Naqvi (Migration) [2020] AATA 56 (6 January 2020)
DECISION RECORD
DIVISION:Migration & Refugee Division
APPLICANTS: Mr Syed Arif Hussain Naqvi
Mrs Husn E Zehra NaqviCASE NUMBER: 1902164
HOME AFFAIRS REFERENCE(S): BCC2016/774729
MEMBER:Antonio Dronjic
DATE:6 January 2020
PLACE OF DECISION: Melbourne
DECISION:The Tribunal affirms the decision to cancel the first named applicant’s Subclass 457 (Business (Long Stay)) visa.
The Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to the second named applicant.
Statement made on 06 January 2020 at 2:49pm
CATCHWORDS
MIGRATION – cancellation – Temporary Business Entry (Class UC) – Subclass 457 (Business (Long Stay)) – ceased employment for more than 90 days – sponsor in voluntary liquidation – opportunity to rectify – no hardship – no jurisdiction in relation to second applicant – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 116, 140, 348
Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth), Schedule 8 Condition 8107CASES
BCR16 v MIBP (2017) 248 FCR 456
Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1459
COT15 v MIBP (No 1) (2015) 236 FCR 148
Ibrahim v MHA [2019] FCAFC 89
Re Drake (No. 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634
STATEMENT OF DECISION AND REASONS
APPLICATION FOR REVIEW
This is an application for review of a decision dated 21 April 2016 made by a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to cancel the first named applicant’s (the applicant) Subclass 457 (Business (Long Stay)) visa under s.116 of the Migration Act 1958 (the Act).
The delegate cancelled the visa under s.116(1)(b) on the basis that the first named applicant (the applicant) breached condition 8107(3)(b) of Schedule 8 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (the Regulations), as the period during which the applicant ceased employment exceeded 90 consecutive days. The issue in the present case is whether that ground for cancellation is made out, and if so, whether the visa should be cancelled.
For the purposes of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under s.348 of the Act, the only decision that is before the Tribunal is the decision with respect to the first named applicant. The second named applicant’s visa was automatically cancelled as a consequence of that cancellation, not by a decision but by force of the operation of s.140(1) of the Act which made the cancellation of the second named applicant’s visa self-executing on the cancellation of the first named applicant’s visa: see Rani & Ors v MIMA (1997) 80 FCR 379 at 385, 393, 400; Tien & Ors v MIMA (1998) 89 FCR 80 at 96. As no decision was involved in the visa cancellation under s.140(1), the Tribunal has no jurisdiction with respect to the second named applicant.
Background to the cancellation of the applicant’s visa
The decision record of 21 April 2016 sets out the reasons for the delegate’s decision to cancel the applicant’s visa. The Tribunal summarises those reasons and findings as follows:
·On 8 August 2012, the applicant was granted a Subclass 457 Business (Long Stay) visa to remain, valid until 8 August…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Tribunal was whether the first applicant's visa should be cancelled under section 116(1)(b) of the Act, on the ground that the applicant had ceased employment for more than 90 consecutive days, thereby failing to comply with visa condition 8107(3)(b). The Tribunal was also required to consider whether to exercise its discretion to cancel the visa, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including the applicant's submissions and the Department's Procedures Advice Manual (PAM3) guidelines, while acknowledging that PAM3 guidelines are administrative and not legally binding.
The Tribunal found that the applicant had indeed ceased employment on 18 September 2015 and that this cessation exceeded 90 consecutive days, thus satisfying the ground for cancellation under section 116(1)(b). In considering the exercise of discretion, the Tribunal noted that the applicant's Subclass 457 visa was due to expire on 8 August 2016, and that the applicant had remained in Australia after the sponsoring business went into voluntary liquidation and had been unsuccessful in finding new employment as a cook. Despite acknowledging the applicant's circumstances, the Tribunal concluded that cancelling the visa was the correct and preferable decision.
The Tribunal affirmed the decision to cancel the first applicant's Subclass 457 visa. The Tribunal also stated that it had no jurisdiction with respect to the second applicant.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
For these reasons, the Tribunal is satisfied that the ground for cancellation in s.116(1)(b) exists. As that ground does not require mandatory cancellation under s.116(3), the Tribunal must proceed to consider whether the power to cancel the visa should be exercised.Consideration of discretion There are no matters specified in the Act or Regulations that must be considered in the exercise of this discretion. The Tribunal has had regard to the circumstances of this case, including matters raised by the applicant, and matters in the Department’s Procedures Advice Manual (PAM3) ‘General visa cancellation powers’. The Tribunal acknowledges that, whilst it may be guided by policy, it is not bound to follow it.[2] Specifically, the Courts have held that the PAM3 guidelines constitute no more than an administrative advisory guide to decision makers in relation to the application of the Act and Regulations and that they are incapable of being elevated into legally necessary or relevant considerations. Indeed, there is judicial authority to the effect that the policy guidelines in PAM3 cannot go beyond the wording of the legislation, even where they are favourable to an applicant.[3] [2] See Brennan, J. in Re Drake (No. 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634.[3] See Chow v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 1459; Lobo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 168; Vishnumolakala v Minister for Immigration [2006] FMCA 1209; Alimi v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2007] FMCA 1520; Durzi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FCA 1767 at [49]; Moller v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 168 at [14]; and Sakhno v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FMCA 1492 at [55]. Nevertheless, the Tribunal considers that the policy guidelines in PAM3 provide a useful starting point in respect of the exercise of its discretion. In considering this matter, the Tribunal has also taken into account the submissions and evidence it received from the applicant.The purpose of the visa holder’s travel to and stay in Australia The Subclass 457 visa is for skilled workers from outside Australia who have been sponsored and nominated by a business to work in Australia on a temporary basis. The Tribunal finds that the purpose of the applicant’s stay in Australia was to work as a cook on a temporary basis. The applicant ceased his employment on 18 September 2015 because the business operated by the sponsor vent into voluntary liquidation. The applicant decided to remain in Australia. The Tribunal accepts that the applicant attempted to find new employment as a cook but was not successful. The Tribunal finds that, as of the day of the Tribunal’s hearing, the applicant is not employed by an Australian company which is an approved standard business sponsor and which successfully nominated the applicant for a position within the business. The Tribunal further finds that the applicant’s Subclass 457 visa would, but for the cancellation, have ceased on 8 August 2016 in any case.