an entity. The appellant relies on a passage from Jessup’s Land Titles Office Forms and Practice SA (Jessup) in support of his submission.[1] That passage explains that the registration of a business name does not create an entity with a separate legal personality that is capable of holding an interest in land. Therefore, any transfer or other dealing which identifies the benefiting party as a trading name will not be registered. The dealing must be registered in the name of the person or persons carrying on the business.
[1] Don Mackintosh, Thomson Reuters, Jessup’s Land Titles Office Forms and Practice SA (online at 4 January 2022) at [2505].
The appellant further submits that the warrant of sale is not valid because it was extended out of time. In support of this contention, the appellant relies on the following passage from Jessup at [12094.2]:
A warrant of sale acts ceases to bind, charge or affect land unless a transfer upon a sale pursuant to the warrant is presented within six months from the day upon which the warrant was served upon the Registrar-General, or within such extended period as the court orders: s 110 of the Real Property Act 1886.
The appellant also relies on a further passage in Jessup that refers to a judgment of Magistrate Millard delivered on 15 July 1994 in Dryga Films Pty Ltd v Dialafone Communications (Aust) Pty Ltd.[2]According to Jessup, in that case his Honour held that r 133(3) of the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 1992 prevented the Sheriff from executing a warrant more than twelve months after it was issued. However, as I explain below at [64], the appellant did not refer to an important qualification to that principle noted in Jessup.
[2] Ibid at [12086.7].
The first respondent’s submissions
The first respondent opposes Ground 1 on the basis that the appellant did not raise, and has not since raised, any fact or circumstance from which a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the Master did not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the matter. The plurality of the High Court identified in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy that the relevant inquiry involves two steps.[3] The first step is to identify “what it is said might lead a judge (or juror) to decide a case other than on its legal and factual merits.” The second step is “no less important” and requires that “[t]here must be an articulation of the logical connection between the matter and the feared deviation from the course of deciding the case on its merits.” It is “[o]nly then can the reasonableness of the asserted apprehension of bias be assessed.”
[3] (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [8] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
Applying this test, the first respondent submits that the appellant did not identify any fact or circumstance which might have led the Master to decide the applications other than on their merits. At its highest, the first respondent submits that the appellant contended that the Master ought to have recused himself because he had made a request to the Registry that the matter not be listed before the Master and the Master had reviewed the Court file prior to the hearing. Neither assertion would cause a fair-minded lay observer to apprehend an appearance of bias. Further, on appeal the appellant has failed to identify any new fact or circumstance which would justify recusal.
In the absence of any relevant fact or circumstance, the first respondent submits that the appellant has not satisfied the first step of the Ebner test. Accordingly, Ground 1 of the appeal must fail.
The first respondent does not take a position in relation to the remaining grounds of appeal.
The second respondent’s submissions
At the outset the second respondent notes that the orders of the Master were either interlocutory, or in the case of the order in respect of the caveat, were orders made pursuant to r 235.1 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) (the UCR) being Part 5 of Chapter 19 of the UCR. Therefore, the second respondent contends that in each instance leave to appeal is required pursuant to UCR 213.1(1)(a).
The second respondent adopts the submissions advanced by the first respondent in support of the argument that Ground 1 should be rejected.
The second respondent submits that there are no grounds of appeal identified by the appellant which would justify interference with the orders made by the Master. The second respondent contends that the appellant bore the onus of establishing that the warrant of sale was unlawful and tainted by fraud. He submits that the Master correctly identified that the appellant had already challenged the validity of the warrant and had subsequently exhausted all available avenues to do so. On that basis, the second respondent submits that the Master had not erred as there could be no challenge to the warrant and the caveat could not be maintained.
The second respondent further submits that the decision made by the Master merely accepted for the purposes of argument that it may be possible for a registered proprietor to caveat his own title. The second respondent submits that this proposition may not necessarily be accepted but in the circumstances of the case, need not be determined or considered further.
The second respondent contends that the appellant has not established any evidentiary or other basis to challenge the warrant, and nor has he advanced any basis to suggest that it is tainted by fraud. The warrant was issued following a regular judgment which has been maintained despite an appeal. Given the finding by the Master that it was not arguable that the warrant is defective in any way, and as there is no serious question to be tried, the second respondent submits that the Master was correct to order the removal of the caveat because the premise on which the caveat was based fails.
The second respondent submits that the validity of the warrant of sale is not affected by the fact that the judgment creditor’s trading name is referred to in the body of the warrant. That is because the warrant of sale is registered to record the rights held by the Sheriff rather than the judgment creditor.
The second respondent also submits that the appellant’s contention that the warrant of sale remained in force for only six months is wrong. Rule 201.5(4) of the Uniform Civil Rules provides that a warrant of sale may be executed up to 12 months after the date of issue and may be extended by order of the Court.
Consideration
Although I do not regard the appellant’s various explanations for the delay in lodgement of his appeal as being particularly persuasive, because the delay is not excessive, and as neither the first nor the second respondent has opposed the application, I grant the required extension of time.
I consider that the order requiring the removal of the caveat was procedural in nature and not finally determinative of the rights of the parties. It was therefore interlocutory. I also accept the correctness of the second respondent’s submission in relation to UCR 235.1. Thus, the appellant requires leave to appeal. As I do not consider the matters raised by the appellant to be reasonably arguable, I refuse permission to appeal.
As the question of permission and the merits of the appeal were dealt with concurrently, I have stated my reasons in full. Given the heavy reliance placed by the appellant upon the views expressed in Jessup, I have referred in greater detail to that publication than would ordinarily be my practice in a judgment.
The Master assumed for the purposes of his analysis that a registered proprietor of land could lodge a caveat on their own title. The second respondent has submitted that in the circumstances of this appeal it is unnecessary to decide the question. Therefore, I should proceed on the same assumption. I agree with that approach. The assumption clearly favours the appellant.
The allegation of a reasonable apprehension of bias

In essence, the factual basis for the contention by the appellant that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias which required the Master to recuse himself is that the appellant did not consider that the Master was properly listening to his various contentions. For that reason, the appellant had requested the Registry not to list the matter before the Master.
The Master noted in his reasons that his only previous dealing with the appellant had been when he declined an application to stay execution of the warrant of sale. That occurred on 31 August 2020. His Honour stated that he had no other dealings with the appellant or the second respondent.
The decision by the Master did not involve any finding of credit (i.e. veracity or truthfulness) relating to the appellant or, for that matter, the second respondent. His Honour’s judgment consisted solely of the application of well-settled legal principles to facts that were not in dispute. To the extent that there was an arguable proposition of law, it was assumed in favour of the appellant, that being whether a registered proprietor of land could lodge a caveat on their own title.
The High Court held in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy that a judge must recuse themself “if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question that the judge is required to decide”.[4]
[4] (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [33] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ) and see also Johnson v Johnson (2000) 201 CLR 488 at [11] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).
I reject the appellant’s complaint that the fact that the Master had read earlier judgments arising from these proceedings somehow demonstrated bias. The fact that the Master read those earlier judgments demonstrated that he was properly preparing himself for the hearing by familiarising himself with the history and issues. Particularly in cases where a party is unrepresented, it has been my experience that often the quickest and most effective means to familiarise oneself with the issues is to read earlier judgments or rulings delivered in the current proceedings.
I also reject the contention that the fact that the Master did not have the warrant and the Magistrates Court file before him demonstrated bias. The nature of the arguments advanced before the Master did not make it necessary for his Honour to consider that material before making a decision.
I accept the correctness of the submission by the first respondent that the appellant has not identified any fact or circumstance that might have led the Master to decide the matter other than on its merits. The first respondent’s complaint that the Master had previously failed to listen properly to his submissions seems to be no more than a grievance that his submissions were unsuccessful.
I am satisfied that there is absolutely nothing in the circumstances of this case that might lead a lay observer to reasonably apprehend that the Master may not have brought an impartial mind to deciding the two questions that were before him. I therefore dismiss ground one.
Grounds two, three and four – validity and operation of the warrant
It is convenient to consider grounds two, three and four concurrently. The fundamental question is whether the appellant is correct in his assertion that the warrant of sale was in some way invalid or had expired.
The power of the Court to issue a warrant of sale to satisfy a monetary judgment is conferred by s 7 of the Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991 (SA). Section 7(1) provides that a warrant of sale may be issued by the Court on application by a judgment creditor. Section 7(3) empowers the Sheriff in pursuance of a warrant issued under s 7 to, amongst other matters, sell any property to which the warrant relates. Section 7(3a) empowers the Sheriff, in case where the warrant authorises the sale of land, to eject from the land any person who is not lawfully entitled to be on the land. Section 7(4) provides that the Sheriff may, in appropriate cases, leave a judgment debtor in possession of the property until it is sold in pursuance of the warrant.
Section 105 of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA) (the RPA) provides that the Registrar-General, upon being served with a copy of any warrant of execution against land issued by a court accompanied by a statement signed by any interested party or by their solicitor or agent specifying the land sought to be affected, shall enter a memorial of the warrant on the certificate of title. That memorial will operate as a caveat against alienation other than in pursuance of the warrant while it remains in force.
Although s 110 of the RPA provides that a warrant of sale operates for six months, nothing in s 7 or elsewhere in the Enforcement of Judgments Act deals with the period of operation of a warrant. That matter is left to be dealt with under the relevant court rules.
The warrant for sale was issued by the Magistrate on 7 August 2018. At that time, r 133(3) of the Magistrates Court (Civil) Rules 2013 (SA) provided that when executing a warrant for the sale of real or personal property issued under r 133 the Sheriff must, subject to the Rules and any order of the Court, comply with the relevant Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) (the 2006 Rules) relating to sale of property.
Prior to 18 May 2020, r 316(8) of the 2006 Rules provided that a warrant issued under s 7 of the Enforcement of Judgments Act remained in force for one year after being issued and may be renewed for a further period of up to one year.
From 18 May 2020, the duration of operation of a warrant has been governed by UCR 201.5(4). UCR 201.5(4) provides that, unless the Court otherwise orders, a warrant of the type presently under consideration must not be executed more than 12 months after the date of issue. UCR 201.5(5) provides that an order extending the operation of a warrant may be made at any time before its expiry.
The result is that both before and after 18 May 2020, under s 7 of the Enforcement of Judgments Act a warrant of sale operated for twelve months and may be renewed.
The appellant has cited the passage in Jessup set out at [20] in support of his submission that the warrant was extended out of time. In effect, he relies upon the six months period referred to in s 110 of the RPA. However, his submission ignores the fact that the reference in s 110 to the operative period of six months is followed by the words “or within such extended time as the Court shall order”. Moreover, the passage in Jessup upon which he relies expressly makes that point.
In support of his submission, the appellant tendered at the appeal hearing a copy of the warrant issued by the Magistrates Court on 27 August 2018. The appellant also tendered a copy of an application to note the extension of the warrant of sale lodged with the Registrar‑General on 8 August 2020 pursuant to s 105 of the RPA. The Registrar-General registered the application on 1 September 2020.
After judgment was reserved, I requested the appellant and the second respondent to supply to the Court any other documents relating to the extension of the warrant. I did so as the appellant had referred in ground 3 of his notice of appeal to the decision of the Master to extend the warrant of sale and I was concerned that the Court should have all relevant documents before it. In addition to the documents previously supplied by the appellant, the second respondent produced an application to note the warrant of sale dated 22 February 2021 which referred to the decision of the Master to extend the warrant. That application was registered by the Registrar-General on 24 February 2021.
The warrant bears endorsements showing that on 26 August 2019 it was extended by a Magistrate until 27 February 2020 and on 25 February 2020 it was extended by a Magistrate for a period of 12 months from that date. The warrant also records the order made by the Master on 17 February 2021 extending the warrant for the period of 12 months commencing from and on 25 February 2021. Each of those orders extending the warrant was made prior to the expiry of the previous extension.
The order made by the Master expressly referred to the Enforcement of Judgments Act. While the orders of extension made by Magistrates on 26 August 2019 and on 25 February 2020 do not refer to the Enforcement of Judgments Act, the law is quite clear that it is not necessary to refer to the enabling power, and in fact even an incorrect reference to a power will not invalidate a decision, provided that the relevant power exists and was available in the circumstances. There can be no doubt that the powers conferred by s 7 of the Enforcement of Judgments Act were available to the two Magistrates and the extensions were valid.
The first application requesting that the Registrar-General note the extension of the warrant of sale pursuant to s 105 of the RPA was not made until 28 August 2020. That application noted the extensions made on 26 August 2019 and on 25 February 2020. At the time of the application, the latter extension was in force. As I have already found, those extensions were clearly valid under s 7 of the Enforcement of Judgments Act.
As I have previously indicated, a further application was made on 22 February 2021 to note the extension granted by the Master with effect from 25 February 2021. At the time of that application, the extension granted on 25 February 2020 remained in force under s 7 of the Enforcement of Judgments Act.
While it has not been clearly articulated by the appellant, I have inferred that his argument may rely on the fact that the warrant was issued on 27 August 2018 and if regard is had only to the period of six months referred to in s 110 of the RPA, it may be thought to have expired on 26 February 2019. However, regardless of the six months period imposed by s 110 of the RPA, the warrant remained in force under s 7 of the Enforcement of Judgments Act until 26 August 2019. Thereafter, as I have already noted, it was extended on several occasions under that Act.
I reject the contention by the appellant that the warrant had ceased to be operative because it was extended after it had expired. On each occasion that the warrant was extended under the Enforcement of Judgments Act, it had not yet expired. The fact that the first application to the Registrar-General to note the warrant was not made until after the period of six months set by s 110 of the RPA had expired did not affect the validity and operation of the warrant. It remained in force under s 7 of the Enforcement of Judgments Act.
The author of Jessup has suggested that a question arises as to whether a warrant that has been renewed by the court “can have legal efficacy for the purposes of s 105 … until it has been served afresh on the Registrar-General and endorsed afresh in accordance with the requirements of that section. In terms of ordinary language usage, a renewed warrant is surely a new warrant and is distinct from a warrant that has been extended”.[5]
[5] Jessup at [12086.7].
The application made to the Registrar-General on 28 August 2020 addressed the concern raised by the author of Jessup. The warrant was served afresh on the Registrar‑General, together with the records of outcome in the Magistrates Court that confirmed that the warrant had been extended. The Registrar‑General registered the extension on 1 September 2020 pursuant to s 105 of the RPA. Thus, the extended time ordered by the Magistrates Court prevails over the time limit of six months for the operation of a warrant otherwise imposed by s 110 of the RPA for the purposes of that Act. The same may be said about the application to the Registrar-General dated 22 February 2021.
While the appellant has placed substantial reliance upon Jessup, he has misconstrued that publication. I have reproduced at [20] the paragraph in Jessup that the appellant relies upon for his submissions about the expiry of the warrant. However, he has apparently overlooked the next paragraph which states:[6]
Independently of the above period, a warrant continues to be authority for the Sheriff to sell the land for a period of up to twelve months from its date of issue. That period may be renewed by an order of the court.
Once both of the above periods have expired (and in the absence of their having been extended by an order of the court) a warrant ceases to have effect for any purpose.
[6] Ibid at [12094.3].
At an earlier point there is a discussion in Jessup of the effect of a registration of a warrant under the RPA.[7] The author notes that in accordance with s 105 of the RPA the warrant operates as a caveat but the general provisions applicable to caveats do not apply. The author also points out that a warrant issued by the Supreme Court, the District Court or the Magistrates Court remains in force for a period of one year but may be renewed under the court rules.[8] Thus, the author recognises the point I have made at [48] to [52] concerning the combined operation of s 7 of the Enforcement of Judgments Act and the provisions of the 2006 Rules and the UCR as in force from time to time.
[7] Ibid at [12086.4] to [12086.8].
[8] Ibid at [12086.7].
I also note that immediately following the discussion in Jessup of the decision of Magistrate Millard in Dryga Films, the author specifically notes that the position stated by his Honour “is (of course) subject to any order made by the Magistrates Court to the contrary”.[9] For the reasons I have given at [52], the Magistrates Court clearly has power to extend a warrant of sale. The warrant has been specifically endorsed to record each of the extensions granted by a Magistrate.
[9] Ibid at [12086.7].
If, in the case decided by Magistrate Millard, the application was not made until after the warrant had expired, I would agree that the warrant could not have been extended. Unfortunately, notwithstanding the great weight placed by the appellant upon the authority of Jessup, the appellant has either overlooked or chosen to ignore the several unequivocal statements in that publication which correctly note that a court can extend a warrant if the application is made before it expires.
Identification by business name
I turn to the contention by the appellant that the registration of the warrant was invalid as it identified the second respondent by his business name.
The passage in Jessup referred to by the appellant which states the principle that a business name is not a legal entity and is incapable of holding an interest in land is plainly correct. However, that is far from the end of the matter.
Both the warrant for sale and the application to note the extension of the warrant identify the second respondent by his given and family names. After his identification as a natural person, both documents go on to mention that the second respondent trades under a business name. I consider the reference to the business name is merely an ancillary description or addendum that does not derogate in any way whatsoever from the initial or primary use of his personal name. Most importantly, a person reading the documents, or searching the Register Book, would be left under no doubt as to the identity of the natural person operating under the business name. I do not consider that this principle has been infringed. I infer that the Registrar-General may have held the same opinion when she registered the application to note the extension of the warrant of sale.
The appellant’s submissions also appear to assume that the validity of the warrant of sale is somehow dependent upon the validity of its registration under the RPA. In fact, a warrant of sale derives its force and legal effect from s 7 of the Enforcement of Judgments Act. It is s 7(1) that empowers a court to issue a warrant of sale authorising the seizure of real or personal property to satisfy a monetary judgment and s 7(3) that empowers the Sheriff in pursuance of such warrant to sell any property to which the warrant relates.
Section 105 of the RPA provides an important protection for a creditor by operating as a caveat to prevent the judgment debtor from dealing with the property upon the warrant being registered upon the title to the land. It is for that reason, when on 12 September 2018 the Sheriff sought instructions from the second respondent’s solicitors to proceed against the land, he pointed out that it would be in the second respondent’s interest to register the warrant on the certificate of title. The Sheriff explained that this would operate as a caveat should there be an attempt to transfer the land. The Sheriff emphasised that the responsibility to do this lay with the second respondent and not the Sheriff.
Even if the appellant were correct in his contention that the Registrar-General should not have accepted the warrant for registration under the RPA because of the reference to the second respondent’s business name, that did not affect the power of the Sheriff to exercise the powers conferred by s 7 of the Enforcement of Judgements Act. The purpose of registration under the RPA was simply to obtain the protection of the statutory caveat under s 105 of the RPA. The Sheriff’s powers under s 7 were not contingent upon registration under s105. That step simply provided a protection for the creditor.
To make the point absolutely clear, while I do not accept that the warrant was invalidly registered under the RPA, even if the appellant is correct, that does not affect the enforceability of the warrant. It could be enforced without registration although the second respondent would lack the protection of the statutory caveat under s 105.
The first respondent has contended that the reference to the second respondent’s business name, and also when it was registered under the RPA, is not relevant as the Sheriff, rather than the second respondent, is the party enforcing the warrant. To the extent that argument advances the contention that I have considered in the preceding four paragraphs, I consider it to be plainly correct.
For these reasons I reject the appellant’s contention that the Master erred in ordering the removal of the caveat lodged by the appellant over the Property. I dismiss ground two.
Ground three complains that the Master erred in ordering an extension of the warrant of sale for the Property. For the reasons I have already given, the Master had power to make that decision and it was necessary and appropriate in the circumstances. The effect of his decision was that the warrant was to remain on foot so that the Sheriff could proceed with the sale of the Property. That decision was clearly correct. I dismiss ground three.
Ground four adds nothing to grounds two and three. I dismiss ground four.
Conclusion
My findings may be summarised as follows.
There is no basis to the complaint of a reasonable apprehension of bias against the Master.
Section 7 of the Enforcement of Judgments Act confers power upon the Sheriff to sell property pursuant to a warrant issued by a court. The noting of the warrant of sale on the certificate of title to the subject land under s 105 of the RPA simply provides the judgment creditor with the protection of a statutory caveat pending sale of the land. The powers of the Sheriff remain available regardless of whether the warrant has been noted on the certificate of title or whether that notation has expired provided that, where necessary, a court has extended the period of operation of the warrant under the Enforcement of Judgments Act.
The fact that the warrant and its notation on the certificate of title both referred to the business name of the second respondent in addition to his name as a natural person did not affect the validity or enforceability of the warrant in any way.
For completeness, I note that even if Jessup did express the views advanced by the appellant (which it does not), it must be recognised that although the publication is well respected and heavily relied upon by solicitors and conveyancers, the views of this Court on questions of statutory interpretation must prevail.

I grant an extension of time but refuse permission to appeal. I will hear the parties as to costs.